This qualitative study describes the lived experience of physicians who work in communities that have experienced a public mass shooting. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seventeen physicians involved in eight separate mass casualty shooting incidents in the United States. Four major themes emerged from constant comparative analysis: The psychological toll on physicians: “I wonder if I'm broken”; the importance of and need for mass casualty shooting preparedness: “[We need to] recognize this as a public health concern and train physicians to (...) manage it”; massive media attention: “The media onslaught was unbelievable”; and commitment to advocacy for a public health approach to firearm violence: “I want to do whatever I can to prevent some of these terrible events.”. (shrink)

As crucial interface organs gut and skin have much in common. Therefore it is unsurprising that several gut pathologies have skin co‐morbidities. Nevertheless, the reason for this remains ill explored, and neither mainstream gastroenterology nor dermatology research have systematically investigated the ‘gut‐skin axis'. Here, in reviewing the field, we propose several mechanistic levels on which gut and skin may interact under physiological and pathological circumstances. We focus on the gut microbiota, with its huge metabolic capacity, and the role of dietary (...) components as potential principle actors along the gut‐skin axis. We suggest that metabolites from either the diet or the microbiota are skin accessible. After defining open key questions around the nature of these metabolites, how they are sensed, and which cutaneous changes they can induce, we propose that understanding of these pathways will lead to novel therapeutic strategies based on targeting one organ to improve the health of the other. (shrink)

In addition to double‐ and single‐strand DNA breaks and isolated base modifications, ionizing radiation induces clustered DNA damage, which contains two or more lesions closely spaced within about two helical turns on opposite DNA strands. Post‐irradiation repair of single‐base lesions is routinely performed by base excision repair and a DNA strand break is involved as an intermediate. Simultaneous processing of lesions on opposite DNA strands may generate double‐strand DNA breaks and enhance nonhomologous end joining, which frequently results in the formation (...) of deletions. Recent studies support the possibility that the mechanism of base excision repair contributes to genome stability by diminishing the formation of double‐strand DNA breaks during processing of clustered lesions. BioEssays 23:745–749, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In Democracy and the Claims of Nature, the leading thinkers in the fields of environmental, political, and social theory come together to discuss the tensions and sympathies of democratic ideals and environmental values. The prominent contributors reflect upon where we stand in our understanding of the relationship between democracy and the claims of nature. Democracy and the Claims of Nature bridges the gap between the often competing ideals of the two fields, leading to a greater understanding of each for the (...) other. (shrink)

The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role of technology in moral revolutions, understood as processes of radical group-level moral change, amounts to. We do (...) so by investigating four historical episodes of radical moral change in which technology plays a noteworthy role. Our case-studies illustrate the plurality of mechanisms involved in technomoral revolutions, but also suggest general patterns of technomoral change, such as technology’s capacity to stabilize and destabilize moral systems, and to make morally salient phenomena visible or invisible. We find several leads to expand and refine conceptual tools for analysing moral change, specifically by crystallizing the notions of ‘technomoral niche construction’ and ‘moral payoff mechanisms’. Coming to terms with the role of technology in radical moral change, we argue, enriches our understanding of moral revolutions, and alerts us to the depths of which technology can change our societies in wanted and unwanted ways. (shrink)

Since 1983, legislators and advocates have introduced Land Access Policy Incentives in twenty of the fifty United States. These bills share a demographic goal: to fund land rental or purchase for young and beginning farmers and ranchers. States’ efforts to facilitate land access are part of a global movement to support farmers’ entry into agriculture and to resist farmers’ increasing exclusion from land. We examine the policy creation processes of nine states to describe how coalitions and government leaders are translating (...) their values around land access barriers into policy tools whose political appeal is broad. The bills often pass unanimously, and enrollments are strong: about 2,000 young and beginning US farmers and ranchers will purchase or rent farms this year through a few states’ land access policy programs. We trace the themes from interviews with 66 of the bills’ authors and advocates, and their documentation and media coverage, to demonstrate the values that bipartisan coalitions enlist to construct successful bills and the compromises that make them politically feasible. The coalitions’ values turn on the threats of rising land costs, farm expansion or consolidation, and land conversion out of agriculture. As a group, the policies serve broadacre farming operations while leaving specialty crop farms largely unserved. Two states have endeavored to include all farmers of color among their policies’ beneficiaries. Our findings demonstrate tradeoffs of states’ current Land Access Policy Incentives and suggest next steps for research and advocacy to inform policy development to support next generation farming opportunities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Farting for Dollars:A Note on Agyrrhios in Aristophanes Wealth 176Wilfred E. MajorEarly in aristophanes wealth,1 Khremylos and his slave, Karion, are trying to persuade the blind god of Wealth that he is the mightiest of all divinities. Men sacrifice to Zeus but for wealth. All professions exist for the pursuit of wealth. The mighty King of Persia grooms himself because of it. Karion next focuses on Athens in particular:(171)Doesn't (...) the Assembly meet because of it (wealth)?Karion follows with examples of money supporting military efforts and then returns to the formula:(174)Won't Pamphilos suffer because of it?Scholia explain that Pamphilos had a reputation, at least in comedy, for demagoguery and embezzlement. Around this time, he was facing a trial. Karion's next example is more enigmatic:(176)Doesn't Agyrrhios fart because of it?Precisely why Agyrrhios should fart on account of wealth has eluded critics and commentators. While modern scholars have long recognized that the scholia to this line contain no reliable information, interpretations still rely on the scholiasts' best guesses. Comparison with other comic [End Page 549] references to farting, however, and to Agyrrhios and his philoi, suggest that farting here refers not directly to his excessive wealth, as is generally supposed, but to his activity as a corrupt orator.Agyrrhios (PA 179, PAA 107660) is known for several key events in his political career, including his role in instituting pay for attending the Ekklesia and his generalship of 389.2 His skill in tax farming made him wealthy, but his financial dealings also landed him in prison for a time (Dem. 24.135). Why he should be associated with the troubles of wealth is clear enough, but not why he should fart on its account. The scholiasts clearly had no more context for the line than we possess now. Older scholia offer two categories of explanations for Agyrrhios' incontinence. It may have resulted from Agyrrhios' extravagant living, perhaps from the overeating characteristic of the rich. On the other hand, it may refer to Agyrrhios' sexual perversions.3 Later scholia expand on the latter explanation, probably by comparing this line with the reference to Agyrrhios' sexuality at Ecc. 102.4 In no case, however, do the scholiasts seem to operate on information unavailable to us. Indeed, modern scholars have rightly dismissed the scholia altogether but have tended to fall back on the older scholia's suggestion of farting as a mark of extravagant living.5 Confidence in this interpretation erodes in the face of comparisons with other instances of farting in Greek comedy.This explanation can appear logical enough, and it is often assumed that the reference thus fits an established typology of the overstuffed rich man farting from excess, but, in fact, there is no parallel in ancient Greek comedy for farting in this context. Forms and variations on occupy a wide semantic range in Greek comedy, but some groups and trends can be usefully demarcated. For example, the similarity [End Page 550] in sound of snoring and farting means sleeping people fart (an equation explicit at Kn. 115 and implied at Cl. 9). Farting can come as a surprise substitute in a mock religious ritual (as part of an oath at Wa. 394; as a good omen in place of a sneeze at Kn. 639). Although religious fear leads Strepsiades to fart at Cl. 293, more properly covers semantic ranges associated with fear.6 The frightening bogey Lamia, however, is associated with (Ecc. 78, 1177). Collapse from physical pain can also result in farting (Fr. 10 and 1097). Farting can accompany idleness and boredom (Ach. 30; Ecc. 464). More often, however, someone farts as part of a triumphal celebration, which may include aggressively farting on or at one's opponent (Wa. 1305; Pc. 335, 547; We. 618; Cratinus fr. 6.3; Epicrates fr. 10.29; Sosipater fr. 1.12). Isolated jokes specific to context also occur (a joke about conditions for rowers at Fr. 1074; a homely example of physics at Cl. 392; a feed for a joke about physicians at We. 699). All of these instances showcase a lower class, rustic, or foolish individual farting... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fear And BeliefAlex NeillIn his recent article “Fear Without Belief,” 1 John Morreall argues that once we have an adequate understanding of fear—and in particular, once we understand that not all fears are based on or conceptually involve beliefs—Kendall Walton’s well-known “puzzle” concerning whether we can fear what we know to be fictional “dissolves.” 2 I would like here to point to some questions and difficulties raised by Morreall’s (...) article.Walton’s puzzle is based on what is often described as a “cognitive” account of the emotions, according to which emotional states, including fear, are founded on beliefs and judgments. Thus he writes, “It seems to be a principle of common-sense, which ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative, that fear [for oneself] must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger” (Walton, p. 7). Radford has made a similar point about other sorts of emotional state: “Roughly speaking,” he argues, “... for someone’s pity for another to be unproblematic, the pitier has to believe that the pitied third-party [is] suffering in some way.” 3 Elsewhere he says, “we have to believe in [a person’s] torment to be tormented by it.” 4 Given that we do not believe in the reality of fictional suffering or torment, nor that we are threatened by fictional beings, it would seem to follow that our affective responses to fictional characters cannot properly be described as states of pity or fear. As Walton says, describing a person watching a horror movie, “Charles does not believe that he is in danger, so he is not afraid” (Walton, p. 7). [End Page 94]Morreall challenges this conclusion, which has been the subject of a great deal of debate over the last fifteen years or so, by attacking the cognitive account of fear. He takes that account to involve two central claims; namely (1) that “fear must have an intentional object,” and (2) that “in order to fear something, one must believe that it is dangerous to her” (p. 360). In response to (1), he offers a number of counterexamples, which he suggests represent “cases of instinctive fear without intentional objects.” How effective are these counterexamples? First, Morreall notes that we may be frightened by loud noises. Yet, “when some joker sneaks up behind us and pops a balloon or shouts ‘Boo!’ we do not have to think of a gunshot or rapist to be scared” (p. 361). Now, suppose that some joker does sneak up behind you and pops a balloon. Your heart leaps, you shriek, you jump. Delighted, the joker says “Got you! You were really afraid that time!” One response to the joker would be this: “I wasn’t afraid; you simply startled me.” I take it that there is a real difference between being afraid and being startled. 5 But what exactly is that difference? It would surely be implausible to try to make it out in phenomenological terms, for one state may feel very like the other. And given Morreall’s account of the physiology of fear (the release of epinephrine into the blood causing a faster and stronger heartbeat, a redistribution of the blood away from the skin and extremities towards the muscles and head, and so on) it looks very unlikely that we shall be able to make out the difference in terms of physiology. In fact, I suggest, the difference between being afraid and being startled is a cognitive difference. A person who is simply startled by a loud noise doesn’t have any thoughts or beliefs about it; a person who is made afraid by the noise is a person who has thoughts about it, thoughts in which the noise is in one way or another associated with danger or harm. These thoughts need not be “occurrent,” nor even conscious. However, unless we suppose that a person does have thoughts in which the noise is associated with danger, we have no reason to describe her as “afraid” rather than “startled.” If we abandon the idea that the fear which a loud noise may arouse in us is intentional, that is... (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon’s work on the value of equality provides the resources for developing a powerful and distinctive contractualist egalitarian view. This view acknowledges a range of egalitarian concerns, of a diverse nature, and points us towards a picture of the place of equality in the normative landscape that is richer and more complex than some other alternative views. I describe the outlines of this contractualist egalitarian view, addressing questions regarding its strength and scope. I then discuss the relationship of (...) equality to other values, such as fairness and community, and examine the contrast between contractualist egalitarian and luck egalitarian views. I conclude with a sketch of some of the practical implications that might follow from further pursuit of Scanlon’s insights on the value of equality, in the hope that this may suggest an interesting direction of travel for further work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 2, November 1998, pp. 335-354 "An Unaccountable Pleasure": Hume on Tragedy and the Passions ALEX NEILL Hume begins his essay "Of Tragedy" with a description of what he calls "a singular phaenomenon": It seems an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are (...) touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle; and as soon as the uneasy passions cease to operate, the piece is at an end.... They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to give vent to their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the tenderest sympathy and compassion. The few critics who have had some tincture of philosophy, have remarked this singular phaenomenon, and have endeavoured to account for it.1 The account of the audience's experience of tragedy that Hume goes on to offer in "Of Tragedy" has been the target of criticism since the essay was published. My purpose in what follows is to show that some of what may appear to be the most damaging of that criticism is based on a misinterpretation of the thesis that Hume develops in the essay. I shall not attempt to argue that Hume's thesis is persuasive; indeed, I believe and have argued Alex Neill is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Hants Sl 7 IBJ ENGLAND. 336 Alex Neill elsewhere that it is not.2 My project here is almost entirely interpretive: it is an attempt to get clear about what Hume's thesis concerning our experience of tragedy really is. To that end, it should be noted that the apparently "unaccountable" pleasure Hume describes at the beginning of "Of Tragedy" is something that he has remarked on before. In Book I of the Treatise, he notes that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify'd, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and 'tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure? The phenomenon that Hume finds so remarkable in these passages from "Of Tragedy" and the Treatise is thus, at a minimum, that in certain circumstances, such as when we are at the theatre, we may find agreeable the experience of "the most dismal and gloomy passions." The explanation he gives of this phenomenon in the Treatise is as follows: In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften'd by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention. (T 115) Hume's explanation of how the experience of "uneasy" passions can be enjoyed when we are in church and at the theatre thus has two components. First, because we do not believe the stories we are told in church4 and at the theatre, the uneasy passions we experience are not so very uneasy; as he puts it later in the Treatise, in such circumstances the passion in question "lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid" (T 631). Second, a weakly disagreeable passion of this sort agreeably "enlivens" the mind and "fixes" (or as he says later, "rouzes") our attention. By the time he wrote "Of Tragedy," however, Hume had come to regard this explanation of his "singular phaenomenon" as inadequate. With regard to the idea that the passions, even if "uneasy," have the pleasurable effect of "enlivening" the mind (an idea which in "Of Tragedy" he attributes to Dubos), Hume objects that having one's mind "enlivened," one's attention "fixed" or "rouzed," need not be pleasurable: "the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were it really set before us, would give the most unfeigned uneasiness; though it... (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between two influential intellectual schools in late 19th century Britain, namely social evolutionary theories and British Idealism, by focusing on the work of D.G. Ritchie who drew inspiration from both sources. In particular, it argues that Ritchie's work can best be understood as an attempt to overcome certain metaphysical problems in the work of his teacher, T.H. Green, by integrating an Idealist account of social development with a Darwinian one, and analyses the effects this synthesis (...) has for his social and political thought. Ritchie's approach is also set in the context of developments in Victorian evolutionary theory and is contrasted with that of other influential Idealists, notably Bernard Bosanquet. More widely, it is claimed that examining Ritchie's synthesis sheds light on the degree to which the labels “idealist” and “positivist” can be reliably used in the later Victorian period, in the areas of both scientific and social investigation. (shrink)

The New Labour we got was different from the New Labour that might have been, had the reform agenda associated with stakeholding and pluralism in the early-1990s been fully realised. We investigate the road not taken and what it means for ‘one nation’ Labour.

The primary aim of this dissertation is an exegesis of Collingwood's historical science of mind. I take seriously Collingwood's claim that history is for "self-understanding" and treat his philosophy of history as a form of reflective philosophy. In particular, I examine the epistemological basis for Collingwood's claim that mind is an object that changes as it understands itself. ;In Chapter One, I consider the distinction between natural process and historical process as central to an understanding of Collingwood's historical science of (...) mind. I defend Collingwood's attempt to preserve the distinction between historical process and natural process in order to reserve for history its appropriate subject matter---mind. ;In Chapter Two, I consider the epistemological basis for Collingwood's claim that mind changes fundamentally in the historical process. I argue that Collingwood's reading of Anselm's proof of the existence of God is the key to understanding his theory of the priority of "faith" to reason and so to the historical nature of first principles. ;Chapter Three has two parts. In part one, I examine Collingwood's logic of philosophical concepts: the scale of forms. In part two, I argue Collingwood's moral philosophy, found in The New Leviathan and in his lectures on "Goodness, Rightness, Utility" , exemplifies this logic. I conclude that Collingwood's historical study of mind is an attempt to overcome the disjunction between theory and practice caused by the abstract thinking of modern scientific consciousness. ;Chapter Four provides a survey of the scholarship surrounding Collingwood's corpus as a whole. I argue that there have been three waves of Collingwood scholarship. The first is influenced by T. M. Knox's editing of Collingwood's manuscripts and his "radical conversion hypothesis." The second wave of Collingwood scholarship argues for the systematic or thematic unity of Collingwood's philosophy. The third and most recent wave builds on the second. As an example, I discuss Guiseppina D'Oro's suggestion that Collingwood's thought is unified by its overarching concern with critical philosophy. I conclude with the suggestion that Collingwood's thought is unified by an attempt to provide a viable reflective philosophy based on historical consciousness. (shrink)

The Lancet–O’Neill Institute/Georgetown University Commission on Global Health and Law published its report on the Legal Determinants of Health in 2019. The term ‘legal determinants of health’ draws attention to the power of law to influence upstream social and economic influences on population health. In this article, we introduce the Commission, including its background and rationale, set out its methodology, summarize its key findings and recommendations and reflect on its impact since publication. We also look to the future, making (...) suggestions as to how the global health community can make the best use of the Commission’s momentum in relation to using law and legal tools to advance population health. (shrink)

Discusses the variety of objections to inequality, relations between these objections, and the implications of this pluralist view of equality for the question of cosmopolitanism about justice.

Newman’s defense of the role of the laity in the development of doctrine not only occasioned a negative reaction from the Vatican, it had continued reverberations among his followers.This essay examines Newman’s influence on Baron Friedrich von Hügel and then compares the Baron’s positions with those Newman’s biographer, Wilfred Ward.

Inflammatory immune cells, when activated, display much the same metabolic profile as a glycolytic tumor cell. This involves a shift in metabolism away from oxidative phosphorylation towards aerobic glycolysis, a phenomenon known as the Warburg effect. The result of this change in macrophages is to rapidly provide ATP and metabolic intermediates for the biosynthesis of immune and inflammatory proteins. In addition, a rise in certain tricarboxylic acid cycle intermediates occurs notably in citrate for lipid biosynthesis, and succinate, which activates the (...) transcription factor Hypoxia‐inducible factor. In this review we take a look at the emerging evidence for a role for the Warburg effect in the immune and inflammatory responses. The reprogramming of metabolic pathways in macrophages, dendritic cells, and T cells could have relevance in the pathogenesis of inflammatory and metabolic diseases and might provide novel therapeutic strategies. (shrink)

Despite being written in 1941–1942, Long Day’s Journey into Night wasn’t released until 1956, two years after the author’s death. The Tyrone family is at the centre of the narrative, advancing the plot and creating further avenues for the characters to develop. The article explores the various aspects of the play that indicate that the Tyrones are a dysfunctional family. The critical analysis of the play and its various themes conclude that Tyrone in “Long Day’s Journey into Night” displays many (...) characteristics of a dysfunctional family while certain behavioural patterns of each one of the family are enough to show that the family is dysfunctional. The article presents a critical analysis of Eugene O’Neill’s Long Day’s Journey into Night. Various modes of reading were employed, including thematic analysis, close reading of the text, and a deconstructive reading of the play. These methods support the exploration of how the Tyrones are depicted as a dysfunctional family. James and Mary’s children, Edmund and Jamie, are central to the drama. Edmund is suffering from tuberculosis, while Mary struggles with a morphine addiction. The play is set at the Tyrones' Monte Cristo Cottage in seaside Connecticut, on a single day in August 1912, from roughly 8:30 a.m. until 12:00 a.m. The Tyrones are painted in a highly negative light as a dysfunctional family, as the parents and sons accuse, lash out, and harbor grudges against one another and in various situations. They possess traits that encourage pitiful and futile endeavours as well as strong desires for their circumstances to improve. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OBJECTIVITY AND RELlGIOUS TRUTH: A COMPARISON OF WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH AND BERNARD LONERGAN DENNIS M. DOYLE University of Dayton Dayton, Ohio WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH •and Bernard Lonergan both propose a new agenda for theology n response to ;the same basic cultura.I developments.1 Both Smith and Lonergan pinpoint the crux of the current siturution!aJS the convergence of various cultures in a world where Western culture had.been heM by (...) its pwrticiipants to be univers•al.and normrutive. The majo'l" problem concerning religious truth :that 1 arises out of this situation concerns universality. Formulrutions tha:t were once taken for granted are now seen to he relative to their context. Concepts that it.T1anscend particular formulations are themselves recognized irus indigenous to 1a culture. T·ruth itself is questioned as to whether it too is not!l'elative to eaich oontert. The responses of Smith and Lonergan to this situa:tion are remarkably ·similar in structure. In the midst of these similarities, 1 however, arise some differences with important implications concerning oibjectivity, itruth, and theology in a global context. Objec:tivity, Method, and Human Knowledge Smith and Lonergan both 'address rthe issue of human knowing before establishing their programs for theo1 logy.2 For botih, 1 Smith's proposal is put forth in Towards a World Theology (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1981 )• Lonergan's proposal can be found in Method in Theology (N.Y.: Herder and Herder, 1972). 2 Smith's reflections on human knowing are in "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences,'' in Towards a World Theology, pp. 56·80'. Lonergan's 461 462 DENNIS M. DOYLE a major problem in wayis of conceiving human knowing in recent centuries has heen an ohjectivism according to which knowledge was iheld to he absolute without regard to human SUJbjectivity and without an openness to other cultures. Both find a £acile cultural remtivism to he.an unsatisfactory reaction to this problem. In response, :both Smith and Lonergan try to re-root human knowing in a human conte:rl. Lonergan does ·this hy establishing the ground of knowing in an analysis of human intentionality. Smith does this by estaiblishing the ground of knowing in a mutual interchange between persons who participate in some traditions and who are observers of other traditions. Smith la.bels such knowing ·a" 001·iporaite critica1 self-iconsciousness." What emerges from such consciousness is "humane knowledge." Although some major di:ffevences arise at this point, the context of istructul'lal similarities must he noted.3 For hoth Smith and Lonergan, hruman knowing is intrinsically connected with :the quality of living both individually and oommullla1ly. Eiach in his own way stresses that knowing is vitally linked to the consciousness of individuals. Each in his own way stresses that knowing takes place within ·community, and that the breadth and quality of the community affects the breadth and quality of the knowing. Smith •and Lonergan both, furthermore, envision the taisk of theology as the conceptualization and articulation in a new context of wihat was once known in a strictly objective, theoretical f:vame;work. Both, finailily, 'lay ouit the major work on human knowing is Insight: A Study of Human Understo;nding (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1957). For a summary view, see chapter one of Method in Theology. For Lonergan's position on objectivity, see "The Origins of Christian Realism" in A Second Collection (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1974), ·pp. 239-61. a For an earlier comparison of the methods of Smith and Lonergan, see Walter E. Conn, "'Faith' and 'Cumulative Tradition' in Functional Specialization : A Study in the Methodologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," Studies in ReligiOn/Soiences Religieuses 5 (1975/76) : 221-46•.Although this article was published before several of Smith's major works in the area, the methodological similarities unearthed by Conn still hold true. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH & BERNARD LONERGAN 463 problem specifically in terms of tmnscending false subject/object :dichotomies. At this point, however, differences between Smith and Lonwgian begin to emerge, foir each attempts to transcend false.suibjoot/oibject dichotomies in a different way. Lonergan holds that objectivity is the fruit of authentic ;subjectivity.4 1t is intended hy the self-transcending subject who loves... (shrink)

Genetic information is widely thought to pose unique risks of reidentifying individuals. Genetic data reveals a great deal about who we are and, the standard view holds, should consequently be treated differently from other types of data. Contrary to this view, we argue that the dangers of reidentification for genetic and nongenetic data—including health, financial, and consumer information—are more similar than has been recognized. Before different requirements are imposed around sharing genetic information, proponents of the standard view must show that (...) they are in fact necessary. We further argue that the similarities between genetic and nongenetic information have important implications for communicating risks during consent for health care and research. While patients and research participants need to be more aware of pervasive data‐sharing practices, consent forms are the wrong place to provide this education. Instead, health systems should engage with patients throughout patient care to educate them about data‐sharing practices. (shrink)

The work that Maurice Merleau-Ponty planned to call _The Prose of the World,_ or _Introduction to the Prose of the World,_ was unfinished at the time of his death. The book was to constitute the first section of a two-part work whose aim was to offer, as an extension of his Phenomenology of Perception, a theory of truth. This edition's editor, Claude Lefort, has interpreted and transcribed the surviving typescript, reproducing Merleau-Ponty's own notes and adding documentation and commentary.

TRAGICALLY, ETHNIC CONFLICTS HAVE BECOME ONE OF THE HALLMARKS of the post-Cold War era. In response to this, two distinct traditions appear to be emerging.The first continues the classical just war tradition while the second represents a new "reconciliation tradition," built largely around questions of restorative justice in areas of social division. Our goal in this essay is to begin a rapprochement of these divergent traditions by asking the question, what does a restorative justice perspective offer to the just war (...) tradition? We proceed in three stages: first, we survey the current state of the just war tradition; second, we introduce the reconciliation tradition, drawing on both reconciliation thinkers and the practical experience of experiments in social reconciliation in South Africa and Rwanda; and third, we draw these two traditions together with a series of constructive proposals for how the reconciliation tradition can enrich the just war tradition. (shrink)

Sexually signalling animals must trade off the benefits of attracting mates with the consequences of attracting predators. For male guppies, predation risk depends on their behaviour, colouration, environmental conditions and changing intensity of predation throughout the day. Theoretically, this drives diel patterns of display behaviour in native Trinidadian populations, where males display more under low-light conditions when their most dangerous predator is less active. Here, we observed Australian guppies in a laboratory setting to investigate their diel display pattern, and if (...) this pattern is controlled by ambient light intensity. We also quantified individual variation in both the daily frequency and diel pattern of displays, and if such variation relates to body size, colouration and a non-sexual behaviour. Under a typical daily light regime, male guppies displayed mostly in the first hour of observation. Extending the duration of dawn-like lighting, however, resulted in an extended period of high display, demonstrating that light intensity per se is an important cue for this behaviour. These findings mirror those obtained for Trinidadian populations, suggesting that male courtship timing is likely shaped by broad, potentially generalizable features of guppy ecology. The effect of acclimation to captive conditions on male behaviour is also discussed. Whereas the temporal pattern of display appeared consistent, individuals varied in their daily display frequency, and this was correlated with variation in colour phenotype and a measure of non-sexual risk acceptance behaviour. Such relationships pose promising avenues for integrating behavioural and sensory ecology with contemporary work on behavioural syndromes and animal personality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RESPONSE TO BRUCE MARSHALL GEORGE LINDBECK There is an abundance of il'iches in Bruce Marshalrs essay. He makes me understand hoth myse1f and Aquinas hetter than I biaid done hefore; and, interestingly, it is chiefly hy his exegesis of St. Thomas that he does :bhis. If I had referred more to the Thomistic ideas he elucidates when I wirus writing Natrure of Dootrine1 it would have!been a better hook. (...) What he calls the " somewhat notorious " example of the crusadeT"s Christus est Dominus is a good oase in point. It would ihave helped if I had made dear that I was thinking in medieval [ashion of a an individual rutterance, the product of a pa•riticular :second 1aJct of the intellect, the ·acl of composing and dividing, of judging ·such and such rto ibe rthe ca,se. In Aquinas' intellectual setting, judgments, not sentences in ·abstraiction from 1 acls of affirmation, were propositions capruble of being true or f.a1se. Many of my ·reruders had a more modern or "Platonic " understanding of rpropositions, and therefore missed the force of the e:xJam:ple ·as Marshall so carefully and rightly explains it. Among his contributions, the major one, however, is system- •a1tically to introduce into the disCUJssion the distinction between the " truth " and " justification " of beliefs or pI'oposi- "'" tionS.- Once the point is made, it is evident that " alethiology" and " epistemology " (to mention a cognate, though not ~den­ tical distinction) ·are, 1 at least in some contexts, partially independent variables. There is no one-to-one relation between different meanings or theories of truth and the v:arious views as to how we know such ·and such is true. It was my failure to make this point explicit which confosed Fr. Colman O'Neill, of blessed memory, ias well as a good many other readers (1as Bruce Marshall quite rightly notes, though, with excessive 408 404 GEORGEl LINDBECK kindness to me, he!blames the,readers rather than the 'author for the misunderstanding). Once iclarfiied, as it has lbeen done hy Mr. Marshall, the issue turns on ·whether,a classical " correspondence " theory of truth can be ioombined,with, to empfoy O'Neill's terminology, the use of "coherentist" and " pragmatist " epistemological criteria in justifying rbelieis. I ·am not sure ·that this is possible for those who e:xdude any reference to an idea.I observer or knower (whether real or hypothetical) when defining truth, hut for any theist r.for whom God is prima veritas, as he was for Aquinas, the answer is dearly in the affirmative. In God, and only in God, are knowledge and reality, not only in correspondence, hut directly known to correspond. Only in him do truth·and knowledge of truth, 1 aleth:iofogy and epistemology, ooindde. In 1human knowledge in via, in contrast, there is always a gap. Our ibe1ieTs may correspond to reality, hut we are justified in holding that they do so, not by directly seeing the correspondence, 1but by some other means. That those other means might in part or w:hole be coherentist or pragmatist cannot :be e:xduded a priori. It is true that in the caise of an Aristotelian 1such 1as Aquinas, coherence •and rpmctise 1are not explicitly accorded major roles in the epistemological justification of natural kno·wledge or scientia, yet even here they are not e:xduded. Nothing can quali[y ais 1an item of knowledge unless it coheres with all other scientia, and right pra.ctice (i.e., training in virtue) is indispensible :llor ethical kno,wledge. Nor need one cease fo be an Aris,totelian, 1as far ·as I can see, if one accepts the contempOO 'ary oommonpJaice that sense experience itself is heavily dependent on linguistic and non-linguistic pmctices which are in part ·acquired rthrough variaible forim:s of aicculturation and not simply through the actualization of 1genetically encoded propensities. One could still, despite this increased emphasis on prwctiice.and on coherence 1 with webs of 1belief, ibe 'able to affum in good Aristotelian,fashion tha;t the knowledge naturally accessible to ra:t]onal animals such,as we a.re is primarily justified RESPONCE TO BRUCE MARSHALL 405 iby reference to... (shrink)

Perceived integrity of managers affects employee attitudes. Yet its impact on employee behavior and organizational performance is unknown. Addressing this gap, we examine the effect of perceived integrity in leadership on both subjective firm performance and objective employee productivity. Applying dynamic capabilities theory, we propose that perceived integrity in leadership may not only directly affect the outcome variables but also moderate the effect of the firm’s multiple-strategy implementation on outcome variables. We test the hypotheses using multiple informants from a transitional (...) economy with an ineffective legal and incomplete institutional environment, which could seriously challenge the leader’s commitment to integrity. As hypothesized, perceived integrity is associated with manager’s perception of firm performance directly and objective employee productivity through its moderating role in the firm’s implementation process of dual strategies. The results illustrate that perceived integrity in leadership plays as an important driver for employee productivity in dual-strategy and non-strategy firms. We provide detailed discussions about the integrity challenge and call for additional future research on this topic. (shrink)

On the classic Hindu philosophies of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika ; autocommentary on Bhāṣāpariccheda with Sanskrit and Hindi commentaries.

Students of the history of ethics sometimes find themselves tempted by moderate or extreme versions of an approach that might roughly be called ‘historicist’. This temptation may result from the difficulties of approaching historical texts from a ‘narrowly philosophical’ point of view. We may begin, for instance, by wanting to know what Aristotle has to say about ‘the problems of ethics’, so that we can compare his views with those of Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Sidgwick, and Rawls, and then decide what (...) is true or false in each theorist's position. But this narrowly philosophical attitude soon runs into difficulties, and writers on the history of ethics often warn us against it. (shrink)

Articles on sentence in Sanskrit grammar according to Mimamsa philosophy.

The subject of this paper is the integrity of nature over time—‘diachronic integrity’. The argument of the parer is that any serious attempt to address conservation problems—the kinds of problems faced by environmental managers the world over, needs to operate with an eye to some principle of diachronic integrity. Whilst acknowledging that applying the principle is largely a matter of experience and judgement, we argue that it applies equally both to human and to natural history.