Hippias

Plato’s Protagoras is famous for Protagoras’s defense of the public practice of sophistry and his great myth, which contains his account of the origins of political life, as well as for Hippias’s rejection of the tyranny of nomos in the name of the natural kinship of the wise. What is perplexing is that Socrates makes no explicit response to these arguments. This essay argues that Socrates’s indirect response is actually contained in his otherwise unmotivated interpretation of the poem of Simonides, (...) where his description of “laconic philosophy” is in fact an indirect description of his own philosophical practice. While the sophists reject nomos without recognizing their own dependence on its stabilizing force, Socrates argues that genuine philosophers, recognizing at once the necessity as well as the defectiveness of nomos, must “unwillingly praise” convention and only present their criticisms indirectly. Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides, then, points the way to his own understanding of the tension between, but also the interdependence of, nomos and physis. (shrink)

Lucian's Hippias or The Bath, traditionally considered to be a straight-faced encomium of a historical architect and real-life bath-house of the Antonine period, is now often judged to be a work of satire, though what exactly is being satirized has remained elusive. This article argues that the architect ‘Hippias’ is closely modelled on Plato's caricature of the sophist Hippias of Elis in the Hippias Minor, and that his bath-house is a comic extrapolation from the sophist's home-made oil-flask and strigil. Lucian's (...) Hippias should be read as a parody of contemporary prose encomia of public buildings. (shrink)

This paper investigates the hypothesis that Heraclitus was a formative influence on the Hippias Major. Specifically, it establishes connections between the dialogue's presentation of "the fine" (τὸ καλόν) and Heraclitus's "unity of opposites" idea. It argues that the fine is characterized by specifically Heraclitean oppositions, and it concludes that this makes a difference for the reading of certain passages in the dialogue and for philosophical conclusions regarding the fine.

Plato's Hippias Major has usually been taken to be a comic dialogue, and rightly so. Its main theme is the καλόν, but what is primarily targeted and harshly mocked throughout the dialogue is Hippias’ pretence of having σοφία, which should allow him to define what the καλόν consists in. Yet, καλόν is an ambiguous term since, besides its aesthetic meaning, it also usually means the ‘morally right’. Not being able to define what καλόν is therefore also amounts to being unable (...) to define what the right is. And indeed, the genuine σοφία, as Plato will tell us explicitly, is the σοφία that helps people, especially the youth, to become morally better. Thus, the serious conclusion Plato wants his reader to draw is, first, that the well-known sophist Hippias have no real σοφία despite their very name, and second, and most importantly, that they cannot help anyone become virtuous, and that therefore their claim of educating people in moral goodness proves to be specious. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed analysis of the first part of Hippias's speech in Plato's Protagoras (337 С 5-E 2). The aim of this analysis is to show the very richness of political notions and implications of Hippias's purpose, which one can be almost considered a sort of 5th century ВС philosophical hetairies's manifesto. Our analysis clarifies the meaning of Hippias's nomos/physis antithesis and it focuses on the philosophical value of these two terms. We try to reconstruct Hippias's conception of (...) positive law and to specify the concept of wise men's relationships and affinity. That, however, does not support the idea of a cosmo-politanism grounded on mankind's universal relationship. Hippias's position – which has to be grasped on the basis of Hippias's ontology explained by an important passage of Plato's Hippias Major – rather sustains the idea of a sort of "aristocratic cosmopolitanism" connected to the philosophical hetairies: that implies the recognition of verified and enhanced differences. (shrink)

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the (...) sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge. (shrink)

The key expressionta hautou prattein, "to do one's own," has two opposite meanings in Plato's Republic: to perform for oneself all tasks required to meet one's own needs (2.370a); or to specialize exclusively in one task, leaving others to other specialists (4.433a and thenceforward). The former sense also appears in Charmides 161e-162a, with a list of tasks that closely matches that atHippias Minor 386b-c. Given these contexts, the inconsistency in Plato's usage in Republic suggests an answer to the teaching of (...) the sophist Hippias, that the goal of life is self-sufficiency though mastery of many specialized crafts. (shrink)