Abstract.If norms are neither true nor false, can logical relations such as contradiction and entailment obtain between them? Earlier logical positivists and also Hans Kelsen in his later years have answered the question with No. While appreciating the seriousness of the problem, the author of the present paper makes a fresh attempt to answer the question with Yes. His answer presupposes that norms can be judged from the point of view of their rationality. The deontic loic or logic of norms (...) built on this foundation is much more restricted, however, than tae “classical” systems. This again is a consequence of the author's opinion that the sentential connectives (negation, conjunction, disjunction, etc.) apply to norms only on condition that they can be “shifted” from joining norm‐formulations to the descriptive contents of the norms themselves. (shrink)

The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the (...) legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a “minimum content” of natural law is not said to be “law,” but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are “right answers” to moral questions. (shrink)

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

IN 1959 and 1960 I gave the Gifford Lectures in the University of St. Andrews. The lectures were called 'Norms and Values, an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Morals and Legislation'. The present work is substantially the same as the content of the second series of lectures, then advertised under the not very adequate title 'Values'. It is my plan to publish a revised version of the content of the first series of lectures, called 'Norms', as a separate book. (...) The two works will be independent of one another. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Ett urval essäer, reportage, recensioner och insändare. De behandlar existentiella frågor, kapprustningen, idén om en stundande ekokatastrof och visar nya sidor hos den nordiska filosofins superstjärna. Ges ut i samarbete med Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland.[Bokinfo].

The Unprovability of Consistency is concerned with connections between two branches of logic: proof theory and modal logic. Modal logic is the study of the principles that govern the concepts of necessity and possibility; proof theory is, in part, the study of those that govern provability and consistency. In this book, George Boolos looks at the principles of provability from the standpoint of modal logic. In doing so, he provides two perspectives on a debate in modal logic that has persisted (...) for at least thirty years between the followers of C. I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine. The author employs semantic methods developed by Saul Kripke in his analysis of modal logical systems. The book will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in logic, mathematics and philosophy, as well as to specialists in those fields. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Humanismens förfall.--Kunskapens träd.--Naturen, människan och den vetenskapligt-tekniska revolutionen.--Enhet och splittring i vetenskapen.--Människor, matematik och maskiner.--Om Marx och marxismen.--Humanismen som livshållning.

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. (...) Metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

In this paper, the author revisits “the emotive theory of value” and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than “linguistic fictions”. Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a (...) subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life‐style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations “crystallize” into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life. (shrink)

This article contains an overview of the author's long‐standing involvement with deontic logic, both from a technical and from a wider philosophical point of view. As far as the formal aspects of deontic logic are concerned, the author describes his intellectual development from the original discovery of the analogy between modal (and deontic) notions on the one hand, and quantifiers on the other, through the formulation of a systematic theory of dyadic deontic concepts, to the proposal of a formal logic (...) of action as a foundation for deontic logic. In a more philosophical vein, the author discusses such questions as the very possibility of deontic logic if norms have no truth‐value, the relation between the descriptive interpretation of classical deontic logic and the logic of norm‐propositions, the correct representation of conditional or hypothetical norms, the distinction between moral obligation and practical necessity, and the interdefinability of permission and obligation. (shrink)

The Entretiens of the Institut International de Philosophie for 1978 were held in connection with the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, from August 27 to September 1. The theme of the Entretiens was Logic and Philosophy. The undersigned, then President of LI.P., was responsible for the planning of the programme. The programme was designed to consist of four sections with the headings Classical and Intuitionist Logic, Modal Logic and its Applications, Inductive Logic and its Applications, and Logic and Epistemology. (...) The aim was also to convey to philosophers who are not experts in logic an informative and representative impression of some of the main sectors of the vast and rapidly expanding field of philosophical logic. At the same time it was thought that this impression should not be conveyed in the form of a series of survey papers but through presentations and discussions of specific topics falling under the main headings men tioned above. For each section a rapporteur was nominated to read a paper and an interlocuteur to comment on it. The programme chairman is grateful that he was able to engage a representative selection of front rank philosophi cal logicians to perform the various tasks. The papers and the comments are printed in this volume in the order in which they appeared in the Programme of the Entretiens. (shrink)

Symposium in Helsinki, 24-27 August 1970 / Entretiens de Helsinki, 24-27 août 1970.

A feature of the spiritual physiognomy of the twentieth century has been belief in "progress" and in the beneficial influence on human wellbeing of science and technology. Wittgenstein never shares these optimistic sentiments. Towards the end of his life he wrote that there is nothing absurd in the belief that the age of science and technology is "the beginning of the end of humanity" and that mankind steering its course towards the future relying on scientific rationality "is falling into a (...) trap. His life and also his philosophy was a protest against these trends and a search for "a changed mode of thought and life". (shrink)