Sophists, Misc

This book offers a new way of looking at the 5th century BCE Sophists, rejecting the bad reputation they have had since antiquity and presenting them as individuals rather than a "movement", each with his own speciality and personality as revealed through the scant surviving evidence. It provides an account of the Sophists of this period that explains the historical and social developments that led to their prominence and popularity, demonstrating the reasons for their importance and for their seeming disappearance (...) in the 4th century BCE. Restricted to discussion of the few Sophists for whom there are surviving quotations or other texts, The Sophists avoids generalizations often found in other books. It contains accurate translations of most of the surviving material, which forms the securest possible basis for understanding the Sophists as individuals in their various roles, not only as educators but also as ambassadors and pioneers in other fields. After a general introduction, the following chapters present each of the Sophists individually, followed by three chapters which present topics treated by more than one Sophist, such as Logos, Definition and the Nomos-Phusis contrast. The final three chapters reveal the way three important intellectuals of the fourth century (Plato, his rival Isocrates and Aristotle) dealt with the Sophists. An appendix contains several longer passages or works in their entirety in translation, allowing readers to have access to the original source materials and develop their own interpretations. This thorough treatment of the fifth-century Sophists is of interest to scholars working on the subject and on ancient Greek philosophy more broadly, while also being accessible to undergraduate students and the general public interested in the topic. (shrink)

Aristotle’s observation that “Plato not wrongly ordered sophistry around non-being” (Metaph. E 2, 1026b14; also in K 8, 1064b29) refers generally to Plato’s Sophist. The admission of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) could be considered as a certain consequence of the Eleatic monism, which gave rise to the Sophistic movement as has been recognized by Plato and Aristotle. In this paper, we try to identify more precisely the context of this setting of non-being of polemical and very particular importance.

A comparative investigation in the metaphysics of material objects and persons in ancient philosophy, this book provides radically new insights into key themes and areas of ancient thought by drawing on Greek and Buddhist philosophies. Ugo Zilioli explicates the neglected tradition of philosophers who in different ways made material objects either redundant or ontologically dispensable in the ancient world. At the same time, while eliminating objects from the material apparatus of the world, some of those philosophers conceived of selves and (...) persons as the only truly existing items. Chapters cover concepts such as nihilism, elusive objects and the emergence of the self, demonstrating how the philosophy of major thinkers Protogoras, Vasubandhu, Gorgias, Nagarjuna, Democritus, Pyrrho, Epicurus and the Cyrenaics advance our understanding of eliminativism. Zilioli's historical and philosophical reconstruction challenges traditional readings of key moments and figures in the history of thought, both Eastern and Western, as well as providing conceptual tools that are of interest not only to historians of philosophy but also to contemporary metaphysicians. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the Classical Greek sophists, placing them afresh in their cultural context. These public figures, such as Protagoras and Gorgias, were wide-ranging experts before discipline-specialization, and represent the flourishing of linguistic, historical, and philosophical reflection in the time of Socrates.

In this paper I focus on the relationships between language, definition and being in Antisthenes. I start from Plato’s Sophist 251b–c, in which the reference to the ὀψιμαθεῖς stands out, and I conclude that it is not possible to identify these characters with Antisthenes. The conception of ὀψιμαθεῖς provides for the exclusive legitimacy of identical judgments, exploiting in an eristic sense an evident Eleatic legacy. But this position, rather than concordances, reveals serious opposition to what is surely known to us (...) of the logical and linguistic doctrines of Antisthenes. The most explicit testimony about the relationship between language and being in Antisthenes is handed down by Porphyry, who attributes to Antisthenes the equation λέγειν = λέγειν τι = λέγειν τὸ ὄν. My analysis intends to show that this equation is assumed by Antisthenes through a Socratic mediation and has a double objective: to ensure an objective reference of language, as opposed to Gorgias’ self-referential conception of language, and to nullify the antilogy, which is typical of sophistic argumentation. To it Antisthenes contrasts the ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων, which is a development of Socratic ἐξετάζειν, and whose aim is to reach, at the end of the examination, no longer just a ὁμολογία, but a definition valid once and for all. Antisthenes is aware that there is a distinction between essence and quality, and with this, he moves a first important step beyond the univocal conception of being proper to Parmenides. The doxography will sum up Antisthenes’ position by describing him as the first philosopher to advance a definition of logos, i. e., definition. He bases his theory of definition on the identification of that attribute which is ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον of the proposed object. Antisthenes coined the phrase τὸ τί ἦν to designate what the predicate is meant to say in a definition, i. e., the proper quality. This expression does not seem to identify the general notion of a predicate as such, but rather to indicate the determination or qualification necessary to actually define the object in question. In the final part of my article, I examine some testimonies that show how, with his theory of definition, Antisthenes is, and was considered already in antiquity, the precursor of the Stoic theory of definition, whose objective is, according to Chrysippus’ formula, to provide the explanation of what is proper (ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις). (shrink)

Platão, em seus diálogos de juventude, apresenta Sócrates recorrendo a uma prática de perguntas e respostas direcionada aos seus interlocutores que visa o teste das pretensões de conhecimento e de sabedoria dos membros da pólis. Essa prática é a refutação socrática, frequentemente associada ao termo grego élenkhos e seus cognatos. Embora se utilize dessa prática de forma frequente, nenhum diálogo a trata como elemento central. Entretanto, podemos encontrar comentários de Platão ao longo de sua obra que nos remetem essa reflexão (...) de cunho mais metodológico. Por conta disso, comentamos reflexões que Platão apresenta em um sentido metadialético acerca do élenkhos e refletimos sobre a refutação socrática a partir desses comentários. Palavras-chave: refutação socrática; élenkhos; Platão. (shrink)

Toplumsal sözleşme teorisi, bir toplumdaki sosyal ve siyasi etkileşimleri yöneten ilkeleri anlamayı amaçlayan kapsamlı bir akademik araştırmaların konusu olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, Antik Yunanda Sofistler, bireysel davranışlara ve toplumsal uyuma rehberlik eden ilkeleri tanımlayan bir toplumsal sözleşme çerçevesi geliştirmede önemli rol oynamışlardır. Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodikos, Antiphon, Hippias ve Isokrates gibi ünlü Sofistlerin toplumsal yaşama ve toplum sözleşmesine farklı noktalardan katkılarını inceleyen bu çalışma, Antik Yunan'da, Sofistlerin toplumsal sözleşmesinin derinlemesine bir analizini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada, Sofistler tarafından ortaya atılan ve ahlaki değerlerin öznel (...) olduğunu, bireyler ve kültürler arasında farklılık gösterdiğini öne süren ahlaki görecelilik kavramı incelenecektir. Protagoras'ın öğretilerini araştırarak ve ünlü “İnsan her şeyin ölçüsüdür” ifadesi incelenerek; ahlaki göreceliliğin toplum sözleşmesi çerçevesindeki sonuçları analiz edilecektir. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es dar cuenta de la posibilidad de establecer una noción de culpabilidad y de reproche en relación al sujeto que actúa injustamente, mediante un análisis de la responsabilidad y castigo en el ámbito moral en el Gorgias de Platón. Para abordar este tratamiento, se profundizará en el intelectualismo moral socrático, según el cual los seres humanos no hacen lo que quieren, sino lo que consideran correcto. De esta manera, se dará tratamiento a cómo la influencia (...) de los apetitos y las pasiones desempeñan un rol fundamental en el dominio sobre sí mismo y, consiguientemente, en los diversos cursos de acción que los sujetos puedan adscribir. Finalmente, se establecerá cómo la educación y el conocimiento cumplen un rol sustancial al momento de la constitución de un juicio de reproche hacia el sujeto. (shrink)

While committed to the argumentative and reasoned discourse recognizable in the work of contemporary professional philosophers, the actual practice that both Socrates and Diogenes routinely engaged in was in many ways more similar to stand-up and other forms of contemporary performative comedy. This paper analyzes the commonalities between Socrates’s and Diogenes's public philosophizing in Ancient Greece and performative comedy in the contemporary world, and emphasizes the subversive rhetorical efficiency and skeptical significance of public irony for their audiences. The paper begins (...) by exploring the ways in which ancient philosophers relied on irony and humor to promote skepticism and critical thinking, analyzes contemporary comic performances that seem similar, and concludes with reflections on the varieties of philosophical activity and experience. (shrink)

In this paper I try to indicate particular elements of Socrates’ philosophy by which educational practice should be guided, as well as certain harmful implications of Sophistic approach to education. In analysis of Socrates’ position, I especially rely on Vlastos’ interpretations, and particularly I refer to Socrates’ thesis that virtue cannot be taught. Among other things, it suggests a non-doctrinal approach to moral-educational practice, which cannot result from Protagoras’ opposite beliefs. Nowadays Sophistic particular- and utilitarian-oriented education occurs especially in the (...) educational (or better: manipulative) transmission of national, business and similar so-called ethics, which are not able for recognizing and overcoming of the existing socio-economic framework, and for which Socrates’ moral-educational philosophy contains critical force, arising primarily out of the emphasis on autonomy. (shrink)

This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras’ measure doctrine (M) and the self-refutation argument (SRA). First, I argue that the relevant interpretation of (M) has it that every individual human being determines all her own truths, including the truth of (M) itself. I then turn to what I take to be the most important move in the SRA: that Protagoras recognises not only that his opponents disagree with him about the truth of (M), but also that they (...) hold that (M) is false simpliciter. By recognising that his opponents do not make the relativising concession he makes for them, he is forced to accept that (M) is false. I go on to argue that several other defenders of the SRA end up with a regress which is difficult to end and might not favour anti-Protagoreans. On my reading, by recognising what his opponents believe, Protagoras is barred from adding qualifiers, and the possible regress doesn’t get off the ground. I conclude with brief discussions of how Protagoras might try to avoid the result of the SRA and the argument’s role in this part of the Theaetetus. (shrink)

At first sight, Isocrates’ use of the term “sophist” (σοφιστής) may appear contradictory as it is associated with both a positive and a pejorative meaning. The article contends that Isocrates was not being unintentionally vague or imprecise as he deliberately used the term to refer to two disparaging groups of professional teachers or writers who, in his opinion, had nothing in common. Isocrates tended to privilege the positive meaning of the term over the negative one, considering the latter as a (...) contemporary deviation of the former. (shrink)

Against prevailing interpretations, this article contends that Plato's Sophist and Statesman accord the sophist a kind of ‘knowing-how’ (epistêmê). In Soph. 233c10‒d2, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that the sophist has not truth but a δοξαστικὴ ἐπιστήμη. This phrase cannot mean ‘a seeming knowledge’, for –ικός adjectives formed from verbs express the ability to perform the action denoted by the verb—here, δοξάζω. Although not a first-order, subject-area knowledge, sophistry is a second-order knowledge of how to form and use judgements (doxai). (...) Other acknowledgements of the sophist's epistêmê and the ascription to him of τέχνη, ‘craft/expertise’, confirm that the Visitor's conclusion is not to be dismissed as irony. To critics who argue from the Gorgias and from other works that Plato must consider the Visitor's conclusion an error, the author replies: 1) other dialogues do not control the Visitor dialogues; 2) the Visitor does not validly demonstrate that the sophist lacks all knowledge; 3) by admitting sensibles into Being, the Visitor and Theaetetus allow the objects of epistêmê to include things in the embodied world, even likenesses. Non-philosophers’ epistêmê in the Visitor dialogues is not implicated in the difficulties that critics have raised about epistemology in the so-called Two Worlds dialogues. On this new ontology, even the sophist, if guided by philosophical rulers, can benefit citizens by employing his elenctic expertise as Socrates did, aiding their growth toward virtue. (shrink)

This paper examines the sophistic practice of antilogikê or antilogic, which consists in, as G. B. Kerferd described, “causing the same thing to be seen by the same people now as possessing one predicate and now as possessing the opposite or contradictory predicate.” Although, since Plato, antilogic has been cast in a cloud of suspicion, understood primarily as the dubious practice of making the weaker argument stronger, I explore a contrary interpretation that antilogic was a technique for pursuing the suspension (...) of judgment, or epochê. In this paper, I define the practice of antilogic through the tale of Corax and Tisias and the surviving fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias. In so doing, I hypothesize that antilogic was a method for averting the natural tendency of language to assign stability and durability to being. Through the perpetual displacement of one logos by another, antilogic grants thought access to the ceaseless flux and becoming of nature. As it barred language from assigning stability to being, so too did it provide a “way out” of the inexorable human drive captured in the opening line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “All humans naturally desire to know.”. (shrink)

This paper investigates the hypothesis that Heraclitus was a formative influence on the Hippias Major. Specifically, it establishes connections between the dialogue's presentation of "the fine" (τὸ καλόν) and Heraclitus's "unity of opposites" idea. It argues that the fine is characterized by specifically Heraclitean oppositions, and it concludes that this makes a difference for the reading of certain passages in the dialogue and for philosophical conclusions regarding the fine.

A presente pesquisa busca refletir, a partir do Górgias de Platão, sobre a controversa estratégia que Sócrates utiliza para desqualificar a retórica sofista, definida por ele como uma falsa tékhne no âmbito da justiça. Surpreende neste diálogo a intensa carga dramática aplicada por Platão nas refutações de Sócrates contra as convicções de Górgias, Polo e Cálicles, combinando recursos retóricos, a fim de levá-los à contradição e, assim, “vencer” o debate. O uso da makrologia, da crítica ad hominem, de uma terminologia (...) ambígua e, claro, da vergonha que suscita em seus oponentes, nos apresentam uma face singular do elenchos socrático, que desperta diretamente os protestos e a hostilidade por parte de Polo e Cálicles. Mas o que justifica a forte carga dramática platônica que aproxima a habitual retórica sofista do método usado por Sócrates? O estudo aqui apresentado, apoiando-se no cruzamento tanto das leituras textuais e subtextuais, como das argumentativas e dramáticas no Górgias, vê na genialidade literária platônica um lugar de destaque para uma articulação de sua prática discursiva com a mesma sofística que ele combatia, e que o teria levado à arena do visceral embate político ateniense. Palavras-chave: Filosofia; Platão; Sofistas, Retórica; Método Socrático. (shrink)

Plato’s Sophist features a discussion of false statements, the literal sense of which has been the source of much scholarly controversy. Two readings of the discussion, the Oxford Interpretation and the Incompatibility Range Interpretation, are especially plausible. This essay enters the exegetical debate by placing the discussion of false statements in the broader context of the dialogue, which is principally concerned with sophistic speech, not false statements. When the discussion of false statements is understood as contributing to an inquiry into (...) sophistic speech, the Incompatibility Range Interpretation—with slight modification—emerges as a clear favorite. (shrink)

On the basis of evidence obtained by unravelling enigmas in Philostratus and Eunapius’ Lives of the Sophists and lifting the veil of mystery surrounding some of the crucial, sophistic-related passages from Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom’s writings, we were able to arrive to a conclusion that, contrary to all expectations, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself, no matter what the so-called sophists say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the essence (...) of things. Paradoxically enough, it turned out that the enigma in Eunapius and, above all, Philostratus’ work played almost the same role as did myth in Herodotus’ historical work in so far as only the skillful use of the mentioned stylistic device might confer an aura of magic to the scarce material being at the disposal of the authors. Keywords: Second Sophistic, Philostratus, Eunapius, legend of Socrates, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Isocrates, Platonism, enigma, symbolism. (shrink)

The article aims to shed light on the connection between rhetoric and politics, and its dissemination in the sophistic and philosophical tradition. The argumentation is based on the conceptions of two contemporary philosophers – Barbara Cassin and Hans Blumenberg, who appear as the protagonists of positions according to which rhetoric takes up a significant place in political life. Since Plato, the sophists were treated as other pre-Socratics, as demagogs, who do not hold the truth but spread a false opinion. The (...) philosophers share a conviction that speech immediately expresses reality, and they also prohibited following the way of non-Being (Parmenides). The sophists (Gorgias, Protagoras) shared the position that speech expresses only itself, but not reality. Two opposite (but related) ways of thinking are best seen in M. Heidegger’s and H. Arendt’s philosophies. Keeping in mind the main theme, Blumenberg’s philosophical position includes logos as the mean of distancing, the art of politics is determined by the ability to delay decisions and soften conflicts by rhetorical means, while Cassins’ logology is understood as the ontology. (shrink)

This collection of essays sheds new light on the relationship between two of the main drivers of intellectual discourse in ancient Greece: the epic tradition and the Sophists. The contributors show how throughout antiquity the epic tradition proved a flexible instrument to navigate new political, cultural, and philosophical contexts. The Sophists, both in the Classical and the Imperial age, continuously reconfigured the value of epic poetry according to the circumstances: using epic myths allowed the Sophists to present themselves as the (...) heirs of traditional education, but at the same time this tradition was reshaped to encapsulate new questions that were central to the Sophists' intellectual agenda. This volume is structured chronologically, encompassing the ancient world from the Classical Age through the first two centuries AD. The first chapters, on the First Sophistic, discuss pivotal works such as Gorgias' Encomium of Helen and Apology of Palamedes, Alcidamas' Odysseus or Against the Treachery of Palamedes, and Antisthenes' pair of speeches Ajax and Odysseus, as well as a range of passages from Plato and other authors. The volume then moves on to discuss some of the major works of literature from the Second Sophistic dealing with the epic tradition. These include Lucian's Judgement of the Goddesses and Dio Chrysostom's orations 11 and 20, as well as Philostratus' Heroicus and Imagines. (shrink)

From Socrates and Plato onwards, the Sophists were often targeted by the authoritative philosophical tradition as being mere charlatans and poor teachers. This book, translated and significantly updated from its most recent Italian version, challenges these criticisms by offering an overall interpretation of their thought, and by assessing the specific contributions of thinkers like Protagoras, Gorgias and Antiphon. A new vision of the Sophists emerges: they are protagonists and agents of fundamental change in the history of ancient philosophy, who questioned (...) the grounds of morality and politics, as well as the nature of knowledge and language. By shifting the focus from the cosmos to man, the Sophists inaugurate an alternative form of philosophy, whose importance is only now becoming clear. (shrink)

This article aims to carry out a review and analysis of the relationship and influence of sophist thought and epistemology in modern Brief strategic psychotherapy, Nardone model. The particular interest of this research revolves around the epistemological aspects and the questioning of objective reality and how this may have influenced the praxis of brief therapy. The epistemological, theoretical, and philosophical contributions of the sophists promoted a cultural change in the Hellenic world their legacy continues to this day, greatly influencing various (...) fields of knowledge, from philosophy to psychotherapy. A review of the preliminary evidence published in the philosophical and psychological literature is presented, examining sophist epistemology and its influence on brief strategic therapy, analyzing its epistemological approach related to relativism and skepticism, at the same time showing a philosophy that continues to this day that influences contemporary thinking and modern psychotherapy, especially Brief Strategic Therapy. From the review and analysis, is evidenced the influence of the sophists thinking on epistemology, the questioning of objective reality, and the clinical practice of brief strategic therapy. (shrink)

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine (...) of sophists, some elements of its dialogism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already charted the paths for modern thought two and a half thousand years ago. The second part of the article discusses the forms of the dialogic thinking that have survived in philosophy after the sophists and the role of the sophists' hermeneutics in the formation of modern philosophy of dialogue. (shrink)

"La méthode proposée ici pour lire le Protagoras part d'une idée simple. Celle que le Socrate de Platon met en pratique et qui entre dans la définition de l'éros philosophique : voir l'aporie comme une ressource, voir l'impasse avant le passage. Suivant cette idée, Platon pose des questions à son lecteur, ou il les lui laisse à poser, face à des apories ; ce qui revient à tenir de telles questions pour de premiers pas - vers une issue. Il s'ensuit (...) par méthode que le questionnement doit progresser là où des indices sont déposés à cet effet. L'expliquent les contraintes propres à un enseignement de la philosophie (Lettre VII) et les critiques que cela fait porter sur l'écrit (Phèdre). Platon invente la philosophie comme une discipline intellectuelle vouée à l'examen des problèmes, à l'épreuve des apories ; il invente (ou réinvente) à cet effet le dialogue, au sens où Schleiermacher et Koyré le font entendre, une écriture destinée à imposer la lecture comme exercice philosophique : le dialogue ne dispense pas d'enseignement sans d'abord donner une épreuve. Au lecteur de s'instruire de son travail sur le texte. Cette méthode part donc du souci de refaire le compte des multiples apories qu'un écrit de Platon peut présenter, et elle veut se donner les moyens de les traverser intégralement, dans l'idée que l'écriture ne laisse rien au hasard ou la fantaisie. Ni Schleiermacher ni Koyré n'accordent d'importance ou même d'intérêt au mythe dans le Protagoras ; au moins aura-t-on aidé à en voir la centralité. Le renversement final n'est pas la seule chose à expliquer entre Prométhée et Épiméthée, l'évolution toute entière du jeu entre Socrate et Protagoras y est impliquée et s'en trouve éclairée."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The paper challenges the traditional assumption that the fragments of ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ are best understood and interpreted against the intellectual and cultural background of the so-called ‘sophistic movement’. I begin by suggesting that we can distinguish, in the fragments, between two separate ‘discourses’ concerning nomos and its role in human life: an abstract ‘sophistic’ discourse, centered around the defense of nomos against the antinomian champions of natural pleonexia, and another, less abstract and more polemical discourse on nomos, which is aimed (...) at the author’s contemporary Athens. I argue that the author’s engagement with well-known sophistic ideas is best understood as instrumental to his polemical agenda: it provides him with a powerful intellectual framework in which to articulate his criticism of democratic society, especially with regard to traditional notions of social ‘benefaction’ and the relation between rich and poor. (shrink)

The question of Plutarch’s attitude towards rhetoric has occupied several scholars since the 19th century. The traditional view is that it is rather negative. Although Plutarch acknowledges some value in rhetoric as a means of persuasion in politics, he nevertheless attributes the dominant role to ethos. As it will be shown below, however, this picture is only partially justified after a closer examination of the relevant texts in their historical-cultural context. In the present study, Plutarch’s remarks on rhetoric are considered (...) against the background of the traditional conflict between rhetoric and philosophy, and analyzed in relation to three thematically significant oppositions, namely that between teaching and persuading, between speech and ethos, and between the philosophers and the sophists. The result is that the secondary, supporting role that rhetoric assumes in certain passages as a means of persuasion is to be relativized rather than emphasized. It can be explained in each case on the basis of its argumentative function. In other cases in Plutarch’s work, where rhetoric is discussed without the usual opposition between speech and ethos playing a role at the same time the attitude expressed is in principle positive. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo comparar el patrón argumentativo de los sofistas del siglo V a. C. tal como son retratados en la obra de Platón con el de los erísticos del Eutidemo. Defenderé que ninguno de estos sofistas es presentado por Platón como experto en dialéctica refutativa, actividad discursiva que caracteriza a la erística. Por el contrario, el retrato platónico de Pródico, Hipias, Gorgias y Protágoras los muestra como incapaces, desinteresados u hostiles a la argumentación de tipo dialéctica.

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine (...) of sophists, some elements of its dialogueism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogueism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already two and a half thousand years ago charted the paths for modern thought. The first part of the article analyzes the relationship between Aristotles hermeneutics and hermeneutics of sophists. (shrink)

This essay aims at elucidating the distinction between sophistry and rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias starting from Socrates’ enigmatic contention that “sophists and rhetors are mixed up in the same area and about the same thing, since they are so close to each other” (465c4-5; Irwin’s translation). To this end I will discuss, firstly, the genealogy of the Greek words sophistikē and rhētorikē in the remaining Greek literature, attempting to show that the modern notions of “sophistry” and “rhetoric” in a broad (...) sense derive from a Platonic-Aristotelian operation of delimitating a special kind of thought and pedagogical activity in opposition to “philosophy”. Secondly, I will analyze some passages of Plato’s Gorgias and Protagoras in which these two notions are being theoretically defined. The general idea pursued in this essay is that rhetoric integrates the sophistic education represented paradigmatically by Protagoras as a necessary means for the citizen to take part in the deliberative institutions of a democratic city (Counsel and Assembly), whereas in the case of Gorgias rhetoric – and more specifically, the judiciary species – consists in the end itself of his pedagogical activity, and not as a means to a wider moral and intellectual education – that is to say, the teaching of political art, identified with moral virtue in Plato’s Protagoras. (shrink)

Anaxarchus accompanied Pyrrho on Alexander the Great’s expedition to India and was known as “the Happy Man” because of his impassivity and contentment. Our sources on his philosophy are limited and largely consist of anecdotes about his interactions with Pyrrho and Alexander, but they allow us to reconstruct a distinctive ethical position. It overlaps with several disparate ethical traditions but is not merely a hodge-podge; it hangs together as a unified whole. Like Pyrrho, he asserts that things are indifferent in (...) value and that realizing this indifference leads to contentment. But this doctrine of indifference is rooted in Democritean atomism. And in his pursuit of pleasure and dismissiveness of conventional standards of what is just, noble, and pious, Anaxarchus is closer to fifth century thinkers such as Aristippus, Antiphon, and Critias. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article approaches the problem of post-truth and the opposition between philosophical dialectics and sophistic rhetoric. The antagonism is addressed through a reading of Žižek's depiction of the ongoing discussion between Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin, the “new version of the ancient dialogue between Plato and the sophists,” as stained by sexual difference, and the dialectics between Parmenides and Gorgias. The article argues that only through acknowledging the inescapable failure of these sides to ever establish a complete totality are (...) we capable of overcoming the antagonism that resides at their core, thus making a dialectical sophistics, on the basis of Žižek's thought, possible. Thus, only by taking the path through post-truth can we attempt to reach the disavowed core of truth that haunts every failed system. (shrink)

In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the orthodox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live. Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralism were made, one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and cultivate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can (...) win the sort of everlasting reputation that makes a life truly admirable and successful. (shrink)

David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles’ immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato’s Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles’ strategy (...) is best read as a response to this difficulty, which sets the stage for Socrates’ revisionist account of justice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to offer a reconstruction of the moral theory defended by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, aided by other contemporary texts that contribute to explain and refine such a theory. The first step of this reconstruction is to show that Callicles offers a perspectivist theory of moral judgements, according to which moral judgements can be issued from two radically distinct perspectives, the contractual and the natural one. The second step is to show that Callicles makes use (...) of a peculiar conception of nature that allows him to claim that certain natural rights and privileges stemming from the natural perspective of valuation must override those rights stemming from the contractual perspective. The resulting theory, as well as being worthy of philosophical interest, does not appear to be vulnerable to most of the objections advanced by the dominant interpretations, nor does it entail the implausible sort of hedonism that Plato attributes to Callicles in this dialogue. (shrink)

Le style de Platon est généralement prisé. Pourtant Nietzsche, dans Crépuscule des Idoles, le décrète « ennuyeux ». Il convient de prendre pleinement la mesure du fait que la critique stylistique de Nietzsche s’inscrit dans la problématique de la volonté de puissance, ce qu’on éclaire notablement avec les cours de philologie qu’il a donnés à Bâle. On revient tout particulièrement sur le phénomène du rythme dans la prose d’art. Tous les écrivains et théoriciens antiques eurent une haute conscience de la (...) puissance propre à la dimension « musicale » de la prose (Gorgias, Thrasymaque, Isocrate, Platon, Aristote, Cicéron, Denys d’Halicarnasse…). Le style n’est pas une affaire secondaire, mais ouvre de nouvelles potentialités pour le logos, au-delà de la logique et de la réfutabilité. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the sophistic method of "two-fold arguments" (antilogic). The traditional understanding of antilogic understood as an expression of agonistic and eristic tendencies of the sophists has been in recent decades, under the influence of G.B. Kerferd, replaced by the understanding of antilogic as an independent argumentative technique, having its own sources, essence, and goals. Following the interpretation of G.B. Kerferd, according to which the foundation of the antilogic is the opposition of two logoi resulting from contradictions (...) or opposites, necessarily associated with the contradictory character of the sensual world, in the paper it is argued that the philosophical basis of antilogic should be sought in the presentation of the views attributed to Protagoras and "adherents of flux" in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus. (shrink)

A pesquisa teve como objetivo explicitar duas importantes obras de Platão, Fédon e Górgias, no primeiro Platão buscará distinguir a natureza do corpo e da alma, sendo que o corpo pertence à natureza sensível estando sujeito a mudanças e sendo f onte das paixões e apetites do homem. Enquanto que a alma pertence à natureza do mundo inteligível, sendo imutável e onde o logos reside e se pode conhecer as coisas em si, ou seja, as essências das coisas. Platão também (...) se preocupará em evidenciar a questão epistemológica, ou seja, como conhecemos as coisas e relacionando a participação da alma e do corpo nesse processo. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa apresenta uma análise da filosofia de Antístenes sobre a epískepsis tôn onomáton – investigação dos nomes. Este tema está relacionado ao problema da orthótes onomáton, que esteve sempre envolvida nas atividades dos sofistas. Nesse aspecto, a orthótes de Pródico, possivelmente um precedente inspirador para a análise antistênica dos nomes, está relacionada com a epískepsis de Antístenes naquilo que convergem e divergem as duas perspectivas. Tanto Pródico quanto Antístenes convergem na mesma base filosófica do princípio do eikeîos lógos e, (...) consequentemente, se identificam na mesma hipótese de uma linguagem objetiva que está estritamente ligada às coisas. Mas, os dois pensadores divergem não só no problema da relação entre linguagem e realidade como também no problema da polissemia. Além do mais, expõe-se na conjectura textual o exame do pressuposto filosófico antistênico, a saber, o eikeîos lógos, concernente ao problema interpretativo da passagem que Aristóteles menciona Antístenes: “ eikeîos lógos hèn eph´ henós ”, ou seja, enunciado próprio para cada coisa. A questão debatida é se a expressão “ hèn eph´ henós ” faz referência ao ónoma ou ao lógos. (shrink)