The article considers the straight solution of S. Kripke’s skeptical problem concerning the stability of linguistic meaning proposed by E.V. Borisov’s. The distinction between two kinds of introspection related to the knowledge of linguistic meaning is analyzed. The moderate solution of the skeptical problem as a basis for the straight solution is explored. It is suggested that R. Carnap’s conception of linguistic frameworks can be useful for the solution of skeptical problem.

The article deals with the nature of legal rules. The authors argue that if all legal rules have obligative character, it means that they have the imperative nature. The article shows that the main feature of legal language is that for an explication of imperative character of legal rules is enough the fact of existence of this rule in particular legal system. Besides, an application of several points of the theory of speech acts to legal language allows showing that the (...) question on what kind of linguistic form an imperative has, doesn’t matter, because this is always the legal rule. (shrink)