This paper suggests that the cases made for atoms and the aether in nineteenth-century physical science were analogous, with the implication that the case for the atom was less than compelling, since there is no aether. It is argued that atoms did not play a productive role in nineteenth-century chemistry any more than the aether did in physics. Atoms and molecules did eventually find an indispensable home in chemistry but by the time that they did so they (...) were different kinds of entities to those figuring in the speculations of those natural philosophers who were atomists. Advances in nineteenth-century chemistry were a precondition for rather than the result of the productive introduction of atoms into chemistry. (shrink)

A new model for the aether is suggested according to which it is a superfluid state of fermion and antifermion pairs, describable by a macroscopic wave function. The vacuum state of this superfluid pervades the entire universe and may account for the missing matter. The visible matter in the universe appears as excitations from the underlying superfluid vacuum.

P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm; direction: ltr; color: rgb; widows: 2; orphans: 2; }P.western { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; }P.cjk { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; }P.ctl { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; } Hegel's transient notion of "Aether", developed and finally abandoned again during his short period of time at the University of Jena in the early years of the 19th century, has received comparatively little attention so far – much less than, for example, his (...) Phenomenology of Spirit, or his later systematic works which he published after his departure from Jena. In modern and contemporary physics, on the other hand, novel notions comparable to Hegel's "aether" have become interesting again with the rise of quantum physics. In this essay we recapitulate and explain the notion of "Aether" in Hegel's works and compare it to novel aether concepts which might be appropriate in the context of contemporary quantum physics. Such a juxtaposition would well have matched Hegel's own intentions, since he had always been a keen observer of the latest developments in the natural sciences during his own lifetime. In conclusion we can say that, in spite of a number of differences, both notions of aether can be speculatively characterised by the paradoxical term "reality of possibility". (shrink)

Throughout Immanuel Kant’s works on natural philosophy, he utilizes an omnipresent aether to explain a wide variety of physical events: including optical, thermodynamical, chemical, and magnetic phenomena. Kant even went as far as claiming that the existence of an omnipresent physical aether can be deduced a priori (without appeal to experience, observation, or experiment), in the notorious “aether proof” of his _Opus postumum_. In retrospect, these commitments are widely seen as a blunder, especially after the demise of (...) the luminiferous aether at the turn of the 20th century. In this paper, I situate Kant’s theory of the aether in the context of the physics of his day. I show that, contra the common understanding of the Scientific Revolution, the 17th and 18th centuries witnessed a staggering proliferation of aethereal explanations in natural philosophy: those appealing to subtle substances as causal grounds for classes of physical phenomena. Kant was a part of this tradition in physics, and his aether theory was no embarrassment but rather revealed a keen understanding both of coeval aethereal theories and their shortcomings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As well as the mathematically-supported celestial mechanics that Newton developed in his Principia, Newton also proposed a more speculative natural philosophy of interparticulate forces of attraction and repulsion. Although this speculative philosophy was not made public before the ‘Queries’ which Newton appended to the Opticks, it originated far earlier in Newton’s career. This article makes the case that Newton’s short, unfinished manuscript, entitled ‘De Aere et Aethere’, should be seen as an important landmark in Newton’s intellectual development, being the (...) first work in which Newton assumed there are repulsive forces operating at a distance between the particles of bodies. The article offers an account of how Newton came to write ‘De Aere et Aethere’ and why. It also outlines its relationship to the ‘Conclusio’, with which Newton briefly intended to finish the Principia, and to the ‘Queries’ in the Opticks. The date of the manuscript is disputed, and the article also aims to settle this dispute. Claims that the ‘De Aere et Aethere’ must have been written before the ‘Hypothesis... of Light’ of 1675 are dismissed, and it is suggested, following R. S. Westfall, that it was written after a well-known letter Newton wrote to Boyle early in 1679. (shrink)

Introduction to alternative ontology of mind and physics based on the multi-dimensional model of A Geometric Theory of the Universe (Holster).

The introduction by Dirac of a new aether model based on a stochastic covariant distribution of subquantum motions (corresponding to a “vacuum state” alive with fluctuations and randomness) is discussed with respect to the present experimental and theoretical discussion of nonlocality in EPR situations. It is shown (1) that one can deduce the de Broglie waves as real collective Markov processes on the top of Dirac's aether; (2) that the quantum potential associated with this aether's modification, by (...) the presence of EPR photon pairs, yields a relativistic causal action at a distance which interprets the superluminal correlations recently established by Aspect et al.; (3) that the existence of the Einstein-de Broglie photon model (deduced from Dirac's aether) implies experimental predictions which conflict with the Copenhagen interpretation in certain specific testable interference experiments. (shrink)

The paper presents the notion of “Spirit of Nature” in Henry More and describes its position within More’s philosophical system. Through a thorough analysis, it tries to show in what respects it can be considered a scientific object and in what respects it cannot. In the second part of this paper, More’s “Spirit of Nature” is compared to Newton’s various attempts at presenting a metaphysical cause of the force of gravity, using the similarities between the two to see this notorious (...) problem of Newton scholarship in a new light. One thus sees that if Newton drew from Stoic and Neo-Platonic theories of aether or soul of the world, we need to fully acknowledge the fact that these substances were traditionally of a non-dualistic, half-corporeal, half-spiritual nature. Both More’s “Spirit of Nature” and Newton’s aether can thus be understood as different attempts at incorporating such a pneumatic theory into the framework of modern physics, as it was then being formed. (shrink)

As befits the proem to so original and immense an undertaking, this passage echoes, in order to retort them upon their inventors, the mythopoeic commonplaces of other ancient schools. One such commonplace was the assertion that some man was the first to effect a revolution in life or thought: those who held with Empedocles that Pythagoras was the first to see beyond his generation, or with Aristotle that Thales was the earliest cosmogonist and Plato the first discoverer of happiness, must (...) learn that neither scientific truth nor human felicity was known before Epicurus. A figure dear to Plato and his admirers was that of the Gigantomachy: if he himself professed to fear that contemporary atomists would drag the heavens to earth, and Aristotle showed similar apprehensions with regard to some of Plato's own interpreters, they were right to foresee the destruction of their own systems, wrong to suppose that this portended anything but deliverance to mankind. (shrink)

The paper argues that a prevalent conception of power in the educational sciences is detrimental to pedagogy both as a field of practice and as a discipline and inept as a scientific concept from an epistemological standpoint. The designation of this power concept as ‘aethereal’ can provide the education theoretical discourses with a means to analyze and criticize positions and arguments that have undermined the autonomy of education since the establishment of Foucauldian thinking in the educational sciences. First, this article (...) argues that the pedagogical notion of the educable child depends on the concepts of individuality, plasticity, and autonomy within the framework of a negative ontology. Second, it problematizes the effects of the substitution of these concepts in the postmodern power-critical educational sciences for pedagogy in general and the child as its key concept in particular. The politicized child is conceived of as subjugated, passive, vulnerable, and what is crucial: as a thing-like, i.e. pedagogically ineducable but only powerfully moldable identity. Third, it analyses the philosophical basis of this shift towards the politicization of the child by introducing the concept of ‘aethereal power’. The article concludes with a sociological reflection on the societal dimension of this fundamental transformation of education and hints at the emerging post-critical pedagogy as a possible remedy. (shrink)

As emphasized by Milne, an observer ultimately depends on the transmission and reception of light signals for the measurement of natural lengths and periods remote from his world point. The laws of geometry which are obeyed when these lengths and periods are plotted on a space-time depend, inevitably, on assumptions concerning the dependence of light velocity on the spatial and temporal coordinates. A convention regarding light velocity fixes the geometry, and conversely. However, the convention of flat space-time implies nonintegrable “radar (...) distances” unless the concept of coordinate-dependent units of measure is employed. Einstein's space-time has the advantage of admitting a special reference system $\hat R$ with respect to which the aether fluid is at rest and the total gravitational field vanishes. A holonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to another reference systemR belonging to the same space-time introduces a nonpermanent gravitational field and holonomic aether motion. A nonholonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to a reference systemR* which belongs to a different space-time introduces a permanent gravitational field and nonholonomic aether motion. The arbitrariness of geometry is expressed by extending covariance to include the latter transformation. By means of a nonholonomic (or units) transformation it is possible, with the aid of the principle of equivalence, to obtain the Schwarzschild and de Sitter metrics from the Newtonian fields that would arise in a flat space-time description. Some light is thrown on the interpretation of cosmological models. (shrink)

Edmund T. Whittaker’s second edition of his A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity is famous for his treatment of Einstein as an almost irrelevant character in the emergence of what he called “the relativity theory of Poincaré and Lorentz.” Historians of science have given a number of explanations, which include Whittaker’s scientific conservatism as an old classical physicist, his commitment to the ether, the pre-eminent role he attributed to mathematics over physics, and foundational philosophical disagreements, to (...) name a few. And in the background, often more implicit than forthright, the accusation of antisemitism looms over Whittaker. In this paper I intend to shed new light on this controversy by taking into consideration the abundant correspondence between Whittaker and his son preserved in the archives of the Fisher Library, University of Toronto. With it, we will get a more complex and personal view of the context in which his attempt at dethroning Einstein took place. Together with the abovementioned reasons, this correspondence shows that the problematic status quo of general relativity in the early 1950s, a period that has been described as the low-mark of general relativity, was very influential in the historical treatment he gave to Einstein. This is an aspect hardly mentioned in the historical work on this controversy and, from this correspondence, it appears to be central to understanding Whittaker at the time of drafting the new History. His possible antisemitic bias will also be addressed, though with the insufficient information on this subject the matter cannot be settled. (shrink)

In this book I investigate the necessary structure of the aether the stuff that fills the whole universe. Some of my conclusions are. 1. There is an enormous variety of structures that the aether might, for all we know, have. 2. Probably the aether is point-free. 3. In that case, it should be distinguished from Space-time, which is either a fiction or a construct. 4. Even if the aether has points, we should reject the orthodoxy that (...) all regions are grounded in points by summation. 5. If the aether is point-free but not continuous, its most likely structure has extended atoms that are not simples. 6. Space-time is symmetric if and only if the aether is continuous. 7. If the aether is continuous, we should reject the standard interpretation of General Relativity, in which geometry determines gravity. 8. Contemporary physics undermines an objection to discrete aether based on scale invariance, but does not offer much positive support.". (shrink)