Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

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Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

The keynote idea of the theses is contained in the author’s assumption that modern philosophy doesn’t meet its claiming pretensions: to be universal form of knowledge. First of all philosophy is connected not with knowledge but with ideas and secondly being authentic it “exists only in everyday life”.1 In orderthat philosophy could realize its innate essence corresponding conditions of social being should exist but they are still absent and therefore philosophy is absent as well. Its place is occupied by metaphysics (...) which is free movement of thinking that has no definiteness as the condition of being of any form of thought. That iswhy we watch crisis state of “philosophy” which becomes apparent in vagueness of its subject: “philosophy is not only one, there are many of them”. The author supposes that philosophy as the highest relation of mankind to objective reality is the only one. Philosophy lowered down from the heaven (Platon, Ciceron) in the field of human being must raise people not only to purity of thought, but mainly to purity of their activity both with each other and with nature. Then real interaction of men and nature will take place. This will be the beginning of spiritualization of the Universe. It may exist only under the conditions of social uniformity as historical form of Weltanschauung (world outlook) that removes religious form. Realization of its being supposes fundamental change of social life. It is necessary that private property should be replaced with social property in the sphere of social production. Only under these conditions philosophy may appear and exist as historical form of Weltanschauung. (shrink)

Ecological humanism is a new broadened form of human ethics that coming into being as an answer to an ecological crisis and an ideology of total consumption. There are two approaches in basing of ecological humanism. The first of them is founded on traditional human values or on anthropocentrism. Milieu is considered as important living conditions that must be conserved with great care but the number of one is man here. The second approach is more radical. It strives to overcome (...) anthropological egoism and is based on Earth-altruism. Its credo can be presented as general weal for all geobiocoenosis. Good is all that helps to preserve integrity, stability and beauty of Earth-community. Stable development can be defined as safeguarding of human living inharmony with ecological systems. As it is well known, 57-th session of UNO announced that 2005-2014 years will be devoted to a program of education for stable development. The Mongolian Government asseverated a national program of ecological education for Mongolia from 1997. Its main object was a forming of common ecological culture for stable development. This program provided:‐ ecological training for common life‐ laying organizing structures and law grounds‐ co-ordinating tacks of stable development with other national projects‐ including ecological knowledge in educational programs.We think also that there is need to elaborate new human ethics that could provide new common living culture for Mongols. There is ecological ethics or ecological humanism that, above all, will remove a tradition of human predominance over nature and establish equality between human beings and animate nature. (shrink)

The article deals with McTaggartś paradox of time from an ontological point of view. There are two basic approaches which are usually taken in solving McTaggartś paradox. The most commonly adopted in analytic philosophy is the rejection of the flow of time as a myth. This position leads to the extreme statement that the world is intrinsically tenseless. The other is the view that temporal passage is a genuine feature of the world and is consistent with an ontology of concrete (...) events. The author endeavours to support the latter position with a discussion of a non-spatial conception of time. This conception is based on the present being conceived as a "moving Now". (shrink)

Již letmý pohled na filosofii 20. století, která se snaží promýšlet podstatu lidského jednání, budí dojem, že patří k její metodě vrátit se k antickým teoriím a představit je jako historické východisko, jehož nové uchopení povede k lepšímu porozumění aktuálního problému. Tyto návraty, jak je lze sledovat u Heideggera, Gadamera, Ricoeura nebo Arendtové, směřují – nakolik se jedná o teorii jednání – především k Aristotelovi a jeho základnímu rozlišení mezi poiésis a praxis. Cílem následující stati je představit základ teorie jednání, (...) jež byla dílem prvních stoiků ve 3. stol. př. Kr. V naznačeném kontextu si však taková interpretace může činit větší ambice, než jak by se mohlo na první pohled zdát. Zůstává-li totiž Aristotelés pro novodobou filosofii jednání myslitelem, k němuž je třeba se vrátit a s nímž je třeba se vyrovnat, pak je dobré si uvědomit, že právě ve stoicismu lze vidět první a bezprostřední kritickou reakci na Aristotelovu filosofii. Navíc byl stoicismus naukou, v níž se jednání stalo gravitačním bodem všech ostatních úvah a která proto musela svoje vyrovnání s Aristotelem soustředit do pojmů souvisejících úzce právě s jednáním. Lze ovšem snadno vytušit, jaký byl hlavní důvod, proč zůstal stoicismus stranou pozornosti současných filosofů . Přesný vztah stoické nauky k aristotelismu má totiž stále tendenci se skrývat. Navzdory malé četnosti explicitních konfrontací s Aristotelovými argumenty je aristotelismus ve stoicismu přítomen všude – je v něm přítomen natolik, že snaze odlišit oba systémy občas hrozí sklouznutí do povrchních kategorizací, z nichž lze podezírat doxografickou tradici hellénistické a římské doby, která se snaží o uchopení téhož rozdílu. Přesto stoicismus není peripatetická filosofie a lze oprávněně předpokládat, že nahlédnutí odlišnosti mezi obojím vrhne nové světlo na moderní přístup k Aristotelovi. (shrink)

This paper analyses two definitions of contingency. Both definitions have been widely accepted and used as to identify contingent events. One of them is primarily of a philosophical character, whereas the other is more commonly used in mathematics. Evidently, these two definitions do not describe the same set of phenomena, and neither of them determines the completely intuitive notion of contingency.Namely, carefully selected examples testify that the first definition is too narrow and the second too wide. These facts have certain (...) epistemological consequences. They must, therefore, serve as a warning for using the definitions only in a restrictive and cautious way when detecting random beliefs – those we cannot identify as knowledge. (shrink)

The book deals with the influences exerted by Social Darwinism upon Korea’s modern ideologies and discourses in the 1880s-1900s. It argues that Social Darwinism constituted the main keystone for many pivotal discourses in early modern Korea, especially nationalism.

In his (several times reprinted) article How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? N. Rescher aspires to clarify the long-lasting discussion on the ‘is-ought’ (‘fact-value’) gap by providing a framework in which the related arguments can be perspicuously articulated. He then argues that even if the logical gap may bereal, the transition from factual premises to value conclusions is smoothly mediated by trivially true value statements. We scrutinize Rescher’s argumentation and show defects in the presented lines of reasoning. (...) In particular, we argue that his tripartite division of statements (factual, evaluative, hybrid), as well as his emphasis on the role of evaluative truisms, introduce serious problems that escape Rescher’s attention. We thus conclude that he failed to achieve his goals. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone rescatar la resistencia y la crítica al poder imperial romano del libro del Apocalipsis como una fuente fundamental para la teología moral cristiana, que lo convirtieron en un foco de luz que ilumina el camino de la conducta humana hacia un mundo mejor. Al mismo tiempo, ofrece pautas para la defensa de la vida en un entorno donde los totalitarismos políticos, económicos y religiosos atentan contra ella. Además, quiere destacar dicha resistencia y crítica como uno (...) de los factores generadores, y por tanto centrales, de la teología del Apocalipsis. Para ello se utilizarán los principios metodológicos de la lectura contextual que parten de la convicción según la cual el texto es una expresión de las vivencias comunitarias del hagiógrafo y de su actitud ante las circunstancias sociales que lo provocaron. El libro busca afectar el entorno, pero este también configura el contenido de la obra escrita. En un segundo momento, con el método se indaga qué de ese momento histórico puede iluminar el presente del lector. En el caso del Apocalipsis, se elegirán los textos en los que el autor presente los temas y actores principales de la trama, a saber: el ser supremo sentado en el trono, el cordero y el mal —simbolizado específicamente en el tercer jinete—, ya que en ellos se juega el mensaje del libro, la soberanía divina que humaniza o la soberanía diabólica deshumanizante. (shrink)

The political teachings of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt imply fundamental ontological structures that reflect the processes of the genesis, assertion, and destruction of political being. The article investigates similarities and differences between these political projects. The approach applied by the author is marked by a reliance on the theoretical analysis of the Leviathan's frontispiece and by employing the conceptual framework of Giorgio Agamben's Homo sacer project. The application of these theoretical optics helps to evaluate the political significance of the (...) present people (the people composed of living human beings) in Hobbes's and Schmitt's contexts and to detect the notable difference between the two projects. The article highlights that political existence presupposes the total depoliticization of the present people in the framework of Hobbes's philosophy. It is argued that the security of the present people's life becomes an underlying condition for the mentioned construction (and is therefore ontologically significant). The provision of security potentially saves the sovereign's own life and guarantees recognition by the subjects. An investigation of Schmitt's teaching reveals the political significance of the present people. Since - according to Schmitt - political will is understood only in the context of political enmity (the necessary "horizon” of which is armed confrontation), it is concluded that the political significance of the present people is closely associated with its members' readiness to die in the war. Due to the fact that political existence is generated through the decision on the public enemy (in which the present people might be involved via acclamation procedures), the resoluteness toward death that underlies this decision must be considered as the key factor of Carl Schmitt's political ontology. In light of this statement, it is argued that the project of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time could be considered as Carl Schmitt's "unwritten" ontology of the individual being. (shrink)

В трактате рассмотрены историко-философские аспекты современных любовных романов в стихах, написанных в русле эниологической поэзии. Для специалистов.

This article discusses the connection between the ideas of Fyodor M. Dostoevsky and Vladimir S. Solovyov on the need for cultural and moral transformation of those who would claim to participate in...

"This personification of wisdom with golden hair and a radiant aura echoes both the eternal feminine and the world soul. Rooted in Christian and Jewish mysticism, Eastern Orthodox iconography, Greek philosophy, and European romanticism, the Sophiology that suffuses Solovyov's philosophical and artistic works is both intellectually sophisticated and profoundly inspiring. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt brings together key texts from Solovyov's writings about Sophia: poetry, fiction, drama, and philosophy, all extensively annotated and some available in English for the first time (with assistance (...) from the translators Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus)."--Amazon website. (shrink)

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

Although it is well documented that language plays an important role in cognitive development, there are different views concerning the mechanisms underlying these effects. Some argue that even early in development, effects of words stem from top‐down knowledge, whereas others argue that these effects stem from auditory input affecting attention allocated to visual input. Previous research (e.g., Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004a) demonstrated that non‐speech sounds attenuate processing of corresponding visual input at 8, 12, and 16 months of age, whereas the (...) current study demonstrates that words attenuate visual processing at 10 months but not at 16 months (Experiment 1). Furthermore, prefamiliarization with non‐speech sounds (Experiment 2) resulted in able processing of visual input by 16‐month‐olds. These findings suggest that some effects of labels found early in development may stem from familiarity with human speech. The possibility of general‐auditory factors underlying the effects of words on cognitive development is discussed. (shrink)

Exegetical scepticism is a strand of scepticism about meaning running through the German Enlightenment. This paper provides the first modern account of its tenets, critics, and proponents, and argues that it shares essential features with modern varieties of meaning-scepticism that have been a preoccupation among philosophers of language since the middle of the twentieth century. I argue that exegetical scepticism is a type of epistemological scepticism first introduced as a philosophical position in a theological debate between August Pfeiffer (1640–1698) and (...) Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705). Under contention, so I argue, was the idea that interpretation is never certain because it is necessarily underdetermined by the evidence. Following the effects of this controversy, I show that exegetical scepticism caused a great deal of unrest in German letters in the eighteenth century and can be seen to contribute to the great proliferation of hermeneutical theories in the Aufklärung, indeed to the very birth of hermeneutics as a standalone discipline. Bringing this type of scepticism to contemporary attention supports a reassessment of issues at the heart of meaning-scepticism and hermeneutics itself, and a reconsideration of the histories of Enlightenment scepticism and hermeneutics. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to present the fundamental theoretical results concerning inference rules in deductive formal systems. Primary attention is focused on: admissible or permissible inference rules the derivability of the admissible inference rules the structural completeness of logics the bases for admissible and valid inference rules. There is particular emphasis on propositional non-standard logics (primary, superintuitionistic and modal logics) but general logical consequence relations and classical first-order theories are also considered. The book is basically self-contained and special (...) attention has been made to present the material in a convenient manner for the reader. Proofs of results, many of which are not readily available elsewhere, are also included. The book is written at a level appropriate for first-year graduate students in mathematics or computer science. Although some knowledge of elementary logic and universal algebra are necessary, the first chapter includes all the results from universal algebra and logic that the reader needs. For graduate students in mathematics and computer science the book is an excellent textbook. (shrink)

People are remarkably smart: They use language, possess complex motor skills, make nontrivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this study focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might (...) be different learning systems that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This study reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal. (shrink)

An algorithm recognizing admissibility of inference rules in generalized form (rules of inference with parameters or metavariables) in the intuitionistic calculus H and, in particular, also in the usual form without parameters, is presented. This algorithm is obtained by means of special intuitionistic Kripke models, which are constructed for a given inference rule. Thus, in particular, the direct solution by intuitionistic techniques of Friedman's problem is found. As a corollary an algorithm for the recognition of the solvability of logical equations (...) in H and for constructing some solutions for solvable equations is obtained. A semantic criterion for admissibility in H is constructed. (shrink)

Philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch has only recently begun to receive his due from the English-speaking world, thanks in part to discussions of his thought by Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Paul Ricoeur. His international readers have long valued his unique, interdisciplinary approach to philosophy’s greatest questions and his highly readable writing style. Originally published in 1967, Le Pardon, or Forgiveness, is one of Jankélévitch’s most influential works. In it, he characterizes the ultimate ethical act of forgiving as behaving toward the (...) perpetrator as if he or she had never committed the action, rather than merely forgetting or rationalizing it—a controversial notion when considering events as heinous as the Holocaust. Like so many of Jankélévitch’s works, Forgiveness transcends standard treatments of moral problems, not simply generating a treatise on one subject but incorporating discussions of topics such as free will, giving, creativity, and temporality. Translator Andrew Kelley masterfully captures Jankélévitch’s melodic prose and, in a substantive introduction, reviews his life and intellectual contributions. Forgiveness is an essential part of that legacy, and this indispensable English translation provides key tools for understanding one of the great Western philosophers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen’s accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim’s reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim’s reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncertainty must be constituted by covert (...) manipulation. (shrink)

In this article we show how the universe of BST, bounded set theory can be enlarged by definable subclasses of sets so that Separation and Replacement are true in the enlargement for all formulas, including those in which the standardness predicate may occur. Thus BST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop topics in nonstandard analysis inaccessible in the framework of a purely internal approach, such as Loeb measures.

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it (...) is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p, which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. (shrink)

Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)