Do you believe you think independently? Do you alone control your actions? Stoic philosophy asserts that your mind, thoughts, and actions are traces of a world which shapes you, and everyone else, together. Our personal nature is part of a system, not independent. This book studies how a Stoic thinks and acts as part of a community and in service of a world, rather than separately or for themselves alone. This is not just another book about Stoic philosophy. Stoicism has (...) been popularized as a way to primarily serve personal benefits, promising mental resilience in an uncontrollable world of people and events. This book instead explores how for the Stoics we only benefit personally by being aware of how we are entangled with our fellow humans and the world. This perspective reveals anti-individualistic conditions for the well-being that individuals seek from the philosophy. By studying features that might seem to define us as separate individuals--our mind, body, self-preserving instinct, knowledge, and happiness--we find that everything about each of us is interconnected and shared. The theoretical analysis, suitable for general and academic readers, involves all ancient Stoic eras, comparisons with pre-Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions, and modern Stoic debates. (shrink)

Despite devoting their time to another person’s needs, many carers paradoxically experience guilt during their caregiving tenure concerning whether they are providing enough care. When discussing the “enough” of anything, what is at stake is that thing’s quantification. Given that there are seemingly no quantifiable units of care by which to measure the role, concerns regarding whether enough care is being provided often focus on what constitutes enough time as a carer. In exploring this aspect of the carer’s experience, two (...) key parameters emerge; guilt, and, quantified time. The guilt that carers report regarding whether they devote “enough time” to their caring responsibilities can be examined through Henri Bergson’s philosophical conception of quantification. By integrating contemporary analyses of carers’ guilt from the social sciences, most significantly via the sociology of Rebecca Olson, the relationship between quantified time and guilt becomes apparent. A quantified conception of time frames the assumption that spending more time on caregiving will reduce the amount of guilt felt by a carer. However, whilst care is structured according to quantified, clocked and calendared time, there are not comparable, quantifiable parameters for guilt. This means that suppositions of an inverse relationship between how much time one spends giving care, and how much guilt they will feel in terms of their caregiving, are problematic. These insights become relevant to health care policies via a coherence with calls to make the role of unpaid, caregiving, labour time more visible, and by explaining how understanding quantified time can help policies guide how caregivers negotiate guilt. (shrink)

The notion that body modification occurs when one undertakes practices like tattooing, piercing or scarification, engenders discourses in which: (i) body modifiers endorse such practices as self-constructive, distancing their practitioners from social regulation and a deterministic biology, whereas; (ii) critics condemn their seemingly violent, corporeal interference. However, in suspecting that such analysis should be attentive to the concurrent individual and social co-constitution of behaviours, a sociological and post-structural interrogation of this characterization of body modification as a “sovereign, denaturalizing” endeavour is (...) demanded. An engagement with the originary violence of Derridian deconstruction will duly re-conceive body modification practice as not something which introduces violence to corporeality. Rather, violence will present as a primordial differentiating process which bodies always already condition, and by which they are conditioned/produced/modified. The second issue at stake in this article will thus develop as a contestation to the characterization of “body modification” as an exclusive category of practice. Such practices do not arrive, pre-existing, but rather manifest as the originary violence/differentiation of bodies-as-modifications-which-modify. This re-defines modification from something that agentive subjects introduce to bodies, to something that subjects-as-bodies cannot help but be. Consequently, individual agency is not divorced from behaviour, but emerges as a corporeal, social production. (shrink)

This book reveals the common conditions of lateness and synchronisation that pervade all cultures around the world.