In recent years, the doctrine of God has once again become a central focus of theological discussion and debate. Internationally respected scholar Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen offers a global survey of understandings of God in Scripture, Christian history, and contemporary theology. This new edition incorporates developments in theological research over the past decade and has been substantially updated throughout.

The South African context has been characterised by the prevalence of various social realities and problems in the form of xenophobia, racism, poverty and social injustice, aspects that adversely affect the ecumenical dream of equality, unity, love and tolerance. This article delves into these issues critically by examining how Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen’s concepts, ideas and symbols as expressed in his Pentecostal ecumenical ecclesiology can effectively inform the South African context. This article also brings into perspective the credible foundational precepts (...) within the Pentecostal tradition that are intricately intertwined within Kärkkäinen’s ecclesiology and determines how these invaluable traits or precepts can be applied effectively within the South African context. Although these Pentecostal foundational precepts have for a long time been overlooked by traditional theologies, they are also embedded within ecumenical values such as cultural diversity, interracial communion, promotion of peace, gender equality and religious pluralism. Contribution: This article is pushing the boundaries of how Pentecostal theology in general is understood by presenting its role and function in a wider ecumenical and geographical context. In this regard, this study makes a contribution by exploring ideas from Kärkkäinen’s ecclesiology which can effectively inform the current South African context which has been plagued by elements of inequality and injustice. (shrink)

Understanding nature of science is widely considered an important educational objective and views of NOS are closely linked to science teaching and learning. Thus there is a lively discussion about what understanding NOS means and how it is reached. As a result of analyses in educational, philosophical, sociological and historical research, a worldwide consensus about the content of NOS teaching is said to be reached. This consensus content is listed as a general statement of science, which students are supposed to (...) understand during their education. Unfortunately, decades of research has demonstrated that teachers and students alike do not possess an appropriate understanding of NOS, at least as far as it is defined at the general level. One reason for such failure might be that formal statements about the NOS and scientific knowledge can really be understood after having been contextualized in the actual cases. Typically NOS is studied as contextualized in the reconstructed historical case stories. When the objective is to educate scientifically and technologically literate citizens, as well as scientists of the near future, studying NOS in the contexts of contemporary science is encouraged. Such contextualizations call for revision of the characterization of NOS and the goals of teaching about NOS. As a consequence, this article gives two examples for studying NOS in the contexts of scientific practices with practicing scientists: an interview study with nanomodellers considering NOS in the context of their actual practices and a course on nature of scientific modelling for science teachers employing the same interview method as a studying method. Such scrutinization opens rarely discussed areas and viewpoints to NOS as well as aspects that practising scientists consider as important. (shrink)

By looking at videogame production through a two-vector model of design – a practice determined by the interplay between economic and technological evolution – we argue that shared screen play, as both collaboration and competition, originally functioned as a desirable pattern in videogame design, but has since become problematic due to industry transformations. This is introduced as an example of what we call design vestigiality: momentary loss of a design pattern’s contextual function due to techno-economical evolution.

Fictosexuality, fictoromance, and fictophilia are terms that have recently become popular in online environments as indicators of strong and lasting feelings of love, infatuation, or desire for one or more fictional characters. This article explores the phenomenon by qualitative thematic analysis of 71 relevant online discussions. Five central themes emerge from the data: (1) fictophilic paradox, (2) fictophilic stigma, (3) fictophilic behaviors, (4) fictophilic asexuality, and (5) fictophilic supernormal stimuli. The findings are further discussed and ultimately compared to the long-term (...) debates on human sexuality in relation to fictional characters in Japanese media psychology. Contexts for future conversation and research are suggested. (shrink)

Past philosophical ideas about arts influence contemporary artistic practices. We still use traditional Idealist concepts, such as the autonomy of art or the subjective expression of the artist. At the same time, today_s art often attacks and abandons Idealist thinking. The author of this book analyses this relation between the Idealist conception of the arts including literature and present-day reality. The aim is to create a link between past and present artistic practices and theoretical, philosophical thinking. The author also questions (...) the Idealist notions of history and the relation between the theoretical, the aesthetic and the practical, and seeks new ways to deal with the relation between the past and the present. (shrink)

The paper introduces measurement of fixation-speech intervals as an important tool for the study of the reading process. Using the theory of the organism-environment system, we developed experiments to investigate the time course of reading. By combining eye tracking with synchronous recording of speech during reading in a single measure, we issue a fundamental challenge to information processing models. Not only is FSI an authentic measure of the reading process, but it shows that we exploit verbal patterns, textual features and, (...) less directly, reading experience. Reading, we conclude, is not a matter of decoding linguistic information. Far from being a text-driven process, it depends on integrating both sensory and motor processes in an anticipatory meaning generation based on the history of experience and cultural context of the reader. Finally, we conclude with remarks on the social character and cognitive history of reading. (shrink)

This paper surveys the ontological and aesthetic character of puzzles in worlds with storytelling potential, storiable worlds (potential storyworlds). These puzzles are termed fiction puzzles. The focus is on the fiction puzzles of videogames, which are accommodated to John Dewey's pragmatist framework of aesthetics to be examined as art products capable of producing aesthetic experiences. This leads to an establishing of analytical criteria for estimating the value of fiction puzzles in the pragmatist framework of aesthetics.

BackgroundOpen peer review practices are increasing in medicine and life sciences, but in social sciences and humanities they are still rare. We aimed to map out how editors of respected SSH journals perceive open peer review, how they balance policy, ethics, and pragmatism in the review processes they oversee, and how they view their own power in the process.MethodsWe conducted 12 pre-registered semi-structured interviews with editors of respected SSH journals. Interviews consisted of 21 questions and lasted an average of 67 (...) min. Interviews were transcribed, descriptively coded, and organized into code families.ResultsSSH editors saw anonymized peer review benefits to outweigh those of open peer review. They considered anonymized peer review the “gold standard” that authors and editors are expected to follow to respect institutional policies; moreover, anonymized review was also perceived as ethically superior due to the protection it provides, and more pragmatic due to eased seeking of reviewers. Finally, editors acknowledged their power in the publication process and reported strategies for keeping their work as unbiased as possible.ConclusionsEditors of SSH journals preferred the benefits of anonymized peer review over open peer and acknowledged the power they hold in the publication process during which authors are almost completely disclosed to editorial bodies. We recommend journals to communicate the transparency elements of their manuscript review processes by listing all bodies who contributed to the decision on every review stage. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

The present article discusses the concept of synderesis in the late medieval universities of Erfurt and Leipzig and the later developments in Wittenberg. The comparison between Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen in Erfurt and Johannes Peyligk in Leipzig shows that school traditions played an important role in the exposition of synderesis by the late medieval scholastic natural philosophers. However, Jodocus Trutfetter's example warns against overemphasizing the importance of the school traditions and reminds us of the manifold history of medieval discussions on (...) synderesis, which were more or less familiar to many authors of this period. Finally, the diverse references to synderesis in the texts of Martin Luther, Johannes Bernhardi of Feldkirch and Philip Melanchthon reveal no uniform relationship with late medieval discussions but rather indicate various ways of adopting scholastic ideas and transforming them in the context of humanist and reformation thinking. (shrink)

The use of evidence in medicine is something we should continuously seek to improve. This book seeks to develop our understanding of evidence of mechanism in evaluating evidence in medicine, public health, and social care; and also offers tools to help implement improved assessment of evidence of mechanism in practice. In this way, the book offers a bridge between more theoretical and conceptual insights and worries about evidence of mechanism and practical means to fit the results into evidence assessment procedures.

Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows (...) epistemologists to have everything they want from the concept of evidence. Finally, the view helps us locate the source of the normative authority of evidence. The book challenges a broad range of current views on the ontology of reasons and their normative authority, making it a must-read for scholars and advanced students in metaethics and epistemology. (shrink)

In 1513 the Fifth Lateran Council determined that the immortality of the rational soul is not true only in theology, but also in philosophy. The determination can be related also to the actual teaching of philosophy. In the university of Erfurt, Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter wrote expositions on natural philosophy at that time. Usingen's and Trutfetter's expositions of De anima represent a position, which faithfully follows in methodology and aspirations the tradition of the via moderna. Furthermore, they (...) give an interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology, which Trutfetter considered consonant with the intentions and the formulations of the Fifth Lateran Council; and finally, Trutfetter even presents a practical application of the Council's recommendations. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to increase understanding of how individual patient care and the ethical principles prescribed for nursing care are implemented in nursing documentation. The method used was a metasynthesis of the results of 14 qualitative research reports. The results indicate that individualized patient care is not visible in nurses’ documentation of care. It seems that nurses describe their tasks more frequently than patients’ experiences of their care. The results also show that the structure of nursing documentation (...) and the forms or manner of recording presupposed by the organization may prevent individual recording of patient care. In order to obtain visibility for good patient-centred and ethical nursing care, an effort should be made to influence how the content of nursing care is documented and made an essential part of individual patient care. If the content of this documentation does not give an accurate picture of care, patients’ right to receive good nursing care may not be realized. (shrink)

Bartholomaeus Arnoldi (b. c. 1465, d. September 9, 1532) (also called Usingen after his birthplace), began as a philosopher in the via moderna school and later became a member and a theologian of the Order of Augustinian Hermits. Together with Jodocus Trutfetter, he was the most prominent philosopher in Erfurt in the early sixteenth century. Usingen’s main authorities were John Buridan, William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Ailly, and Gabriel Biel. The focus of his teaching was on a (...) “common view of the via moderna,” which was strongly involved in semantic–metaphysical questions. Usingen stressed the importance of logic as a necessary tool for gaining scientific knowledge, but it was his works on natural philosophy, in particular, that were respected by his contemporaries. In natural philosophy, he generally followed the tradition of Buridan. His discussion on the theory of supposition follows Ockham. On the relationship between theology and philosophy, he strongly posited the unity of truth by allowing certain theological truths a sufficient degree of plausibility as truths in natural philosophy. This view was partly based on Lawrence of Lindores. (shrink)

In his discussions on the psychology of moral judgement, Mair appears as a follower of the via moderna in the footsteps of Gabriel Biel. However, his refinements of, and even conscious disagreement with the Bielian position reveals a degree of originality in his thinking. In all of this, Mair seemed to be interested in the problems of moral psychology throughout his career and endeavoured to find satisfactory solutions even if some remained open to further questions.

The internal senses are a class of cognitive faculties that were posited to exist between external sense perception and the intellectual soul. The notion of internal senses was developed in the Arabic philosophy of the Middle Ages on the basis of certain ancient philosophical ideas. The classical list of five internal senses was provided by Avicenna: common sense, retentive imagination, compositive imagination, estimative power, and memory. He also localized these faculties in the three ventricles of the brain. According to Avicenna, (...) the function of common sense is to receive and relate the perceptions of the external senses. The retentive imagination stores the forms of these perceptions and the compositive imagination processes these forms. Furthermore, estimative power grasps the “intentions” of the perceived objects, such as hostility or pleasantness, which the external senses do not perceive. The intentions are finally stored in memory. Averroes’ position was critical of Avicenna’s view, and both accounts had a remarkable influence in medieval Latin philosophy. Avicenna’s view dominated throughout the Middle Ages, although it was challenged and modified with help of other authorities. Albert the Great adhered to Avicenna in general outline, but incorporated some of the views of Averroes, John Damascene, and Qusṭ;a ibn Lūqā. Thomas Aquinas followed the same lines, but further modified the view. There were also constantly differing positions concerning whether the brain or the heart is the primary organ of the internal senses. Peter John Olivi and John Duns Scotus presented a novel reading of the estimative function, which gave up the Avicennian notion of intentions as the objects of the estimative faculty. John Buridan reduced the number of internal senses to two: common sense and memory. His view was adopted by some later authors but rejected by others. (shrink)

Johannes Bernhardi of Feldkirch (1490-1534), Melanchthon’s close collaborator elaborated significantly the Lutheran method in works written shortly before his untimely death in 1534. He seems to have systematized to a considerable degree the Melanchthonian concept of method and to have developed it towards an explicitly Aristotelian and even scholastic framework. In doing so, he did not merely imitate his authorities, who included above all Aristotle and Albert the Great: these figures served as sources for his Melanchthonian/Lutheran manner of presenting and (...) organizing scientific knowledge. The example from Bernhardi’s discussion of causes shows that his contribution to the discussion on method did not remain at the level of mere theorizing, but was applied to some degree in his own teaching of natural philosophy. (shrink)

Jodocus Trutfetter (also Trutvetter) was a philosopher and theologian of the via moderna, at the University of Erfurt, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. His main works include a textbook on logic, the Summule totius logice, and another on natural philosophy, the Summa in totam physicen. As a proponent of the via moderna, Trutfetter stressed the importance of taking both ancient and modern authorities into account. In questions concerning universals, categories, and psychology, his views were close to those (...) of John Buridan. On the relationship between theology and philosophy he shared, for the most part, William of Ockham’s position. (shrink)

The Buridanian view of the concrete cognition as the general characteristics of sense perception was adopted by Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen. This theory was not accepted merely on the basis of authority, but it was argued against the competing view, which appeared as legitimate inside the late medieval school of via moderna.

In his Questions on Aristotle’s De anima, John Buridan faced the problem, whether it follows from the definition of the term ‘animal’ that all quantitative parts of an animal are to be called animals. His solution was that parts of the animal are to be called animals, though in a extraordinary, non-connotative, sense of the term. The problem variously discussed by some later Buridanian authors from Erfurt. Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen ends up to deny the use of such terms as (...) ‘animal’ and ‘human being’ as connotative terms. Jodocus Trutfetter, however, uses the distinction between the absolute and connotative senses of these terms without reservation. (shrink)

In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the University of Erfurt was one of the strongholds of the via moderna in Germany. The present article examines how this school's identity was manifested in discussions on the soul and its powers, engaged in by three Erfurtian philosophers: Johannes Carnificis de Lutrea, Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen. In the various forms of their expositions these authors reveal a rather uniform stance concerning doctrinal issues. Their positions are largely based on (...) the tradition of the via moderna going back to the early fifteenth century, and their argumentation is deeply bound to the problems arising from this school's position. Comparisons with concurrent Thomist and Scotist sources show that the Erfurtians describe the positions of other schools in an appropriate manner, although the arguments for and against these positions are often borrowed from the authorities of their own school rather than from contemporaneous discussion. (shrink)

The chapter gives a general description of philosophical psychology as it was practiced and taught in the sixteenth century at three of the most important universities of the time, the universities of Erfurt, Padua, and Bologna. Contrary to received notions of the Renaissance it argues that the sixteenth-century philosophical psychology was tightly bound to the Aristotelian tradition. At the University of Erfurt, philosophical psychology was developed with strong adherence to the basic doctrines of Buridanian via moderna, as it had been (...) taught for over a century. The Buridanian approach dominated especially discussions on the metaphysical nature of the human soul and disputes about universal realism versus nominalism. The situation was somewhat different at the universities of Bologna and Padua. The connections between these two universities were close, and they can be seen as developing one and the same Aristotelian tradition. Although the works produced were rather eclectic in nature, they shared research topics as well as conceptual and methodological frameworks which contributed to the unity of the school. In Bologna and Padua, Averroës had a central position as an authority cited and criticized; and philosophical questions concerning the immortality of the soul and the nature of the intellectual species attracted continuous interest. The development of philosophical psychology was also influenced by the special organizational situation of these universities: theology had a relatively unimportant position, and medicine instead had continuous impact on teaching. (shrink)

This chapter present a glimpse of medieval academic discussions concerning sense perception, which had by the end of the Middle Ages gained a prominent position as a major element of Aristotelian psychology.

The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice. I first sketch what I take to be the core features of epistemic decolonisation. I then philosophically situate the topic. Finally, I map it in relation to key epistemic-injustice concepts (...) and to the contributions in this special issue. (shrink)

The call to decolonise knowledge is gaining increasing popularity in African philosophy. But as scholarly attention to the topic intensifies, so do doubts about the usefulness of theorising it, especially in spaces – like Africa – that are riddled with deeper problems such as mass poverty and social disempowerment. I focus on three challenges that Bernard Matolino has recently issued. If these challenges are on the right track, they threaten to derail the whole project of epistemic decolonisation worldwide, since many (...) of the aspects of Africa that Matolino thinks make decolonial theorising unhelpful are shared by the rest of the Global South. In this paper, I develop a conception of epistemic decolonisation that is geared to withstanding such doubts in the contemporary African context, and can hopefully serve others in the Global South who share some of Africa’s problems. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.

What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...) accommodate all roles for the concept, we need to think of evidence as propositional, psychological and factive. Our only present option along these lines is the fourth view, which holds that evidence consists of all and only known propositions. But the view comes with some fairly radical commitments. This paper proposes a more modest view—‘truthy psychologism’. According to this view, evidence is also propositional, psychological and factive; but we don’t need the stronger claim that only knowledge can fill this role; true beliefs are enough. I first argue for truthy psychologism by appeal to some standard metaethical considerations. I then show that the view can accommodate all of the roles epistemologists have envisaged for the concept of evidence. Truthy psychologism thus gives us everything we want from the evidence, without forcing us to go either pluralist or radical. (shrink)

What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘explanatory injustice’. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in which such injustice wrongs the victim qua epistemic agent. In particular, explanatory injustice is best understood as occurring in explanations of belief through (...) a so-called reason-why when the correct explanation in fact features a motivating reason. I reach this conclusion by arguing that such explanations are a kind of normative inversion of confabulation. Thinking in these terms helps us see both how certain reason-ascriptions empower while others disempower, and (consequently) how through them believers are robbed of agency over their beliefs. (shrink)

Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: (1) inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and (2) truth inherits some of its value (...) from the value of inquiry. This makes truth finally but extrinsically valuable, a thesis that to my knowledge has not been directly defended in the literature. I support (1) by appeal to the notion of epistemic injustice, and (2) through the surprising claim that some goals get their value from the pursuit that aims at them. (shrink)

When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume (...) reflects major recent developments in thinking about this 'Factive Turn', and advances the lively debate around it in relation to core epistemological themes including perception, evidence, justification, knowledge, scepticism, rationality, and action. With clear and comprehensive chapters written by leading figures in the field, this book will be essential for students and scholars looking to engage with the state of the art in epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the issue of the contingency and inevitability of science. First, I point out valuable insights from the existing discussion about the issue. I then formulate a general framework, built on the notion of contrastive explanation and counterfactuals, that can be used to approach questions of contingency of science. I argue, with an example from the existing historiography of science, that this framework could be useful to historians of science. Finally, I argue that this framework shows (...) the existing views on historical contingency and counterfactuals in a new light. The framework also shows the value of existing historiography in philosophical debates. (shrink)

Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by (...) bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief‐forming procedure is epistemically risky. (shrink)

In this chapter we explore the process of extrapolating causal claims from model organisms to humans in pharmacology. We describe and compare four strategies of extrapolation: enumerative induction, comparative process tracing, phylogenetic reasoning, and robustness reasoning. We argue that evidence of mechanisms plays a crucial role in several strategies for extrapolation and in the underlying logic of extrapolation: the more directly a strategy establishes mechanistic similarities between a model and humans, the more reliable the extrapolation. We present case studies from (...) the research on atherosclerosis and the development of statins, that illustrate these strategies and the role of mechanistic evidence in extrapolation. (shrink)

The concepts we use to value and prescribe are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?

This paper analyses the similarities and connections between philosophy of science and causal layered analysis. The paper points out that philosophy of science can be understood as a kind of causal layered analysis of science. These similarities and connections mean that the insights in philosophy of science can be used to investigate the important but neglected topic of possible futures of science. The connections make it possible (i) to open up the present and past to create alternative futures of science, (...) and (ii) to reveal deep worldview commitments behind surface phenomena in science-related discourses. (shrink)

This article compares the epistemic roles of theoretical models and model organisms in science, and specifically the role of non-human animal models in biomedicine. Much of the previous literature on this topic shares an assumption that animal models and theoretical models have a broadly similar epistemic role—that of indirect representation of a target through the study of a surrogate system. Recently, Levy and Currie have argued that model organism research and theoretical modelling differ in the justification of model-to-target inferences, such (...) that a unified account based on the widely accepted idea of modelling as indirect representation does not similarly apply to both. I defend a similar conclusion, but argue that the distinction between animal models and theoretical models does not always track a difference in the justification of model-to-target inferences. Case studies of the use of animal models in biomedicine are presented to illustrate this. However, Levy and Currie’s point can be argued for in a different way. I argue for the following distinction. Model organisms function as surrogate sources of evidence, from which results are transferred to their targets by empirical extrapolation. By contrast, theoretical modelling does not involve such an inductive step. Rather, theoretical models are used for drawing conclusions from what is already known or assumed about the target system. Codifying assumptions about the causal structure of the target in external representational media allows one to apply explicit inferential rules to reach conclusions that could not be reached with unaided cognition alone. (shrink)