The European Legacy, Volume 16, Issue 6, Page 799-802, October 2011.

The European Legacy, Volume 16, Issue 5, Page 663-666, August 2011.

We argue that we have obligations to future people that are similar in kind to obligations we have to current people. Modifying Michael Bratman’s account, we argue that as planning agents we must plan for the future to act practically in the present. Because our autonomy and selfhood are relational by nature, those plans will involve building affiliative bonds and caring for others. We conclude by grounding responsibility to future others by the way we plan through our social institutions. Our (...) account fills out the story of responsibility to future generations by referring only to ourselves, our practical identities, and practical reason. (shrink)

The Digital Revolution is transforming the way in which we interact with one another and relate to experience. The superabundance and superfluity of the virtual world, the fleeting moment and instantaneous pleasure it provides, begin to prevail as a cultural value and determine an attitude of detachment and indifference that extends to all aspects of our life. For Søren Kierkegaard this is a “demoniacal temptation” that leads to a life devoid of spiritual depth. In the midst of the undeniable bounties (...) of technology, reflection on this paradoxical nature of the technological in our lives becomes an urgent task. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 44-46.

Cruelty is the deliberate infliction of physical or psychological pain on other living creatures, sometimes indifferently, but often with delight. Though cruelty is an overwhelming presence in the world, there is no neurobiological or psychological explanation for its ubiquity and reward value. This target article attempts to provide such explanations by describing three stages in the development of cruelty. Stage 1 is the development of the predatory adaptation from the Palaeozoic to the ethology of predation in canids, felids, and primates. (...) Stage 2, through palaeontological and anthropological evidence, traces the emergence of the hunting adaptation in the Pliocene, its development in early hominids, and its emotional loading in surviving forager societies. This adaptation provides an explanation for the powerful emotions – high arousal and strong affect – evoked by the pain-blood-death complex. Stage 3 is the emergence of cruelty about 1.5 million years ago as a hominid behavioural repertoire that promoted fitness through the maintenance of personal and social power. The resulting cultural elaborations of cruelty in war, in sacrificial rites, and as entertainment are examined to show the historical and cross-cultural stability of the uses of cruelty for punishment, amusement, and social control. Effective violence prevention must begin with perpetrators, not victims. If the upstream approaches to violence prevention advocated by the public-health model are to be effective, psychologists must be able to provide violence prevention workers with a fine-grained understanding of perpetrator gratifications. This is a distasteful task that will compel researchers to interact with torturers and abusers, and to acknowledge that their gratifications are rooted in a common human past. It is nonetheless an essential step in developing effective strategies for the primary prevention of violence. Key Words: compassion; cruelty; entertainment industry; evolutionary psychology; intraspecific killing; pain; predation; punishment; torture; violence prevention. Correspondence:c1 Correspondence to: West Hill House, 6 Swains Lane, Highgate, London N6 6QS, United Kingdom. (shrink)

This paper argues that the foundation for Skovoroda’s philosophical evolution was laid by the elements of his existential experience: overcoming the fear of death; uncertainty of an individual’s existence in the world; friendship; a series of events in his social life, simultaneous to changes in his works. The most fundamental factor of this experience was Skovoroda’s Christian identity, particularly his continuous efforts to grasp the meaning of the most crucial dogma of Christian religion – the mystery of Resurrection. The totality (...) of these factors caused further development of Skovoroda’s doctrine. The article schematises the inner logic of this development as follows: (1) discovery of the perspective of love, interpreted as being struck by divine beauty; (2) interpretation of human condition as being on the edge of the created and the divine world; (3) proper assessment of the fact that a human being discovers in its own essence the incorruptible beauty of divine image; (4) comprehension of how love to this image arises; (5) interpretation of man as a being that is capable to grasp the eternity of divine charity, and understand itself as a meta-historical entity that has its continuation in eternity. The existential experience brings Skovoroda to a unique and extremely powerful existential experience of the mystery of Cross, which causes a cathartic effect: having undergone the sufferings of the Cross, the material fire of human ἔρως transforms into the living water of divine ἀγάπη, and the confusion of a living creature lost in the world gives way to a tranquil wisdom of a heir of divine gifts and a friend of God. (shrink)

O presente artigo é uma discussão sobre a noção heideggeriana de Überwindung. Seu objetivo é duplo: por um lado, [1] mostrar a perspectiva que tal termo deve ser compreendido; por outro, [2] aprofundar esta perspectiva à luz de comentários ao aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik. Para tanto, duas questões são postas: em que perspectiva e que questões estão implícitas quando Heidegger propõe o projeto da Überwindung der Metaphysik?; e por que uma Überwindung contém em si tantos problemas? De (...) modo a discutir e comentar tais questões, o artigo percorre dois caminhos: [1] faz-se uma análise da própria indicação heideggeriana da perspectiva de compreensão da Überwindung der Metaphysik, qual seja, revisitar, a partir de um olhar determinado, a construção da noção de história do ser. Esta, por sua vez, tem sua gênese antes mesmo da própria Kehre. Mais especificadamente, na reinterpretação que o próprio Heidegger faz de seu texto Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. A partir desta reconsideração feita por Heidegger e inserida em seu próprio texto, é possível detectar quatro teses fulcrais que traçam essencialmente a metafísica e que justificam a sua superação. São elas: [a] o fato de o ser, originariamente, se velar e provocar, historialmente, o seu esquecimento; [b] a relação entre a verdade do ser e a história, que se desenvolve como história do ser; [c] a ideia de que pertence ao ser um caráter originário de retração de si mesmo e que essa retração é um destino que pertence à história do pensamento metafísico e se configura na própria essência da metafísica; [d] afirmar que a certeza da manifestação da essência coincide com o seu fim. [2] Adentra-se, mediante uma aproximação pari passu, no aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik, com intuito de comentar a problematicidade do termo Überwindung quando usado para repensar a metafísica à luz da perspectiva da história do ser. (shrink)

This article explores Bonaventure’s metaphysical account of creation, which holds that at the heart of every creature is a sort of metaphysical vanity. That vanity stems from the exigencies of a creation metaphysics in which the creator-God draws every creature out of nothingness into being. But, while God’s creative act sustains the creature in being, the nothingness from which God preserves creation, on Bonaventure’s view, always remains a feature of creation’s metaphysical constitution. In short, for the Seraphic Doctor, because nothingness (...) always resides in creation, creation itself is fundamentally vain. Since vanity is a central theme in the book of Ecclesiastes, concerning which Bonaventure has left us a commentary, I argue that the metaphysical vision he employs to illuminate the nature of vanity as it pertains to creation—both within his biblical commentary and beyond—can be properly described as a “metaphysic of Ecclesiastes.”. (shrink)

L’article propose une étude de spectacles qui, bien que dans des scénographies antagonistes, investissent le champ de l’entrée en salle du public et nous permettent d’entendre différemment le concept de seuil développé par Walter Benjamin à propos de la ville. La scénographie contemporaine colonise le bâtiment théâtral, elle s’étend en dehors de la cage de scène. Elle construit une représentation plus large que les bornes traditionnelles de la fable, elle s’inscrit comme un axe dramaturgique déterminant, dès les premiers instants d’entrée (...) au théâtre. (shrink)

Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus. By Jodi Magness. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011. Pp. xv + 335, illus. $25.

Resumen: Varios comentaristas han sostenido que la ontología de la concepción hegeliana de “alma bella” se funda en la determinación conocida como “mal infinito”, desarrollada en la Doctrina del Ser. En correlación con lo antedicho, comentaristas como Paha, Hinchman, Solomon y Harris sostienen que Hegel pensaba en el sistema filosófico fichteano al momento de desarrollar su concepción de “alma bella”. Sin embargo, esta hipótesis de lectura adolece de algunas falencias que serán desarrolladas a continuación. En primer lugar, es necesario realizar (...) una breve exposición de la figura del Espíritu conocida como “alma bella”; en segundo lugar, se describirá la determinación denominada “mal infinito”; en tercer lugar, se desarrollarán los problemas que conlleva la mencionada exégesis; en cuarto lugar, se expondrán las objeciones a la inclusión de la filosofía de Fichte como ejemplo de la concepción hegeliana de “alma bella”. Finalmente, se expondrán las conclusiones.: Many scholars have stated that the ontology of the Hegelian notion of “beautiful soul” is grounded in the category known as “bad infinite”, developed in the Doctrine of Being. Regarding this, scholars like Paha, Hinchman, Solomon and Harris state that Hegel was thinking of the Fichtean philosophical system as He developed his own notion of “beautiful soul”. However, this interpretation has some issues, which will be developed below. First, we give a short explanation about the shape of the Spirit known as “beautiful soul”. Second, we describe the category called “bad infinite”. Third, we show the issues related to the interpretation. Fourth, we present the objections to the inclusion of the Fichtean philosophy as an example of the Hegelian notion of “beautiful soul”. Finally, we present the conclusions. (shrink)