In constitutional scholarship, legal sanctions and customary law seem to be opposed to each other: customary law is often defined precisely as law without sanctions. Applied to the constitutional field, it is possible to better define those two elements of discourse: constitutional sanctions are essentially procedures of constitutional review of legislation, while customary law is more frequently referred to as constitutional conventions. While insisting on the presence of the element of sanction is typical of the normative discourse (...) attributed to Hans Kelsen, stressing the importance of constitutional conventions implies different strategic goals. Those goals are related to the definition of constitutional law and its specificity compared to other –less political– legal fields. (shrink)

This book addresses current practices in customary law. It includes contributions by scholars from various legal systems (the USA, France, Israel, Canada et cetera), who examine the current impacts of customary law on various aspects of private law, constitutional law, business law, international law and criminal law. In addition, the book expands the traditional concept of the rule of law, and argues that lawyers should not narrowly focus on statutory law, but should instead pay more attention to the (...) impact of practices on "real legal life." It states that the observation of practices calls for a stronger focus on usage, customs and traditions in our legal systems - the idea being not to replace statutory law, but to complement it with customary observations. (shrink)

Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated (...) by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts. (shrink)

This paper examines the extent to which dispute resolvers in customary law systems provide widely understandable justifications for their decisions. The paper first examines the liberal-democratic reasons for the importance of publicity, understood to be wide accessibility of legal justification, by reviewing the uses of publicity in Habermas’ and Rawls’ accounts of the rule of law. Taking examples from Sierra Leone, the paper then argues that customary law systems would benefit from making local dispute resolution practices, such as (...) “begging” from elders, witchcraft, and customary law judgments, more widely accessible. The paper concludes that while legal pluralism is usually taken to be an analytical concept, it may have a normative thrust as well, and that publicity standards would also apply to formal courts in developing countries, which are also typically “defective” along this dimension. (shrink)

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to (...) its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law. (shrink)

The present essay addresses the conceptual structure of customary law, understood as a set of customary rules. More specifically, it deals with the core question of what opinio juris entails as a constituent element of customary law. The work will begin with an analysis of samples of common strategies in contemporary legal theory that deal with opinio juris when analyzing the structure of customary law. Subsequently, following Hart’s notion about what constitutes social rules, and introducing explanatory (...) features from Game Theory applied to social philosophy and some insights from Behavioral Economics, the goal of the present study is to propose a different conceptual path for analyzing and identifying customary law with what could be understood as “opinio juris”, given the conceptual necessity of finding the normative element that lies within the usus, or social practices. (shrink)

The main goal of this article is to analyse the current status of the precautionary principle in international law and outline the tendencies of its development into a rule of customary law. The methods of comparative and systematic analysis were used in this paper. The article concludes that there is sufficient state practice and opinio iuris to support the position of the European Communities that the precautionary principle has already crystallized into a general customary rule. Evidence may be (...) found in international legally binding and non-binding documents, domestic law, and the jurisprudence of national and international courts and tribunals. (shrink)

The Russian conquest of Central Asia marked the beginning of record-keeping for Qazaq arbitrators and customary law. It remains obscure how bīs complied with the colonial regulations obliging them to record their court proceedings. I approach this issue first by questioning the utility of extra-judicial sources crafted in Russian at the instigation of colonial bureaucrats; hence, I argue that the comparison alone of ’ādat-related judicial records written in Turki with šarī’a court certificates allows situating the legal terminology applied by (...) Qazaq arbitrators within the discursive tradition of Islamic law. By way of illustrating my approach, I offer a close reading of a report of a murder case adjudicated according to Qazaq customary law in the vicinity of Khiva in 1895. My commentary on the summary of the trial sheds light on the interplay of customary and Islamic law in the region. In addition, it challenges earlier interpretations of the use of the exculpatory oath among the Qazaqs. (shrink)

Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes that most premodern legal cultures “wrote extensive sets of laws for academic purposes or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible to most members of the community and had relatively little effect on the actual operation of the legal system.” This article addresses the implications of writing for customary or regional law in South and Southeast Asia. The textual tradition of Dharmaśāstra, which canonizes a particular model of (...) Brahmin customary norms, can certainly be called a “scholarly” exercise, and it was also intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical cosmopolitan world order. But it also formulated a procedural principle to recognize the general validity of other, even divergent, customary norms, though for the most part such rules remained lex non scripta. On the other hand, inscriptions provide evidence that writing was used for diverse legal purposes and offers glimpses of actual legal practice. In these records, customary laws are sometimes laid down as statutes by decree of a ruler or community body, or are simply invoked as long-established customary rules. But even when Dharmaśāstra texts are not directly cited, their influence over the longue durée is discernable in the persistence of śāstric legal categories and terms of art. This influence is even more evident in Java, where legal codes on the Dharmaśāstra model were composed in Javanese, and where the inscriptions came to exhibit a closer connection with śāstric discourse than is found in India. (shrink)

The paper presents a novel take on the character of South Africa’s governance structure. It argues that, insofar as it constitutionally recognises traditional authorities, figures who rule in accordance with idiosyncratic and localised customary laws, as well as instigate a cheek-by-jowl existence of an asymmetrical property law (where in the urban setting land is nominally bought or transferred for sale, but in traditional rural areas granted by the chief), manifest in the differentiated land laws brought about by the Communal (...) Land Rights Act of 2003, is more akin to, and necessitates a definitional alignment with, the federal system of government than a unitary one – or at least a weak “federalism with South African characteristics.”. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that Grotius views on customary law are compatible with the concept of a ‘Grotian Moment’. However, the idea of accelerated customary international law is developed by Van Vollenhoven, who interpreted Grotius in a questionable way. Whereas Grotius qualifies as a thinker in the tradition of natural law, Van Vollenhoven should be seen as an interactionist. This is especially visible in his publications on adat law, in which he visibly belongs to a romantic, (...) Germanist, and rather pluralist tradition of law. The idea of a Grotian Moment also fits better with this starting point than with natural law. For this reason, the ‘Grotian Moment’ should be renamed ‘Van Vollenhoven’s Moment’. It is argued that this legal theoretical position explains some of Van Vollenhoven’s rather peculiar interpretations of Grotius. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La labor del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex-Yugoslavia tuvo un momento importante en la compresión del principio de legalidad, como principio básico en la garantía de los derechos humanos, al enfrentar no sólo el derecho consuetudinario como fuente de derecho sino también diferentes modos o enfoques en la identificación de este derecho consuetudinario. Esta relación debe ser analizada a la luz de las limitaciones que tiene el derecho internacional y, sobre todo, de los procedimientos de creación de normas. (...) No resulta fácil exigir responsabilidad en el cumplimiento del derecho internacional humanitario y de los derechos humanos. La práctica de este Tribunal abre una vía para la reflexión con la finalidad de asegurar el respeto de los derechos humanos en cualquier circunstancia, incluso de aquellos que llevaron a cabo la comisión de graves crímenes contra la comunidad internacional.ABSTRACT: The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was important for understanding the principle of legality as a key principle on the guarantee of Human Rights. The former was due to the Tribunal’s work on having faced the customary law as a source of law using different perspectives for its identification. The link between customary law, principle of legality and human rights has to be analyzed taking in account the limits of International law and the procedures for creating legal norms. It is not easy to invoke responsibility in the fulfillment of international humanitarian law and international law of human rights. The practice developed by this Tribunal provides an avenue for thinking about ensuring the respect of the human rights in any case including the commission of grave crimes against international community. PALABRAS CLAVE: derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, principio de legalidad, derecho internacional humanitario, costumbre internacionalKEYWORDS: international law of human rights, principle of legality, international humanitarian law, international custom. (shrink)

The ethical authority carried in the conventions of fairness and human well-being has been widely adopted under the idea of “moral economy,” forming an eclectic and interdisciplinary debate. Significant, though external to this debate, is a corpus of medieval thought which exhibits a fundamental interest in legitimate market protocols, and the political rights and obligations of agents in relation to the common good of the community. This article asserts the imperative status of a customary basis for understanding not just (...) the analytic version of moral economy but the legacy contained in what might be termed the “the moral economy of Aquinas.”. (shrink)

Assisted migration (AM) is a translocation of the representatives of species to areas outside their natural habitats as a response to climate change. This article seeks to identify how customary norms and general principles of international environmental law could guide the development of regulation of AM maximizing the benefits of using AM and minimizing AM-related risks. Among the customary norms and principles of international environmental law discussed in the article and relevant to the regulation of AM are the (...) permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the principle of cooperation, the no-harm rule, the precautionary principle, the principles of prevention, due diligence, and obligation to conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA), the principles of integration and intergenerational equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and the polluter pays principle, the principles of non-regression, progression, resilience, in dubio pro natura, the principle of ecological proportionality, and the principle of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (principle of good governance, environmental democracy). (shrink)

Africa, before European colonization, knew no other form of legal system outside customary arrangements. Based on secondary sources and a primary survey conducted between 2009 and 2010 on the situation of women and land rights in anglophone Cameroon, this paper examines the grounds for discrimination in customary laws against women's rights to land in the context of legal pluralism, and discusses the implications of this custom of gender discrimination. In drawing from Cameroon as an exemplar, it concludes that (...) the strong influence and impact of customs on current land tenure systems have global implications on women's land rights, food security and sustainable development, and that gender equality in land matters can be possible only where the critical role of ethics is recognized in pursuit of the economic motive of land rights. (shrink)

Law wrangles with setting and applying standards for the practice of medicine in many different arenas. One of the most prominent is medical malpractice litigation in which the trial process examines a physician's performance and measures it against the standard of care. The profession's prevailing custom, with some substantial tolerance for “respectable minority” views, has been the gold standard for scrutinizing physician practice and treatment decisions in the malpractice context. Using the profession's custom as the measure against which a physician's (...) performance is judged defers to the expertise of medicine. Deference to the medical profession is attractive as a tool for reining in law. Reliance on customary practice is criticized, however, for driving physicians to the relative safety of the middle of the herd. Creating such a strong incentive for compliance with customary practice can dampen medical innovation and the diffusion of new clinical knowledge. The safety of the herd can also deprive individual patients of the best care in their particular circumstances.Several current trends are strengthening claims that professional practice patterns are an inappropriate tool for distinguishing between high‐quality and substandard care. In particular, advocacy for evidence‐based medicine aggressively asserts that the traditional way of making medical treatment decisions is largely untethered from scientific method or data, rendering professional judgment, even in the aggregate, suspect. (shrink)

This paper traces back the sources of our present legal system and of market economy to Medieval Europe which itself benefited from Hellenistic and Roman legal culture and commercial practices. Roman provinces placed Rome in the wider Greek cultural and commercial world. If Aristotle was already transcending the narrow polis-based conceptions of his predecessors, after him Hellenistic Civilization saw the emergence of a new school of philosophy: Stoicism. The legal thought in the Latin West will hence be characterized by Cicero’s (...) writings and its Stoic sources. The Roman legal system was similar to the later northern European customary law and the English common law; Roman law was evolutionary and customary. The rise of Western individualism, whether it dates back to St. Augustine in the fifth century, or to the two Papal Revolutions of Gregory I (establishing the nuclear family as the core of individualism) and of Gregory VII, also played a crucial role in shaping the western legal tradition. The paper describes the main forces that led to this second (Gregorian) revolution. Monasticism is one of them. Benedictine monasticism plaid a leading role in the Peace of God Movement. Hence collective oath-taking by groups in the name of peace was essential in the founding of cities and in the formation of guilds. Europe’s economic resurgence in the Eleventh Century was on the basis of the creation of the rule of law by the Peace of God movement. This movement also allowed for Europe’s agricultural economy to progress. Indeed, the European Middle Ages is one of the major periods of technological innovation in the history of the world. The Gregorian Revolution itself was supported and financed by the Commercial Revolution: Italian bankers sustained Papal reformers against the Emperors. The independence of the Italian cities and provinces reveals one of the most important consequences of the Gregorian Revolution: the polycentricism of Western Europe. This Revolution also witnessed the first large number of political pamphlets in European history; the Gregorian clergy emphasizing a compact theory of government. Soon after, the order of Cistercians was founded (1098) and underwent spectacular growth during the next two centuries. The Cistercians accepted no rents or labor services from feudal donors but would take only full possession of land to do with it as they wished.These monasteries were the most economically effective units that had ever existed in Europe, and perhaps in the world, before that time. Finally, the Magna Carta (1215) that will be so influential on modern political thought can be seen as a direct consequence of the Gregorian Revolution. (shrink)

After the French Revolution, the codification movement led to the introduction of the Dutch Civil Code and the Commercial Code of 1838. These codifications were generally regarded as the bedrock of a dogmatic system in which little space was left for customs and customary law. Mercantile jurists, such as Holtius and Levy, were opponents of the legalistic approach of the new codifications. They tried to separate mercantile law from civil law in order to protect mercantile law from excessive legalistic (...) influences. According to them, mercantile law was characterised by internationality, custom as its main source of law, continuity through an extended mercantile legal history and by good faith and mutual trust between the merchants. Out of these, the historicity and homogeneity of a strong community of merchants are particularly in line with a traditional and conservative view on society. Holtius and Levy, however, had little in common with their Christian-conservative contemporaries. On the one hand, they rather seemed to foreshadow the kind of liberal-conservatism as expressed by Hayek during the 20th century. On the other hand, their ideas have much in common with different lex mercatoria –traditions developed by authors as Goldman and Schmitthoff. On the aspects of historicity and internationality Holtius and Levy seem to have much in common with Hayek whereas concerning communality and the legal nature of customary law there are more similarities with the lex mercatoria-traditions. (shrink)

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that (...) this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms. (shrink)

In this paper, I first discuss the concept of ‘Grotian Moment’ in the context of the capacity of international organizations to contribute to the formation and identification of customary international law. Afterward, I apply three levels to discuss the time element of the formation of custom. At the micro-level of the institutional practice, the time required to form a customary norm may depend on whether each form of practice is directed to the institutional or to the international dimension. (...) At the level of the organ, I reflect on the difference played by the presence or absence of member States in the institutional organ that adopts the practice relevant for custom formation. At the macro-level of the characteristics of the organization, I distinguish between so-called supranational and functional organizations. In general, I exclude the relevance of speaking in terms of a ‘Moment’ that produces a paradigm shift, and I stress the continuous change to which international law is subject. (shrink)

Superior responsibility has been a widely recognised form of responsibility for omission in both treaty and customary international law. Superiors are held responsible for the acts of their subordinates when they fail in fulfilling their duties to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates. Duties to prevent and punish arise only after the superior knows about the subordinate’s crimes or has a reason to know about it. ‘Has a reason to know’ is a form of constructive knowledge and could be (...) defined as absence of actual knowledge about subordinates’ crimes where that knowledge should exist because of information available to the superior from the content of which it could be easily concluded that there is a possibility that subordinates intend to commit, are committing or have already committed crimes and the lack of that knowledge is a cause of willful disregard of his duties or at least disregard based on gross negligence. (shrink)

The paper examines the realignment of the legal sources in an information society, by considering first of all the differences with the previous system of sources, dubbed as the “Westphalian model”. The current system is tripartite, rather than bipartite, for the sources of transnational law should be added to the traditional dichotomy between national and international law. In addition, the system is dualistic, rather than monistic, because the tools of legal constructivism, such as codes or statutes, have to be complemented (...) with the rules of customary law and contracts. In light of the canonical version of the law as a set of commands enforced through the threat of physical sanctions, however, two further novelties must be stressed, namely the soft law-tools of governance as a source of the system and the aim to embed normative constraints into technology, in order to enforce the law through the use of filtering systems, self-enforcing technologies, etc. This latter approach impacts on functions and requirements of the system, by transferring the normative side of the law from the traditional “ought to” of legal commands to what actually is on the basis of automatic techniques, thus affecting the very notion of source. The overall aim of the paper is to show that rearrangements of the legal sources are intertwined with redistributions of power and hence, a normative standpoint is needed, so as to determine whether scholars can obtain the solution that best justifies the integrity of the law before its hard cases, or the answer is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests. (shrink)

Toward the end of the twentieth century, Highland Maya intellectuals and activists in Guatemala began to argue for the recognition of indigenous customary law, rooted in traditional Maya moral and ritual discourse. Such law is often in tension with the Western notion of rights that undergirds national and international treatises regarding indigenous peoples. This essay identifies three distinct but mutually engaged pairs of moral concepts—hot/cold, left/right, and favorable/not favorable—articulated through K'iche' Maya quotidian and ceremonial practices and speech. It also (...) identifies the extent to which they do not necessarily align with Western notions of good and bad. These three pairs of moral terms, specifically as conserved through the high-register of Maya discourse used by traditional ceremonial specialists, illustrate a normative means by which Highland Maya discern understandings of justice, and ground their advocacy for restorative justice. (shrink)

Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...) international law (e.g., crystallizing norms of customary law) can be binding in much the same way as better-established doctrine. This point becomes perspicuous, I argue, once we get a clear sense of the plausible options for grounding the moral authority of international law generally. -/- This result is interesting in its own right, but it also reveals two other features of the character of state responsibility under international law. First, the distinction between legislation and compliance is less pronounced compared to domestic law. Consequently, the virtues of good governance will frequently be pertinent to determining the content of states’ obligations under international law. Second, normally more powerful and influential agents will be more strongly bound by international law than other subjects. This is an attractive result, addressing a concern that motivates many international lawyers to view international law as absolutely binding. An absolutist view international legal authority is unnecessary for showing that the most powerful and dangerous states are strongly bound by the terms of much existing law. (shrink)

The present paper addresses the mutual relationship between society and law in shaping women’s law in Islam from the perspective of the sociology of law. It analyzes the role of pre-Islamic social, political, and economic structures in the Arabian Peninsula in modeling women’s law and highlights some customary laws which were rejected or revived and integrated in Islamic jurisprudence. In this regard, the paper reviews issues such as polygyny, rights to inheritance, marriage, the process of testimony and acceptable forms (...) of evidence in legal matters, diyya, the exclusion of women from the judiciary and the system of issuing fatwa, natural right of guardianship of underage children after divorce, and regulations related to the veil. Finally, referring to the manner of the Prophet of Islam, the paper suggests that ʿurf can be considered as a source of Islamic legislation alongside other commonly known sources of fiqh. (shrink)

In Namibia, as in many other parts of Africa, customary law continues to play an important role for ordinary people, by setting the framework of behaviour that the law expects of them and, in return, what protections they can expect from laws. This role is today increasingly under challenge from the growing importance of constitutional law.

Despite their obvious importance to social and political life, custom and customary law have largely escaped philosophical scrutiny. There are important recent philosophical analyses of convention, but none of custom. And customary law has been recently neglected by the dominant legal positivism. One reason for the neglect of custom is the familiar dichotomy between nature and convention. Social practices are said to be either by nature, and therefore assumed to be unalterable, or they are said to be by (...) convention, and therefore assumed to be created at will. But customs arise neither simply from nature nor from deliberate stipulation, so they are excluded by the familiar opposition of nature and convention. Custom is a notoriously vague concept: custom seems both to be natural and conventional. I attempt to show how custom bridges human nature and social norms. I argue that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: habit and convention. Custom is a habitual convention and a conventional habit. I discuss habit and convention in relation to contemporary psychology and analytic philosophy. Habit roots custom in the physiology of human nature while convention links custom to social norms. Aristotle pioneered this approach to custom by using two words to describe what we call custom: ethos and nomos. Ethos focuses our attention on the habitual dimension of custom while nomos focuses our attention on the conventional dimension of custom. I argue that the function of law is to remedy the deficiencies of custom: law is custom’s instrument for shaping its own evolution. (shrink)

In between the time of John Austin and H.L.A. Hart a great legacy, and an accompanying debate, spawned out of the work of Sir ­Henry Maine. While employing a primarily comparative, historical perspective, Maine sought to scrutinize and redefine the way philosophy relates to the social sciences within jurisprudential enquiries. From this perspective, the present paper aims to reclaim and represent Maine’s work as a project in and for the philosophy of law. A project which came to inspire and influence (...) future generations of philosophers, and two subsequent schools of thought, by instigating a forgotten debate around the concept of custom, its relation to the concept law, and the status of customary law. This examination will close with a note, highlighting certain aspects the revival of Maine’s works, as well as the legacy which spawned out of them, can have generally for the philosophy of law and interdisciplinary jurisprudence, as well as more particularly for the philosophy of customary international law. (shrink)

The relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello has been characterized differently throughout European history. There have been three main positions exemplified by Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf and Emer de Vattel. They are, first, both the cause and the conduct of warfare must be just; second, the cause must be just, but the conduct of the war is unconstrained in order to achieve the goal of peace; and, third, we must assume justice on both sides, and concentrate (...) on ensuring just conduct in armed conflict. Each attempted to distil customary practices, which they saw in some relation to Natural Law, the ultimate source of moral obligation. Customary international law now serves the function of Natural Law in that even if treatises in which it is articulated lapse the customary constraining precepts remain, and are equally obligatory. It is contended that the relationship between just war and just conduct in war during the 20th and 21st centuries has mirrored the three classic positions, and since 9/11, with the advent of new dimensions to warfare in the war against terror, the relationship is in flux. Since 9/11 there has been a growing emphasis on jus ad bellum and a relative silence on the principles of jus in bello. Implicitly, there is an informal acceptance of something like Pufendorf’s position in which outlaw combatants are deemed to place themselves outside of the protection of customary law. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that the pre-codified, customary law of war had little true influence on the decisions or behavior of combatants in the western world. Evaluating this assumption concerning the custom (or norm) of the giving of quarter to enemy combatants in the Texas War of Independence of 1835--1836, this paper finds a strong and widely accepted norm on this subject already by the early 19th century, which exerted significant influence on the behavior in and the results and (...) consequences of the war. The following of this custom of war by the Texian Army, on the one hand, and its intentional and preplanned breaking by the Mexican army headed by Santa Anna for the supposed military and psychological benefits that would accrue from it, on the other, such as in the cases of the Alamo and Goliad, led to severe internal and external consequences for the Mexican side in the short and long term that greatly contributed to their failure to achieve their objectives and to the Texian success in achieving theirs. These consequences indicate the importance of the norms of warfare, even in the pre-codification era, and the major potential costs involved in their breaking or disregard by decision makers. (shrink)

What is the significance of asserting that certain agents, be they individual or collective ones, have a duty to create just institutions at a global level? It might appear none. For many agree that there is no global authority to coordinate compliance with the duty. Hence, it is up to individual agents to decide how to comply. If this is the correct account of the duty to create just institutions, then one can say that significant global justice projects depend on (...) insignificant duty to realize them. The state’s duty is indeterminate, however, only on the supposition that authoritative institutions are necessary to secure coordination among different agents. The dissertation challenges this fundamental assumption in two steps. First, I investigate the practical relevance of conventions for solving coordination problems. By building on the works of Hume and Lewis, I show how individuals in the state of nature could have coordinated their actions by conventions up until a point when a government could have emerged. I argue that similar considerations apply to relations among states. I identify relevant similarities between conventions creating a government and international customary law. Moreover, I argue that international customary law is a global governing convention since it prescribes how rules that bind all states are to be made. The second step in my argument concerns the normative assessment of conventions. I argue that conventions are essential for the demands of justice as long as they enable compliance with the demands. Not all conventions, however, do so. I put forward the principle of salience to identify those practices that play such a role. The salient practices determine the state’s duty to create a just world order. Ceteris paribus, the duty is not indeterminate after all. Consequently, current coordination problems that arise among states should not be seen as a normal consequence of states’ rational and self-interested behavior in the absence of a global authority; instead, the coordination problems amount to the violation of the duty to create a just world order. The major implication of the argument is that we should replace the Hobbesian framework for thinking about the nature of states as well as how they relate to one another by the Humean one. Thus, instead of insisting on states’ consent and necessity of a centralized authority to coordinate actions, we should pay more attention to the habitual behavior of states as well as the role conventions play in solving coordination problems among them. Importantly, the relevance of conventions to compliance with moral demands does not make authoritative institutions obsolete. The argument of this dissertation is modest – it only asserts that conventions can coordinate actions in the process of transitioning toward more centralized forms of global authority. As opposed to the pessimistic outlook of the Hobbesian framework, the Humean one makes room for hope that the change of the present unjust conditions is possible. (shrink)

An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they (...) must be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else. (shrink)