Thrasymachus

Este artigo analisa a apresentação do tema da pleonexia por Trasímaco, personagem da República de Platão. Ele explota a sua descrição do funcionamento do kratos (predomínio) tal como ele o observa em cidades reais e a conclusão normativa que ele parece tirar deste diagnóstico: ter mais (pleon ekhein) é o caminho para a prosperidade. Do ponto de vista da caracterização do seu personagem, notaremos também as atitudes competitivas que Trasímaco demonstra no diálogo com Sócrates, fazendo parecer que a persuasão seria (...) uma disputa em que persuadir equivale a ganhar, enquanto ser persuadido equivaleria a perder; mas aprender por cooperação mútua não parece uma opção. O artigo se desenvolve em três partes: I) o tratamento erístico que Trasímaco dá à persuasão, II) a apresentação do tema do motivo psico-político através do emprego da palavra kratos e derivadas, III) a tematização que Trasímaco, Glauco e Sócrates fazem da pleonexia. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain why Thrasymachus, upon first appearing in Republic I, prohibits Socrates from defining justice as what is good. I argue that Thrasymachus views such definitions as equivocal, since he conceives of the good as relative: what is good must be good for someone. This relative conception of the good makes Thrasymachus similar to the sight-lovers, who believe in good things, which are relatively good, but deny the existence of the good itself, which is (...) absolutely good. Understanding Thrasymachus as a sight-lover permits an illuminating reframing of his outlook and his significance for the larger project of the Republic. (shrink)

This article applies Russon's principles of reading Plato's dialogues to solve a problem arising from both the dramatic and philosophical aspects of Plato's Republic: persuasive speech seems effective only when its audience is already willing to listen and be convinced. Yet if so, then either persuasive speech is powerless to persuade anybody truly, or it is unclear how it differs from simple manipulation or brainwashing. This article resolves this dilemma by using Russon’s insights about the kind of rationality Plato invites (...) us to assume, namely a “concrete rationality,” and by analyzing the first three interlocutors of Socrates in the Republic: Polemarchus, Cephalus, and, of course, Thrasymachus. This approach enables us to differentiate these three interlocutors, explain Thrasymachus’s persistence in listening to the conversation until the end despite his unwillingness to listen, as well as the therapeutic function of theōria for providing him some momentary relief from his “hatred of speech” (misologia). (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Thrasymachus’ Inmoralism, that is to say, of the set of judgements concerning the superior value of injustice in comparison with justice, issued by him in book I of Plato’s Republic. It is argued that both the argument in support of these judgements and its implicit resource to the concept of πλεονεξία cannot be interpreted descriptively, if they are to serve to justify the immoralists judgements. It is also argued that a particularly important subgroup of (...) such judgements is supported by a peculiar conception of practical reason based on the concept of πλεονεξία. Finally, the comparison is made between this ‘pleonexic’ conception of practical rationality and the one that Plato advocates in the Republic. (shrink)

In the first book of the Republic, through the figure of Thrasymachus Plato presents the antithesis of Socrates’ idea of justice. Justice, declares the sophist, is nothing but the stronger person’s advantage. The climax of his colorful and violent entry on the scene is the argument that the happiest person of all is the tyrant. In this interpretive study I discuss Thrasymachus’s approach to political and personal power, together with Socrates’ refutation of it, based on a reconstruction of seven explications (...) on the justice-theme by the sophist. From a philosophical perspective that takes account of a range of literary, psychological, and historical factors, I analyze the Republic’s opening dialog as a foundational text in Plato’s theory of virtue, state, and soul. The Republic has retained its status as one of the most influential works in the history of Western philosophy. In the Republic, Thrasymachus serves, in an essential way, as an opening catalyst for Plato’s following exposition. Remarkably, this study represents the first full-length examination of both Platonic and historical Thrasymachus. (shrink)

The paper discusses different interpretations of Callicles and Thrasymachus’ positions. There are good reasons for interpreting Callicles as a critic of democracy and as an aristocratic political thinker whose political views are closer to Plato’s than is usually assumed. The paper argues that Callicles defends a natural right of the best citizens to rule over the crowd. However, in contrast to Plato, for Callicles the rule of the best should not aim at the common good but at their personal advantage. (...) The paper also discusses the view that Thrasymachus is just a sociologist of power who diagnoses what actually happens in politics (Henning Ottmann, Max Salomon). This interpretation is still current, and enables us to understand important aspects of legislation in contemporary democracies. Finally, the paper argues that there are reasons to understand Thrasymachus not only as a political realist, but, similar to Protagoras, as a moral sceptic. (shrink)

It is argued that the true definition of justice in Plato’s Republic appears not in Book IV but in Book I, where it is clear that justice is other-oriented or external rather than internal as per Book IV. Indeed, on Book IV’s definition, there is virtually no difference between justice and moderation. Considered here is a single argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus, in which Socrates contends that imperfect injustice is “stronger” than perfect. Rather than producing a just group, the justice (...) between members of a group strengthens the injustice of a group whose external project is already unjust. (shrink)

In Republic 1, Thrasymachus makes the radical claim that being just is ‘high-minded simplicity’ and being unjust is ‘good judgment’ (348c–e). Because injustice involves benefiting oneself, while justice involves benefiting others, the unjust are wise and good and the just are foolish and bad (348d–e). The “greedy craftsperson” argument (1.349b–350c) attempts to show that the unjust person's desire to outdo or have more than ( pleon echein) everyone is a symptom of her ignorance. Many commentaries have found the argument problematic (...) and unclear. However, this paper argues that the greedy craftsperson argument defends plausible constraints on the nature of justice and wisdom. (shrink)

One issue of contention amongst scholars of the Republic is whether Thrasymachus initially espouses a conventionalist account of justice, according to which just actions are merely those which are lawful; required, or at least allowed, by the laws passed by the ruler of the state. A further question is then whether his initial conceptions of rulers and laws are positivist ones, such that to be a ruler or law of a state is simply determined by the state’s constitution. At 340c (...) Thrasymachus effectively rejects such positivism by placing a condition on being a ruler that one should be exercising the art of ruling and on being a law that it should work to the ruler’s interest. Some have maintained that this works to clarify his initial account and so shows that he was never a positivist about rulers and laws. In this paper I argue against such an understanding of Thrasymachus’ argument and explore the problems which beset the position he is, on my reading, forced into by Socrates’ objection to his opening claim that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger and the argument he first gives to support it. (shrink)

In this paper I try to explore Plato’s concept of power in the first book of the Republic as opposed to Thrasymachus’. I argue that the core of Thrasymachus’ position is not to be found in his definitions of justice, but in his concept of power and, in this sense, he has a coherent philosophical position. I also claim that although Plato does not explicitly develop a concept of power, it is possible to find it in his arguments throughout the (...) dialogue. Moreover, the link Plato establishes between power and knowledge is going to play a big role in the entirety of his political philosophy. (shrink)

Cynical speech is a proper form of manifestation of what we call cynicism. It takes the form of a persuasive strategy which assumes the achievement of the rhetorical consubstantiation of a cynical speaker and her/his auditorium. Cynical speech is a game that takes place between three sides: a cynical speaker posing as an immoralist, a moralist and an auditorium, the acquisition of which is the aim of both interlocutors. At the outset, the cynical speaker gives the identity of naive dilettantes’ (...) to both the members of the auditorium and the moralist and then tries to persuade the audience to side with him and take on the role of the students of a cynical expert. This is what can be described as cynical modulation. In its course, the initial opposition of a professional versus dilettante turns into an opposition of master versus student, while the unattractive identity of a dilettante is transferred to a moralist. In this way, the speaker achieves what Kenneth Burke thinks is the right goal for any rhetorical act: the speaker’s consubstantiation with the auditorium. This process is presented based on the example of the disputes between Socrates, as a moralist on the one hand, and sophist-politicians Thrasymachus and Callicles, who personify the type of cynical speakers, on the other. The analysis of cynical speech carried out in the paper leads to an indication of some basic features of this way of speaking, as well as the relationship that exists between them and the content of viewpoints voiced by cynical speakers. These viewpoints have been described as aristocratic democratism and people’s anti-democratism. These are two forms of what has been described as the cynical counter-ideal. The adoption of these positions is an indirect expression of the same systematic ambiguity that lies in the form of cynical speaking, which belongs to the very essence of cynicism as a cultural phenomenon. (shrink)

The phenomenological vision, particularly, Husserl’s idea of critique as an infinite vocational theoria and Patočka’s as an enduring programme, view Platonic logic and Socratic act as the paradigms for a normative justification of the idea of universal science and philosophy. In light of that, the Thrasymachus-Socrates debate is interpreted as a case to testify the critical power of philosophy successfully exercised over sophistic tyrannical non-philosophy. This paper criticizes the phenomenological idealization of the Socratic victory as an ethico-teleologically anticipated success of (...) philosophy and rewrites the defeat of Thrasymachus as a political failure in warring with philosophy during which Thrasymachus questions the legitimacy of the act of philosophizing to decide its legitimacy and thereby exposes the politics played out in that act. (shrink)

Law, often neglected in treatments of the Republic, is essential to the philosopher-kings’ rule. Only law accomplishes the partial divinization of citizens at which philosophical politics aims. Socrates’ interrogation of Thrasymachus and Glaucon reveals law to be a command whereby citizens participate in philosophical knowledge and limit the pleonexia congenital to humanity. Law does so primarily by instilling in souls a true opinion resistant to pleonectic passion, producing a state of political virtue. This primary work is supported by the musical (...) and poetical education, itself shaped by law for the sake of law. Law persuades and compels the soul by appealing to both reason and spiritedness, enabling them to overcome the appetites. The soul’s consequent acceptance of truth and resistance to the passions indeed makes it resemble divinity. In so transforming the citizens through the law, the philosopher-king also unifies the city and makes it happy under his rule. (shrink)

A careful reading of Plato's works show that Thrasymachus and Callicles, his famous immoralists, are unselfconsciously devoted to virtue as they see it. They thereby offer surprising support for the view that people are not simply self-interested, and they cast light on the beliefs and hopes we all have of justice.

Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. Para isso, há de se observar a relação da justiça com o governo e a força que a determina. O intuito é reavivar as discussões hodiernas sobre as teses de Trasímaco dentro da filosofia platônica, assim como demonstrar sua importância para o âmbito da filosofia política.

Ao associar governo à téchne, Trasímaco estabelece que o governo também exige um conhecimento específico. Esse saber permitiria que o governante pudesse beneficiar-se dos governados, tirando proveito deles. Em sua definição de governo, ele aproximará essa téchne do governo ao governante injusto, mais especificamente o tirano. Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar a relevância dos argumentos de Trasímaco para a filosofia política.

This paper attempts a detailed and in-depth examination of the particular case of Thrasymachus’ behavior. Our attempt is not to provide a consistent analysis and interpretation of Thrasymachus’ account of justice, but to present his rhetorical skills. In particular, the aim of this paper is to provide an account of behavior as an essential parameter in his teaching of rhetoric. Plato’s choice of Thrasymachus in order to confront Socrates is not a random one. He chooses a renowned Sophist in the (...) art of rhetoric, who places great emphasis on the release of emotions in rhetorical speech. Against this backdrop, following Thrasymachus’ arguments and behavior, we might configure his pedagogical method of teaching rhetoric. (shrink)

Tendo o Livro I da “República” de Platão como seu horizonte de referência, este artigo pretende, enquanto apresenta sumariamente as posições defendidas por Sócrates e Trasímaco sobre a justiça, examinar suas principais implicações para nós, no sentido de estabelecer algumas pistas sobre como responder à pergunta feita em seu título, a saber, “como devemos viver?”.

The conviction that Plato manipulated Thrasymachus’ views is today accepted by the scholarly opinion. Given the absence of testimonies regarding the political and moral views held by the historical Thrasymachus, the degree of this manipulation can be gauged only by assessing the degree of incoherence and ambiguity in the views of the Platonic Thrasymachus. This perspective, of necessity a self-referential one, is overcome by the hypothesis presented in the following article, namely, that Plato manipulates not as much the views of (...) the historical Thrasymachus as the extremely concise and ambiguous thesis which he has ascribed to him; and that the goal of this manipulation is to mock Thrasymachus’ style and rhetorical posture – both confirmed by testimonies outside the Platonic text – as ill suited to the philosophical reflection on the content of this thesis. (shrink)

In defending the view that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus puzzlingly claims that rulers never err and that any practitioner of a skill or expertise (τέχνη) is infallible. In what follows, Socrates offers a number of arguments directed against Thrasymachus’ views concerning the nature of skill, ruling, and justice. Commentators typically take a dim view of both Thrasymachus’ claims about skill (which are dismissed as an ungrounded and purely ad hoc response to Socrates’ initial criticisms) and Socrates’ (...) latter arguments (which are deemed extremely weak). In this paper, I clarify Thrasymachus’ views (and those of several other ancients) concerning qua locutions and the nature of skill and ability and I reconstruct Socrates’ arguments against Thrasymachus’ views concerning skill and justice. I argue that Thrasymachus’ views are not ungrounded or ad hoc and that Socrates’ arguments are rather different (and significantly stronger) than often supposed. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a justificativa para o contrato no início da história do pensamento político grego, tendo em vista o estatuto do acordo no livro II da "República" de Platão. Pretendese avaliar como Glaucon apresenta o contratualismo da maioria das pessoas como um desdobramento da tese de Trasímaco de que o justo é o vantajoso para o mais forte e em conexão com os valores que levam as pessoas a admitirem a necessidade do contrato em razão do (...) medo que elas possuem daquilo que poderia ser considerado o maior mal: sofrerem injustiças e não poderem se vingar, enquanto abdicam do que consideram como o maior bem: cometer injustiças sem serem punidas. (shrink)

In Max Weber’s typology of legitimate rule, the element of “force” does not appear among the legitimating factors. During the classical period of the polis, however, the element of “force” had been considered as one possible basis for the right to rule, among other legitimating principles like nomos, aretè, episteme, and plethos. With the intention of contributing to the understanding of the distinction between ancient and Weberian conceptions of “force” in relation to the legitimation process as the process of authority-building, (...) this article compares and contrasts the views of Weber with those of Thrasymachus. In fact, in The profession and vocation of politics Weber quotes Trotsky, who had declared that «every state is founded on force », and elevates force to a conditio sine qua non for the existence of the modern State. Nevertheless, his view is quite different from that of Thrasymachus, when he declares that «justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger», assuming that justice exists only as an expression of the will of the strongest forces in society. This article explores the implications of the passage from the triad of “force”, “power to rule”, and “justice as advantage of the stronger” to the triad of “power, “force/coercion, and “legitimacy” grounded in the beliefs or conceptions of actors. (shrink)

This is an imagined dialogue between one of the more famous skeptics regarding moral attribution, Thrasymachus, and an imagined Socrates who, through the convenient miracle of time travel, returns to Athens after exposure to contemporary metaethics, now a devoted and formidable quasi-realist expressivist. The dialogue focuses on the characterization of moral conflict and moral justification available to the expressivist, and the authors attempt to lay out the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of the expressivist view.

In Book I of the Republic, or so I shall argue, Plato gives us a glimpse of sheer horror. In the character, beliefs, and desires of Thrasymachus, Plato aims to personify some of the most diabolical dangers that lurk in human nature. In this way, the role that Thrasymachus plays for Plato is akin to the role that for Hobbes is played by the bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, which would allegedly be the inevitable result (...) of a "state of nature", where human beings have no government to terrorize them into obedience. It is also akin to the role that for Kant is played by the "radical evil" that is allegedly an indelible feature of human nature itself. As I shall try to show, the desires that characterize Thrasymachus are of the kind that are described in Book IX as "lawless" desires, desire of the wild insane kind that dominate the tyrannical soul; and his beliefs systematically reflect these desires, in a way that has its own hideously coherent logic. (shrink)

In this paper, I oppose the now-dominant view that Thrasymachus offers a definition of justice in Book I of the Republic. This way of interpretation Thrasymachus does not pay sufficient attention to the methodological assumptions he makes during his disagreement with Socrates. To better understand Socrates’ antagonist, it is crucial to remember that he was, in fact, a sophist. I argue that what the character Thrasymachus is doing in Book I is importantly akin to a certain genre of sophistic arguments (...) from the 5th century. In his discussion with Socrates, Thrasymachus attempts a genealogical unmasking of justice, which he hopes will change the action-guiding beliefs of his audience. Although my discussion is primarily about the methodology or structure of Thrasymachus’ argument, I conclude by offering a brief discussion of its substance, as well. (shrink)

In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus contends two major claims: (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger, and (2) justice is the good of the other, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage. In the beginning of Book II, Glaucon self-proclaims that he will be representing Thrasymachus’ claims in a better way, and provides a story of how justice has originated from a state of nature situation. However, Glaucon’s story of the origin of justice has an (...) implication that justice is the advantage of the weak rather than the stronger. This is inconsistent with Thrasymachus’ first claim which states that justice is the advantage of the stronger. This is a problem for Glaucon since Glaucon is supposed to be representing Thrasymachus’ original claims in a better way. In this paper, I provide two solutions to this puzzle with the help of elementary game theory. (shrink)

This text intends to analyse the new version of Trasymachus’ thesis proposed by Glaucon and Adimantus in Republic II. Its aim is to understand its philosophical intentions and main aspects. We attempt to show that there is an important methodological change, related to a new terminology adopted to express Trasymachus’ thesis, and, most significantly, a new attitude of both interlocutors, especially Glaucon, towards the investigation, as we now find interlocutors presenting a philosophical way of understanding and investigating a philosophical problem.

In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus famously maintains that ideas of morality and justice are nothing more than an ideology indoctrinated in “the weaker” to benefit “the stronger.” This is Thrasymachus’s challenge to morality: the thesis that some social arrangements, including some moral norms, are products of ‘false consciousness.’ False consciousness occurs when a dominant social group shapes the beliefs and desires of a subordinate group in such a way that the subordinates act for the benefit of the dominants, (...) but against their own interests. In this paper, I grant that some moral norms emerge or persist because of false consciousness. However, I shall argue that these norms actually have the function of impartially promoting the interests of all persons in their range of application. Even if the actual effect of false consciousness norms is to benefit a powerful class while being harmful and discriminatory toward others, the true function of false consciousness norms is the intended effect that they were designed to have. And the crucial feature of false consciousness norms is that their designers—particularly subordinates—teach, preach, follow, and enforce them with the intention of promoting the mutual interests of everyone to whom the norms apply. (shrink)

Socrates defends justice against the attack mounted by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, but it isn’t easy to say what the defense consists of. A careful reading shows that Thrasymachus himself is deeply though unselfconsciously attached to justice. Thrasymachus admires skillful artisans and thinks that devoting oneself to one’s art makes one a good man, worthy of good things. He feels that the skillful and unjust deserve to get the better of the artless and weak, which is to say he unselfconsciously (...) believes in a form of distributive justice. Moreover, his surprising attachment to justice resembles and casts light on the attachment to justice that most people feel. (shrink)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric al-Fārābī harmonizes Plato and Aristotle in terms of philosophic education by ordering Aristotle’s eight logical works onto Plato’s famous image of the cave. He represents the way out of the cave with Aristotle’s four logical works of ascent and the return into the cave through Aristotle’s four logical works of the descent. Al-Fārābī’s image of ascent and descent also alludes to Socrates’ conception of protreptic education in Book VII of the Republic. In essence, protreptic (...) education consists in the Socratic art that freely turns the soul from the images and political interpretations of things to being itself. In this essay I argue that for al-Fārābī the four logical works of ascent guide the soul to free itself from its habituations so as to contemplate real beings, particularly the good of one’s own soul and the souls of one’s fellow citizens. Yet the ruler needs to use the arts of “descent,” as demonstrated by Thrasymachus, in order to rule the city well. The way of Socrates consists of the logical methods used to come to possess knowledge of being, while the way of Thrasymachus comprises the methods of persuasion to habituate citizens and protect the philosophic quest for the truth. Al-Fārābī, I conclude, combines the way of Socrates and the way of Thrasymachus in order to show that both ways are useful and necessary for good governance. (shrink)

Si esaminano gli argomenti di Trasimaco (anche alla luce della posizione di Callicle) e, segnatamente, il rapporto tra la legge e il potere costituito: il raffronto con il pensiero di Carl Schmitt prende avvio dal nodo centrale del significato attribuito al νόμος. Si analizzano le argomentazione nei dialoghi platonici per ricostruire la concezione del νόμος e gli elementi che possono fornire risposte indirette alla questione posta da Trasimaco, al di là della ricerca della definizione del concetto di giustizia, con particolare (...) attenzione alla legge ed alle forme di governo. Si esamina la relazione tra le tesi sulla sovranità elaborate da Schmitt e le teorie sul potere rintracciabili nelle posizioni di Trasimaco e di Callicle in rapporto ai frammenti di Pindaro ed Eraclito. Considerata la centralità della relazione amico-nemico nel pensiero di Schmitt, posta a confronto con le posizioni platoniche, si esamina la distinzione tra la concezione della legge come atto cognitivo di scoperta della verità e la sua fondazione sul principio della decisione da parte di chi detenga il potere sovrano, punto di arrivo dello sviluppo delle tesi hobbesiane da parte di Schmitt. (shrink)

Most scholars agree that Socrates’ arguments in the course of his refutation of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic are at best weak and at worse fallacious. Some interpreters have used this logical inadequacy to argue that Socrates’ aim is psychotherapeutic rather than cognitive, but this does not address why Thrasymachus feels shamed. I argue in this article that Thrasymachus blushes not simply because his explicit propositions are contradictory but because two principles of his sophistic ēthos—that his skill requires knowledge and that (...) his skill achieves victory in logoi—are fundamentally at odds. My claim that Socrates’ elenchus of Thrasymachus appeals to a principle of ethical consistency has the specific advantage of reconciling the otherwise opposed views of Socratic elenchus as exclusively ‘logical’ or ‘psychotherapeutic’. (shrink)

I argue that the strict account of techne agreed to by Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I provides a useful framework for addressing a central question of the dialogue as a whole: how philosophy might belong to the polis. This view depends upon three positions: 1) that Plato invites us to interpret the relationship between techne and polis outside the terms of the city-soul analogy, 2) that the strict account contributes to a compelling description of vocational work, and 3) that (...) this description determines what Socrates means by a true polis, and thus frames the problem of philosophy’s political inclusion. (shrink)

The essay concerns the negative end of the political argument of the Republic, that injustice—the rule of unreason—is both widespread and undesirable, and that whatever shadows of virtue or order might be found in its midst are corrupt and unstable. This claim is explained in detail in Republic 8 and 9. These passages explain recognizable faults in recognizable regimes in terms of the failure of the rule of reason and the corresponding success of the rule of non-rational forms of motivation. (...) I will first look at degenerate regimes as they appear in a less systematic way in the Ship of State passage in Republic 6 and in the discussion with Thrasymachus in book 1. I then give a general overview of the system of degenerate regimes in book 8 to examine what exactly goes wrong with them and why, and explain how the process of degeneration ought be understood as the progressive decay of the rule of reason. Finally, I argue that a close look at this decay reveals something surprising: that degenerate regimes and characters feature weak versions of virtue, shadow-virtues that are based on appearances and held in place by force. Thus in the end the whole process of degeneration ought be understood as an extended conflict between reason and appetite. (shrink)

The chiastic nexus between Socrates’ irony and its ridiculousness in the eyes of Thrasymachus permits to reformulate the importance of laughter as an ambiguity-laden philosophical subject. Taking into account the functions attributed to laughter by many authors – particularly Plato, Bergson, Kant, and Plessner – this paper investigates the relationship among laughter, approval, and displeasure, suggesting that the ambiguity of laughter comes out from a temporary breakdown either in the consolidated frames of meaning, or in the attempts to suggest new (...) ones. (shrink)

This paper interprets the Republic’s “parallel” imagery of a contest between the lives of the most just and most unjust men as indicating that book 9’s two pleasure arguments are the culmination of the dialogue’s refutation of Thrasymachus’ sophistry. This strategic function of the pleasure arguments explains why Socrates designates the account of the just man’s pleasure the most severe defeat of the unjust man. The article concludes with a brief defense of using the contest imagery as an interpretive aid (...) to the dialogue. (shrink)

En el centro de La república, Sócrates expresa su disgusto de que Glaucón trate de enemistarlo con Trasímaco cuando existe entre ambos una relación de amistad (498c9- d4). Más allá de la ironía socrática, lo cierto es que la amistad de sus lógoi está basada en un doble acuerdo: 1) La justicia exige el conocimiento de lo útil o bueno (339d5-9); 2) El gobernante inteligente no está dispuesto a beneficiar a la ciudad si no se beneficia de algún modo a (...) sí mismo (347d6-8). El propósito de la comunicación es aclarar el sentido de esta doble homología en la que intersectan y divergen las posiciones de Trasímaco y de Sócrates. (shrink)

Zu den beiden -Bosewichten- der antiken Philosophie, Kallikles und Thrasymachos, existiert uberraschend wenig detailreiche Sekundarliteratur, obwohl das intellektuelle Interesse an ihren bei Platon uberlieferten Anschauungen uberaus gross ist - denn das Faustrecht fasziniert. Der vorliegende Kommentar zu den entsprechenden Textstellen des -Gorgias- bzw. des ersten Buches des -Staates- soll die Lucken in der Sekundarliteratur nun schliessen. Gangigen Standpunkten heutiger Interpreten, zwar nicht offen fur Kallikles und Thrasymachos Partei zu ergreifen, Ihnen aber warmherziges Verstandnis auszusprechen, tritt der Autor entschieden entgegen. Er (...) nahert sich dem Problem um das durch Kallikles und Thrasymachos vertretene sophistische Recht des Starkeren von Platons Seite her. Das Buch sagt insgesamt dem anhaltenden Rehabilitierungsstreben zur Sophistik bzw. der um sich greifenden Diffamierung Platons den Kampf an. Damit wird den Sophisten diejenige Rolle zugewiesen, die ihnen geschichtlich gesehen auch zukommt, nicht Aufklarer, sondern Aufwiegler zu sein. Nicht zuletzt kommt uber die umfangreiche Charakterdarstellung des Kallikles und Thrasymachos hinaus die ethische Grundhaltung ihres grossen Gegenspielers Sokrates zum Tragen. Das Buch zeichnet ihn als echten Bezwinger des Immoralismus aus. Und Sokrates erweist sich schliesslich einmal mehr als der, der er ist: als der wahre Erzieher der Menschheit.". (shrink)

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, as a famous rhetor and an infamous interlocutor in the Republic, has experienced a rebirth in the disciplines of political science, history and rhetoric. A major question concerning work in these fields is the extent to which the historical Thrasymachus can be separated from the character of the Republic. In the historical record, Thrasymachus is an opaque figure. Only a single fragment of a speech survives for posterity. From this fragment, research has tried to distil a system (...) of political thought.What did Thrasymachus think of politics? In which political camp did he reside? Attempts to answer these questions run into a formidable wall: the abject paucity of evidence. Given few definitive clues, research into the political thought of the historical Thrasymachus has reached no tenable conclusions. Thrasymachus remains a fairly obscure rhetor most famous for a fictional confrontation with Socrates. (shrink)

This is an earlier version of a chapter from my book "Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well" (2014). The book analyses Plato’s Politeia (= Republic) as a philosophical drama in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves (...) as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader). (shrink)

Book I of Plato's Republic is unusually eventful, yet one episode stands out: Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus' challenge raises a hurdle that Socrates must overcome if he is to convince the audience -- both those present and those reading his account of the discussion -- that, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, might does not make right. That challenge, however, puts Socrates in the awkward position of having to prove Thrasymachus wrong without appearing to overpower him in the (...) argument and thereby inadvertently proving his opponent's point. Socrates thus allows Thrasymachus to take the reins of the inquiry, only to overthrow and replace him. Once in charge, however, Socrates admits that his own rule over the inquiry ended in an injustice. Socrates' surprising admission signals that his demonstration was necessary to clear the ground for the discovery of justice. His power struggle with Thrasymachus thus renders Book I an indispensable part of the Republic, and foreshadows the interlocutors' troubling realization that justice and power are ultimately impossible to reconcile fully. (shrink)

In the Platonic dialogues Socrates is shown talking to two, and only two, famous teachers of rhetoric, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Gorgias of Leontini. At first glance relations between Socrates and Gorgias appear to be much more courteous—they might even be described as cordial—than relations between Socrates and Thrasymachus. In the Gorgias Socrates explicitly and intentionally seeks an opportunity to talk to Gorgias and treats him with great respect. Socrates shows that Gorgias’s claims concerning the power of his art are (...) contradictory, but the philosopher does not press his advantage or embarrass the rhetorician (Stauffer 2006, 34). Although Gorgias indicates his interest in hearing what Socrates has to say by urging his young friends Polus and Callicles to continue the conversation, Gorgias never says that he is convinced by Socrates. And Socrates never announces that Gorgias has become his friend. In the Republic Socrates reports that Thrasymachus burst into the conversation like a lion. Socrates even claims that he and his interlocutor (Polemarchus) were frightened. The initial exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus thus appears to be hostile. In the argument that follows, Socrates embarrasses Thrasymachus; the famous teacher of rhetoric blushes. Nevertheless, Socrates declares later in the conversation (1900, 498d) that he and Thrasymachus have become friends. (shrink)