: Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure in extremis still (...) does not save the appearances of his predecessors, nevertheless, for Dennett tacitly presupposes the existence of veridical phenomenology in his very treatment of non-veridical sensory phenomena that he uses to argue analogically from, to thereby suggest the plausibility of a parallel illusoriness of veridical phenomena of perception and introspection. This inhering inconsistency renders unsound Dennett's radical extension of the logic of identity theory, and ironically shows up the persistence of mental phenomenology that extant reductionism appears so desirous to argumentively eliminate. Nonetheless there is much to be learned from such an analysis of Dennett's purported elimination of mental contents, for a generalization of our critique throws light on the occult assumptions underlying realism and reductionism since early identity theory and its variants, and upon the possible viability of that programme as a whole., Someone does a sum in his head. He uses the result, let's say, for building a bridge or a machine[horizontal ellipsis]. There surely must have been calculation going on, and there was. For he knows that, and how, he calculated; and the correct result he got would be inexplicable without calculation.-But what if I said: "It strikes him as if he had calculated[horizontal ellipsis]." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, [S] 364), My debt to Wittgenstein is large and longstanding. When I was an undergraduate, he was my hero[horizontal ellipsis]. I gave up trying to "be" a Wittgensteinian, and just took what I thought I had learned from the Investigations and tried to put it to work. ( Dennett, 1991, p. 463), (C) 2003 by the American Psychological Association. (shrink)

The present book is the result of the conference 'Renovatio, inventio, absentia imperii. From the Roman Empire to Contemporary Imperialism', held in Brussels at the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Academia Belgica in Rome (September 11-13, 2014). At the heart of the conference was the 'reception', 'Nachleben' or 'permanence' of the Roman Empire, of an idea and a historical paradigm which since classical Antiquity has supported the most widespread claims to obtain and consolidate power. The volume's focus (...) is on culture in a broad sense, i.e. including besides the arts, philosophy, religion and, most importantly, discourse. As such, a wide array of themes are subjected to academic scrutiny. Whereas the main focus is on Europe and North America, some contributors also reach out towards non-Western contexts, whether or not directly related to the Roman example. A theoretical and sociological dimension is also added thanks to the discussion on methodological issues. More specifically, the following question(s) receive particular attention: what is our position as researchers, embedded in a contemporary, often Western, democratic and capitalist context; what about the notion of empire itself, its constituent elements and the kind of ideological prerogatives to which it is generally subjected; in other words, apart from the many historical variants and instances of reception of empire, through which filters can, and inevitably do, we approach this topic? A question that has become ever more pregnant since the beginning of the twenty-first century, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events of September 11, which have revivified what could be called American 'imperialism', and at a time when an essentially economic variant, driven by 'emerging' powers such as China, has increasingly contested existing power structures."--Page [4] of cover. (shrink)

The article investigates how national and international measures to protect wolves turned the whole of Norway into a field of study for wildlife biologists, and how the extensiveness of this “field” prompted a transformation in the methods employed to count and monitor wolves. As it was not possible to conduct traditional field studies throughout the whole of Norway, the biologists constructed an extensive infrastructure, which I have termed a “counting complex,” in order to count wolves from a distance. The article (...) identifies three decisive periods in the construction of this complex: the 1960s, the 1980s, and the first decade of the new millennium. During the first two periods, biologists used the infrastructure to mobilize ordinary people’s observations; they did this by first searching through newspaper notes, then enrolling people more directly through local committees of game management. However, the public’s observations often turned out to be unreliable, and, in the 2000s, molecular biologists helped to incorporate genetic techniques into the counting complex. By using the infrastructure to mobilize wolf scat, rather than observations, and by constructing DNA profiles for individual wolves, the molecular biologists enabled research that I have termed “nationwide field studies in absentia.” The article argues that the biologists’ main motive for constructing and refining the counting complex was to make wolves amenable to government, as they considered this a vital premise for the successful practice of protecting wolves. The increased intensity in monitoring in the last period, however, was also driven by international conventions and detailed regulations. (shrink)

Mark Crooks has given a helpful discussion of Daniel Dennett's "philosophical abolition of mind," adding to the list of reasons why many philosophers jokingly say Dennett should have titled his 1991 book "Consciousness Explained Away". As Crooks argues, Dennett really is committed 'to our phenomenal experience, beliefs, desires, etc. as all being illusory in the strongest possible sense. Yet, when it comes to free will, Dennett fights hard to maintain that free will is something more than an illusion, that it (...) is a capacity our neurophysiological machinery has. Dennett's new book-like his writings on mind and consciousness-is short on argument and long on rhetoric and cute stories. And herein lies Dennett's greatest strength, to seemingly make palatable ideas that many people think stand no chance. This, however, is also his greatest weakness in that ultimately the rhetoric fails to carry the day under closer scrutiny. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The primary end of an account of personal identity is to discover what phenomena explain a person’s status as a unified agent and contribute to the person’s self-understanding. This paper explores the consequences upon a person’s ability to understand her motives for action, as unified agency requires, when the person is removed from the source of her identity and from the practices that support the self-regarding attitudes to which this identity gives rise.

The paper proposes a solution to the problem with Odysseus’ kingship in the Odyssey by maintaining that Odysseus is not officially considered dead. Consequently, Telemachus cannot inherit the position of king and Penelope must leave Odysseus’ household before remarrying. After discussing the modern concept of legal death and previous interpretations of the Ithacan situation, the paper focusses on Athena's speech at 1.275–92. A close reading demonstrates that erecting a cenotaph to Odysseus would be tantamount to a modern declaration of death (...) in absentia, since it will render Penelope a widow and Telemachus the head of the household. This legal convention chimes with the Homeric depiction of Hades. (shrink)

Haunting history -- Presence in absentia -- Chladenius, Droysen, Dilthey : back to where we've never been -- The analog ceiling -- The past that is.

Healthcare environments continue to prove discriminatory and marginalizing towards patients and healthcare workers themselves, which contributes to inequitable health outcomes across lines of socially constructed difference. This content and discourse analysis of nursing identity scholarship asks whether there is a connection between nursing identity and oppressive behaviour by examining the construction of nursing identity and the foundational discourses, sometimes in absentia, that support such a construction. Bourdieu's concepts of social fields and Audre Lorde's concept of the master's house are (...) applied as a framework towards understanding the constructs of power and status in healthcare. The analysis identifies a gap in nursing identity literature where social constructs of difference are not considered. In the reviewed literature, nursing identity has been co‐opted by the professionalization project in effort to stabilize a conceptualization of nursing's contribution to healthcare towards gaining professional and societal status. This leads to a monolithic, apolitical representation of nursing identity that erases difference, denies historical influence, universalizes nursing work and further marginalizes marginalized identities. The oppressive and hegemonic nature of a universal nursing identity may contribute to a lack of disciplinary reflexivity about the ongoing influences of foundational discursive constructs of gender, epistemology, power and professional status. (shrink)

Quels sont les liens entre phantasia et perception? Aristote a bien découvert en la première, rattachée à la seconde, la faculté de se représenter en l'absence. Il y a certes des cas de représentation en présence imputés à la phantasia, mais cet emploi du terme, qui renvoie à des situations infraperceptives, est plutôt résiduel. Ces cas pathologiques sont pour Aristote assez peu dignes d'intérêt. On ne peut dire que la phantasia « interprète ». What is the link between phantasia and (...) perception? Although it depends on aisthêsis itself, Aristotle calls phantasia a faculty of representing in absentia, of which he is the discoverer. Of course, some cases of representation in praesentia are attributed to phantasia, but this use of the word is not central; these cases are cases below perception proper, and pathology of perception is of minor interest in Aristotle's mind. Phantasia is not an interpretation of the data. (shrink)

The radical Islamist regime of the Taliban affords an extensive view of the logic of Muslim fundamentalism regarding the public and private spheres. I argue that the Taliban de-privatized several life-spheres, "publicizing" religion and the body. The Taliban performed power as public spectacle, employing public executions, amputations and whippings. Religion, too, was to be completely public, as Habermas argues it was in Europe before the 18th century. As soon as they took Kabul, the Taliban insisted that all residents had to (...) say their five daily prayers, the men in mosques. Likewise, men were given six weeks to grow out their beards to a hand's length and to trim their moustaches in accordance with a literal reading of sayings about the Prophet Muhammad's appearance. The young female memoirist of life in Taliban Kabul, Latifa, reported that her middle class father complied with the new rule, but insisted, "My beard belongs to the Taliban, not to me!" The rendering public of religion made public property of every religious act. His body had a choice, of being conformed to the movements and shaping of religion, or of being tortured because of lack of compliance. This publicization of the believer's body resulted in an alienation from individuals of parts of themselves. Likewise, the gendered character of the public and private spheres, with women being confined to the private, is as visible in Taliban thinking as it is in Hegel. The expansion of the public realm of religion and morality by the Taliban had the effect of shrinking the private sphere and so constraining women further. Girls' schools were shuttered and many war widows were reduced to begging and risking sanctions for being in the street without a male guardian. Posters of Bollywood actresses were forbidden, and Kate Winslet was condemned to death in absentia for portraying a fornicator in The Titanic. It is argued that the goal of perfectly privatizing the female body lay behind these Draconian measures. (shrink)

The coupled growth of population aging and international migration warrants attention on the methods and solutions available to adult children living overseas to provide distance caregiving for their aging parents. Despite living apart from their parents, the transnational informal care literature has indicated that first-generation immigrants remain committed to carry out their filial caregiving obligations in extensive and creative ways. With functions to remotely access health information enabled by emergency, wearable, motion, and video sensors, remote monitoring technologies (RMTs) may thus (...) also allow these international migrants to be alerted in sudden changes and remain informed of their parent’s state of health. As technological solutions for caregiving, RMTs could allow independent living for older persons while any unusual deviations from normal health patterns are detected and appropriately supported. With a vignette of a distance care arrangement, we engage with concepts such as filial piety, in-absentia caregiving distress, and the social exchange theory, as well as the upholding of shifting cultural ideals to illustrate the complex dynamic of the satisfaction and quality of the informal caregiving relationship. This paper extends the traditional ethical issues in technology-aided caregiving, such as autonomy, privacy, and justice, to be considered within the context of distance care. We also posit newer ethical considerations such as consent in power imbalances, harm to caregivers, and stigma. These known and new ethical issues aim to encourage further ethically conscious design and use of RMTs to support distance care for older persons. (shrink)

Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical (...) percepts, as interpreted by elementary science of perception, and as this implicates a more general critique of naive realism and its applications to such hypothetical scenarios as our actual existence within cranial vats and the so-called inverted spectrum argument devolved from Locke. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

As today's battles rage between those who march under the banner of liberty and those who unfurl the flag of equality, even an engaged partisan might be forgiven for occasionally wondering whether the game is, after all, worth the candle. For one thing, neither party simply rejects the other's principle – properly understood. Egalitarians routinely emphasize that their concern for equality is, also, a concern for true liberty; thus Michael Walzer, writing “In Defense of Equality,” finds it “worth stressing that (...) equality as I have described it does not stand alone, but is closely related to the idea of liberty.” 1 Libertarians tend to be less enthusiastic in their embrace of equality, but almost all endorse some form of equality or other – for example, equality of political rights or equality before the law. It would seem, then, that the differences between egalitarians and libertarians are really over the meaning and scope of equality and liberty, and that putting the issue as one of equality vs. liberty may be misleading. More important, one can wonder whether either the egalitarian or the libertarian combination of the principles of liberty and equality is worthy of support. What society has exalted personal liberty, has taken rights more seriously, than ours? Yet who can easily dismiss Solzhenitsyn's charge that our worship of freedom has resulted in “destructive and irresponsible freedom” being granted “boundless scope,” leaving us defenseless against “the corrosion of evil”? 2 The cause of liberty against tyranny surely continues to command our support; but what conclusion ought we to draw from the facts that liberty in absentia seems so markedly more attractive than liberty in practice, and that the qualities manifested in the struggle for liberty seem so superior to those that come to the fore once liberty is secured? (shrink)

Pejoratives carry with themselves as part of their meaning the stereotype containing representations (concepts) of negative qualities ascribed to the target, and the claim that the target is bad because it has these negative qualities. This is the kernel of our conceptual truth conditional proposal that this paper expounds and defends. The paper starts with a brief taxonomy of views, and very briefly mentions the reasons for disagreeing with the majority of them. The paper then argues for our truthconditional conceptual (...) view from ordinary nasty inferences involving pejoratives, and then passes to figurative pejoratives offering a novel argument from the metaphorical nature of them. Decoding metaphorical meaning is a cognitive task. Since cognition has to do with semantic traits, and since the cognitive task is a good indicator of semantic structure, this cognitive complexity indicates interesting semantic properties of pejoratives, namely that the negative material involved in the traditional uses of such a pejorative is not merely expressive, but is part of its cognitive, truth-evaluable meaning. Some objectionsand replies follow. The conclusion briefly discusses the pragmatics of pejoratives pointing to the ubiquitous but little noticed use of pejoratives in the third person, slurring in absentia. This use suggests a novel interpretation of the perlocutory nature of the use of pejoratives. (shrink)

Today’s pornography constitutes a semiotic laboratory capable of meticulously describing some characteristics of the cultures from which it comes and for which it is intended. In it, the role of the face is preeminent and assumes relevance both from a diegetic and a formal point of view. A face which makes itself a sign and is articulated in a dialectic between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axis, finding expression as an aspectual device, establishing a peculiar semiotic procedure of absentia (...) in praesentia, and highlighting an eminently enunciative dimension of the textual genre. Thus a facial semiotics of pornography becomes to all effects a cultural semiotics, which through the exploration of a transversal genre – both in its mainstream and more niche actualizations – produces significant results in defining how cultures of the face, including extrapornographic ones, delineate themselves. The aim of this article is to verify this peculiar facial semiotics through a case history that stretches from traditional to contemporary pornography, also analysing the “facial pornography” website beautifulagony.com and the visual works of some contemporary artists. (shrink)

The subject of the research in this article are certain aspects of the "philosophy of culture" of the prominent thinker, theologian, historian of Russian thought Georgy Vasilyevich Florovsky, which influenced the evolution of his worldview. Special attention is paid to the facts of the "European" period of his biography, the analysis of his "Eurasian" works, as well as his assessments of the philosophical concepts of some Russian thinkers and calls for the conversion of the process of cultural creativity to spiritual (...) principles. Particular attention is paid to the content of the discussion that unfolded between G.V. Florovsky, N.S. Trubetskoy and (in absentia) N.Ya. Danilevsky on the problem of the status of "universal culture" and the mutual influences of cultures. The study reveals the philosophical nuances of the evolution of G. Florovsky's views as a "Eurasian" author based on his own works and the assessments contained therein. Scientific literature often emphasizes the influence of Eurasian ideology on G. Florovsky, expressed, in particular, in his ideas about culture and cultural creativity. However, based on the analysis of the material presented in the article, the author comes to the conclusion that G.V. Florovsky, although he was a member of the Eurasian circle, on some significant issues differed from the main direction of development of the Eurasian ideology presented by E. Trubetskoy. (shrink)

Far from being haphazard, Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay on cinema and 1953 notes on cinema for the lectures at the Collège de France are a precursor of a genuine phenomenology of cinema. Accordingly, in this paper I shall demonstrate that a phenomenology of movement and space tacitly appears in films, since cinema is the art of motion on screen and therefore the art of intersubjectivity par excellence. Moreover, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontological conception of the chiasm between the visible and the (...) invisible resembles the interlacing of the “two spaces” mentioned by Noël Burch. Likewise, the interpretation of the world as the “something else” that is simultaneously present and absent in every appearance corresponds, in cinema, to Alain Bergala’s “présence in absentia” of the off-screen on the screen – i.e., to the opening up of off-screen space by means of eyeline match and characters exiting and entering the frame. I finally claim that the use both of long take and depth of field, as analysed by film theorist André Bazin, and of specific camera movements, as analysed by neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, preserves the continuity of reality and give the impression that the film is a perceptual experience that happens within reality’s space-time continuum.Loin d’être incohérent, l’essai de 1945 de Merleau-Ponty sur le cinéma et ses notes sur le cinéma pour son cours au Collège de France en 1953 sont les précurseurs d’une vraie phénoménologie du cinéma. Dans ce texte, je démontre qu’une phénoménologie du mouvement et de l’espace apparaît tacitement dans les films puisque le cinéma est l’art du mouvement à l’écran et par conséquent l’art de l’intersubjectivité par excellence. Par ailleurs, je montre que la conception ontologique de Merleau-Ponty du chiasme entre le visible et l’invisible ressemble à l’entrelacement des « deux espaces » mentionnés par Noël Burch. De même, l’interprétation du monde comme le « quelque chose d’autre » simultanément présent et absent dans toute apparition correspond, au cinéma à la « présence in absentia » du hors champ dans le champ d’Alain Bergala – à savoir l’ouverture de l’espace du hors champ par la technique du eyeline match et des personnages qui entrent et sortent du cadre. Je soutiens enfin que l’usage à la fois du plan long et de la profondeur de champ, analysés par le théoricien du cinéma André Bazin, ainsi que de mouvements spécifiques de caméra, analysés par le neuroscientifique Vittorio Gallese, préserve la continuité de la réalité et donne l’impression que le film est une expérience perceptive qui se produit à l’intérieur du continuum de l’espace temps de la réalité.Lungi dall’essere interventi estemporanei, i saggi di Merleau-Ponty sul cinema del 1945 e le sue note sul cinema per il corso al Collège de France del 1953 sono precursori di un’autentica fenomenologia del cinema. In questo articolo intendo mostrare come nei film si delinei tacitamente una fenomenologia del movimento e dello spazio, poiché il cinema è l’arte del movimento sullo schermo e per eccellenza l’arte dell’intersoggettività. Inoltre, intendo mettere in luce come la concezione ontologica merleau-pontyana del chiasma di visibile e invisibile si accosti all’intreccio dei “due spazi” menzionati da Noël Burch. In modo analogo, considererò l’interpretazione del mondo come il “qualcos’altro” che è al contempo presente e assente in ogni apparizione come corrispondente, nel cinema, a quella che Alain Bergala definisce la presenza “in absentia” del fuori campo sullo schermo, ossia all’apertura dello spazio fuori campo per mezzo del raccordo sullo sguardo e dell’ingresso e dell’uscita dei personaggi rispetto all’inquadratura. Infine, sosterrò che tanto l’impiego del long take e della profondità di campo, descritti dal teorico del cinema André Bazin, quanto l’uso di specifici movimenti di macchina, analizzati dal neuroscienziato Vittorio Gallese, preservino la continuità del reale e forniscano l’impressione che il film sia un’esperienza percettiva che si svolge entro il continuum spazio-temporale della realtà. (shrink)

This contribution responds to the ongoing discussion about the narrativity of history and looks at some differences between fictive and historical narrative. The objective of this contribution is to further elaborate on the ideas of narrative transformations developed by Wolf Schmid, focusing particularly on historical narratives. The authors see differences between both kinds of narrative, especially on the level of reference (which is in line with the views of D. Cohn, P. Ricouer and L. Doležel). The problem of fiction and (...) reference is illustrated by Schmid's four tiered narratological model, especially on the level of happening. In fiction, this tier (of happening) is inferred backwards based on the presentation of the narration. This tier is positioned (excluded in absentia) so the elements of the narrative can be selected. In historical narrative happening has a different status and precedes both the story and the text. Although the shape of the past is related to the presentation of the narrative, it is not determined by nor reduced to it. The authors of this contribution describe the specific character and aspects of narrative transformation in the writing process. (shrink)

This book examines the works of major artists between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, as important barometers of individual and collective values toward non-human life. Once viewed as merely representational, these works can also be read as tangential or morally instrumental by way of formal analysis and critical theories. Chapter Two demonstrates the discrimination toward large and small felines in Genesis and The Book of Revelation. Chapter Three explores the cruel capture of free roaming animals and how artists depicted their (...) furs, feathers and shells in costume as symbols of virtue and vice. Chapter Four identifies speciest beliefs between donkeys and horses. Chapter Five explores the altered Dutch kitchen spaces and disguised food animals in various culinary constructs in still life painting. Chapter Six explores the animal substances embedded in pigments. Chapter Seven examines animals in absentia-in the crafting of brushes. The book concludes with the fish paintings of William Merritt Chase whose glazing techniques demonstrate an artistic approach that honors fishes as sentient beings. (shrink)

This article examines Aby Warburg’s enterprise as an anamnesis, as a question of memory in exosomatisation in relation to the pharmakon. Here the pharmakon is considered as a ‘support’ in relation to questions of ‘care’ and as a therapeutics, prescribing the way by which such a pharmakon can become or remain curative, rather than toxic. The discussion looks at how the pharmakon makes possible the transmission of the condition of knowledge, that is: as a preindividual milieu that contains, retains and (...) re-activates traumatypes, providing opportunities for bifurcations in the future. Warburg’s employment of photographic montage is considered as an exploration of pharmacological possibilities inherent to tertiary retentions and providing the condition for revenance. Such revenance is proposed as the return of the serpent in absentia: as a new form of tertiary retention that today appears as digital tertiary retention. At stake is the libido’s economisation, interactivity and algorithmic governmentality all of which effect the faculties for dreaming, imagination and knowledge. (shrink)

O episcopado francês e a lei de Separação - Reflexão sobre um processo de reconhecimento ( The French episcopate and the Law of Separation -Reflection on a process of recognition - L`épiscopat français et la loi de Séparation - Retour sur un processus de reconnaissance). O “princípio da modernidade” – introduzido pela Revolução Francesa e ratificado por um conjunto de leis durante o século XIX – rompe com o tradicional “princípio do Estado confessional católico” e estabelece o regime de separação (...) entre a Igreja Católica e o Estado francês. Como a Igreja recebeu o regime de separação entre Igreja e Estado, constituído à sua revelia e, geralmente, contra ela? O artigo propõe-se a responder a pergunta, destacando dois pontos de vista: a) o da ruptura, segundo o qual a instituição católica, marcada pelo princípio do Estado cristão, nutre forte hostilidade contra o regime laico, ainda que estabelecendo com ele acordos práticos; b) e o da continuidade, sob o qual a Igreja acolhe e defende o princípio da “sã laicidade” e justifica a liberdade pública de consciência. Baseado em minuciosa leitura de documentos oficiais da Igreja e do episcopado francês, o artigo dialoga com os dois pontos de vista evocados, analisando seus termos e interpretando criticamente seus pressupostos e suas teses. Palavras-chave: Estado confessional; Estado laico; Laicidade; Episcopado francês.The "principle of modernity" - introduced by the French Revolution and ratified by a set of laws during the nineteenth century - breaks with the traditional "principle of the Catholic confessional state" and establishes the separation between the Catholic Church and the French State. How did the Church receive the system of separation of church and state, made in absentia and generally against the church? This paper seeks to answer that question, highlighting two points of view: a) the break, according to which the Catholic institution, marked by the principle of the Christian State, nourishes strong hostility against the secular regime, although establishing practical agreements with such regime b) the point of view of continuity, under which the Church welcomes and embraces the principle of "healthy secularism" and justifies the public liberty of conscience. Based on careful reading of official documents of the Church and of the French episcopate, this article dialogues with the two mentioned points of view , analyses and interprets in a critical way their terms, assumptions and theses. Keywords : State religion; Secular state; Secularism; French episcopate. Résumé Le “principe de la modernité” – introduit par la Révolution française et ratifié par un ensemble de lois durant le XIXème siècle – rompt avec le traditionnel “principe de l’État confessionnel catholique” et établit le régime de séparation entre l’Église catholique et l’État français. Comment l’Église a-t-elle reçu le régime de séparation entre Église et État, institué malgré elle, et, généralement, contre elle? L’article se propose de répondre à cette question en soulignant deux points de vue: a) celui de la rupture qui fait que l’institution catholique, marquée par le principe de l’État chrétien, nourrit une forte hostilité envers le régime laïque, bien qu’elle passe des accords pratiques avec lui; b) celui de la continuité, qui fait que l’Église accueille et défend le principe de la “saine laïcité” et justifie la liberté publique de conscience. Basé sur une lecture minutieuse de documents officiels de l’Église et de l’Épiscopat français, l’article dialogue avec ces deux points de vue, analyse leurs termes, tout en interprétant de manière critique leurs présupposés et thèses. Mots-clés: État confessionnel. État laïque. Laïcité. Épiscopat français. (shrink)