Results for 'buck‐passing strategy'

954 found
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  1.  18
    Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game.Takaaki Abe - 2022 - Theory and Decision 93 (3):509-533.
    We study stable strategy profiles in a pure exchange game of bads, where each player dumps his or her bads such as garbage onto someone else. Hirai et al. (Mathematical Social Sciences 51(2):162–170, 2006) show that cycle dumping, in which each player follows an ordering and dumps his or her bads onto the next player, is a strong Nash equilibrium and that self-disposal is α\alpha -stable for some initial distributions of bads. In this paper, we show that a (...)
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  2. Excellence and means: On the limits of buck-passing.Johan Brännmark - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):301-315.
    The article explores the limits of buck-passing analysis in evaluating value or goodness. It talks about the inability of back-passers to account for two important types of value or goodness, which include excellence and means. The use of delimiting strategy in buck-passing analysis in order to be in possession of goodness is discussed.
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  3. (1 other version)Lewis on Reference and Eligibility.J. R. G. Williams - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 367-382.
    This paper outlines Lewis’s favoured foundational account of linguistic representation, and outlines and briefly evaluates variations and modifications. Section 1 gives an opinionated exegesis of Lewis’ work on the foundations of reference—his interpretationism. I look at the way that the metaphysical distinction between natural and non-natural properties came to play a central role in his thinking about language. Lewis’s own deployment of this notion has implausible commitments, so in section 2 I consider variations and alternatives. Section 3 briefly considers a (...)
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  4.  6
    1. The intentional object constraint.Dancy On Buck—Passing - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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  5. Buck-passing about Goodness.John Skorupski - 2007 - In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Defends the buck-passing account of value from the wrong kind of reason objection by arguing that in the cases proposed there are no reasons to value the intuitively worthless object, but there are practical reasons to bring it about that one values it. Also extends the account to other evaluative concepts.
     
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  6. Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...)
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  7. The buck passing account of value: assessing the negative thesis.Philip Stratton-Lake - unknown
    The buck-passing account of value involves a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that to be good is to have reasons for a pro-attitude. The negative claim is that goodness itself is not a reason for a pro-attitude. Unlike Scanlon, Parfit rejects the negative claim. He maintains that goodness is reason-providing, but that the reason provided is not an additional reason, additional, that is, to the reason provided by the good-making property. I consider various ways in which (...)
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  8. Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
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  9. The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
    T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority (...)
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  10. (2 other versions)Making our children pay for mitigation.Aaron Maltais - 2015 - In Aaron Maltais & Catriona McKinnon (eds.), The Ethics of Climate Governance. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 91-109.
    Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge, there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations (...)
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  11. Buck-passing and the wrong kind of reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such (...)
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  12. Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.
    This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value . Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe (...)
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  13. The Buck Passing Theory of Art.James O. Young - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4): 421-433.
    In Beyond Art (2014), Dominic Lopes proposed a new theory of art, the buck passing theory. Rather than attempting to define art in terms of exhibited or genetic featured shared by all artworks, Lopes passes the buck to theories of individual arts. He proposes that we seek theories of music, painting, poetry, and other arts. Once we have these theories, we know everything there is to know about the theory of art. This essay presents two challenges to the theory. First, (...)
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  14. Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony.Judith Baker & Philip Clark - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):178-199.
    Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and (...)
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  15. Compunction, Buck-Passing, and Moral Reasons: Reply to Darwall.Dale Miller - manuscript
    In “’But It Would Be Wrong,’” Stephen Darwall advances a mixed view regarding “deontic buck-passing.” He holds that a wrong action’s “wrong-making features” are our reasons for reactive attitudes like blame; with respect to these reasons, the action’s wrongness “passes the buck” to these features. Yet the action’s being wrong is itself an additional reason for the agent not to do the action, Darwall contends, a “second-personal” moral reason. So with respect to reasons for action, the buck doesn’t get passed. (...)
     
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  16. Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is not attractive (...)
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  17. Making our Children Pay for Mitigation.Aaron Maltais - 2015 - In Aaron Maltais & Catriona McKinnon (eds.), The Ethics of Climate Governance. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 91-110.
    Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long-term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations by (...)
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  18.  90
    The Buck-Passing Stops Here.Andrew Moore - 2012 - In Martin Frické Frické (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    Thomas Scanlon influentially argues that, in the provision of reasons to act or believe, goodness and value ‘pass the buck’ to other properties. This paper first extends his arguments: if Scanlon shows that goodness and value pass the buck, then relevantly analogous arguments show that, contrary to Scanlon, duty and wrongness too pass this same buck. The paper then reverses Scanlon’s buck-passing arguments: if they show that goodness and value pass the reason-providing buck, then reasons themselves also pass the buck (...)
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  19.  42
    Passing Strategies and Performative Identities: Coping with (In)Visible Chronic Diseases.Tanisha Jemma Rose Spratt - 2019 - Journal of Medical Humanities 43 (1):73-88.
    In this article I consider the role of passing and performance in the everyday lives of alkaptonuria and vitiligo patients. Race, LGBTQ, gender and disability scholars have long used the term passing to describe sub-groups of people within marginal populations who intentionally manipulate their bodies or alter their behaviour in order to claim identities that are not socially assigned to them at birth. In this paper I demonstrate the effectiveness of the passing strategies that patients use in order to mitigate (...)
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  20.  56
    A Buck-Passing Account of ‘Moral Equality’.Elaine Lok-Lam Yim - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (1):25-40.
    The belief that all human beings are ‘moral equals’ is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what ‘moral equality’ or its associate terms mean, what grounds our ‘moral equality’ and what the implications of being ‘moral equals’ are. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of understanding ‘moral equality’: the ‘buck-passing’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘reverse-explanatory’ accounts. The buck-passing account of moral equality is in parallel with Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value. It holds that (...)
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  21.  23
    Buck-Passing Personal Values.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - In David K. Chan (ed.), Values, Rational Choice and the Will. Springer. pp. 37-51.
    in UndeterminedSo-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value (...)
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  22. Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
    It has been thought that the prospects for non-naturalism about normativity may be significantly advanced if non-naturalists take the relation of being a reason as the basic normative entity, and so if, inter alia, they endorse a buck-passing account of value. This is thought to yield theoretical benefits regarding (i) the open question argument, (ii) the defence against the charge of queerness, and (iii) demands of parsimony. In the paper I contest these claims. Non- naturalists need not focus on reasons, (...)
     
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  23. Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - In Michael S. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground that has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’. Buck-passing stands in a complicated relation to the fitting-attitude analysis (...)
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  24. (2 other versions)Resisting the buck-passing account of value.Pekka Vayrynen - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:295-324.
    I first distinguish between different forms of the buck-passing account of value and clarify my target in other respects on buck-passers' behalf. I then raise a number of problems for the different forms of the buck-passing view that I have distinguished.
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  25. Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
    In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be (...)
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  26. Buck‐Passing Accounts.Jonas Olson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
     
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  27. The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
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  28. A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
    This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of (...)
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  29.  94
    Discounting, Buck-Passing, and Existential Risk Mitigation: The Case of Space Colonization.Joseph Gottlieb - forthcoming - Space Policy.
    Large-scale, self-sufficient space colonization is a plausible means of efficiently reducing existential risks and ensuring our long-term survival. But humanity is by and large myopic, and as an intergenerational global public good, existential risk reduction is systematically undervalued, hampered by intergenerational discounting. This paper explores how these issues apply to space colonization, arguing that the motivational and psychological barriers to space colonization are a special—and especially strong—case of a more general problem. The upshot is not that large-scale, self-sufficient space colonization (...)
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  30. An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck.Philip Cook - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
    Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal (...)
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  31. What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...)
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  32.  22
    (1 other version)Dancy on buck passing.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    I defend the buck-passing account of value from Dancy's critique.
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  33.  52
    Implications of Paternalism and Buck-passing: A Reply to Quong.Mats Volberg - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):91-108.
    In his latest book, Liberalism without Perfection (2011), Jonathan Quong argues against liberal perfectionism and defends Rawlsian political liberalism. In the course of his argumentation he presents us with a judgmental account of paternalism and the buck-passing account of truth in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to critique both of those elements in Quong’s argumentation. I will first present the judgmental account of paternalism and then demonstrate that it will place impossible demands on us, insofar as paternalism (...)
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  34.  4
    The normative and the evaluative: the buck-passing account of value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
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  35.  46
    The Common Good: A Buck‐Passing Account.Eric Beerbohm & Ryan W. Davis - 2017 - Journal of Political Philosophy 25 (4):60-79.
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  36. Passing the Deontic Buck.Matt Bedke - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 128.
    In this paper I explore buck passing analyses of deontic properties in terms of reasons. The preferred analysis is that the permissibility/impermissibility/optionality/requiredness/etc. of some agent's acting is to be couched in terms of reasons to respond in some way to that agent's action, or the prospect thereof. Along the way I try to accommodate supererogation, wrong kinds of reasons objections, and commonly accepted inferences in deontic logic.
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  37.  49
    Protecting future generations: intergenerational buck-passing, theoretical ineptitude and a brief for a global core precautionary principle.Stephan M. Gardiner - 2006 - In Tremmel J. (ed.), The Handbook of Intergenerational Justice. Edward Elgar. pp. 148--169.
  38. Beyond wrong reasons : the buck-passing account of value.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - In Michael S. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  39.  37
    Why of Buck—Passing.Michael Smith - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 50.
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  40.  41
    The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):652-655.
    The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value. By Rowland Richard.
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  41.  12
    A defense of McKinsey’s theory of reference appealing to buck-passing descriptions. 이풍실 - 2021 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 148:81-112.
    맥킨지는 우선권 부여 사용의 경우에 고유명의 의미론적 지시체가 어떻게 결정되는지를 책임전가기술구를 통해 설명한다. 최근에 나는 크립키의 비판을 기초로 하여 맥킨지의 설명이 실패한다고 논증하였다. 그러나 이러한 나의 논증은 맥킨지의 기술구주의 지칭이론을 충실하게 반영하지 못한 채 맥킨지의 입장을 단순화시키고 있다. 본 논문에서 나는 맥킨지의 책임전가기술구 전략이 무엇인지 정확하게 설명하고, 이를 바탕으로 맥킨지 측에서 설득력 있는 반론을 내놓을 수 있음을 보일 것이다. 따라서 맥킨지의 지칭 이론을 경쟁 이론들과 비교하는 작업의 초점은 책임전가기술구 전략이 적용되는 우선권 부여 사용이 아니라 우선권 비부여 사용을 비롯한 그 외의 (...)
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  42.  39
    Whose dirty hands? How to prevent buck‐passing.Barbara Goodwin - 2001 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):106-122.
    (2001). Whose dirty hands? How to prevent buck‐passing. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 4, Trusting in Reason: Martin Hollis and the Philosophy of Social Action, pp. 106-122. doi: 10.1080/13698230108403367.
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  43. Review of Rach Cosker-Rowland's the Normative and the Evaluative - the Buck-Passing Account of Value. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2020 - Ethics 130 (2):255-259.
    This is a short review of Rach Cosker-Rowland's book The Normative and the Evaluative - the Buck-Passing Account of Value.
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  44.  40
    The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing.Michael Smith - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 50.
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  45. Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck‐Passing Account of Normativity. [REVIEW]Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2011 - Ratio 24 (3):340-348.
  46. Moving from plagiarism police to integrity coaches: assisting novice students in understanding the relationship between research and ownership.Rachel Hall Buck & Silvia Vaccino-Salvadore - 2021 - International Journal for Educational Integrity 17 (1).
    Much of the discourse surrounding plagiarism is one of fear—a fear of being caught and punished, but many plagiarism examples happen unintentionally as students struggle with a new language, new ideas, and new communities in tertiary education. Specifically, many students are challenged with the task of writing a research paper, which involves finding academic sources, reading those sources to answer a research question, and integrating direct quotations and paraphrasing. Because novice writers often struggle with these skills, what is a developmental (...)
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  47. We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too.Zöe Johnson King - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.
    Chapter 8 argues against the view that the moral rightness of an act is not a reason to perform it, and our reasons are instead the features that make the act right. Philosophers typically defend this view by noting that it seems redundant to take rightness to be an additional reason, once it has been acknowledged that the right-making features are already reasons. The author shows that this argument dramatically overgeneralizes, ruling out all cases in which two or more reasons (...)
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  48.  19
    Fitting attitudes and Value; the Buck-passing Account.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  49.  81
    Richard Rowland, The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-passing Account of Value. [REVIEW]Francesco Orsi - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly.
  50.  24
    Dynamics of Positive Frequency Dependent Selection Triggers Selection for Silence.I. Hashem, V. De Buck & J. Van Impe - 2022 - Complexity 2022:1-11.
    Positive frequency dependent selection is a natural selection regime where the fitness of a phenotype increases with its frequency in the population. Examples can be typically found in the spread of disease tolerance strategies in a population. A characterizing feature of PFDS is that the focal allele may experience favorable selection only when it becomes more frequent in the population, while being selected against when it is rare. In this paper, by applying a solution concept from evolutionary game theory, we (...)
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