A book review of Beth Savickey. Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Awakening the Imagination. Cham: Springer, 2017, 137 pp. ISBN 978-3-319-45308-8.

This book is a study of Wittgenstein's descriptive, improvisational, and performative art of philosophical investigation. In addition to clarifying the nature of Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations, this study highlights several neglected aspects of his work: its humour and playfulness, its collaborative nature, and its emphasis on the imagination. These aspects often become distorted under the pressure of theory and argumentation, resulting in interpretations that equate grammatical investigation with confession, therapy, or a common sense view of the world. After presenting Wittgenstein's (...) art of investigation in part one, this study challenges these dominant and influential interpretations in part two. The volume examines Wittgenstein's mottos, forewords, and dedications. It looks at the art of his philosophical and grammatical investigations, linking it to drama and improvisation. The book discusses the complexity and subtlety of Wittgenstein's response to Augustine in the opening of the Investigations, and Wittgenstein's response to Moore's defence of common sense in On Certainty. The book also examines three kinds of therapeutic readings: those that compare Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychoanalysis, those that compare his philosophy to therapy generally, and those that describe philosophy itself as an illness or as the cause of illness. (shrink)

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The differences in the styles of these books are only tokens of more important differences in their methods and results. To see this it might be useful to look at the theses about representation which are central to the Tractatus, but which Wittgenstein leaves altogether aside in his Investigations.

Stephen Mulhall offers a new way of interpreting one of the most famous and contested texts in modern philosophy: remarks on "private language" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He sheds new light on a central controversy concerning Wittgenstein's early work by showing its relevance to a proper understanding of the later work.

In this book, Rupert Read offers the first outline of a resolute reading, following the highly influential New Wittgenstein 'school', of the Philosophical Investigations. He argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to understand its liberatory purport. Read contends that a resolute reading coincides in its fundaments with what, building on ideas in the later Gordon Baker, he calls a liberatory reading. Liberatory philosophy is philosophy that can liberate the user from compulsive patterns of thought, freeing (...) one for possibilities that were previously obscured. Such liberation is our prime goal in philosophy. This book consists in a sequential reading, along these lines, of what Read considers the most important and controversial passages in the Philosophical Investigations 1, 16, 43, 95 & 116 & 122, 130-3, 149-151, 186, 198-201, 217, and 284-6. Read claims that this liberatory conception is simultaneously an ethical conception. The PI should be considered a work of ethics in that its central concern becomes our relation with others. Wittgensteinian liberations challenge widespread assumptions about how we allegedly are independent of and separate from others. Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, and to scholars of the political philosophy of liberation and the ethics of relation. (shrink)

In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the Investigations and the way in which the work is written, and especially to the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the (...) reasons why the Investigations have inspired such a diversity of readings. Following closely the text of the Investigations and meant to be read alongside it, this survey is accessible to readers with no previous background in philosophy. It is well-suited to university-level courses on Wittgenstein, but can also be read with profit by students in other disciplines. (shrink)

_Wittgenstein's Art of Investigation_ is one of the first to focus on and provide an original and detailed analysis of Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations. Beth Sarkey offers us new insight into the historical context and influences on method which will help students understand the intricacies and depth of his work.

In this provocatively compelling new book, Michael Luntley offers a revolutionary reading of the opening section of Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical Investigations _ Critically engages with the most recent exegetical literature on Wittgenstein and other state-of-the-art philosophical work Encourages the re-incorporation of Wittgenstein studies into the mainstream philosophical conversation Has profound consequences for how we go on to read the rest of Wittgenstein’s major work Makes a significant contribution not only to the literature on Wittgenstein, but also to studies (...) in philosophy of language. (shrink)

Guarding against reliance on his own biography and romantic tendencies in Bildungsroman literature, I draw parallels to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of the journey trope and place-based inquiry in the Philosophical Investigations, as an exploration of concept development and confusion that exhorts and guides readers in traversing the borderlands of their own cultural–linguistic practices. l recall Wittgenstein’s journey in search of himself: his retreat from Cambridge to a remote hut in Norway, leading him on a philosophical search for (...) meaning. This self-transformative (Bildung) process of writing the Philosophical Investigations offers new ways for thinking the concept of ‘place’: not the bounding limit of things/beings; rather, working through the linguistic turn in philosophy, as potentially meaningful ‘sites’ in conceptually familiar/unfamiliar landscapes of native languages. The Investigations also carries ancient Heraclitian and Homeric tropes of homecoming and authenticity: ‘searching ourselves’ and ‘becoming who we are’, as found in Wittgenstein’s call to ‘know our way about’—rediscovering the grammatical order operating out of view but pervading the world as we see and know it, as well as setting its limits. Awareness of different languages of place is crucial to appreciating Indigenous discourses of Land-based education—a topic central to discussions of incorporating Indigenous knowledge while decolonizing education. Rethinking Bildungsroman literature in postcolonial terms—through the lens of reconciliation, renaissance, and resurgence —I call for careful listening to Indigenous peoples’ storied landscapes instead of fact-checking them: recognizing their sovereign right to self-govern their own education and resources. The goal is not to assess the truths of Land-based education, as in some epistemological inquiries, nor to make them accessible as pedagogical resources or instruments for non-Indigenous educators. The aim rather is to promote respect for its deep, nearly inaccessible context within Indigenous grammars and ways of life. (shrink)

Stephen Mulhall offers a new way of interpreting one of the most famous and contested texts in modern philosophy: remarks on 'private language' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He sheds new light on a central controversy concerning Wittgenstein's early work by showing its relevance to a proper understanding of the later work.

This paper draws on a number of parallels between Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and St. Augustine’s Confessions to suggest that Wittgenstein’s relation to the text with which he opens the Investigations is less adversarial than is normally supposed. In particular, the paper draws attention to two important parallels: the difficulty both Philosophical Investigations and Confessions have with beginning and with arrogating to themselves the authority to begin, and the role of conversion in both texts. These parallels (...) help us read the methodological remarks of Philosophical Investigations §§89–133 as a conversion narrative of sorts. However, Wittgenstein’s conception of conversion runs counter to Augustine’s: where Augustine aspires to overcome the lusts of the physical world and and toward the purity of the divine, Wittgenstein turns away from the aspiration for purity toward a humbler acceptance of the ordinary. Augustine’s text is an exhortation to conversion, but not the kind of conversion Wittgenstein seeks, and this is the deeper provocation that Wittgenstein finds in Augustine’s text. (shrink)

Brendan Wilson leads the reader through Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, revealing a new clarity, singleness of purpose and contemporary relevance in this acknowledged masterpiece.

Published in 1953, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations had a deeply unsettling effect upon our most basic philosophical ideas concerning thought, sensation and language. Its claim that philosophical questions of meaning necessitate a close analysis of the way we use language continues to influence Anglo-American philosophy today. However, its compressed and dialogic prose is not always easy to follow. This collection of essays deepens but also challenges our understanding of the work's major themes, such as the connection between meaning and use, (...) the nature of concepts, thought and intentionality, and language games. Bringing together leading philosophers and Wittgenstein scholars, it offers a genuinely critical approach and demonstrating Wittgenstein's relevance for contemporary philosophy. This volume will appeal to readers interested in the later Wittgenstein, in addition to those interested in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology. (shrink)

This book collects 13 papers that explore Wittgenstein's philosophy throughout the different stages of his career. The author writes from the viewpoint of critical rationalism. The tone of his analysis is friendly and appreciative yet critical. Of these papers, seven are on the background to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Five papers examine different aspects of it: one on the philosophy of young Wittgenstein, one on his transitional period, and the final three on the philosophy of mature Wittgenstein, chiefly his Philosophical (...) Investigations. The last of these papers, which serves as the concluding chapter, concerns the analytical school of philosophy that grew chiefly under its influence. Wittgenstein’s posthumous Philosophical Investigations ignores formal languages while retaining the view of metaphysics as meaningless -- declaring that all languages are metaphysics-free. It was very popular in the middle of the twentieth century. Now it is passé. Wittgenstein had hoped to dissolve all philosophical disputes, yet he generated a new kind of dispute. His claim to have improved the philosophy of life is awkward just because he prevented philosophical discussion from the ability to achieve that: he cut the branch on which he was sitting. This, according to the author, is the most serious critique of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Many theorists have focused on Wittgenstein’s use of examples, but I argue that examples form only half of his method. Rather than continuing the disjointed style of his Cambridge lectures, Wittgenstein returns to the techniques he employed while teaching elementary school. Philosophical Investigations trains the reader as a math class trains a student—‘by means of examples and by exercises’ (§208). Its numbered passages, carefully arranged, provide a series of demonstrations and practice problems. I guide the reader through one (...) such series, demonstrating how the exercises build upon one another and give us ample opportunity to hone our problem-solving skills. Through careful practice, we learn to pass the test Wittgenstein poses when he claims that something is ‘easy to imagine’ (§19). Whereas other critics have viewed the Investigations as merely a diagnosis of our philosophical delusions, I claim that Wittgenstein also writes a prescription for our disease: Do your exercises. (shrink)

This anthology identifies four central themes in Wittgenstein's Investigations — reference and meaning, rules and their application, the interiority of mind and the alleged uses of private languages, and necessity and grammar-and provides important recent essays that explore these themes in lucid detail. Intended for both the novice and experienced reader of Wittgenstein's classic work, this book includes important notes and references to help make his problems and arguments more accessible.

This article undertakes a comparison between Wittgenstein's philosophy of the early and late periods with the musical theories of Wittgenstein's contemporary, Heinrich Schenker, an influential Viennese theorist of tonality, as well as those of their contemporary Arnold Schoenberg. Schenker's reductive analytical procedure was designed to unveil fundamental and uniform ways in which all works of music function, unfolding a deep structure constituting their essence. Schoenberg deplored this line of thought, and for reasons strikingly parallel to those that led Wittgenstein back (...) to what he called the ‘rough ground’ in his Philosophical Investigations. Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, the abstracted picture of the musical work as a platonic entity is nourished by grammatical conflations as well as by the Platonic and Cartesian legacies. (shrink)

Wittgenstein in his early work viz. Tractatus argued that there is a common, essential, underlying structure that links logic, language and the world. He also argued about the need for an analysis of ordinary language in terms of a perspicuous symbolism that would display a one to one relationship between a proposition and a fact – when both of them are broken down to their simplest components – viz. to atomic propositions and atomic states of affairs. All propositions are ultimately (...) truth-functional combinations of atomic propositions – thus all language is resolvable to a unique constant. So for early Wittgenstein, though there is an apparent complexity and diversity of propositions still there lies a uniform, essential structure of truthfunctional propositions and that can be reduced to a single constant. And language to have a determinate sense must be ultimately based on objects – the absolutely simple logical atoms of the world. These objects imbibe their range of combination with other objects, which implies that any genuine propositions – however unusual and unconventional it may seem to be – must ultimately be constrained by the permissible range of combination of the objects. In this way early Wittgenstein sought to secure an essential metaphysics via an essential structure of language. However in Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein attacked essentialism by rejecting the picture theory, and the search for commonality and uniformity. He denied essence, the universal, the common element present in all the objects of a class and accepted only an indeterminate and incomplete flow of the criss-crossing, the overlapping features. For him language is constituted by an ever expanding flow of uses, which he called language-games. The significance of the term ‘language-game’ lies in the fact that like games language too is not based on any ontology that would confer a common essence across all the widely divergent uses. Nor did Wittgenstein accept any hidden essence behind appearance. In PI the later Wittgenstein denied both analysis and essence and propagated description of usage and behaviours as the only method of philosophy. Later Wittgenstein will neither commit himself to ontological necessity, nor to necessity being a matter of scheme-relative propositions in the Quinean sense. For later Wittgenstein all attempts to establish essences, or the contrary exercises to relativise them to a particular set of presumptions, are themselves language-games – they boil down to usage and practices that do not rest on any foundation. (shrink)

In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; (...) and private names are not really names, private language is not really a language, therefore, private language is a grammatical illusion. My interpretation has the advantage of being able to reconcile Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, which is to dissolve philosophical problems by rearranging grammatical facts, with his actual philosophical practice, at least in the case of private language. (shrink)

Brenner labels his book a “companion”. It provides a workbook or roadmap that can used to guide one’s reading of Philosophical Investigations. Its first half follows the progression of Wittgenstein’s text. Rather than providing a traditional commentary, Brenner proceeds by testing paraphrases of key sections, juxtaposing well-traveled with less familiar passages, and constructing ongoing dialogues with various Wittgensteinian interlocutors. The book’s second half presents interpretative essays on Wittgenstein’s treatment of the mental, the grammar of color and number (...) talk, and the idea of “theology as grammar.” Brenner skillfully navigates the difficult paths of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of traditional philosophy. While emphasizing that Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity systematically opposes itself to reductionism and to attempts to think beyond the limits of thought and language, he avoids the pitfalls of ascribing to Wittgenstein a dogmatic standard by which to deem traditional metaphysical theorizing nonsensical. He appreciates that to understand how Wittgenstein puts the nature of philosophy in question, we must work through the ways his methods force our attention onto particulars and dampen our “craving for generality.” Wittgenstein tries to impress on us the need to reexamine the details of our lives as language users, and to lead us to the “real discovery” that affords a “complete clarity” on which “the philosophical problems should completely disappear”. In this call for attentiveness, Brenner finds the essential spirit of Wittgenstein’s thinking. Here “the true value of philosophy lies in this clarificatory activity”, and “life ceases to seem essentially problematic”. (shrink)

"One of the most impressive pieces of scholarship I have ever encountered."-W. E. Kennick, Amherst College There is nothing in the literature on the Philosophical Investigations comparable to this learned and exhaustive commentary. Offering both information and interpretation, it is a remarkable book that fills a recognized need for a close study of one of the world's major works of philosophy. After a general introduction, Father Hallett divides the text of the Investigations into forty-one units, and then provides (...) an introduction to each section, along with detailed comments on individual paragraphs, statements, and expressions. His use of paragraph numbers in the general introduction and in the sectional introductions permits ready reference downward, for detailed development or illustration of a general observation, or upward, from a particular passage to its wider context. To clarify the philosophical point of Wittgenstein's remarks, Father Hallett makes frequent references to other parts of the Investigations; to Wittgenstein's other writings, both published and unpublished; and to the works which Wittgenstein knew and often had in mind, such as those of Frege, Russell, Moore, James, Augustine, Plato, Schlick, and Kohler. Father Hallett also cites and quotes secondary sources, and he includes an appendix relating Wittgenstein to more than 150 authors, particularly those of his own generation or earlier whom he read, or knew personally, and who are mentioned in this commentary. Written in straightforward and lucid prose, this outstanding book reveals continuities in Wittgenstein's thought over long periods of time. It is an indispensable guide for those preparing courses on the Investigations and a useful tool for students taking those courses. (shrink)

Most readers of the Investigations take skepticism as a target of Wittgenstein’s remarks, something to be refuted by means of a clear grasp of our criteria. Stanley Cavell was the first to challenge that consensual view by reminding us that our criteria are constantly open to skeptical repudiation, hence that privacy is a standing human possibility. In an apparently similar vein, Saul Kripke has argued that a skeptical paradox concerning rules and meaning is the central problem of the (...) Investigations – and one that receives a skeptical solution. Following the orthodoxy, however, Kripke does not take privacy as a real threat but instead reads Wittgenstein as offering an argument against its very possibility. This paper offers a critical assessment of Kripke’s and Cavell’s readings, and concludes by delineating an understanding of our linguistic practices that acknowledges the seriousness of skepticism while avoiding the kind of evasion shared by Kripke and the orthodoxy, enabling us to see agreement and meaning as continual tasks whose failure is imbued with high existential costs. (shrink)

The paper aims to elucidate the elementary premises of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations based on the principle of “language games” through the prism of intertextuality within which his book leads an active dialogue with other texts, by its content belonging to the field of philosophy of language. Wittgenstein’s theory in which examined are the questions of the essence of language, philosophy and meaning, intertwines with the most relevant linguistic movements and theories – especially when the problem of (...) specific perspective on the world is considered, the comparison of language and chess game, as well as the thinking about the inner language, a relation between language and thinking and deep and surface structures. Wittgenstein is being linked to Humboldt, then with the founder of general linguistics de Saussure, Vygotsky and his work Thinking and Speech, and Chomsky’s generative-transformative theory. Since Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a specific paradigm had a response in literature, Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch, being a representative of postmodern novel, will be used as a form of language review and illustration of the described philosophical game. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with speech acts, or Wittgenstein's uses of language , mostly fix their attention on actions done by issuing just a phrase or short sentence (in the appropriate circumstances with the proper qualifications, feeling, intent, uptake, etc.). "Five red apples" is Wittgenstein's paradigm example in his Philosophical Investigations . "There's a bittern at the bottom of your garden" plays a similar role in J. L. Austin's most central and ambitious essay, "Other Minds." Indeed, as Wittgenstein points out, a (...) single word or gesture may do the job perfectly well, just as an illiterate man can make a valid contract by marking an "X" on a piece of paper. And, of course, in all relevant philosophical respects, a speech act may be written rather than spoken: in his leitmotiv example, Wittgenstein.. (shrink)

An imaginative and exciting exposition of major themes from Wittgenstein's mature philosophy.

In the Philosophical Investigations §242, Wittgenstein asserts paradoxically that objectivity is not lost even though communication requires the interplay of agreement in definitions and agreement in judgments. Although Wittgenstein does not claim that objectivity is only determined by this interplay, the objective status of logic initially appears to have disappeared. Wittgenstein here foresees the criticism launched by Kripke that objectivity has been replaced by inter-subjectivity. However, he retorts that the only aspect of objectivity that has vanished is the illusion (...) of any access to an absolute truth independent of language-use. In a transcendental rotation reminiscent of Kant, Wittgenstein maintains that when the notion of a direct trajectory between human consciousness and truth is relinquished, objectivity of any kind relies on rules that language-use generates in the play of a language-game. Wittgenstein grounds objectivity in judgment, and thereby subjects logic to the possibility of communication. (shrink)

These works, as the sub-title makes clear, are unfinished sketches for Philosophical Investigations, possibly the most important and influential philosophical work of modern times. The 'Blue Book' is a set of notes dictated to Witgenstein's Cambridge students in 1933-1934: the 'Brown Book' was a draft for what eventually became the growth of the first part of Philosophical Investigations. This book reveals the germination and growth of the ideas which found their final expression in Witgenstein's later work. It is (...) indispensable therefore to students of Witgenstein's thought and to all those who wish to study at first-hand the mental processes of a thinker who fundamentally changed the course of modern philosophy. (shrink)

Wittgenstein is one of the most important and influential twentieth-century philosophers in the western tradition. In his Philosophical Investigations he undertakes a radical critique of analytical philosophy's approach to both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. _The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations_ introduces and assesses: Wittgenstein's life The principal ideas of the Philosophical Investigations Some of the principal disputes concerning the interpretation of his work Wittgenstein's philosophical method and its connection with the form of (...) the text. With further reading included throughout, this guidebook is essential reading for all students of philosophy, and all those wishing to get to grips with this masterpiece. (shrink)

Self-Hypnosis: The Complete Manual for Health and Self-Change, 2nd ed offers a step-by step guide to using hypnosis to better well-being and stronger self-control. For over two decades renowned therapist and author Brian Alman showed thousands of individuals how to use self-inductive techniques for relief from pain, stress, and discomfort. Self-hypnosis assists in meditation and fosters positive self-regard. The exercises in Self-Hypnosis are clear, concise and easily attainable. As an effective therapy in alleviating the pain of childbirth, medical and dental (...) surgery, burns, and accidental injuries, hypnosis is practiced widely. Hypnosis in pain relief is a noninvasive and natural healing process. Self-Hypnosis makes this healing technique available to the lay reader. (shrink)

I consider the support variously offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: ‘It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.’ Against the first sort of argument to be found in Wittgenstein and the literature I offer cases in which I learn of pain. Against the second sort of argument I develop the case in which I am persuaded by compelling evidence that I am, contrary to what (...) I imagined, still in an emotional pain about N. I then consider the counter-argument that the mix of sensation and emotion in my second case makes it irrelevant as a criticism of Wittgenstein, but argue that the reverse holds. That ‘sensation’ is quite separate from ‘emotion’ is a Cartesian Mistake which is, I argue, implicit in Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘I know I am in pain’. (shrink)

The present article aims at investigating the political aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, focusing mainly on the Philosophical Investigations. This theme remains rather marginal within Wittgensteinian scholarship, facing the key challenge of the sparsity of explicit discussions of political issues in Wittgenstein’s writings. Based on the broader anthropological and synecdochic character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the main objective of the article is to make explicit the implicit political import of some of the main themes of the (...) Philosophical Investigations. This is done by correlating them with certain political concepts and issues, such as reification, mystification, emancipation, self-institution and the common. In such a way, a new light is shed on Wittgenstein’s influence on and his relevance to contemporary political theory, while at the same time the first steps are taken for the enrichment of the discussion regarding personal and social autonomy and the critique of late capit... (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects By Gordon Baker. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004 pp. 328. £40.00 HB.. Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism By Ilham Dilman. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. pp. 240. £52.50 HB. Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies By P. M. S. Hacker. Oxford: Oxford University Press,. pp. 400. £45.00 HB; £19.99 PB. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction By David G. Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. pp. 224. £40.00 HB; £10.99 PB.

References to God. Some Remarks by Wittgenstein on Religion in the Years 1949 – 51. After a brief overview of Wittgenstein's stock of remarks on the subject of religion from 1949 – 1951, this article will focus on two particular points: supposedly nonsensical conceptions of God, for instance in the context of proofs of God, definitions of the term ”God” by hinting at something. Connections between and both systematically and exegetically within the framework of Wittgenstein's remarks are made.Ich danke Anja (...) Weiberg für sehr hilfreiche Kommentare. (shrink)

Sixty years after its first edition, there is an increasing consensus among scholars that the work posthumously published as _Philosophical Investigations _represents something that is far from a complete picture of Wittgenstein’s second book project. G.H. von Wright’s seminal research on the _Nachlass_ was an important contribution in this direction, showing that the Wittgenstein papers can reveal much more than the source of specific remarks. This book specifically explores Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical_ _Investigations_ from the different angles of its (...) originary conceptions, including the mathematical texts, shedding new light on fundamental issues in twentieth century and contemporary philosophy. Leading authorities in the field focus on newly published or hitherto unpublished sources for the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work and a Wittgenstein typescript, translated for the first time into English, is included as an appendix. (shrink)

This first volume of Wittgenstein's Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology was written between October 1948 and March 1949, when the philosopher had moved to Dublin and was having one of his most fruitful working periods. He then finished work which he had begun in 1946 and which in its entirety constitutes the source material for Part II of the "Philosophical Investigations". When, later in 1949, Wittgenstein composed the manuscript for Part II he selected more than half the (...) remarks for it from the Dublin manuscript. Although this material is a direct continuation of the writings which make up the two volumes of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology it deserves more than they to be regarded as a "preliminary study" for the second part of Wittgenstein's "chef-d'oeuvre". (shrink)

Introduction -- Building blocks -- The old way of thinking -- The new way -- Grammar and philosophy -- The grammar of mathematics -- The grammar of experience -- The grammar of psychology -- Part II -- What does it all mean?