The first English translation of a classic work in vision science from 1936 by a leading figure in the Gestalt movement, covering topics that continue to be major issues in vision research today. This classic work in vision science, written by a leading figure in Germany's Gestalt movement in psychology and first published in 1936, addresses topics that remain of major interest to vision researchers today. Wolfgang Metzger's main argument, drawn from Gestalt theory, is that the objects we perceive (...) in visual experience are not the objects themselves but perceptual effigies of those objects constructed by our brain according to natural rules. Gestalt concepts are currently being increasingly integrated into mainstream neuroscience by researchers proposing network processing beyond the classical receptive field. Metzger's discussion of such topics as ambiguous figures, hidden forms, camouflage, shadows and depth, and three-dimensional representations in paintings will interest anyone working in the field of vision and perception, including psychologists, biologists, neurophysiologists, and researchers in computational vision—and artists, designers, and philosophers. Each chapter is accompanied by compelling visual demonstrations of the phenomena described; the book includes 194 illustrations, drawn from visual science, art, and everyday experience, that invite readers to verify Metzger's observations for themselves. Today's researchers may find themselves pondering the intriguing question of what effect Metzger's theories might have had on vision research if Laws of Seeing and its treasure trove of perceptual observations had been available to the English-speaking world at the time of its writing. (shrink)

The paper displays the similarity between the theory of probabilistic causation developed by Glymour et al. since 1983 and mine developed since 1976: the core of both is that causal graphs are Bayesian nets. The similarity extends to the treatment of actions or interventions in the two theories. But there is also a crucial difference. Glymour et al. take causal dependencies as primitive and argue them to behave like Bayesian nets under wide circumstances. By contrast, I argue the behavior of (...) Bayesian nets to be ultimately the defining characteristic of causal dependence. (shrink)

Leibniz's development of a "calculus universalis" stands and falls with his theory of negation. During the entire period of the elaboration of the algebra of concepts, L1, Leibniz had to struggle hard to grasp the difference between propositional and conceptual negation. Within the framework of syllogistic, this difference seems to disappear because 'Omne A non B' may be taken to be equivalent to ‘Omne A est non-B’. Within the "universal calculus", however, the informal quantifier expression 'omne' is to be dropped. (...) Accordingly, ‘A non est B' expresses only the propositional negation of ‘A est B' and is hence logically weaker than ‘A est non-B'. Besides Leibniz's cardinal error of confusing propositional and conceptual negation the following issues are dealt with in this paper: -"Aristotelian" vs. "Scholastic" Syllogistic; – Metalinguistic theory of the truth-predicate; -Individual-concepts vs. concepts in general. (shrink)

If the universe is a machine, consciousness is not possible. If the universe is more than a machine, then physics is incomplete. Since we are both part of the universe and conscious, physics must be incomplete and the understanding required to construct conscious mechanisms must be sought through the advancement of physics not the continued application of inadequate concepts. In this paper I will show that an impediment to this advancement is the confusion arising through the use of terms such (...) as 'physical reality' to refer to an absolute a priori Kantian 'Ding an Sich' when they should both be recognized as referring to data structures holding the knowledge upon which we act and nothing more. Once this confusion has been clarified, I will go on to suggest that the cycle of activity updating physical reality becomes a candidate for a conscious process. I will show how implementing algorithms in modern computers can mimic this process but if actual consciousness is to be achieved the update activity must correspond to a cycle in time. Such cycles have been identified with Whitehead's 'actual occasions' and thus I will argue that fundamental events should replace fundamental particles as the building blocks of the universe if consciousness is to be explained. (shrink)

The paper investigates the prospects of Spohn’s ranking theory with respect to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Based on a novel analysis of the riddle (Freitag [manuscript]), we show it to be an inductive extension of Hansson’s puzzle (Hansson 1992, 1999). As a consequence, a solution needs to take into account the dependence relations between evidential beliefs: “grue” is unprojectible because it depends on evidence whose projection is defeated. It will be suggested that this solution can be implemented into Spohn’s (...) ranking theory, but that ranking theory is unable to provide a proper explanation of the required conditional ranks. (shrink)

The paper attempts to rationalize cooperation in the one-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD). It starts by introducing (and preliminarily investigating) a new kind of equilibrium (differing from Aumann's correlated equilibria) according to which the players' actions may be correlated (sect. 2). In PD the Pareto-optimal among these equilibria is joint cooperation. Since these equilibria seem to contradict causal preconceptions, the paper continues with a standard analysis of the causal structure of decision situations (sect. 3). The analysis then raises to a reflexive (...) point of view according to which the agent integrates his own present and future decision situations into the causal picture of his situation (sect. 4). This reflexive structure is first applied to the toxin puzzle and then to Newcomb's problem, showing a way to rationalize drinking the toxin and taking only one box with-out assuming causal mystery (sect. 5). The latter result is finally extended to a rationalization of cooperation in PD (sect. 6). (shrink)

Verfasser behandelt die Frage, ob die Naturwissenschaften ihre gegenwärtige Hauptfunktion, die Lieferung technikrelevanter Erkenntnisse, wirksamer als bisher erfüllen könnten, wenn sie sich nicht nur während revolutionärer Perioden, sondern ununterbrochen theoretisch pluralistisch entwickeln würden. Zuerst wird gezeigt, warum die Naturwissenschaften unter der Forderung nach maximaler Effektivität stehen, anschließend, daß diese Forderung durch einander abwechselnde pluralistische und nichtpluralistische Entwicklungsphasen in höherem Grade erfüllt wird als durch eine permanent pluralistische Entwicklung. Daraus wird geschlossen, daß eine Ersetzung der bisherigen Entwicklungsdynamik in den Naturwissenschaften durch (...) eine permanent pluralistische wenig Realisierungschancen hat. Mit Hilfe der Effektivitätsforderung wird ferner erklärt, warum auch während evolutionärer Perioden in einem gewissen Ausmaß theoretischer Pluralismus besteht, insbesondere, warum in der Praxis neue Theorien bei Mißerfolgen nicht strikt eliminiert werden, sondern Bewährungsfristen erhalten. (shrink)

Aristoteles hat seine Lehrschriften sicherlich sowohl als Vorlesungsmanuskripte für seine Schüler als auch für ein abstraktes Publikum und für die Nachwelt geschrieben. Denn wir finden sowohl Bezugnahmen auf seine Hörer als auch Bemerkungen, die einzelne seiner Thesen selbstbewusst im positiven Sinne mit der Leistung der Vorgänger vergleichen und in einen historischen Zusammenhang stellen, was nur sinnvoll ist, wenn der Vergleich von außen nachvollzogen warden konnte. Wieweit einzelne Schriften zu seinen Lebzeiten in Umlauf kamen, ist unbekannt.

The article deals with some aspects of Dilthey’s thought. First, we examine those elements of Dilthey’s philosophy that play important role in the discussion of his ideas in the 20th century. Next, we refer to the relation of some representatives of late hermeneutics to Dilthey. Finally, we study and evaluate some views of Dilthey’s critics. Key words DILTHEY, HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY.

If Art is smart and Art is rich, then someone is both smart and rich – namely, Art. And if Art is smart and Bart is smart, then Art is something that Bart is, too – namely, smart. The first claim involves first-order quantification, a generalization concerning what kinds of things there are. The second involves second-order quantification, a generalization concerning what there is for things to be. Or so it appears. Following W.V.O. Quine, many philosophers have endorsed a thesis (...) of Ontological Collapse about second-order quantification. They maintain that ultimately, second-order quantification reduces to first-order quantification over sets or properties, and therefore also carries the latter’s distinctive ontological commitments. In this revised version of his doctoral dissertation, awarded the Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Prize in 2012, Stephan Krämer examines the major arguments for Ontological Collapse in detail and finds all of them wanting. Quantifications, he argues, fall into at least two irreducible kinds: those on what things there are, and those on what there is for things to be. (shrink)

Die Welt ist alles, was wir in unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien beschreiben konnen so eine weit verbreitete Uberzeugung, die seit den Tagen des Positivismus unser Weltbild bestimmt. Aber reicht das tatsachlich schon aus? Wer sich am Ideal der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis orientiert, neigt dazu, viele nicht-begriffliche Erfahrungsformen zu unterschlagen, die uns aus dem Alltag vertraut sind: Symbolsysteme wie Musik, Literatur oder Bilder, Instanzen der unmittelbaren Erfahrung wie Anschauung, Wahrnehmung oder Gefuhl und den Bereich des praktischen Konnens. In der Regel sind wir nicht (...) in der Lage, den Gehalt dieser Phanomene vollstandig begrifflich wiederzugeben. Dennoch ist das weite Feld des Nichtbegrifflichen eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung unserer Satze und Gedanken: Ohne Kunst, Wahrnehmung und Handeln gibt es kein Denken, keine Wissenschaft, keine Philosophie. Der Band geht der Vielfalt des Nicht-Begrifflichen in asthetischen, symboltheoretischen und semantischen Untersuchungen nach. Aus ihnen ergibt sich ein umfassender systematischer Uberblick uber eines der spannendsten und offensten Problemfelder der aktuellen philosophischen Debatte. Mit Beitragen von: Andreas Bartels, Uwe Baumann, Volker Beeh, Gottfried Boehm, Olaf Breidbach, Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Markus Gabriel, Ernest Wolf Gazo, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Jurgen Goldstein, Jens Halfwassen, Thomas Soren Hoffmann, Wolfgang Harms, Jochen Horisch, Peter Janich, Guilherme F. R. Kisteumacher, Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz, Imi Knoebel, Theo Kobusch, Klaus-M. Kodalle, Sibylle Kramer, Guido Kreis, Wolfgang Kubin, Sonke Lorenz, Antonio Cota Marcal, Aliasghar Mosleh, Theodoros Penolidis, Dominik Perler, Hans-Joachim Pieper, Andrzej Przylebski, Birgit Sandkaulen, Matthias Schmoeckel, Oswald Schwemmer, Josef Simon, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Dieter Teichert, Kai Vogeley, Gottfried Willems und Gereon Wolters". (shrink)

Let an oracle be called low for prefix-free complexity on a set in case access to the oracle improves the prefix-free complexities of the members of the set at most by an additive constant. Let an oracle be called weakly low for prefix-free complexity on a set in case the oracle is low for prefix-free complexity on an infinite subset of the given set. Furthermore, let an oracle be called low and weakly for prefix-free complexity along a sequence in case (...) the oracle is low and weakly low, respectively, for prefix-free complexity on the set of initial segments of the sequence. Our two main results are the following characterizations. An oracle is low for prefix-free complexity if and only if it is low for prefix-free complexity along some sequences if and only if it is low for prefix-free complexity along all sequences. An oracle is weakly low for prefix-free complexity if and only if it is weakly low for prefix-free complexity along some sequence if and only if it is weakly low for prefix-free complexity along almost all sequences. As a tool for proving these results, we show that prefix-free complexity differs from its expected value with respect to an oracle chosen uniformly at random at most by an additive constant, and that similar results hold for related notions such as a priori probability. Furthermore, we demonstrate that on every infinite set almost all oracles are weakly low but are not low for prefix-free complexity, while by Shoenfield absoluteness there is an infinite set on which uncountably many oracles are low for prefix-free complexity. Finally, we obtain no-gap results, introduce weakly low reducibility, or WLK-reducibility for short, and show that all its degrees except the greatest one are countable. (shrink)