This volume is a popular presentation of Nietzsche's thought. Hoover's analysis comes from the viewpoint of a Christian operating within a Thomist framework. An early chapter focuses on Nietzsche's life; the following chapters weave autobiographical materials into the treatment of his philosophical system, showing the close relationship between his life and thought. Hoover's study includes an analysis of Nietzsche's perspectivism, his contribution to propaganda theory, the demonstration of a deep and fundamental contradiction in his epistemology, and an (...) analysis of his critique of anti-body idealism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His PhilosophyAlan D. SchriftWolfgang Müller-Lauter. Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy. Translated from the German by David J. Parent. Foreword by Richard Schacht. Ghicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999. Pp. xviii + 246. Paper, $21.95.Since this work first appeared in 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter has been at the forefront (...) of German Nietzsche scholarship. The long overdue appearance in English translation of this important work is a welcome addition to the Nietzsche literature and, although dated in some respects, it remains an important work that warrants careful attention. As Richard Schacht notes in his foreword, the original publication of this work was a significant event in the history of Nietzsche studies in Germany. Coming ten years after the publication of Heidegger's massive two-volume Nietzsche, Müller-Lauter's book "provided a much-needed counterweight" to Heidegger's idiosyncratic treatment (ix). Aside from proferring a significant rejoinder to the Heideggerian interpretation, Müller-Lauter also responds to a vast array of German Nietzsche scholars, some well-known (K. Löwith, K. Jaspers, E. Fink, K. Schlechta), but many much less familiar. As such, this book is an important piece of historical scholarship, offering the contemporary English-speaking reader an interesting picture of German scholarship on Nietzsche before Heidegger's work took center stage as the dominant (unfortunately, some would say only) German work worth engaging.But Müller-Lauter's book is not just of historical interest; it offers a powerful and profound reading of Nietzsche's corpus focused on the question of contradiction, both the contradictions readers find amidst Nietzsche's various works and Nietzsche's own philosophy of contradiction, namely, that contradictoriness is in some sense constitutive of the world. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction, the unresolvable conflict between essentially antithetical perspectives, grounds Nietzsche's philosophizing in wills to power. Emphasizing the plurality of conflicting wills to power, Müller-Lauter offers in successive chapters interpretations of Nietzsche's views on history as the "concrete occurrences" of these conflicting wills to power; nihilism as the process by which an organized system of forces (physical, social, intellectual, cultural) disintegrates into an antagonistic multiplicity of competing wills; morality as demanding truths that, once discovered, it can neither face nor accept, fleeing instead into a fictitious world of its own creation; Christian truthfulness as a destruction of truth that presents a "multiplicity of mutually opposing untruths" (72). All of these interpretations are shown to rest upon a contradiction at the heart of Nietzsche's own account of will to power, namely, that the strong will to power both affirms the multiplicity of perspectives and yet imposes its perspective as absolute.This is the paradox of the overman, a paradox Müller-Lauter addresses in his final chapter on "the doctrine of eternal recurrence." Not surprisingly, the eternal recurrence reveals itself to be essentially contradictory. But this contradiction is not self-refuting; rather "since the eternal recurrence is only as a thought and a doctrine, its meaning remains insurmountably split into a duality" (121) reflected in two ultimately incompatible types of overman. There is, on the one hand, the "powerful overman" who sees the entirety of what is as necessary for his own existence; to affirm eternal [End Page 453] recurrence is to understand everything that has been as a necessary series of events that ends with himself at its apex. But there is also the "wise overman," who understands the totality of what has been and is as necessary for his having arrived at the present moment in which he transcends himself and becomes other. Where the meaning of the powerful overman's affirmation of eternal recurrence resides in his appearance as the being who is dominant, the meaning of the wise overman's affirmation lies in understanding and accepting what has been as the precondition for both what he presently is and what he can become. Although both types of overman want recurrence, Müller-Lauter concludes they want something different in it and by it: the wise overman "is concerned with dissolving in the stream of... (shrink)

This is the first translation into English of a milestone in Nietzsche interpretation. Wolfgang Mller-Lauter examines Nietzsche's doctrines of the will to power and the overman in light of Nietzsche's philosophy of real contradictions.

Nietzsche s work was heavily influenced by ancient Greek philosophy. Meyer shows how Nietzsche attempted to revive the Heraclitean-Protagorean position that is critically analyzed by both Plato and Aristotle in the Theaetetus and Metaphysics IV, and establishes Nietzsche as a naturalist who believes that there are objective facts.The book not only highlights the foundations of his thought, but also restores order to Nietzsche s work.".

For some years, Matthew Meyer has labored at a comprehensive interpretation of Nietzsche’s oeuvre that understands his philosophical and literary output as a revival of a particularly Greek mode of thought. This volume represents the culmination of much, but not all, of this previous work, and it serves also as a promise of future work in the same vein. The title, Reading Nietzsche Through the Ancients, is therefore a trifle misleading: Meyer is not reading all of Nietzsche (...) through all the ancients, but only some of Nietzsche through some of them. That is all for the good, so far as I am concerned, since I am usually suspicious of ambitions to resolve Nietzsche’s debt to antiquity in a single... (shrink)

Nietzsche criticizes Stoicism for overstating the significance of its ethical ideal of rational self-sufficiency and for undervaluing pain and passion when pursuing an unconditional acceptance of fate. Apparent affinities between Stoicism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his celebration of self-mastery and his pursuit of amor fati, lead some scholars to conclude that Nietzsche cannot advance these criticisms without contradicting himself. In this article, I narrow the target and scope of Nietzsche’s complaints against Stoicism before showing how they (...) follow from his other philosophic commitments. I suggest that the first line of criticism follows from his denial of teleology and his skepticism toward moral values’ descriptive objectivity. I then suggest that the second line of criticism follows from Nietzsche’s account of overcoming as bestowing contributory value upon pain and suffering. Explaining Nietzsche’s criticisms of Stoicism in this way substantially qualifies similarities between his philosophy and that of Stoicism while absolving him of the charge of inconsistency. (shrink)

Scholars point out contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy. An example would be his po itions on science, object of praise and criticism. If so, Nietzsche would make contradictory remarks about a domain that, on principle, seeks to rid itself of contradictions. From the perspective of Nietzschean philosophy, would attributing contradiction to it mean an objection? Would Nietzsche’s praise and criticism of science be incompatible? After trying to answer these questions, we will aim to show that the (...) philosopher’s considerations on science reveal a way of proceeding that he not only claims for himself but also prescribes to scientific thought: the art of nuance. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can Nietzsche's ideal of man, the overman, be conceived as an educational ideal in post-modern democratic societies? Should it be so conceived? This paper answers both questions positively. The affirmative answer to the first question is based on arguments aimed at overcoming two obvious difficulties: the Contradictions in Nietzsche's various references to his human ideal, and his blatant anti-democratic attitude. The affirmative answer to the second question builds on an analysis portraying Nietzsche's conception of man (...) as one that allows us, in a non-objectivist era, to accord a clear meaning to the term the “good life” and to educate in the light of this meaning. (shrink)

In his essay, Tobias Endres devotes himself to the theoretical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, which continues to have a reputation for self-contradiction, albeit an affirmed one. While this problem is increasingly losing importance in recent and most recent Nietzsche research, the study attempts to dispel the accusation of performative self-contradiction and genetic fallacy. In contrast to the readings inspired by analytical philosophy, however, Nietzsche's metaphilosophy is not understood exclusively as a contribution to classical epistemology, but as a (...) variant of philosophical hermeneutics. -/- In 1968, Jürgen Habermas stated that Nietzsche had “nothing contagious left”. However, the history of the reception and impact of Nietzsche's thought has clearly refuted this judgment. The first volume of the Critical Complete Edition had been published just one year earlier. This marked the beginning of a path that led to Nietzsche no longer being read primarily as an outsider, but as a classic of Western philosophy. While this path was previously a rather Franco-German affair, the edition and the Anglo-American reception of the 1990s contributed to the internationalization of Nietzsche research. Today, Nietzsche is read globally and as one of the most influential philosophers of modernity. (shrink)

F. Nietzsche does interesting indications on the anthropological foundation of language in his lessons on classical rhetoric, at the University of Basel in 1874. Many quotations of Gerber and Humboldt, and older notions, drawn from the Aristotle's Rhetoric are discussed in this dissertation. Many studies highlighted Nietzsche's attempts during thirty years (1976-2006) to draw a consistent anthropological foundation of the language. Some of them shed light on the metaphor, described from the point of view of anthropology, as an (...) innovative perspective on the philosophy of rhetoric. Would metaphor be a verbal vehicles for conveying scientific and philosophical concepts by attaching unusual importance to the veracity or the truthfulness of a claim? Is that in contradiction to any conceptual truth? Some interpreters suggest that metaphors seen as linguistic products fail to explain the unnatural way meaning is transmitted from the unconscious musicality of language. If imperceptible bonds move the meaning of a word in the musicality of language, then to transmit a message by non verbal means or metaphors relates to a subjectively felt musicality of language. Meaning is expressed, not because there are words with fixed meaning in a conventional way, but because the word is seen in the first place as an action. Living language, seen as metaphorical by essence, is a view shared by German idealism, on the so-called origins of language. A consequence of this view on language is a wide reinterpretation of the reason, from the point of view of a rhetorical turn. Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann and Lichtenberg are some thinkers who pointed out the possibility of a pan-psychist notion of reason that inspired Nietzsche, and later Piaget (e. g. his theory of analogy is built on similar roots). A first part of this dissertation presents the historical genesis of doctrines that don't see language as an innate substratum of the conscious mind, but as rhetorical and conditioned by environment in the wide sense. In the second part, we read the main arguments of contemporary studies in cognitive sciences, discovering new structural similarities compared to the 19th Century views of Nietzsche. In the third part, we discuss the form of poetic imagination regarding a relation between metaphor and melancholy in Greek empirical medicine. (shrink)

We want to become those we are—Menschen who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists [Physiker, i.e., natural scientists] in order to be able to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics [Physik, i.e., natural science] or were constructed so as to (...) contradict it. Therefore, up with physics [Hoch die Physik]! And even more so [höher noch] that which compels us to it [das was uns zu ihr zwingt]—our intellectual integrity [Redlichkeit]!Nietzsche is quite relentless in his .. (shrink)

Readers of Nietzsche are not unfamiliar with the thought that his philosophical writings contain numerous at least apparent contradictions. We begin with one of them. On the one hand, Nietzsche takes pride of place in the canonical parade of theatre-haters. Indeed, he himself demands inclusion: ‘I am essentially anti-theatrical’. This antipathy appears to extend to the actor’s ‘inner longing for a role and mask’. On the other hand, Nietzsche is known as an advocate and admirer of (...) the mask: ‘everything profound loves masks’ reads one of his best-known lines. Mask-wearing, whatever that turns out to be, is not only a social strategy, but also a philosophical or intellectual one, as we shall see. The mask has a variety of associations, of course, but a salient one, for Nietzsche, was its relation to the actor, beginning with its use in Greek tragedy. Thus we seem to find a Nietzsche who on the one hand opposes the theatre and the actor’s role-playing and mask-wearing and, on the other hand, who encourages the mask, which he himself associates with acting and theatre. Of course, this tension has potential implications for our understanding of Nietzsche's antipathy to theatre. To take one example, he seems to connect theatre with lack of honesty, including to oneself (GS 368). And yet some have taken Nietzsche as ‘masking’ his own thoughts, as a means to avoid being honest with himself. This chapter looks in detail at the use of the mask in Nietzsche and at how it relates to questions of sincerity, interpretation and his later, naturalist project. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article examines Nietzsche’s evaluation of D. F. Strauss’ progressive theology. It argues firstly, that Nietzsche identified a nihilistic strain in Strauss’ vision, a strain which renders his views ultimately untenable and that this strain is detectable in latter-day atheistic activism. This claim is supported by identifying two major contradictions in Strauss’ thought. The first is a misreading of Hegel which renders Strauss’ own reliance on Hegel illegitimate and incoherent. The second is Strauss’ failure to appreciate (...) the full impact of Darwin’s naturalistic shift. It is demonstrated that Strauss’ attempt to forge a new progressive religion on scientific principle still rests upon Christian moral principle. Like his latter-day inheritors, Strauss ultimately fails to make a convincing argument. The article shows the nihilistic consequences of Strauss’ continuous reliance on Christianity. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s conception of eros and its role in the development of philosophers is similar to the conception of those same topics espoused by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Nietzsche and Diotima agree that eros is an insatiable desire to possess the beautiful, that eros aims at immortality through reproduction, and that philosophy requires an ascent beyond sexual desire to “higher” forms of eros, which nevertheless are still modeled on heterosexual reproduction. Understanding these facets of Nietzsche’s view leads to (...) an apparent contradiction in that Nietzsche thinks of philosophy on the model of reproduction and ascribes to the philosopher both the female and the male roles in heterosexual reproduction. I argue that this ambivalence reflects Nietzsche’s view that practicing philosophy requires balancing two conflicting philosophical tendencies: on the one hand, pursuit of truth, which involves dissatisfaction with oneself; on the other hand, creation, which involves acknowledgment of one’s own capacity and value. (shrink)

Nietzsche Awakens! is a philosophical work, written entirely in aphorisms. It is an analytical way to trigger readers to think; to negate the "common sense" notions; to re-question the raison d'être of principles and elements; to refuse the "absolutes"; to criticize the epistemology and the methodology of sciences; and to wonder about the ontology of the human being and his teleology. The first part of the book consists of "modifying" Nietzsche's aphorisms, either to contradict his sayings or to (...) be even more cynical than he is, or to explore new dimensions to his thinking. The second part consists of persuading him, to accept the author's refutation. Indeed, the main concept of the book is to concretize "The Eternal Recurrence." Rather than being influenced by Nietzsche, the author is bringing Nietzsche alive. Rather than saying the author is influenced by Nietzsche, can't we say that the author enables Nietzsche's aphorisms to expand, innovate, and enrich themselves? (shrink)

In this shorter piece, at the instigation of a former philosophy student, I accepted to contribute alongside two other writers to the "Expert Help" rubric, and attempted to explain the genesis in Nietzsche's mind of the conception of the eternal recurrence. I lay stress on both the internal contradiction that the solitary of Sils-Maria was trying to resolve and the secret desire that this cherished and embraced rather than demonstrated theory be true in the face of conflicting evidence, and (...) I furthermore challenge the received view that makes this vision incompatible with a Christian ontology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values by Thomas H. BrobjerCharles P. RodgerThomas H. Brobjer. Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. Pp. viii + 210. Hardback, $115.00.It is difficult to review a book so rich in consequences and seemingly sui generis. To categorize it as the work of a (...) "lumper" or "splitter," for example, would only confuse matters. Granted, Brobjer dismisses The Will to Power as the tendentious forgery of Nietzsche's sister. Methodologically, he also appears as a "moderate" splitter who provides a close textual reading and draws on the Nachlass only so far as this serves to elucidate the claims Nietzsche made in his published works. Nonetheless, Brobjer's central hypothesis might, albeit falsely, suggest that he is an old-fashioned lumper, for he holds that Mazzino Montinari was wrong to claim Nietzsche abandoned his plans for a Hauptwerk ("Nietzsches Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in Nietzsche Lesen [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982], 92–119).Granted, Montinari admitted that after abandoning plans for The Will to Power, Nietzsche did, in the fall of 1888, entertain a new plan for a four-volume Hauptwerk titled The Revaluation of All Values. According to these plans, The Antichrist would be its first volume, followed by The Free Spirit, containing a critique of philosophy as a nihilistic movement; The Immoralist, containing a critique of morality and its dangers; and Dionysos Philosophos. Nonetheless, Montinari claimed, these plans also collapsed when, sometime after mid-November 1888, Nietzsche decided to make The Antichrist into the whole of The Revaluation of All Values. Indeed, Montinari's hypothesis was that Nietzsche finally realized, at the last minute, that the work of the past five years and what he had previously regarded as his life task was untenable and, having published everything he could salvage from his failed Hauptwerk project, "Nietzsche's collapse in Turin came when he had literally finished with everything" (12, emphasis in the original). To Brobjer, however, "this claim seems both psychologically improbable and, in regard to Nietzsche's intention to write a Hauptwerk, simply wrong" (12). Yet despite Brobjer having demonstrated in a number of articles published over the past decades that the evidence is not only too thin and ambiguous to sustain Montinari's hypothesis, but that it contradicts his timeline (92–94), scholars continue to treat Montinari's conclusions as established fact, and moreover treat all "discussions and considerations of a magnum opus … as hypothetical and old-fashioned" (12). But if so, why should the present study, wherein Brobjer advances this same thesis, not also fall on deaf ears? The answer is surprising: Ecce Homo.The Druckmanuskript shows that both the final chapter headings and the majority of the final text of Ecce Homo were established prior to mid-November, and, while Nietzsche continued to make additions and alterations to Ecce Homo up until a day before his collapse, his revisions to the completed portions of the text were only "minor" (21). Since, even according to Montinari's timeline, the vast majority of Ecce Homo was thus written at a time when Nietzsche still incontrovertibly intended that The Antichrist would constitute only the first volume of The Revaluation of All Values (47), nothing can possibly speak against examining whether Ecce Homo might retain at least traces of Nietzsche's original plans for his Hauptwerk. To the contrary, a great deal speaks for it. After all, the conventional interpretation of Ecce Homo as a "backward-looking autobiography" (5) has hardly borne fruit; read as a summary of Nietzsche's life and writings, Ecce Homo is so "elliptic, paradoxical, absurd" (48), and so contorted by excessive self-praise and praise for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that the text is incoherent and unusable for its supposed purpose. Yet Nietzsche explicitly told his publisher that his intention was merely to tell of his life and works "in snatches" (3), and that Ecce Homo was being composed with the "intention to give this work the same form and appearance which that magnum opus [Hauptwerk] will have, to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology by Mattia RiccardiClaire KirwinMattia Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. xi + 249 pp. isbn: 9780198803287. Hardcover, $70.00.Nietzsche was not a systematic philosopher. Indeed, it is probably fair to say, as many commentators have, that he was an anti-systematic philosopher. It is harder to say what this means, and harder still to know how to deal with it when (...) we aim to interpret his philosophy. For we wish to attribute to Nietzsche certain claims and positions, perhaps even arguments, and in doing so we generally prefer that these not contradict each other. And so as we attempt to understand “Nietzsche’s philosophy” as a coherent entity, we tend to find ourselves—for better or worse—heading down the path of systematizing that philosophy.Mattia Riccardi’s Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology is an impressive example of such a systematizing reading of Nietzsche. In developing his account of Nietzsche’s (mature) philosophy of mind, Riccardi acknowledges that Nietzsche’s own approach to this topic is “scattered” and “piecemeal” (5). What Riccardi aims to offer is a comprehensive reconstruction of the systematic account that Nietzsche, for whatever reason, did not explicitly give us. And what we are presented with here is a very systematic Nietzsche, one who offers a comprehensive and detailed account of the inner workings of the mind in terms of drives and affects and their relation (this is the topic of the book’s Part I, “Beneath the Surface”); consciousness—three different types of consciousness, to be precise—and the sense in which it is epiphenomenal (in Part II, “Mapping the Surface”); and the nature of the self, the possibility of self-knowledge, the nature of the will, and the relevance of all of this for the Nietzschean “ideal type” of human being (in Part III, “The Upshot”). [End Page 203]We might worry that such a systematic philosopher is no longer quite recognizable as Nietzsche—that in doing such comprehensive and systematic reconstructive work one is somehow leaving behind the Nietzsche who wrote not treatises but rather aphorisms, polemics, pseudo-biblical texts, and poetry. But Riccardi is upfront that what he is doing is reconstructive work of this kind and meticulous in showing how the positions he develops can plausibly be attributed to Nietzsche—or at the very least, that such positions can be constructed out of genuinely Nietzschean building blocks. These positions are fleshed out and given contemporary relevance through discussion of their relation to modern accounts of mindedness (the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, for example, a version of which—carefully modified—Riccardi attributes to Nietzsche), but at the same time Nietzsche’s thought is throughout set carefully within the relevant historical and biographical contexts. The seeds and impetus for Nietzsche’s ideas are located in authors he was known to have read (Schopenhauer, Leibniz, and Stendhal, of course, but also Schneider, Mayer, Fouillée, Espinas, and more). The development of these ideas over time is then traced through Nietzsche’s notes and published work. At each point, alternative readings of these texts that have been proposed in the secondary literature are considered and carefully, persuasively, refuted. For philosophers seeking to offer a systematic reconstruction of Nietzsche’s thought on some topic, this sort of approach should be seen as the gold standard. And for anyone interested in understanding what Nietzsche has to say about human psychology, this book will be essential reading.Riccardi’s Nietzsche offers us a serious and detailed philosophy of mind. It seems appropriate, then, to respond to it as such. Rather than giving a précis of each chapter, or debating the exegetical accuracy of the account, I shall instead offer some critical engagement with the detail of the account itself. I will focus on two key components of the system Riccardi elaborates: first, the account of reflective consciousness and, second, the sense in which he takes that form of consciousness to be epiphenomenal. These parts of the system, the topics of chapters 5 and 7, respectively, play crucial roles within the architecture of the book as a whole. For taken together, they show just how radically... (shrink)

In this extraordinary contribution to Nietzsche studies, Robert Alejandro offers an original interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy viewed as a complete whole. Alejandro painstakingly traces the different ways in which Nietzsche reconfigured and shifted his analyses of morality and of the human condition, until he was content with the final result: nothing was dispensable; everything was necessary. This is a philosophy of reconciliation--hardly nihilism--and it is a perspective that is not adequately addressed elsewhere in the literature on (...) Nietzsche. Alejandro traces the evolution of Nietzsche's thought by identifying the different layers of his philosophy, expressed in a complex array of stories and historical narratives. Alejandro analyzes the different stories of Nietzsche, places those stories within a tradition of genealogical theorizing, and interprets both the stories and the genealogy in terms of one of Nietzsche's unique features, his use of "historiobiography." According to Alejandro, historiobiography blends the idea of an attunement with all history and one's awareness of this attunement. As a mode of philosophizing, historiobiography allows Nietzsche to view all human history as if it runs through his own life and thoughts. Alejandro argues that Nietzsche deployed three strategies to find relief from his sense of the meaninglessness of life: his magnified concept of what he himself represented in human history, his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, and his philosophy of reconciliation. "I am confident that this book will be considered essential reading for any scholar doing serious research into Nietzsche's thought and its implications.... The author carefully traces the shifts and turns and occasionally the contradictions and dead-ends in the development of Nietzsche's major themes. I have never read an account of Nietzsche's thought as fully and convincingly supported by textual reference as this book. Others will disagree with the author's readings of Nietzsche, that is the nature of scholarship, but I cannot see how they could be ignored." --_Edward Portis, Texas A & M University_ "This is a major work on Nietzsche. Robert Alejandro offers us a reading of Nietzsche's Herculean efforts that Nietzsche scholars and scholars who write about modernity and postmodernity will be unable to ignore. This wide ranging and deep book addresses major issues in cultural history, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, and the vast literature on modernity and secularization. I expect this to be a book that generates debate and discussion for years to come." --_Robert Hollinger, Iowa State University_ "Robert Alejandro delivers a rich, lively account of Nietzsche's quest for meaning. By focusing on the theme of _historiobiography_, Alejandro illuminates Nietzsche's bold attempt to place himself at the center of a comprehensive account of the rise and fall of Western civilization. A thoughtful, well-crafted book, written very much in the spirit of Nietzsche himself." --_Daniel Conway, Texas A & M University_. (shrink)

Nietzsche's philosophy of life-affirmation and perspectivism is often charged with skeptical relativism and a seemingly unsurmountable problem of self-referentiality that necessarily leads to a “performative contradiction” (Habermas). While the charge of skeptical relativism can be easily dismissed, the problem of self-reference is a much more complicated affair. After discussing certain aspects of Nietzsche's perspectivism, and particularly those texts in which he explicitly deals with the issue of self-referentiality, I come to the conclusion that Nietzsche's various judgements and (...) his perspectivism can be sustained without succumbing to the charge of self-referential inconsistency. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(4) 2003: 348-360. (shrink)

For Peter Sloterdijk, Friedrich Nietzsche represents nothing short of a "catastrophe in the history of language" -- a new evangelist for a linguistics of narcissistic jubilation. Nietzsche offered a philosophical declaration of independence from humility, a meeting-point of sobriety and megalomania that for Sloterdijk has come to define the very project of philosophy. Yet for all the significance of this language-event named Nietzsche, Nietzsche's contributions have too often been elided and the contradictions at the root (...) of his philosophy too often edited out. As Sloterdijk observes, "Never has an author so insisted on distinction and yet attracted such vulgarity." Nietzsche Apostle, drawn from a speech Sloterdijk gave in 2000 on the hundredth anniversary of Nietzsche's death, looks at the ways in which Nietzsche has been branded over the years through selective compilation, and at the ways in which Nietzsche turned himself into a brand -- a brand announced by his proclaimed "fifth Gospel," _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_. For Sloterdijk, the focus should not be on the figure of Zarathustra or on the "will to power" often used as a kind of philosophical shorthand to sum up Nietzsche's work, but on Zarathustra's act of "speaking" itself. _Nietzsche Apostle_ offers a brief history of self-praise and self-affirmation, an examination of the evolution of boasting, and a very original approach to Nietzsche, philosophy's first designer brand of individualism. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine’s apparent self-refuting character. If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself? Nietzsche’s perspectivism must be construed either as a fact or as one further interpretation—but in the former case the doctrine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of (...) one’s perspective are rendered bothimpotent and superfluous. The unpalatable consequences of Nietzsche’s perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche’s treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Nietzsche’s perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctrines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense. There is every reason, I conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche’s perspectivism. (shrink)

Guiding questions in this dissertation: Does indeterminacy of interpretation imply no standards and limits of meaning? Is Nietzsche "modern" or "postmodern" in his approach to this and other problems? What is Nietzsche's "affirmative" message? What are the implications for the identity and future of philosophy? ;If Nietzsche has freed the signifier from any transcendental signified, how do we know when the free play of reading has utterly departed from the text? How do we recognize that one reading (...) of a text or one account of the world is better than another? ;Nietzsche said, "What was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but something else--let us say, health, future, growth, power, life." Truth in the service of life: Truth understood as transitory boundaries or limits without which life is impossible. As esteemers, we always impose limits, constraints. Hence, limits are absolutely necessary, never absent, though never fixed and absolute. Temporary fixity is ensured and so is truth in this sense. Conflict is resolved not by "truth," but by the demands of life, in response to which "truth" has its meaning. It is through Nietzsche's interplay of philological rigor and interpretive play that we can avoid the result in which "the text disappears under the interpretation." ;Nietzsche said, "My style, which is affirmative ... deals with contradiction and criticism only as a means." It is a means for something not easily captured in language, and certainly not in any set of logical inferences: A transformation of the attitude of resentment toward the challenge and struggle of life, and overcoming the desperate desire for salvation from suffering, insecurity, uncertainty, i.e., salvation from oneself and life through "truth." The overcoming of such motives is troped in the myth of the ubermensch and in the transforming ideas of eternal recurrence and amor fati. These are signifiers of a possible type of consciousness, a way of living in which we have a radically different relationship to our beliefs, and are no longer trapped by our "truths" in our unceasing attempt to say the unsayable, to interpret the enigma that is life. (shrink)

Peter Sloterdijk's essay on Friedrich Nietzsche and the benefits and dangers of narcissistic jubilation. For Peter Sloterdijk, Friedrich Nietzsche represents nothing short of a “catastrophe in the history of language”—a new evangelist for a linguistics of narcissistic jubilation. Nietzsche offered a philosophical declaration of independence from humility, a meeting-point of sobriety and megalomania that for Sloterdijk has come to define the very project of philosophy. Yet for all the significance of this language-event named Nietzsche, Nietzsche's (...) contributions have too often been elided and the contradictions at the root of his philosophy too often edited out. As Sloterdijk observes, “Never has an author so insisted on distinction and yet attracted such vulgarity.” Nietzsche Apostle, drawn from a speech Sloterdijk gave in 2000 on the hundredth anniversary of Nietzsche's death, looks at the ways in which Nietzsche has been branded over the years through selective compilation, and at the ways in which Nietzsche turned himself into a brand—a brand announced by his proclaimed “fifth Gospel,” Thus Spoke Zarathustra. For Sloterdijk, the focus should not be on the figure of Zarathustra or on the “will to power” often used as a kind of philosophical shorthand to sum up Nietzsche's work, but on Zarathustra's act of “speaking” itself. Nietzsche Apostle offers a brief history of self-praise and self-affirmation, an examination of the evolution of boasting, and a very original approach to Nietzsche, philosophy's first designer brand of individualism. (shrink)

Through a reading of Nietzsche's texts, primarily of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, this article develops a phenomenological description of the variety of intoxication exemplified in conditions of drunkenness, or in states of emotional excess. It treats Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a literary expression of such intoxication, arguing against attempts to find a coherent narrative structure and clear authorial voice behind this text's apparent disorder. Having isolated the intoxicated characteristics of Thus Spoke Zarathustra - its hyperbolic rhetoric and emotions, its lack (...) of balance, its injustice, its shifting and conflicting moods, and its self-contradictions - I then offer an interpretation of the work, and by extension of intoxication itself, in terms of Nietzsche's model of the self as a dynamic multiplicity of forces. At the same time, I argue for a multiple and dynamic conception of personality in general. (shrink)

Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence, and the Being of Entities. Heidegger’s “Aus-einander-setzung” with Nietzsche. The article examines the internal dynamics of Heidegger’s influential interpretation of Nietzsche, focusing on his lectures written between 1936 and 1942, which form the basis for Heidegger’s two-volume book Nietzsche, first published in 1961. Speaking of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche is potentially misleading, however, since Heidegger gave a series of different interpretations that contradict one another in some essential points. In the first (...) two lectures from 1936/37, we can still observe a far-reaching identification with Nietzsche as the mastermind of a ‘new beginning’ in the ‘history of being’. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards, Heidegger makes Nietzsche’s metaphysics responsible for the domination of modern technology and thus for the last stage of the ‘forgetting of being’. As such, Heidegger no longer views Nietzsche as a thinker of ‘transition’, but merely as the philosophical founder of a hopeless ‘end time’. Against this backdrop, and after the Second World War, Heidegger declared that this particular critique of Nietzsche entailed an “intellectual resistance” against National Socialism. This assertion is discussed at the end of the article together with Heidegger’s rapprochement with Nietzsche during the early 1950s. (shrink)

The fictitious controversy turns around the question of how to know what Jesus meant by 'Kingdom of God'. Nietzsche pretended this kingdom to be merely interior and to be found only there, whereas elsewhere he declared God to be "dead". For Luther, the Kingdom of God is located in faith and the pure grace of God. On the other hand, Luther, due to his bible literalism, justifies the persecution of Jews and insurgent peasants, and this in flagrant contradiction to (...) Jesus' commandment of Love. The idea of 'Kingdom of God' has been of considerable impact and significance in the history of mind-. (shrink)

Gabriel Marcel’s writings stand in a complex relationship to Nietzsche’s thought. Paying homage to Nietzsche’s influence as one of the most eminent representatives of the existential thought, Marcel is aware that he deals with a thinker who is as distant from him as he is very close. Marcel’s references to Nietzsche’s thought are tied to Nietzsche’s expression “God is dead”, and the end of the divine is the theme that simultaneously highlights the greatness and the tragedy (...) of Nietzsche. Marcel accepts the contradictions of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought as both dangerous and fruitful. (shrink)

As his ambitious title suggests, Houlgate intends his study to compare and contrast the respective critical methodologies of Hegel and Nietzsche. Toward this end, Houlgate endeavors to establish two central points. First, despite their obvious differences, Hegel and Nietzsche share as a common objective the development of a systematic critique of metaphysical speculation. They both agree that Western metaphysics largely impoverishes life by privileging the formal, lifeless abstractions of a spectral realm. Second, although Nietzsche is perhaps the (...) more famous critic of Western metaphysics, Hegel is the more thorough and radical critic. According to Houlgate, Nietzsche criticizes metaphysical abstractions as necessarily inimical to the nature of life itself, which lies beyond the grasp of human cognition. As Houlgate points out, however, any such critique of metaphysics must presuppose a fundamental metaphysical distinction between language and life: "Nietzsche seems to be employing a distinction between being-for-another and being-in-itself which in his own terms can only be called metaphysical.... This contradiction... invalidates any claim that Nietzsche might make to have produced a truly non-metaphysical philosophy". Houlgate thus presents Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics as representative of a retrograde current in German philosophy: "Nietzsche remains a metaphysical thinker because he employs a metaphysical distinction in order to reject metaphysical categories". Unlike Nietzsche, however, Hegel was able successfully to circumvent the traditional appeal to metaphysical foundations. Hegel's phenomenological method thus underwrites an immanent, rather than a transcendent, critique of modes of consciousness: "This method involves no reference to a presupposed standard of judgement.... We can thus examine how internally consistent each mode of consciousness is, that is whether each mode of consciousness is determined as it believes itself to be". Hegel's development of an immanent critique of consciousness thus distinguishes him from Nietzsche and privileges his criticism of metaphysics vis-à-vis the latter's. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the notion of monetary debt does not displace but merely conceals our deeper, ontological debt to the sources of our being and way of life. I suggest that first Christianity and then modern science attempted to find a means of redemption that could free us from debt, but that both were unable to reconcile the ideas of freedom and indebtedness. I then examine the way in which Friedrich Nietzsche tried to resolve the apparent (...) contradiction of our debt to the past and our freedom to shape the future by developing a new form of redemption rooted in his doctrine of the eternal recurrence. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s metaphorical statements often are used to show the vagueness, contradiction, and radicalism of his ideas. The author of the article proves that Nietzsche's metaphorical style is a part of philosophical tools, and it constitutes the philosopher's methodology of knowledge. The main attention is focused on: (1) a set of factors that shaped Nietzsche's linguistic criticism – ideological motivations of an anti-metaphysical nature, key trends in the comprehension of language, and a fascination with music – and their (...) role in the formation of the philosopher's metaphorical style is shown; (2) instrumental features of Nietzsche's metaphor in the process of cognition. In the first part of the article, the author concludes that the problem of concepts as a key linguistic problem for Nietzsche is the falsity of their content and proves that this was the reason for the philosopher's “search for a new form” of writing and, ultimately, his use of metaphors. In the second part of the article, the author interprets Nietzsche's metaphor as a possibility of “infinite clarification”, which made it possible to substantiate the perspective nature of Nietzsche's cognition. (shrink)

This article is concerned with what Nietzsche claims about particular kinds of suffering that can emerge in encounters with others. I maintain that, even taking into account statements of Nietzsche’s that contradict or modify his language of solitude, hardness and domination, his acknowledgement of the capacity of witnessing others’ suffering to cause pain does not indicate an intersubjective notion of self-affirmation, but is an instance of a tension he identifies between our inescapable implication in social ways of being, (...) and our need to create ourselves independently to overcome self-alienation. I argue that Nietzsche’s claims about pity are a particular instance of this tension – that is, that while he recognizes that we feel pity, he treats this as an unfortunate affect to be overcome, to be appropriated on an individual basis, rather than as an invitation to be authentically with others – as indicating the possibility of a mutual project of self-affirmation. (shrink)

Nietzsche wrote in Human, All Too Human: "The worst readers are those who behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole" . Nonetheless, Nietzsche's interpreters have, to a large extent and to this day, proceeded in just this way. Instead, Nietzsche demanded that one read his aphorisms and aphorism books slowly and thoroughly within the contexts in which he placed them and, further, that (...) one always be attuned, in this reading, to new surprises. This article advocates for such a contextual interpretation of Nietzsche's works . This interpretation must be penetrating enough to clear away the ostensible ambivalence and contradiction with which Nietzsche's work is so often maligned. While notes that Nietzsche did not intend for publication can offer important assistance, they should not themselves become the basis of such an interpretation. (shrink)

"We argue about how the entirety of Frederick Nietzsche's work hangs together. To what extent do the major works contradict one another, and to what extent can they be reconciled? In order to resolve that question, Jeremy Fortier shows that Nietzsche's own autobiographical statements provide a more reliable guide to the coherence and unity of his corpus than scholars have appreciated. Using Nietzsche's own self-assessments as a guide to the major developments of his career brings together works (...) that are typically thought of as quite separate, showing how they each form an integral part of a single project. By clarifying the evolution of Nietzsche's thought in this fashion, the book is able to illuminate what Nietzsche judged to be the primary courses of action open to thoughtful and politically-concerned individuals in the contemporary world"--. (shrink)

Modernity between Wagner and Nietzsche argues that the operas and writings of Wagner contradict the values that are fundamental to modernity. Analyzing Wagner’s works in contrast to the philosophical thought of Nietzsche, Brayton Polka examines how Wagner breaks with Nietzsche and their common influencer, Schopenhauer.

This article analyzes the reception of Nietzsche in Brazil, with emphasis on the Pernambuco press, in which his name appears first. It understands the contradictions in Nietzsche’s interpretations as a result of a dispute of meanings perpetrated by different social groups and in different contexts, for which the notion of modernity is important.

The rich and fascinating life of Lou Andreas-Salom (1861-1937) has been reconstructed by Professor Binion on a vast documentary basis, and his findings contradict all earlier versions of her life. Frau Lou was a woman of prodigious intellect, a woman of letters, and a powerful personality. She was closely linked with many of the great cultural figures of the time, often before they achieved recognition. This was the case with Nietzsche, Rilke, Freud, Ferdinand T nnies, Gerhart Hauptmann, Arthur Schnitzler, (...) and Martin Buber. Frau Lou not only relates but interprets Lou's life, and the point of the book is to discover how the works of the mind, whether scientific or imaginative, arise out of personal experience. Contents: I. Father and Father-God. II. God's Vicar, Gillot. III. After Gillot. IV. The Unholy Trinity. V. From Pillar to Post. VI. "A Pity Forever." VII. Lou Without Nietzsche. VIII. The Wayward Disciple. IX. Rites of Love. X. Super-Lou and Raincr. XI. Russia In, Raincr Out. XII. Idly Busy. XIII. At Freud's Elbow. XIV. A Personalized Freudianism. XV. Theorizing for Freud. XVI. Living for Freud. XVII. Aside from Freud. XVIII. Revamping the Past. XIX. "Homecoming." XX. A Retrospect. XXI. Beyond Frau Lou. Bibliography. Index. Originally published in 1968. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Given the ascribed antinaturalist theory of judgment, Green’s Nietzsche cannot stop with the error theory. “Kant and Spir argue that the only way an objectively valid judgment about an object is possible is if the qualities attributed to the object are unconditionally united in the mind, that is, united in an atemporal and necessary manner”. Thoughts, and the subjects that have them, must be timeless. There must also be a “necessary connection between thought and its object”. Reality, on the (...) other hand, isn’t timeless: there is change, or becoming—this is Nietzsche’s naturalism. Thus, the connection between thoughts and reality fails, there is no timeless subject to have thoughts, and so: “We do not think”. It follows that there are no thoughts to be false—no error theory—and naturalism itself “cannot be thought”. Green calls this Nietzsche’s “noncognitivism” and concludes that the contradictions between Nietzsche’s naturalism, error theory, and noncognitivism mean that he “did not have one considered epistemological position” —a rather mild way of putting it. (shrink)

Abstract Nietzsche defends an ideal of freedom as the achievement of a ?higher human being?, whose value judgments are a product of a rigorous scrutiny of inherited values and an expression of how the answers to ultimate questions of value are ?settled in him?. I argue that Nietzsche's view is a recognizable descendent of ideas advanced by the ancient Stoics and Spinoza, for whom there is no contradiction between the realization of freedom and the affirmation of fate, and (...) who restrict this freedom to rare individuals, who escape the bondage of conventional mores and passive emotional states. Although Nietzsche rejects key assumptions made by both the Stoics and Spinoza, his outlook is an extension of their efforts to elaborate the notion of freedom as an ideal. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s reflection on the constitution of human subjectivity is an essential moment of his philosophy. As historical and academic conditions change, distinct interpretations of this reflection often contradict each other. This review essay aims to offer an insight into this situation. The anthology edited by Dries, which focuses on the concepts of “consciousness” and the “embodied mind,” presents innovative readings from the perspective of the philosophy of mind. However, this collection is marred by an insufficient comparison with the embodiment (...) debate. Second, Benne and Müller’s volume shows how the concepts of “person” and “personality” are used by Nietzsche to describe the complexity of human subjectivity after the dissolution of the metaphysical subject. Third, Papparo’s monograph denotes with clarity the positive and productive aspects of the concept of soul in Nietzsche, but it is unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. Finally, Scandella’s book succeeds on the contrary in highlighting some significant themes that have been overlooked in previous contributions. From a theoretical point of view, this review points out some shortcomings of the naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche, which seem inadequate not only to grasp the complexity of his conception of human subjectivity, but also to show its actuality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche and MetaphorKarsten HarriesNietzsche and Metaphor, by Sarah Kofman; translated by Duncan Large; xivi & 239 pp. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, $37.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.Since its first publication in 1972, Sarah Kofman’s Nietzsche et la métaphore has become a minor classic; reason enough to welcome this readable translation, accompanied with the translator’s unusually informative introduction, which resituates the work “in the context in which it (...) first appeared, at the high-water mark during an extraordinary surge of interest in ‘the new Nietzsche’ which swept over France in the 1960s and early 1970s” (p. ix), and concludes with a brief glance at the similarly extraordinary growth of interest in Nietzsche today in the English speaking countries, which should assure this translation of a warm reception. The addition of thoughtful notes and a complete bibliography of Kofman’s writings reinforces the impression that a major work of a major writer has finally been made available in English.Indeed, anyone interested in the metaphor-intoxicated, “new Nietzsche,” will be required to turn to this book, which has made such an important contribution to the discourse that constructed this Nietzsche. Rather short (without Kofman’s appended review of Granier’s Heideggerian Nietzsche, just 119 pp.) and readable, it invites us to confront this “new Nietzsche” with Nietzsche himself, or rather with the texts he published and—here we must be on our guard—with texts that for different reasons he left unpublished.The way this book gives precedence to the unpublished over the published works invites challenge, and here again it is not The Will to Power, but rather early material that comes in for intense scrutiny where, by now quite expectedly, “The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge” and even more “On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense,” come in for special attention—chapter 3, “The Forgetting of Metaphor,” and chapter 4, which bears the title “Metaphorical Architectures,” offer themselves as a partial commentary on the latter brief and never completed text. But still only a partial commentary, and as revealing as the passages Kofman chooses to discuss are those passed over. As expected one meets with Nietzsche’s famous description of truth as “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms” (p. 58) and a great many related passages, pointing in the same general direction. But we should not allow ourselves to be carried away by the flow of Nietzsche’s youthful prose: only a one-sided reading of this text will overlook how close, despite his use of architectural metaphors to call into question the architecture of philosophy, Nietzsche here remains to one of the paradigmatic philosophical builders, to Kant, and even more to Schopenhauer—both mentioned only in passing by Kofman. That we ourselves have constituted the world of science is for Nietzsche no reason to question “the eternal consistency, omnipresence, and infallibility of the laws of nature” (“On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense”). Quite the opposite, he goes on, the [End Page 153] turn to the subject allowed a thinker like Kant to conclude that, in Nietzsche’s words, “so far as we can penetrate here—from the telescopic heights to the microscopic depths—everything is secure, complete, infinite, regular, and without any gaps. Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and all the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other.” Nietzsche advances no considerations to dispute such confidence. Readers of this text focused on the many ways in which Nietzsche here emphasizes “the artistic process of metaphor formation” should keep in mind his insistence that this process, with which every sensation is said to begin, is also said to presuppose Kant’s pure intuitions, time and space, and therefore “relationships of succession and number.” “The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms. That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor. Every explanation of metaphor formation is here said to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Killing God, Liberating the “Subject”: Nietzsche and Post-God FreedomMichael LackeyIIndeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectations. 1After God’s death, if Michel Foucault is to be believed, the death of the subject followed quite naturally. But how, one might ask, did that (...) fateful event of God’s death necessarily lead to the demise of that most noble animal? Answering this question is crucial, for once we understand how, for Nietzsche, God’s existence and His metaphorical participation in the creation of humanity are most destructive of what is most vital within the human, then we will see how, in killing God and His crown of creation, Nietzsche does not become the quintessential nihilist; rather, he becomes, to his mind, the first sane voice crying in the intellectual wilderness: make way the coming of a new human, a “subject” which can only become a “self “ when it paradoxically learns to overcome its very constructed “self.” Nietzsche’s logic therefore runs as follows: so long as God exists, a subject which overcomes itself cannot come into being; for as Richard Schacht rightly notes, the God-hypothesis serves as a support for the traditional subject-hypothesis in Nietzsche’s writings. So to produce a self-overcoming subject Nietzsche must first kill what he considers that stodgy old tyrant of the soul. But this raises the question of how one goes about doing away with [End Page 737] God. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche gives his reader a puzzling answer to this question when he says that he fears that “we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (“Reason,” 5). 2 Given Nietzsche’s logic, to kill off God he needs to eliminate belief in grammar, and once God is dead, he can then do away with the subject. In what follows I will show how Nietzsche tries to eliminate God and the traditional subject through his extended analysis of what it means to “believe in grammar.”IIIf there is today still no lack of those who do not know how indecent it is to “believe”—or a sign of decadence, of a broken will to live—well, they will know it tomorrow. 3To understand what it means to believe in grammar, it is best to note how Nietzsche contrasts belief and freedom. More starkly, we could say that for Nietzsche to have faith means, necessarily, to lack freedom; or to be free means, necessarily, to reject faith. Nietzsche makes this clear in the fifth book of GS when he says: “Once a human being reaches the fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he becomes ‘a believer.’ Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses” (§ 347). I isolate this passage not in order to outline Nietzsche’s criticism of belief but rather to understand how Nietzsche defines freedom by contrasting it with belief. Such an analysis of course begs the question how it is possible that belief necessarily precludes freedom. Intuitively, it would seem that belief and freedom entail no contradiction. For instance, given two choices, to believe in God or not to believe in God, I exercise my freedom in choosing one belief over the other. With this example, it would seem that belief necessarily presupposes freedom. So how is it that Nietzsche concludes that freedom and belief are irreconcilable?That Nietzsche considers faith obscene is clear when he tells us in AC that belief of any kind is a “sign of decadence” (§ 50) which leads to “self-alienation” (§ 54). In fact he goes so far as to claim that faith is actually “slavery in a higher sense” (§ 54). To see why belief implies slavery we must first understand what Nietzsche means by faith. While the standard view suggests that faith is... (shrink)

The Anthology Which First Introduced Nietzsche to the English-speaking World Originally published in 1901, the result of several years of translation work by the very first generation of Nietzscheans in Britain and America, Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher, Poet and Prophet is a comprehensive selection of Nietzsche's writings, from The Birth of Tragedy through to the final works of 1888. Arranged topically with reference to the original sources, the book still stands as one of the finest anthologies of (...) Nietzsche's writing in English and a worthwhile introduction to his thought on a wide range of subjects. This new edition also includes an appreciation of the editor and translator Thomas Common, whose tireless work promoting and translating Nietzsche over nearly twenty years was instrumental in bringing him to a wider audience. (shrink)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed (...) task was that of describing the human condition as consisting of choices, as unavoidable as arbitrary, without any attempt at providing criteria for making such choices. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the heir of ethics was a philosophy of morality, that is, an analysis of the language of morality that intended to clarify valuations without trying to justify them. 1958 was the year of the normative turn that led to the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, a turn followed by decades of controversies between distinct kinds of normative ethics: utilitarian, Kantian, virtue ethics. While the controversy was raging, a quiet revolution took place, that of applied ethics which surprisingly dissolved the controversy's very subject matter by providing methods for making convergence possible on intermediate principles even when no agreement was available about first principles. The normative turn and the revolution of applied ethics have led us, at the turn of the century, to a goal that was quite far from the starting point. Instead of scepticism and relativism that was the fashion at the beginning of the century, at the beginning of the third millennium impartial and universal moral arguments seem to hold the spot being supported, if not by a final rational foundation, at least by reasonableness, the most precious legacy of the Enlightenment. -/- ● TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- ● I Anglo-Saxon philosophy: naturalism 1. Dewey beyond evolutionism and utilitarianism 2. Dewey and anti-essentialist moral epistemology 3. Dewey and naturalist moral ontology 4. Dewey and normative ethics of conduct and function 5. Perry and semantic naturalism -/- ● II Anglo-Saxon philosophy: ideal utilitarianism and neo-intuitionism 1. Moore's critique of utilitarian empiricism 2. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy 3. Moore on the nature of intrinsic value 4. Moore on ideal utilitarianism 5. Prichard on the priority of the right over the good 6. Ross's coherentist moral epistemology 7. Ross's moral ontology: realism, pluralism, and non-naturalism 8. Ross's normative ethics of prima facie duties -/- The chapter reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore's early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. It stresses the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. It argues that PE is more a patchwork of somewhat diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. -/- ●III Anglo-Saxon philosophy: non-cognitivism 1. The Scandinavian School, the Vienna circle and proto-emotivism 2. Wittgenstein and the ineffability of ethics 3. Russell's and Ayer's radical emotivism 4. Stevenson and moderate emotivism 5. Stevenson and the pragmatics of moral language 6. Stevenson and the methods for solving ethical disagreement 7. Hare and prescriptivism The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of 'good', its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with 'emotive' meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell's ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson's theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. A section reconstructs the discussion from the Forties about Hume's law, mentioning Karl Popper's argument and Richard Hare's early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- ●IV Anglo-Saxon philosophy: critics of non-cognitivism 1. Neo-naturalism and its objections to the naturalistic fallacy argument 2. Objections to Hume's law 3. Clarence Lewis and the pragmatic contradiction 4. Toulmin and the good reasons approach 5. Baier and moral reasons 5. Baier, social moralities and the absolute morality 6. Baier and the moral point of view 7. Baier and the contents of absolute ethics -/- ● V Continental philosophy: the philosophy of values 1. Max Weber and the polytheism of values 2. Phenomenology against psychologism and rationalism 3. Reinach and the theory of social acts 4. Scheler and the material ethics of values 5. Hartmann and the ontology of values 6. Plessner, Gehlen and the Philosophische Anthropologie -/- The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl's project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the apriori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy conducted in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach's theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that sketches the ideas 'discovered' later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section discusses Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of 'values' – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler, who claimed to be Husserl's legitimate heirs. -/- ● VI Continental philosophy: the critics of the philosophy of values 1. Freud, the Superego and Civilization 2. Heidegger on original ethos against ethics 3. Sartre and de Beauvoir on authenticity and ambiguity 4. Adorno and Horkheimer on emancipation and immoralism -/- ●VII Post-liberal theologians and religious thinkers 1. Barth on the autonomy of faith from ethics 2. Developments of Reformed moral theology after Barth 3. Bonhoeffer on the concrete divine command and ethics of penultimate realities 4. Developments of Reformed and Catholic moral theology after world war II 5. Baeck and the transformation of liberal Judaism 6. Rosenzweig against liberal Judaism 7. Buber and religion as the vital lymph of morality 8. Heschel and Judaism as a science of actions -/- The chapter examines the main protagonists of Christian theology and Jewish religious thinking in the twentieth century. It stresses how the main dilemmas of contemporary philosophical ethics lie at the root of the various path of inquiry taken by these thinkers. -/- ● VIII Normative ethics: neo-Utilitarianism 1. The discussion on act and rule utilitarianism 2. Hare on two-tiered preference utilitarianism 3. Harsanyi, Gauthier and rational choice ethics 4. Parfit, utilitarianism and the idea of a person 5. Brandt and indirect conscience utilitarianism -/- The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick's and Moore's fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine refuted. Two examples give the reader a glimpse at this uproarious process. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This transformation results in preference utilitarianism combined with a 'Kantian' version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare's two-level preference utilitarianism, where act utilitarianism plays the function of the eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of an action-guiding practical device. -/- ● IX Normative ethics: neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 1. Hannah Arendt, action and judgement 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer and phronesis 3. Alasdair MacIntyre on practices, virtues, and traditions 5. Stuart Hampshire on deliberation 6. Bernard Williams and moral complexity 7. Feminist ethics -/- Sect 1 reconstructs the post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named 'Rehabilitation of practical philosophy' is described. Heidegger's most brilliant disciples were the promoters of this Rehabilitation. Hans-Georg Gadamer is a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle's lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger's lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the significant role of the notion of phronesis. Sect 3 discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. It argues that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. The chapter gives a short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot's and Peter Geach's critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre's grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- ● X Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based ethics 1. Dialogical constructivism 2. Apel, Habermas and discourse ethics 3. Gewirth and rights-based ethics 4. Nagel on agent-relative reasons 5. Donagan and persons as ends in themselves Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This current started with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. The chapter offers an examination of his argument in some detail, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas's elaboration on Apel's theory. -/- ● XI The applied ethics renaissance 1. Elisabeth Anscombe on the atom bomb 2. From medical ethics to bioethics 3. Rawls and public ethics 3. Nozick, Dworkin and further developments of public ethics 5. Sen and the revival of economic ethics -/- The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin's new casuistry. The chapter argues that Rawls's distinction between a "political" and a "metaphysical" approach to the theory of justice, one central part of ethical theory, is a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and the new casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter. The idea is that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls' view never will be close – on the essential criteria for judgment. -/- ● XII Fin-de-siècle metaethics 1. Deontic logics 2. Anti-realism 3. External realism 4. Internal realism 5. Kantian constructivism -/- The chapter illustrates the fresh start of meta-ethical discussion in the Eighties and Nineties and the resulting new alignments: metaphysical naturalism, internal realism, anti-realism, and constructivism. (shrink)

This convenient new compendium contains the five most philosophically significant of Nietzsche’s post- Thus Spoke Zarathustra writings. Nietzsche wrote of these works that he intended them as “fish hooks” for catching readers who shared his sense that a cataclysmic shift in human psychology had suddenly occurred with the advent of nihilism - the uncanny and pervasive feeling that life is devoid of all meaning, purpose, and value. Taken together these books offer the reader a definitive account of (...) class='Hi'>Nietzsche’s mature philosophy as he intended it to be presented and a sweeping attack upon everything the modern Western world holds to be good about itself. (shrink)

Sensitive to the fluidity of Nietzsche's thought, which often expresses itself in apparent contradiction, Karl Jaspers notes that “for nearly every single one of Nietzsche's judgements one can also find an opposite.” But Jaspers goes on to warn that the art of reading Nietzsche faithfully demands that we gradually locate the central axis of his philosophy so that seeming irreconcilables may be resolved into a hierarchy of importance. Not surprisingly, however, this painstaking study has seldom been performed, (...) with the result that Nietzsche's paternity has been claimed by a wildly disparate band of selective readers. Thus in Wilhemine Germany the most radical wing of the SPD denounces rigid party orthodoxy by quoting approvingly Nietzsche's distaste for “herd morality,” while completely ignoring the fact that Nietzsche considered socialism itself to be alate blooming variety of just such morality. (shrink)

Presenting the entire German text of Nietzsche's lectures on rhetoric and language and his notes for them, as well as facing page English translations, this book fills an important gap in the philosopher's corpus. Until now unavailable or existing only in fragmentary form, the lectures represent a major portion of Nietzsche's achievement. Included are an extensive editors' introduction on the background of Nietzsche's understanding of rhetoric, and critical notes identifying his sources and independent contributions.