The Yogacara school of Buddhist thought claims that all language-use is metaphorical. Exploring the profound implications of this assertion, Roy Tzhoar makes the case for viewing the Yogacara account as a full-fledged theory of meaning, one that is not merely linguistic, but also applicable both in the world and in texts.

A defense of Yogacara Buddhism in light of contemporary trends in Western philosophy and theology, this paper begins with an historical survey and proceeds with a comparative analysis. Yogacara was successful in addressing the same problems 1600 years ago that many in the West have failed to address, or even recognize today. With its metaphysical and epistemological implications, Yogacara may also be employed in the resolution of, or continuing investigation into, long-standing problems within Christian theology over and against the (...) Greek metaphysics of presence. (shrink)

Preface Part One Buddhism and Phenomenology Ch.1Buddhism and Phenomenology Ch.2 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty Part Two The Four Basic Buddhist Models in India Introduction Ch.3 Model One: The Five Skandhas Ch.4 Model Two: Pratitya-samutpada Ch.5 Model Three: Tridhatu Ch.6 Model Four: Sila-Samadhi-Prajna Ch.7 Asamjni-samapatti and Nirodha-samapatti Ch.8 Summary of the Four Models Part Three Karma, Meditation, and Epistemology Ch.9 Karma Ch.10 Madhyamikan Issues Ch.11 The Privilaging of Prajna-paramita Part Four Trimsika and Translations Ch.12 Texts and Translations Part Five The Ch’eng (...) Wei-Shih Lun and the Problem of Psychosophical Closure: Yogacara in China Ch.13 Ch.14 Seven Trajectories Ch.15 The Legend of the Transmission of the Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Ch.16 Alterity: Parinama Ch.17 Why Consciousness in Not Empty Ch.18 On Rupa Ch.19 Externality Ch.20 The Four Conditions Ch.21 Mirror Knowing: Soteric Alterations Ch.22 Language, Avijnapti-Rupa and Vijnapti-Rupa Ch.23 Is What is Ultimately Real Itself Ultimately Real? Conclusions Appendices Bibliography Index. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the Yogâcāra Buddhism transmitted by the Indian translator Paramârtha (Ch. Zhendi 真諦) underwent a significant transformation due to the influence of his later Chinese interpreters, a phenomenon to which previous scholars failed to paid enough attention. I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha’s notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of “original awakening” (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In (...) contrast, a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805). The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha’s corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha’s interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha’s disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha’s original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha’s true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 玄奘 (600-664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang’s characterization of the notion of “aboriginal uncontaminated seeds” looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of “tathāgatagarbha” in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of “tathāgatagarbha” strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India. (shrink)

The paper looks for the similarities between illusionism—a contemporary theory of phenomenal consciousness—and the Yogācāra´s philosophy of consciousness presented in Vasubandhu´s Treatise on the Three Natures. Despite substantial divergences in writing style, the commonalities between East and West regarding phenomenal consciousness are considerable. I claim that a particular reading of Vasubandhu´s Treatise on the Three Natures reflects, in many respects, the contemporary illusionist program. Furthermore, I argue that there is not only a meeting point between their postulates about the illusory (...) nature of phenomenal consciousness but also a strong coincidence in the proposed solutions to the most pressing problems that threaten the illusionist paradigm. (shrink)

It is claimed that misrepresentations of Yogācāra Buddhism appeared in older and later works in India, and then in European and other scholarship. The thesis that Yogācāra denies external existence is rejected, the defense being this Buddhist system's own response. Two major sections divide the argument: (1) The Position of the Yogācārins and (2) Three Clarifications of the Position.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind, and: SciousnessBenjamin J. ChickaContexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind. By Tao Jiang. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006. xi + 198 pp.Sciousness. Edited by Jonathan Bricklin. Guilford, CT: Eirini Press, 2006. 229 pp.It has become popular to view Buddhist concepts as nothing more than self-help techniques. The tradition, (...) stripped of religious content, is now used to foster human growth. Given such interests, psychological comparisons have become prevalent and Buddha has been understood as the first to explore the ego. This is a review of two books—Jiang’s Contexts and Dialogue and Bricklin’s Sciousness—approaching such developments from different directions. In Contexts and Dialogue, Tao Jiang worries that jumping into comparison too hastily risks losing original meanings when words are made relative to whatever structure in which they are placed. The original contexts of Yogācāra Buddhism and modern psychology both need to be understood in order to reveal existing presuppositions about how the two can be brought together. Jonathan Bricklin’s Sciousness has more hope for comparative work because he believes he has found an untapped resource for comparison in the theory of sciousness developed by William James (1842–1910). Pragmatic philosophy has yet to be compared with Buddhist traditions in depth, even though both favor practical solutions to problems over merely theoretical pondering.Jiang is a specialist in comparative philosophy. His method is to deconstruct current comparisons between different systems by recovering the original meanings of their different terminologies in their original context and in relation to the particular problems each system was addressing. Comparison can then be reconstructed out of these original contexts so that genuine similarities and differences can emerge. Regarding Yogācāra thought, the systematic theory of mind /consciousness, ālayavijñāna (“storehouse consciousness”) is at its center. This “storehouse of consciousness” is a subliminal reservoir for memories and habits that has made a correlation with the psychological unconscious tempting (pp. 9–10). However, rather than ask whether ālayavijñāna can serve the needs of modern psychology, Jiang first explores what problem it was originally meant to address. He achieves this goal by examining the seventh-century Chinese Buddhist work Cheng Weishi Lun (Discourse on the Perfection of Consciousness-only) of the Buddhist monk pilgrim Xuanzang (Hsüan-tsang, ca. 600–664). Only when this journey is complete does Jiang compare [End Page 201] ālayavijñāna to the psychological theories of Sigmund Freud (1856 –1939) and Carl Jung (1875–1961). The result Jiang argues for is that notions of transcendence and immanence are emphasized differently in the three theories of consciousness offered by Xuanzang, Freud, and Jung.Yogācārins were dealing with deep meditative states in which consciousness is supposed to cease and with the problem of how meditators could arise from such meditative states without violating the doctrine of anātman (“no-self ”). What supports the meditator in these states if no enduring substantive self exists? How can there be identity and change without substantial reification? On the other hand, how can impermanent existence account for the seeming continuity of the world we experience?The answer given by Xuanzang is that an empirical self can be embraced while a metaphysical one is rejected. However, without such a metaphysical self, the question of “whose” arises (p. 27). Whose consciousness of continuous experience is being dealt with if not that of a metaphysical self? The radical solution offered is that ālayavijñāna contains subliminal seeds that produce continuity between successive dharma moments. This solution must be possible without violating the simultaneity of cause and effect. Thus, Xuanzang spoke of dharmas as actual and bījas, seeds of the potential for production, as only potential (p. 60). Perishing dharmas are maintained by the seeds to be manifested in the future and substantive entities are not introduced because seeds are only potential (p. 42). The result is that after deep meditative states when mental activities halt, the mind can emerge from the seeds of mental activity without needing antecedent actual mental activity.Xuanzang’s approach... (shrink)

Over the last several years, there has been a growing controversy about whether Yogacara Buddhism can be said to be idealist in some sense, as used to be commonly thought by earlier scholars. In this paper, I first clarify the different senses of idealism that might be pertinent to the debate. I then focus on some of the works of Vasubandhu, limiting myself to his Vimsatika, Trimsika, and Trisvabhavanirdesa. I argue that classical Yogacara Buddhism, at least as found (...) in these works of Vasubandhu, is closer to epistemic rather than metaphysical idealism or absolute idealism, as I understand these. However, there are undoubtedly some important differences between Vasubandhu's Yogacara and Western epistemic idealism that cast doubt on the idea that Yogacara is simply to be lumped together with Western epistemic idealism. (shrink)

Are there Buddhist conceptions of the unconscious? If so, are they more Freudian, Jungian, or something else? If not, can Buddhist conceptions be reconciled with the Freudian, Jungian, or other models? These are some of the questions that have motivated modern scholarship to approach ālayavijñāna, the storehouse consciousness, formulated in Yogācāra Buddhism as a subliminal reservoir of tendencies, habits, and future possibilities. -/- Tao Jiang argues convincingly that such questions are inherently problematic because they frame their interpretations of the (...) Buddhist notion largely in terms of responses to modern psychology. He proposes that, if we are to understand ālayavijñāna properly and compare it with the unconscious responsibly, we need to change the way the questions are posed so that ālayavijñāna and the unconscious can first be understood within their own contexts and then recontextualized within a dialogical setting. In so doing, certain paradigmatic assumptions embedded in the original frameworks of Buddhist and modern psychological theories are exposed. Jiang brings together Xuan Zang’s ālayavijñāna and Freud’s and Jung’s unconscious to focus on what the differences are in the thematic concerns of the three theories, why such differences exist in terms of their objectives, and how their methods of theorization contribute to these differences. -/- Contexts and Dialogue puts forth a fascinating, erudite, and carefully argued presentation of the subliminal mind. It proposes a new paradigm in comparative philosophy that examines the what, why, and how in navigating the similarities and differences of philosophical systems through contextualization and recontextualization. (shrink)

Indian philosophy has a history of sophisticated linguistic analysis (Pāṇini's grammar being the usual example), which includes theories of reference, polysemy, ellipsis, sentential unity, figurative language, and more. Roy Tzohar's A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor is a sustained argument for attending both to the intertextual nature of Indian philosophy and to the philosophical importance of topics such as metaphor and figurative language. Tzohar's central thesis is that Sthiramati, a fifth- or sixth-century CE Indian Buddhist thinker, has a theory of (...) metaphor ("metaphor" being Tzohar's preferred translation of the Sanskrit upacāra) which can be understood more broadly as a theory of meaning. (shrink)

For Kierkegaard, inwardness is a focusing on one’s own existence. Inwardness is therefore concerned with one’s relations to objects rather than with the objects themselves. This means that within the realm of inwardness objective truth loses importance. For here, the question of the truth of one’s beliefs will not be determined by the existence of the object of one’s belief, but rather by the way in which one holds belief about it. Consequently, says Kierkegaard, ‘as long as this relationship is (...) in truth, the individual is in truth even if he should be thus related to what is not [objectively] true’. This is the basis of his claim that subjectivity is truth. Yet for Kierkegaard, both subjectivity and objectivity can take turns at vanishing and being brought forward. Kierkegaard does not explain the way in which these two transform into one another. Yogacara Buddhism offers insight here because it gives an account of the how subjective and objective reflections can transform into each other. This is done in the three-natures theory of how the other-dependent nature functions as a basis for the transformation of the imagined nature (objectivity) and the ultimate nature (subjectivity) into each other. In the ultimate nature, emptiness and thus freedom is experienced. This parallels Kierkegaard’s idea of inwardness’ relation to freedom. (shrink)

This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 and his protégé Kuiji 窺基, articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in (...) its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih LunCharles MullerBuddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun. By Dan Lusthaus. Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series. London: Routledge, 2002. Pp. xii + 611. Hardcover $65.00.Western students of Yogācāra Buddhism have long been in need of a full-length work that analyzes the key Yogācāra problematic concepts (...) in a comprehensive manner. Due to the lack of such a text, many nonspecialists have been forced to rely on the accounts provided in reference and survey works, which have tended to offer vague and confusing interpretations of what the tradition actually represents. In writing Buddhist Phenomenology, Dan Lusthaus has provided us with the most comprehensive and coherent response to these needs seen in recent years. After decades spent reading descriptions of the school written by both classical and modern scholars that he considers to have missed the point in one way or another, his aim in writing Buddhist Phenomenology is to set the meaning of Yogācāra straight. In so doing, he provides a re-articulation of Yogācāra that amounts to a must-read for anyone with an interest in this seminal Buddhist system.The core thread in this work lies in treating what Lusthaus takes to be the foremost of the misunderstandings of Yogācāra-the meaning of vijñapti-mātra, commonly rendered as "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Standard introductions to Yogācāra for several decades now have tended to explain vijñapti-mātra as either a Buddhist form of "idealism" or a Jungian psychologism wherein the store consciousness is equated with a collective unconscious. Most introductions to "consciousness-only" continue to explain it as a "kind of happy realization and valorizing affirmation of consciousness as a reality, meaning something like 'true cognition' or 'consciousness is real'" (p. 435). Lusthaus argues that Vasubandhu and his colleagues never intended such a valorizing signification, but in fact used the term vijñapti-mātra with "the intent of laying out an indictment of the problems that the activities of consciousness engender" (p. 435). The explanation of exactly how and why this is so necessitates a reexamination of a wide array of arcane Yogācāra concepts. But in a more fundamental sense—at least for Lusthaus (and, we would suppose, for Vasubandhu and Xuanzang)—it implies a reevaluation of one's understanding of the most basic concepts of Buddhism itself, including karma, dependent origination, and selflessness. Lusthaus' main vehicle for carrying out this project is Xuanzang's Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun (CWSL), which Xuanzang composed for the express purpose of clarifying the meaning of Yogācāra in his own time. Lusthaus has been working on the CWSL for decades, and so this book also represents a culmination of his studies on that text.We should not misunderstand, based on the title, that Lusthaus is attempting to write a work of East-West comparative philosophy that directly correlates Husserlian phenomenology and Buddhism. The reason for the reference to phenomenology, as explained in the first two chapters, is that despite the numerous fundamental differences that lie between Buddhism and Western philosophy, when we attempt to translate the discourse of a Buddhist tradition such as Yogācāra, which is epistemological [End Page 135] in character (and not ontological or metaphysical, as it is often construed to be), the branch of Western philosophy that has the language most applicable to the task is that of phenomenology, with such hallmark concepts as noesis/noema and hyle.In these first two chapters Lusthaus gives a welcome review of the various permutations and usages of the term "idealism," as understood by different branches of philosophy, so that we may, later in the book, see exactly why the term is not applicable to what is going on in Yogācāra. In the second part of the book (starting from chapter 3), Lusthaus shows how Yogācāra fleshes out the fundamental components of the Buddha's teaching by examining the terms and concepts located within the discourse of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Sadrā. By Christian Jambet. Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2006. Pp. 497. Hardcover $38.95.Analysis in Śaṅkara Vedānta: The Philosophy of Ganeswar Misra. Edited by Bijayananda Kar. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006. Pp. xxv + 190. Hardcover Rs. 240.00.Bhakti and Philosophy. By R. Raj Singh. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. 112. Hardcover $65.00.Brahman and the Ethos of Organization. (...) By Leonard R. Silos. Paseo de Roxas: Asian Institute of Management, 2006. Pp. xix + 344. Price not given.Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. viii + 145. Hardcover $89.95.Classical Northern Wu Style Tai Ji Quan: The Fighting Art of the Manchurian Palace Guard. By Tina Chunna Zhang and Frank Allen. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2006. Pp. xiii + 203. Paper $21.95.Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience. By Mikel Burley. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. Pp. xiv + 226. Price not given.Comparative Philosophy and Religion in Times of Terror. Edited by Douglas Allen. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. xiv + 257. Hardcover $62.00. Paper $32.00.Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge. By B. Alan Wallace. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 211. Hardcover $29.50, £19.00.Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind. By Tao Jiang. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. Pp. xi + 198. Paper $20.00.Dialogue Transcultural. Edited by Yue Diayun et al. Nanjing: Jiangsu Peoples Press, 2006. Pp. 335. Price not given.Dōgen on Meditation and Thinking: A Reflection on His View of Zen. By Hee-Jin Kim. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 169. Hardcover $65.50. Paper $21.95.The Garden of Loneliness: A Translation of Jayshankar Prasad's Āṅsū, "Tears." By Charles S. J. White. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006. Pp. xv + 136. Hardcover Rs. 295. [End Page 608]The Happening of Tradition: Vallabha on Anumāna in Nyāyalīlāvatī. By Anna-Pya Sjödin. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2006. Pp. 195. Price not given.Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood: Giving Away the Body in Indian Buddhist Literature. By Reiko Ohnuma. 2006. Pp. xvii + 372. Hardcover $45.00, £29.00.Hwa Yu T'ai Chi Ch'uan: Unlocking the Mysteries of the Five-Word Song. By Glenn D. Newth. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2007. Pp. xiii + 160. U.S. $18.95. Can $24.95.A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings. By Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006. Pp. xii + 274. Hardcover $130.00, €100.Letting Be: Fred Dallmayr's Cosmopolitical Vision. Edited by Stephen F. Schneck. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Pp. x + 382. Paper $35.00.Myth and the Existential Quest. By Vassilis Vitsaxis and translated by Deborah Brown Kazazis and Vassilis Vitsaxis. Boston: Somerset Hall Press, 2006. Pp. 301. Hardcover $49.95. Paper $39.95.Nietzsche-Buddha-Zarathustra: Eine West-Ost Konfiguration. By Michael Skowron. Daegu: Kyungpook National University Press, 2006. Pp. 293. Paper $18.00, Won 17,000.Popularizing Buddhism: Preaching as Performance in Sri Lanka. By Mahinda Deegalle. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 241. Hardcover $65.00. Paper $21.95.Ramana Maharashi: The Sage of Arunachala. By Arvind Sharma. New Delhi: Penquin Group, 2006. Pp. 215. Hardcover Rs. 295.Readings in Han Chinese Thought. Edited and translated by Mark Csikszentmihalyi. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006. Pp. xxx + 220. Hardcover $39.95. Paper $14.95.Religions of Korea in Practice. Edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pp. xx + 542. Paper $24.95, £15.95.The Scripture on Great Peace: The Taiping jing and the Beginnings of Daoism. By Barbara Hendrischke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Pp. x + 410. Hardcover $60.00, £38.95.The Self 's Awareness of Itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakantha's Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. By Alex Watson. Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili, 2006. Pp. 433. Price not given... (shrink)

A comprehensive guide to scriptural sources and authors, translations and critical editions of texts, and books and articles on Yogacara and related topics.

Huayan Buddhism is regarded as one of the most philosophical schools of Chinese Buddhism, representing the elite-scholar Buddhism under the Tang Dynasty. Its vision of truth is based on the Avatamsaka Sutra, the scripture that Huayan masters studied, explained, and commented intensively throughout their lives. This was the common vocation of these monks, which gradually created a lineage of the Huayan tradition, a succession of exegetes who believed that the Avatamsaka Sutra was the consummate teaching of Buddha (...) preached directly after his enlightenment under the bodhi tree. Although the base text of Huayan Buddhism was the Avatamsaka Sutra, classified as the round or perfect teaching in the classification of doctrines (panjiao), other teachings, such as Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Tathāgatagarbha had exerted a great influence on the way Huayan scholars apprehended and interpreted this Mahāyāna scripture. In this article, we are going to discuss how Yogācāra philosophy was evaluated in the context of Huayan Buddhism, how the Huayan masters classified the consciousness-only teachings, and finally how they applied this philosophy in revealing the purport of the inline image, formulating its own distinctive school, the round teaching of one vehicle. (shrink)

Do the two rival schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, share more in common than it may appear at first blush? Interpretation of Madhyamaka that see it as a philosophical enterprise concerned with language games, conceptual holism, and the limits of philosophical discourse, it is argued, miss the point about its distinctly epistemic concern with conventions of everyday practice. Likewise, interpretations of Yogācāra that regard it as a form of pure idealism overlook its uniquely phenomenological epistemology. Offering a (...) detailed analysis of the two-truths and three natures doctrines, this paper makes the case for continuity while examine the impact of philosophical trends in modern approaches to Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

Watsuji Tetsurô is famous for having constructed a systematic socio-political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought, in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a balanced theory (...) of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine-tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non-duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities. (shrink)

Various features of the interpretation of these schools main positions, the reasons for their appearance and the consequences for the development of Mahayana Buddhism have been the subject of discussion in this research. Attention is drawn to the existence of various ideas of Buddhist authors about the interpretation of fundamental philosophical ideas of these schools. The influence of the peculiarities of translation into other languages for the adequate transmission of the author’s thought is discussed. It is noted that the (...) possibility of different interpretations was already established in the very methodology of the transmission of Buddhist doctrines, formed at the earliest stages of Buddhism. The opinions of a number of Tibetan authors are analyzed. The study presents the derivation of the existence of different interpretations of some categories central to Mahayana Buddhism due to the presence of different philosophical methodologies. A number of features were associated with the interpretation of the correlation of logical-critical knowledge, yogic methods and their priority in choosing ways to achieve an exit from the chain of rebirth. The factor of similarities in the positions of such authors as Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu (traditionally attributed to different schools) makes it problematic to unambiguously interpret their philosophical positions; Some features of these schools were determined not only by theoretical backgrounds, but also by political struggle for a leading place in the Buddhist hierarchy of a certain country, as well as the desire to affect authorities. (shrink)

This paper outlines a shift in the role of self-awareness from Yogācāra to tantra and connects some of the dots between Yogācāra, Pratyabhijñā, and Buddhist tantric traditions in Tibet. As is the case with Yogācāra, the Pratyabhijñā tradition of Utpaladeva maintains that awareness is self-illuminating and constitutive of objects. Utpaladeva’s commentator and influential successor, Abhinavagupta, in fact quotes Dharmakīrti’s argument from the Pramāṇaviniścaya that objects are necessarily perceived objects. That is, everything known is known in consciousness; there is nothing that (...) can be known outside or separate from consciousness. This aspect of Pratyabhijñā thought is shared with Yogācāra. While Utpaladeva drew upon Yogācāra epistemology to formulate a differential construction of objects, he departed from this theory to develop a distinctive monistic framework for the interpretation of subjectivity. By appealing to the ultimate reality of a singularly nonconceptual, transcendental subject rather than a plurality of conceptual particulars, Utpaladeva appropriated Dharmakīrti’s epistemological model while turning it on its head. That is, Utpaladeva critiqued Dharmakīrti in one context while he is indebted to him in another to establish the framework for his own absolute idealism, where everything happens in and through the absolute self that is Śiva. Utpaladeva extended the place of self-awareness in Yogācāra to formulate an absolute idealism that is the theoretic foundation for philosophical tantra. In this paper, I will chart a trajectory of this development, from Yogācāra to Pratyabhijñā, and show how a parallel development took place in tantric assimilations of Yogācāra in Tibet. (shrink)

This volume collects Jay Garfield 's essays on Madhyamaka, Yogacara, Buddhist ethics and cross-cultural hermeneutics. The first part addresses Madhyamaka, supplementing Garfield 's translation of Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, a foundational philosophical text by the Buddhist saint Nagarjuna. Garfield then considers the work of philosophical rivals, and sheds important light on the relation of Nagarjuna's views to other Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical positions.

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhāṣya on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of (...) this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Triṃśikā-bhāṣya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues. (shrink)

이 논문은 유식학의 사상구조와 분석심리학에 대한 통합적인 이해를 통해 최근 우리사회에서 다양한 형태로 주목받고 있는 명상심리치료에 대한 유식학적 융합모델의 정립을 위한 하나의 시도이다. 이를 통해 필자는 불교학의 패러다임에 현대 심리학의 성과를 통합적으로 도입할 수 있는 단초를 어느 정도 마련해보려는 것이다. 이를 위해 본고는 먼저 불교명상에 대한 최근의 국내․외 연구경향을 간략하게 소개한 후, 유식학과 분석심리학의 기본구조를 이해하기 위해 알라야식에 기반 한 8식의 구조와 융의 의식․무의식의 관계구조를 중심으로 비교․검토하였다. 또한 필자는 이러한 기본적 이해를 토대로 실존적인 고통발생의 기제와 그 해결방안을 제시하는 측면에서 유식학의 (...) 교설 가운데 사상구조의 핵심을 이루는 삼성설과 轉依의 구조를 명상심리의 맥락에서 살펴본 것이다. 결론적으로 유식학의 가장 대표적인 삼성설은 융이 제시하고 있는 바와 같이 현상적 고통의 문제를 중심으로 접근하는 ‘변계소집성’ 중심의 명상심리는 ‘과학적 치료’의 일환으로 상정된다. 한편 의타기성을 근거로 한 노력, 즉 轉依를 향한 ‘원성실성’ 중심의 명상심리는 개성화를 통한 인간전체 즉 자기실현을 향한 수행의 과정과 그 치료적 맥락에서 ‘철학적 치료’의 일환으로 정립할 수 있다고 본다. (shrink)

The connection between early yogācāras, or practitioners of yoga, and later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda philosophy has long preoccupied scholars. But these connections remain obscure. This article suggests that a text that has received little attention in modern scholarship, the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra, may shed light on aspects of early yogācāra contemplative cultures that gave rise to some of the formative dynamics of Yogācāra-vijñānavāda thought. I show how traditional Buddhist meditative practice and engagement with Abhidharma theoretics come together in the Saddharmasmṛtyuasthānasūtra to produce a novel (...) theory of mind that mirrors many of the philosophical problematics that early and late Yogācāra-vijñānavādins confronted and attempted to work out in śāstric detail. (shrink)

A practical, down-to-earth guide to Vasubandhu's classic work "Thirty Verses of Consciousness Only" that can transform modern life and change how you see the world. In this down-to-earth book, Ben Connelly sure-handedly guides us through the intricacies of Yogacara and the richness of the "Thirty Verses." Dedicating a chapter of the book to each line of the poem, he lets us thoroughly lose ourselves in its depths. His warm and wise voice unpacks and contextualizes its wisdom, showing us how we (...) can apply its ancient insights to our own modern lives, to create a life of engaged peace, harmony, compassion, and joy. In fourth-century India one of the great geniuses of Buddhism, Vasubandhu, sought to reconcile the diverse ideas and forms of Buddhism practiced at the time and demonstrate how they could be effectively integrated into a single system. This was the Yogacara movement, and it continues to have great influence in modern Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. "Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only," or "Trimshika," is the most concise, comprehensive, and accessible work by this revered figure. Vasubandhu's "Thirty Verses" lay out a path of practice that integrates the most powerful of Buddhism's psychological and mystical possibilities: Early Buddhism's practices for shedding afflictive emotional habit and the Mahayana emphasis on shedding divisive concepts, the path of individual liberation and the path of freeing all beings, the path to nirvana and the path of enlightenment as the very ground of being right now. Although Yogacara has a reputation for being extremely complex, the "Thirty Verses" distills the principles of these traditions to their most practical forms, and this book follows that sense of focus; it goes to the heart of the matter--how do we alleviate suffering through shedding our emotional knots and our sense of alienation? This is a great introduction to a philosophy, a master, and a work whose influence reverberates throughout modern Buddhism. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans cet article, j'explore comment nous pouvons nous servir d'idées philosophiques provenant du Yogācāra chinois afin d’élargir le projet du féminisme bouddhiste. En me concentrant sur les écrits de Xuanzang (env. 602–664) et de son disciple Kuiji (632–682), j'examine comment la théorie de la conscience du Yogācāra peut être interprétée comme un récit genré de la non-dualité. Ainsi, le terme «dialectique du Yogācāra» serait employé afin de décrire cette théorie de la non-dualité qui souligne la fluidité et la transformabilité. Je (...) soutiens que les Yogācārins chinois ont développé la dialectique du genre, et qu'ils ont ainsi pu éroder subtilement le sexisme à l’époque prémoderne. (shrink)

While phenomenology and Yogacara Buddhism are both known for their investigations of consciousness, there exists a core tension between them: phenomenology affirms the existence of essence, whereas Yogacara Buddhism argues that everything is empty of essence (svabhava). How is constructive cultural exchange possible when traditions hold such contradictory views? -/- Answering this question and positioning both philosophical traditions in their respective intellectual and linguistic contexts, Jingjing Li argues that what Edmund Husserl means by essence differs from what Chinese (...) Yogacarins mean by svabhava, partly because Husserl problematises the substantialist understanding of essence in European philosophy. Furthermore, she reveals that Chinese Yogacara has developed an account of self-transformation, ethics and social ontology that renders it much more than simply a Buddhist version of Husserlian phenomenology. Detailing the process of finding a middle ground between the two traditions, this book demonstrates how both can thrive together in order to overcome Orientalism. (shrink)

The late tenth century siddha and scholar Ratnākaraśānti, also known as the Mahāsiddha Śāntipa, was renowned as the author of both philosophical śāstras and commentaries on tantra. Typically, these are considered separate spheres of activity. However, Ratnākaraśānti’s approach, building on the tradition of scholarship associated with the Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra and the Guhyasamājatantra, as well as on Yogācāra analysis and Buddhist pramāṇa theory, is highly syncretic. This paper is a study of Ratnākaraśānti’s commentaries that highlights his synthesis of the exoteric and esoteric (...) streams of Buddhist discourse, with particular emphasis on the nondual nature of reflexive awareness (svasaṃvitti, rang rig), or 'luminosity' (prakāśa, gsal ba), which serves as the conceptual bridge between sūtra and tantra. (shrink)

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative (...) dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. (shrink)

Development of Buddhist thought in India; 1. The Buddha’s suffering; 2. Practice and theory of no-self; 3. Kleśas and compassion; 4. The second Buddha’s greater vehicle; 5. Karmic questions; 6. Irresponsible selves, responsible non-selves; 7. The third turning: Yogācāra; 8. The long sixth to seventh century: epistemology as ethics; I. Perception and conception: the changing face ofultimate reality; II. Evaluating reasons: Naiyāyikas and Diṅnāga. III. Madhyamaka response to Yogācāra IV. Percepts and concepts: Apoha 1 ; V. Efficacy: Apoha 2 ; (...) VI. The path of the Bodhisattva; Epilogue; Background information; Appendix 1: The languages of Buddhism; Appendix 2: Intellectual context; Appendix 3: The Abhidharma. (shrink)

Xuanzang (602–664) is famous for his legendary life, his important translation works, and also his Discourse on the Realisation of Consciousness-Only (Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, 成唯識論). This text, which is considered as a synthesis of Yogācāra thought, has been diversely interpreted by modern scholars and is still discussed, in particular about the status of external things. Nevertheless, this issue seems to be of little interest for Yogācāra thinkers compared to other topics such as the Noble Path, or else the three types of wisdom (...) (trividhā prajñā, 三慧): learning (śruta, 聞), reasoning (cintā, 思), and cultivating (bhāvanā, 修). As emphasized in recent research, this topic represents a major issue for Buddhist practitioners. In an attempt to analyse it in Xuanzang’s Discourse, and more generally in Yogācāra thought, this paper will first discuss Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s thought on the three types of wisdom. Secondly, since it is important to replace the three types of wisdom in the general argumentation of Xuanzang’s Discourse, we will present the structure of his text which is modelled on a “path” leading progressively to Supreme Awakening. Then, we will present the main elements of the Noble Path and situate the three types of wisdom into it. Finally, we will explain that Xuanzang follows Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s conceptions and eventually confirm the importance of the three types of wisdom in Yogācāra thought. (shrink)

I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a (...) deep renunciation of the world. Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with ‘emptiness,’ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose. Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of ‘Oneness,’ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks to avoid, namely, eternalism. I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as ‘pliancy.’ This would imply that what Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution. (shrink)

In Sect. 1 an argument for Yogācāra Buddhist Idealism, here understood as the view that everything in the universe is of the nature of consciousness / cognition, is laid out. The prior history of the argument is also recounted. In Sect. 2 the role played in this argument by light as an analogy for cognition is analyzed. Four separate aspects of the light analogy are discerned. In Sect. 3, I argue that although light is in some ways a helpful analogy (...) for the Buddhist Idealist, in other ways it is thoroughly inappropriate. At the end of the article I ask whether the lack of fit between light and cognition is unavoidable, or whether the Buddhist Idealists could have chosen a better analogy. (shrink)

Emptiness is a central concept in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy; however, it has multiple meanings. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the most prominent meanings of emptiness in Mahāyāna Buddhism and highlight some important interpretive disputes. This chapter is also an exercise in comparative philosophizing; it discusses similarities between the emptiness concept and some Western philosophical ideas. The Madhyamaka assertion that all things are empty means that they are all dependently originating; they lack or are empty of autonomous (...) existence because they are reliant on causes to bring them into and sustain their existence. Another concept of emptiness occurs in the buddha‐nature teaching. The chapter presents Yogācāra as a form of ontological idealism, which claims that the external world of objects is actually a creation of the mind. It explains that the concept of emptiness in Mahāyāna Buddhism is contested and open to a variety of interpretations. (shrink)

The Pātañjalayogaśāstra concludes with a description of the pinnacle of yoga practice: a state of samādhi called dharmamegha, cloud of dharma. Yet despite the structural importance of dharmamegha in the soteriology of Pātañjala yoga, the śāstra itself does not say much about this term. Where we do find dharmamegha discussed, however, is in Buddhist yogācāra, and more broadly in early Mahāyāna soteriology, where it represents the apex of attainment and the superlative statehood of a bodhisattva. Given the relative paucity of (...) Brahmanical mentions of dharmamegha in the early common era, Patañjali appears to adopt this key metaphor from a Mahāyāna context—and to revise its primary meaning from fullness to emptiness. This article traces the early elaborations of dharmamegha in Buddhist texts, and, drawing on conceptual metaphor theory, lays out four arguments that each, in part, accounts for the stark contrast in how classical yoga and yogācāra employ the superlative metaphor of dharmamegha. (shrink)

Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...) Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. (shrink)

In this article, I elaborate on the approach to joy preserved in East Asian Yogācāra texts authored by Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji. I argue that these Yogācāra Buddhists propose a contextualist approach that does not presume joy to be an emotion with an essential property but rather perceives joy as always contextualized in lifeworlds at the personal and interpersonal levels. As such, Xuanzang and Kuiji outline two contrasting pictures of joy to capture how it is experienced in the lifeworld (...) of ignorance and the lifeworld of wisdom, respectively. Upon delineating what joy is and how it is experienced, I continue to explore what joy can promise. Since joy does not have an inherent property, people can always make a collaborative effort to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation. As such, I hope to draw on the Yogācāra analysis of joy to enrich the feminist discussion on happiness. (shrink)