The hermeneutic tradition divides /physical/ discourse, which takes an 'exterior' point of view in /describing/ its subject-matter, from /mental/ discourse, which takes an 'interior' point of view in /expressing/ its subject-matter: a 'metapsychological dualist' or 'metadualist' approach. The analytic tradition, in its attachment to truth-logic and consequently the 'unity of science', is 'metamonist', and thinks all discourse takes the 'exterior' viewpoint: the 'bump in the rug' moves to the disunification of mind into the functional and (big-'C') Consciousness. Assuming the (...) hermeneuts are correct, the literature's twisty path---from Place and Smart's confused metamonist responses to Ryle's crypto-metadualist /Concept of Mind/ to contemporary metamonist 'phenomenal intentionality'---emerges as an attempt to stabilize theory on a fundamentally wobbly platform. (shrink)

The question standing in the backgrounds of this paper is what kind of hermeneutics can emerge on basis of philosophy of life. To answer it, the theories of German philosophers Georg Misch and Josef Koenig have been analyzed. The first developed hermeneutical logics, which is based on identification the notions ‘life’ and ‘articulation’ ). Three aspects –life as logical category, life as hermeneutical category, and the discoursive forms of self-representation of life- extracted from Misch’s theory seem to be relevant for (...) further development of hermeneutics. Koenig carries forward this research program, but focuses on the linguistic structures of human perception experience and drafts a kind of analytical hermeneutics. The remarkable part of both conceptions is that they pose it logical heterogenity of theoretical and practical discourses. These differences are relevant for rethinking of such epistemological phenomenon, such as ‘meaning’, ‘concept’, ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. According to these positions, hermeneutics can be a homogenous theory of interpretation or understanding, but on the contrary the different logical areas of hermeneutics must be constituted. Thus, hermeneutics can be interpreted as an alternative to the traditional, i.e., epistemological approach, to the theory of knowledge, on the one hand, and to analytical philosophy of language on the other. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy is often divided into two approaches or orientations: analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. The relation between these two philosophical approaches is often presented as oppositional and exclusionary. This chapter illuminates the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy and to clarify the position of hermeneutics within the field of philosophy. It argues that rather than being philosophical or empirical in nature, the analytic–continental distinction operates rhetorically and serves regulative functions. The origin of the division between analytic and continental philosophy (...) is usually traced back to the difference between the new philosophies that Husserl and Frege developed in parallel at the turn of the twentieth century. In the phenomenological‐hermeneutical tradition, we can find some dismissive comments about logical positivism and logical empiricism. This chapter indicates that the roots of the opposition between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy are in the cultural‐political antagonism of postwar Europe. (shrink)

A new hermeneutical theory is needed that will avoid both the "analytical" fixation on the epistemic functions of the historian and the "dialectical" tendency to "ontologize" interpretation to the point where questions of truth in the sense of fidelity to the past become increasingly marginal. The prospects for such a theory are not particularly good. We do not have what would be required to reconcile these ways of thinking about interpretation. That would be a new and more powerful way (...) of conceiving the unity of theoretical and practical reason based on a much deeper understanding of what it is to be hurnan. But the antihumanistic temper of much contemporary thought makes a revival of constructive philosophical inin that question unlikely. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers—analytic as well as continental—tend to feel uneasy about Ernst Tugendhat, who, though he positions himself in the analytic field, poses questions in the Heideggerian style. Tugendhat was one of Martin Heidegger's last pupils and his least obedient, pursuing a new and controversial critical technique. Tugendhat took Heidegger's destruction of Being as presence and developed it in analytic philosophy, more specifically in semantics. Only formal semantics, according to Tugendhat, could answer the questions left open by Heidegger. Yet in doing (...) this, Tugendhat discovered the latent "hermeneutic nature of analytic philosophy"—its post-metaphysical dimension—in which "there are no facts, but only true propositions." What Tugendhat seeks to answer is this: What is the meaning of thought following the linguistic turn? Because of the rift between analytic and continental philosophers, very few studies have been written on Tugendhat, and he has been omitted altogether from several histories of philosophy. Now that these two schools have begun to reconcile, Tugendhat has become an example of a philosopher who, in the words of Richard Rorty, "built bridges between continents and between centuries." Tugendhat is known more for his philosophical turn than for his phenomenological studies or for his position within analytic philosophy, and this creates some confusion regarding his philosophical propensities. Is Tugendhat analytic or continental? Is he a follower of Wittgenstein or Heidegger? Does he belong in the culture of analysis or in that of tradition? Santiago Zabala presents Tugendhat as an example of merged horizons, promoting a philosophical historiography that is concerned more with dialogue and less with classification. In doing so, he places us squarely within a dialogic culture of the future and proves that any such labels impoverish philosophical research. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala recast Karl Marx's theories at a time when capitalism's metaphysical moorings are buckling. Leaving aside the ideal of development and the general call for revolution, hermeneutic communism relies on interpretation rather than truth and proves more flexible in different contexts. It motivates a resistance to capitalism's inequalities yet intervenes against violence and authoritarianism by emphasizing the interpretative nature of truth. Paralleling Vattimo and Zabala's work on the weakening of religion, Hermeneutic Communism realizes the (...) effective potential of Marxist thought. (shrink)

The paper discusses the gap which opened up between the so called Anglo-American, analytic Philosophy and the continental, hermeneutic tradidtion and the mutual reproaches of either side against the other - e.g. the neglect of the historical dimension in philosophy vs. the lack of conceptual and methodological rigor. After an examination of the hermeneutic approach it is suggested that analytically trained philosophers should chng to their techniques and their ideal of clarity but not hesitate to cope with the (...) issues brought up by hermeneutics, while the hermeneutic approach recommends itself as a respectable tool for those pursuing substantive issues in the analytic stile. (shrink)

In a series of lectures on German philosophy ‘since Kant’, the names of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and their critical reference to Kant are, of course, a must. No less a must, though, would seem to be Wilhelm von Humboldt, a philosopher and linguist who, together with Herder and Hamann, formed the alliterating triumvirate of a romanticist critique of Kant. The response, within the discipline, to transcendental philosophy from this side was, in contrast to the idealistic mainstream, long in the (...) coming but, in the end, rich in consequences. (shrink)

This paper focuses on some issues where the process of convergence between analytical and hermeneutic perspectives, with respect to their general philosophical grounds, mainly turns out to be clear. On the analytical side, the overcoming of logical Neopositivism and radical formalism and the rejection of the atomistic theory of reference by holistic theories of meaning have been the core shifts. On the side of the continental philosophical tradition, the main theoretical change lies in replacing the centrality of (...) the subject with the centrality of language, with its links to the dimension of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, the importance given to concepts such as action and intention, mainly due to the Wittgensteinian connection between language and forms of life, has led to recognising the active role of the subject in the world and the ability of language to be a means for doing things and not just a system of signs representing the world. Such a convergence, though it has not yet been reached, seems to be particularly fertile in the legal domain. Here, for example, some outcomes of speech acts theory fit the hermeneutic view of law. (shrink)

The irreducibility thesis -- The facticity of practices -- Constructing practice theory through double hermeneutics -- The trans-subjectivity of social practices -- The dialogical self as thrown projection in practices -- Epilogue -- Bibliography -- Index.

Multiple modernities has emerged as the post-Huntingtonian paradigm in the study of secularism and religion, and the concepts ‘imaginary’ or ‘ verstehen’ are the most common candidates guiding research aiming to articulate this multiplicity. This article revisits Shmuel Eisenstadt’s original ‘Multiple Modernities’ thesis, Charles Taylor’s concept ‘imaginary’ and Max Weber’s ‘ verstehen’, and offers concise examples on how they are put into practice in the current literature on secularism and religion. I argue that the original Eisenstadt thesis is built upon (...) interactions of modernities, and the ‘imaginary’ and ‘ verstehen’ analytics eliminate from sight non-isomorphic relations between ideas and actions, despite the ample presence of both interactions and non-isomorphic relations in the politics of secularism and modernity. Turning multiple modernities into an exercise in typologies of non-interacting modernities articulated in isomorphic relations between ideas and actions produces new kinds of post-Huntingtonian culturalism. I finally sketch a comparative politics of new meanings as the counter-hypothesis to which ‘imaginary’, ‘ verstehen’ and non-interacting typology analytics of modernities have to respond. (shrink)

The irreducibility thesis -- The facticity of practices -- Constructing practice theory through double hermeneutics -- The trans-subjectivity of social practices -- The dialogical self as thrown projection in practices -- Epilogue -- Bibliography -- Index.

This book details a history of the methodology of textual interpretation from Ancient Greece to the 20th century. It presents a complete English translation of Hermeneutics and Its Problems, written by Russian philosopher Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, along with insightful commentary. Written in 1918, Shpet's text remained unpublished in its original Russian until the collapse of the Soviet Union. This engaging translation will be of value to anyone interested in early phenomenology, Russian intellectual history, as well as the divergence of phenomenology (...) and the analytic philosophy of language. The volume also features translations of five key essays written by Shpet. The first presents an extended elaboration of a non-egological conception of consciousness on Husserlian grounds that considerably predates the well-known arguments of early Sartre and Gurwitsch. The second details the rudiments of a phenomenological philosophy of history that traces a central theme back to Parmenides. The next two reveal Shpet’s abiding philosophical interest in combating skepticism and what he took to be the reigning neo-Kantian model by which philosophy is a handmaiden to mathematical physics. The final one features a terse statement of Shpet’s overall philosophical viewpoint, written during the early years of the Stalinist period. Shpet offers an example of one facet of philosophy from a phenomenological viewpoint, demonstrating the progress as well as the deficiencies of successive eras along the historical journey. In doing so, he also gradually reveals the need for a theory of signs, interpretation, and understanding. This collection brings together key documents for assessing Shpet’s hermeneutic phenomenology and his perceived need to develop a phenomenological philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this article I want to continue the characteristics of philosophical methods specific to analytical philosophy, which were and are important for Professor Jan Woleński. So I refer to his work on the methods of analytical philosophy, but I also point out a few new methods that have grown up in the climate of studies of philosophers, especially analytical ontologists. I will therefore describe the following methods: generalization, specialization, formalization, de-formalization and topological hermeneutics. Instead of the term (...) “method” I use interchangeably the terms “operation” or “procedure”. I will show that each of these operations makes an important contribution to ontological investigations, and, in particular, to formal ontology. (shrink)

Combining exemplary scholarship and analytic precision, Stanley Rosen illuminates the underpinnings of post-modernist thought, providing valuable insight as he pursues two arguments: first, that post-modernism, which regards itself as an attack upon the Enlightenment, is in fact the penultimate stage of the Enlightenment itself; and second, that the extraordinary contemporary emphasis upon hermeneutics is the latest consequence of the triumph of history over mathematics within the unstable essence of the Enlightenment. Hermeneutics is consequently at bottom a political phenomenon. In developing (...) these arguments, Rosen demonstrates the paradigmatic status of Kant for a proper understanding of post-modernism, analyzes Derrida's influential critique of Platonism as well as his defense of writing, explains the political dimension of the quarrel between the ancients and moderns by studying the hermeneutics of Leo Strauss and Alexander Kojhve, and shows how the modern notion of "theory" is intrinsically relativized by the triumph of history over mathematics into the notion of interpretation. A wide-ranging exploration into current critical thinking, Hermeneutics as Politics will generate considerable debate among scholars interested in post-modernism, the Enlightenment, hermeneutics, the relation of philosophy and politics, deconstruction, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Making meaning out of life requires effort, sustained thought and action. It can be difficult to reassert our responsibility for solving real life problems from within social science research or current trends, such as extremely deconstructivist text, and postmodernism in its cheerfully nihilistic guise. Hermeneutical philosophy, of the Ricoeurian reconstructive mode, rehabilitates text as a powerful device for influencing others and offers us courage to proceed with the human project by developing a way of writing, thinking and behaving that is (...) provisional, affirmative and conciliatory, yet constantly questioning. Ricoeur invites the person, both reflective subject and empiricist object of research, to combine these elements and use written text and action as text for an active mode of living. Within philosophy he attempts to achieve a rapprochement between hermeneutical and rational thought. Understanding oneself, through better understanding of the other, derives benefit from crossing disciplinary boundaries between, in this study, philosophy and the social sciences (education and psychology), in order to attempt to move from the particular, individual issues to the general, holistic view and return to one’s own situation to act for oneself and others. Ricoeur offers us the opportunity to repossess language, to be ethical and practical, and to challenge the hegemony of Explaining, going beyond method and methodology into epistemology and beyond fact into Understanding: an ontology of hope that makes sense of plurality, without the damage of relativism. This text attempts a narrative ethics, illustrating how Ricoeur’s work transformed my thinking from that of a method-bound psychologist to that of, perhaps, a philosopher in the making. Key Words: critical realism • hermeneutics • holism • Hollis • individualism • Norris • rational analytic • Ricoeur • self • text. (shrink)

In addition to opening a fertile field for inquiry in analytical social epistemology, Miranda Fricker’s work has provided powerful conceptual tools that merge descriptive capacity and political potency. For this reason, over the last fifteen years, the conceptual repertoire introduced by the author has been well received in both academic and political arenas. At times, the concepts of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice acquire excessive dimensions in the literature, and this undermines, on the one hand, their analytical precision (...) and, on the other, their usefulness. In this paper I argue against Fricker’s structural parallelism thesis and defend an independent treatment of each of these concepts. On this basis, to counteract the hyperinflation of the concept of hermeneutic injustice, I proceed with an exercise of conceptual precision. To this end, I identify the conditions that make hermeneutic injustice both unjust and hermeneutic. Finally, I present theoretical and practical reasons to encourage the rigorous use of these concepts. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger first adverted to the hermeneutic phenomenological orientation to nature and scientific observation in the scientist's laboratory practice in addition to the scientist's own reflective theoretical expressions. From the start, hermeneutic philosophy of science has focused not only on historical and current scientific texts, including scientific laboratory reports and communications, professional articles, and research protocols, but, even beginning with Heidegger, it has also attended to the scientist's own hermeneutic and phenomenological (that is to say: experimental) interpretation (...) of nature. This includes the hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific observation‐“reading” scientific instruments. For Heidegger, a hermeneutic phenomenology is built into the world of scientific research. The range of approaches to the hermeneutic philosophy of science also includes Joseph Kockelmans’ studies of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, in addition to a range of philosophers of science cutting across the contemporary analytic‐continental divide. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of critical hermeneutics as a research methodology employed in a conceptual analytic study of the concept ‘institutional culture’ within the context of higher education. The research was undertaken to develop an understanding of the concept and to explore its construction in university policy documents. The aim of this paper is to motivate the choice of critical hermeneutics as a research methodology for the mentioned study. I explore both aspects of critical hermeneutics, namely hermeneutics and critical (...) theory. The interpretive nature of hermeneutics enabled me to expose the hidden meanings of institutional culture, while its context-specific nature was beneficial for pointing out the nature of institutional culture in the university setting. Critical theory, on the other hand, was appropriate because it is a theory that is self-conscious about historicity and the role of the social environment. In combination, the merits of these two aspects of critical hermeneutics facilitated the understanding of the university setting as a social reality. Employing critical hermeneutics as a research methodology furthermore assisted in analysing the construction of institutional culture within university policy documents, taking into account the important role of history in interpretation. In essence, critical hermeneutics facilitated my understanding of the difficult-to-explain concept ‘institutional culture’ in the higher education setting. (shrink)

Fictionalist approaches to ontology have been an accepted part of philosophical methodology for some time now. On a fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense. Although in reality, the problematic entities do not exist, according to the pretense we engage in when using the discourse, they do exist. In the vocabulary of Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. 6), a nominalist construal of a given discourse (...) is revolutionary just in case it involves a “reconstruction or revision” of the original discourse. Revolutionary approaches are therefore prescriptive. In contrast, a nominalist construal of a given discourse is hermeneutic just in case it is a nominalist construal of a discourse that is put forth as a hypothesis about how the discourse is in fact used; that is, hermeneutic approaches are descriptive. I will adopt Burgess and Rosen’s terminology to describe the two different spirits in which a fictionalist hypothesis in ontology might be advanced. Revolutionary fictionalism would involve admitting that while the problematic discourse does in fact involve literal reference to nonexistent entities, we ought to use the discourse in such a way that the reference is simply within the pretense. The hermeneutic fictionalist, in contrast, reads fictionalism into our actual use of the problematic discourse. According to her, normal use of the problematic discourse involves a pretense. According to the pretense, and only according to the pretense, there exist the objects to which the discourse would commit its users, were no pretense involved. My purpose in this paper is to argue that hermeneutic fictionalism is not a viable strategy in ontology. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I discuss in detail several problematic consequences of any interesting application of hermeneutic fictionalism. Of course, if there is good evidence that hermeneutic fictionalism is correct in some cases, then some of these drastic consequences would have to be accepted.. (shrink)

Though Hume is often considered the hero of analytic philosophy in its positivistic phase, his concept of sympathy can be understood as an eighteenth- century prototype of Verstehen. Sympathy is central to Hume's moral philosophy, as he considered it the source of human motivation, social interaction, evaluation, and understanding. It has been acknowledged that sympathy, for Hume, was the human ability to associate with the sensations and passions of others. However, he also stated that this association was neither feeling nor (...) passion, but a species of communication. This sympathetic communication included not only passions and feelings, but ideas, opinions, and reason. Though somewhat inconsistently, Hume argued that the process of sympathy was hermeneutic rather than causal. Like the concept of Verstehen, sympathy requires a contextual understanding of human relations. (shrink)

When people respond to chants of “Black lives matter” with “All lives matter” or excoriate Colin Kaepernick for being “anti-military” or “anti-American” when he sits or kneels during the playing of the national anthem, there appears to be a break in understanding. BLM protestors and Kaepernick understand their actions and messages in one way, detractors in quite a different way. This presents an interpretive challenge. In this essay, I aim to explore the nature of this interpretive challenge by illuminating the (...) various obstacles that leave us without understanding. I will refer to such breaks in understanding as hermeneutical impasses. First, I sketch a taxonomy of hermeneutical impasses. I then discuss various ways of describing the notion of ‘understanding’ that may be at issue in impasses. Next, I discuss the relation between power and hermeneutical impasses, showing some of the ways power relations constrain our discursive practices. I conclude by arguing the structures of our environment make hermeneutical impasses difficult to avoid, if not inevitable. (shrink)

Examines how a hermeneutic psychotherapy might be possible by adapting interpretive theory arising in the human sciences and in response to the critiques that continue to question hermeneutics proper. Based on the work of several noted researchers, including M. Foucault , M. Merleau-Ponty , and H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow , such topics as the relationship of psychoanalysis and phenomenology, the distinction of hermeneutics and interpretive analytics, hermeneutics and the deep self, and hermeneutics and psychoanalysis are discussed. 2012 APA, (...) all rights reserved). (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical debate on Seng Zhao ’s Thesis on No-Motion of Things, a debate which took place approximately at the turn of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. Without doubt the Zhao Treatise is the most precious gem in the early Chinese Madhyamaka legacy. The sterling reputation of this seminal treatise had never been challenged until Zhencheng published the Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things during 1588–1589. The following focuses on Zhencheng’s WBQZLL (...) to see how he applied hetu-vidyā in his hermeneutical project. How did Zhencheng employ the syllogism in his critique of the Zhao Treatise? Is his critique justifiable? How is the role of syllogism employed as a hermeneutic tool to understand classical Buddhist texts? In highlighting the innovative features in the application of hetu-vidyā in the late Ming Chinese Buddhist scholasticism as showcased in Zhencheng’s WBQZLL, The controversies swirling around Zhencheng’s challenge to traditional doctrinal authority reveal the distinctive contrast between two forms of Buddhist hermeneutics in the late Ming Buddhist scholasticism: experiential hermeneutics and analytical hermeneutics. While the former has long been practiced in the mainstream of Chinese Buddhism, the latter has received little attention. (shrink)

This richly textured book bridges analytic and hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophy of science. It features unique resources for students of the philosophy and history of quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation, cognitive theory and the psychology of perception, the history and philosophy of art, and the pragmatic and historical relationships between religion and science.

It is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once the positions are stated in this way, their putative incompatibility vanishes. Also, to (...) inspire further research I include an appendix which contains an unfinished prototype of a hermeneutic foundationalism. (shrink)

Hermeneutics is one of those archaic and refractory, yet fashionable words which seem to crop up in so many places that they take on a power all their own. E. D. Hirsch has observed that the word has become “a rather vague, magical talisman.” For better or worse hermeneutics has entered into the theoretical controversies of literary criticism, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, philosophy—not only the theory of the humane disciplines but even the theory of the natural sciences.

Summary According to the contemporary hermeneutical school the distinguishing feature of the humanities is the capability of the inquirer to communicate with the object of his inquiry. This idea underlies K.-O. Apel's model for the humanities adopted from psycho-analytical therapy. It is argued (1) that there is no sense in which the object of the historical inquiry can be regarded as aKommunikationspartner of the historian; and (2) that when the traditionalVerstehen doctrine is re-interpreted counterfactually (e.g., If I were Caesar, (...) then ... substantiates my explanations of Caesar's actions), then the doctrine has an acceptable application to history and the charge of psychologism is removed. (shrink)

This work identifies a recurring element in Paul Ricœur1s thought, namely that of carrying out a hermeneutic graft in specialized areas of knowledge that deal with certain philosophical problems, which will be demonstrated in the following topics, where they will be presented: i) the phenomenological investigation into the privileged access to the cogito, in The Conflict of Interpretations — Essays in Hermeneutics; ii) the epistemological and ontological problems of access to the historical past, as well as the relationship between (...) historiography and fictional literature, in Time and Narrative; iii) the question of personal identity in the analytical tradition of the philosophy of language, in Oneself as Another; iv) finally, the limits of the naturalistic approaches of neurosciences and cognitive sciences on memory in Memory, History, Forgetting and What makes us think?. The philosopher, in The Conflict of Interpretations, openly claims to promote a grafting of the hermeneutic problem into the phenomenological method in his investigation into the understanding of oneself based on the conflict between rival interpretations concerning the cogito. Jean Greisch, in turn, suggests the existence of a graft not assumed by Ricœur of hermeneutics in the philosophy of language in Oneself as Another. Along the same path, this work offers as a novelty the encounter of two other tacit hermeneutic grafts in Ricœur’s work, namely the hermeneutic graft in the phenomenology of time in Time and Narrative and in the naturalized treatment of memory by neurosciences in Memory, History, Forgetting and What makes us think?. (shrink)

This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when at stake is the incommensurability between the concepts of reality developed by philosophical hermeneutics, on the one hand, and realist branches of analytical philosophy, on the other. The view of hermeneutic realism is suggested not as a remedy against this incommensurability, but as a vehicle for revising those aspects of both hermeneutics and ontological realism which impede the dialogue between them. It is a view that opposes (...) epistemological foundationalism, Cartesian dualism, essentialism about theoretical objects, and cognitive relativism. The role of reading/textualizing in science’s spaces of representation is specified. (shrink)

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine (...) of sophists, some elements of its dialogueism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogueism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already two and a half thousand years ago charted the paths for modern thought. The first part of the article analyzes the relationship between Aristotles hermeneutics and hermeneutics of sophists. (shrink)

e paper seeks to evaluate the critical perspective on scientism and epistemological objectivism put forward by a version of hermeneutic phenomenology. It is a version that addresses the issues of the meaningful constitution of research objects in natural-scientic research. In opposing Habermas’ quasi- transcendental epistemology of the empirico-analytical sciences, the paper offers an attempt at interpretative investigation of the formation of knowledge- guiding interests in these sciences. e possibility of a “dialogical research of nature” is scrutinized.

Computer simulation has become important in ecological modeling, but there have been few assessments on how complex simulation models differ from more traditional analytic models. In Part I of this paper, I review the challenges faced in complex ecological modeling and how models have been used to gain theoretical purchase for understanding natural systems. I compare the use of traditional analytic simulation models and point how that the two methods require different kinds of practical engagement. I examine a case study (...) of three models from the insect resistance literature in transgenic crops to illustrate and explore differences in analytic and computer simulation models. I argue that analyzing simulation models has been often inappropriately managed with expectations derived from handling analytic models. In Part II, I look at simulation as a hermeneutic practice. I argue that simulation models are a practice or techné. I the explore five aspects of philosophical hermeneutics that may be useful in complex ecological simulation: (1) an openness to multiple perspectives allowing multiple levels of scientific pluralism, (2) the hermeneutic circle, a back and forth in active communication among both modelers and ecologists; (3) the recognition of human factors and the nature of human practices as such, including recognizing the role of judgments and choices in the modeling enterprise; (4) the importance of play in modeling; (5) the non-closed nature of hermeneutic engagement, continued dialogue, and recognizing the situatedness, incompleteness, and tentative nature of simulation models. (shrink)

Report on a symposium “Analytical Philosophy of Science today”, July 23–24, 1995, in Beijing. The symposium demonstrates the actual interest and familiarity of Chinese researchers with Western philosophy of science and especially with analytical philosophizing. Main topics were diagnoses of the actual state of the art, discussion and critique of some classics and classical analytical conceptions, application of analytical thinking on hermeneutical problems, and its possible social function.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HERMENEUTIC OF AQUINAS'S TEXTS: NOTES ON THE INDEX THOMISTICUS PAOLO GurnTTI Universita Cattolica Augustinianum Milan, Italy I. Introduction: First Impressions of the Index Thomisticus UPON ENTERING an excellent library of philosophy, one cannot help but notice the 56 volumes of the Inde:c Thomisticus.1 Anyone with a scholarly interest in Saint 1 Index Thomisticus: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Operum omnium Indices et concordantiae... (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974-1980). Reference to this work (...) in notes takes the form: IT [section]-[vol.], [p.]. References to Aquinas's works will follow the conventions established by Busa in the Index Thomisticus (e.g., STl=Summa theologiae, prima pars) and unless otherwise indicated are from the same texts processed in the Index Thomisticus. References to Roberto Busa's works will have the following abbreviations: Clavis Indicis Thomistici: Clavis Indicis Thomistici (Stuttgart: FrommannHoltzboog, 1979). Fond. informatica linguistica: Fondamenti di informatica linguistica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1987), (contains a bibliography of Busa's works through 1987). Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ': "Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis' significa 'codice genetico '. Problemi e metodi di lessicologia e lessicografia tomistiche," in Atti dell'VIII congresso tomistico internazionale (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), vol. 1. L'Index Thomisticus: "L'Index Thomisticus," in Stitdi medievali, III serie, XXI, I, 1980. Informatica e filologia: " Informatica e nuova filologia," in G. Savoca ed., Lessicologia, filologia e critica (Florence: Olschki, 1986), pp. 17-25. L'originalite linguistique: "L'originalite linguistique de S. Thomas d'Aquin," in Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), Tome XLIV-XLV, fascicule double, 1985, pp. 65-90. ORDO dans les ouevres: "ORDO dans les ouevres de St. Thomas d'Aquin," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., ORDO II Colloquia internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1979), pp. 59-184. Voces REALIS-REALITER: "Voces REALIS-REALITER in S. Thoma Aq. Cum appendice de voce 'resrei," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi eds., RES. III Colloquia internazionale del Lessico intellettuale Europea (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1982), pp. 104667 668 PAOLO GUIETTI Thomas Aquinas will be drawn to employ the Index Thomisticus as a powerful concordance. But any reasonable scholar can recognize the disproportion between a desirable concordance and this hyperbolic system of about 70,000 pages. The Index Thomisticus is the second largest written work of this century, surpassed only by the Enrcyclopedia Britannica. The Index Thomisticus is a mountain of pages that classifies with a precision never before realized everything that came from Aquinas's pen in twenty-five years.2 Is it not awkwardly disproportionate and too pedantically analytical for scholarly research? Moreover, what would Aquinas think if, in a return to this life, he could see the electronic digestion of his work? A neoscholastic Jesuit who devoted thirty-four years of his life to chopping and classifying even the most insignificant things, like " et " and " est," could seem to St. Thomas a modern computernut, i.e., a person who has lost his good sense in front of a screen.3 Everyone understands the usefulness of a concordance; even St. Thomas wanted and used concordances.4 But the Index Thomis136. De voce SPIRITUS: "De voce SPIRITUS in operibus S. Thomae Aquinatis," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., SPIRITUS. IV Colloquia lnternazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1983), pp. 191-222. Thomistische H ermeneutik: " Das Problem der thomistischen Hermeneutik nach der Veroeffentlichung des Index Thomisticus," in A. Zimmermann, ed., ~Miscellanea Medievalia, Bd 19: Thomas von Aquin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 359-364. L'Indez Thomisticus per la filoso fia: " L'Index Thomisticus per la filosofia e la teologia," in Teologia 5, 1980, pp. 258-265. Il logos Principia di dialogo: "Il logos principio di ogni dialogo tra persone secondo San Tommaso,'' in Portare Cristo all'Uomo. Congresso del Ventennio dal Concilio Vaticano II (Vatican City: Urbaniana University Press, 1985), pp. 577-584. 2 I. e., 8,767,854 words. The lnde:i: Thomisticus classifies everything St. Thomas has probably written, everything St. Thomas erased (Autographi deleta: Inde:i: Thomisticus: 006 ADL) and even works of other chosen authors for comparison with St. Thomas. a Roberto Busa, S.J., was born in Vicenza, Italy in 1913... (shrink)

While the richness of Heideggerian philosophy is attractive as a healthcare research framework, its density means authors rarely utilise its fullest possibilities as an hermeneutic analytic structure. This article aims to clarify Heideggerian hermeneutic analysis by taking one discrete element of Heideggerian philosophy (Being-towards-death), and using it’s clearly defined structure to conduct a meta-synthesis of Heideggerian phenomenological studies on the experience of living with a potentially life-limiting illness. The findings richly illustrate Heidegger’s philosophy that there is either an (...) inauthentic positioning towards death, or an authentic positioning towards death with a proposition that (1) death is certain; (2) death is indefinite; (3) death is non-relational; and (4) death is not-to-be-outstripped. None of the 29 included studies on the experience of a confrontation with death fully utilised this framework, despite claiming a grounding in Heideggerian thought. This demonstrates the value in modelling how Heideggerian existential structures can be used proactively as analytical ‘hooks’ for data in research claiming a basis in this philosophy and/or method. By modelling the potential application of an important Heideggerian philosophical construct to published qualitative data, this meta-synthesis has revealed new domains and more nuanced understandings of the temporal structure of Being-towards-death. Such an approach helps to more fully unveil the existential concerns of people at the core of interpretative phenomenological enquiry and may provide a blueprint to map either primary or synthesised data to other key ontological existentials. (shrink)

The task of interpreting the Holy Scriptures has been a daunting enterprise throughout the history of the Church. This article explores how analytic philosophy could be promising in biblical interpretation. Notwithstanding the suspicion related to analytic philosophy, this article argues that analytic philosophy could creatively aid the interpretation of the Holy Scripture. My interest is in how its focus on coherence and clarity of description could add force to making sense of the truth claims of the Bible. I argue that (...) when used creatively, analytic philosophy holds excellent prospects for biblical interpretation, especially in distinguishing between the presupposition of the message of a Bible text and the presupposition of the interpreter. Contribution: The article argues that the omission of the Hebrew Bible from academic discussion in fields like political philosophy or psychology and mainstream philosophy because it is considered a product of revelation that must not be approached using reasoning is a false dichotomy because, in the Scriptures, we find God inviting us to reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, linguistic-analytic philosophy has been identified as the dominant methodology in the philosophy of sport. The hermeneutics of sport is contrasted with linguistic-analytic philosophy by analyzing Heidegger’s view of Truth. In doing so, two views of philosophy are compared: ontology or description. Sport hermeneutics’ task has to do with description. Hermeneutical explanations of sport attempt to describe the facticity of sport. Such a facticity is formed by three moments: embodiment, capabilities, and tradition. They are not components of sport (...) that can be identified as essential components but rather, they are identifiable only for analytic purposes. These three above-mentioned elements cannot be identified as elements, because they are intrinsically intertwined forming a unitary network of meaning. The task of sport hermeneutics is to describe the different relationships that compose such a network of meaning. In doing so, sport is a humane activity linked to the constitutive human task of making sense of reality by projecting meaning into it. (shrink)

This chapter contrasts the broadly empirical, pluralist, and construction device–oriented approaches to film study of analytic philosophy of film with the broadly socially hermeneutic, artistically and politically avant-gardist stances of Continental film theory. Analytic philosophy of film has tended to focus on classic Hollywood films and continuity editing, in order to explore the achievements of these films as art, while Continental film theory frequently finds such films to be regressive and technically uninteresting. I explore in detail the work of (...) such analytically oriented film scholars as Cavell, Danto, Walton, Carroll, Wilson, Bordwell, Plantinga, and Wartenberg, among others, against the background of this broad divergence in styles of work. I conclude by suggesting possibilities of rapprochement between these two styles, possibilities that embrace both the insights of analytic philosophers concerning specific devices and effects of film construction and the insights of Continental theorists concerning human subject formation and human social, political, and artistic interests. (shrink)

In this contribution, we first discuss the aspects of the analytic method conceived by Kant in the Deutlichkeit that differentiate it from the Wolffian method and relate it to the Newtonian method. Compared to the philosophical tradition, the task of analysing concepts appears profoundly changed. Since Kant aims philosophy towards the world, he considers concepts as something given and intends to discern their characteristic marks by observing their usual applications. Although Kant abandons any attempt to define concepts nominally, he still (...) gives great relevance to words to the extent that concepts, according to him, acquire their meaning in the linguistic usage. We will also point out how for Kant the linguistic usage makes the analysis of concepts anything but easy and how a hermeneutic process is necessary for its completion. In distinguishing philosophical signs from mathematical signs, Kant provides the semiotic reasons that underlie his recourse to hermeneutics. (shrink)