For the contemporary Serbian sociology of religion it is evident that the process of desecularization has been present on the social scene of Serbia in the last fifteen years. Sociologists have provided arguments for this claim based on data gathered in Serbia during this period. The religious changes in question have been empirically recorded in all aspects of attachment to religion and the church, that is, in aspects of religious identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious behavior. Certain political (...) subjects and social scientists feel that social life in Serbia is getting increasingly, and that religion and church are exerting influence within social fields they are not supposed to, if Serbia is to become a secular, democratic state. The paper analyzes some major conditions of the clericalization of the Serbian society. U savremenoj srpskoj sociologiji religije nije sporno da je u poslednjih petnaestak godina na drustvenoj sceni proces desekularizacije. Sociolozi su taj proces argumentovali pozivajuci se na iskustvenu evidenciju koja je za to vreme stvorena u Srbiji. Navedene religijske promene empirijski su evidentirane u svim segmentima vezanosti za religiju i crkvu, dakle: u segmentu religijskog identifikovanja, doktrinarnog verovanja i religijsko-obrednog ponasanja. Postoji misljenje nekih politickih subjekata i drustvenih naucnika da se drustveni zivot u Srbiji sve vise klerikalizuje i da religija i crkva ispoljavaju svoj uticaj tamo gde ne bi smelo da ga bude ukoliko Srbija treba da bude laicka, demokratksa drzava. U tekstu se analiziraju neki od vaznih uslova klerikalizacije drustva. (shrink)

An important moment in the history of the Orthodox Church is despite the withdrawal of local churches like the Bulgarian, Russian, Georgian and Alexandrian ones and the fear of Serbian Church to take part in it, the Pan-Orthodox Council of Crete remains an important meeting that influenced the history of Orthodoxy and shifted its conception to the world. The relevance of some of the topics discussed there explains why it can be found inside the important (...) theological journals from the entire world chronicles of the event and articles dedicated to some of the topics investigated. Noticing this fact, we have tried to see the way the social thinking of the Orthodox Church is reflected in the documents released by the participants and its encyclical letter. Because of the fact that, until today, only the Russian Orthodox Church has a document that defines in an articulate way its social thinking and this one was published in 2002, when many challenges were not present in society, the ideas presented there are not only important for their relevance and actuality, but also for the fact that they became the official document that articulates the landmarks of social thinking of the Eastern Orthodox Church, seen as a federation of local churches that are in Eucharistic and doctrinaire communion. Therefore, we have tried to see how the bishops presented to the Pan-Orthodox meeting, the way they understood and approached these topics and what represented the motivations of their conclusions. (shrink)

The paper looks into the phenomenon of criticism of the Russian World concept in contemporary Ukrainian religious, political and social discourses. It is shown that the propagandistic ideological narrative model, developed according to numerous historical analogs, is becoming a subject of critical analysis by specialists in many scientific areas. Experts' views coincide in many respects but there are also different stances on some disputable issues. The historical aspiration of Russia for domination and substantiation of its unique nature is considered (...) the root of the concept. This explains the use of such narrative constructs as "Moscow is the third Rome", "specific civilization" etc. Based on evidence of competent authorities, the author proves that the concept was most likely developed by a group of leading Russian ideologists in the late 20th century. It acquired the modern conservative and nationalist form only after it had become an object of interest of Russian clerical circles and started spreading through church resources. The symbolic figure in this respect is the current Moscow Patriarch Kyrylo who has been an active promoter of the Russian World concept from the early 21st century. After he had been voted into the Patriarch office, Kyrylo turned the Russian World into the leading church and political narrative. The wide use of the concept for political purposes was consistently criticized for undisguised militarism, aggressive and nationalistic ideas underpinning the Russian World. According to numerous experts, these ideas have no common root with Christianity, sometimes being in open contradiction with the latter. Critical studies also indicate that the basis of the Russian World is the belief that the Russian culture and language are culturally superior to historical achievements of numerous other peoples, including the Ukrainians. As historical experience shows, the use of such ideological concepts as the Russian World results in consolidation of society around one national idea and expansion of aggressive state policy to neighboring countries. (shrink)

Using documents, books and articles written by Nicola Velimirović during World War I, this article investigates his attitude towards this conflagration and shows how his Christian views influence his outlook on this topic. Shared during his visits to the USA and England and via lectures given in venues like Westminster Abbey or Oxford University, his ideas make him a militant for peace and, at the same time, a man who defends his country's cause in front of the Austro-Hungarian abuses. Investigating (...) his writings from this point of view is important because he manages to show a different face of the future Serbian bishop and brings to the fore his concerns regarding his contemporary society. (shrink)

In the context of the Union of Greater Romania, a problem specific to the development of the Romanian society and of the re-united national state was the regulation of the status or the varied religious cults. It is well known that under the Older Romanian Kingdom, the Orthodoxy was a state religion. The other cults – Lutheran, Catholic, Mosaic, and Moslem – represented small numbers of believers and had not been regulated under the law; they were tolerated. Following the Union (...) of 1918, the Romanian State came to accommodate not just one, but several denominations. Consequently, it had to clarify its relations with the cults in the Romanian provinces of Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults which had not existed in the Older Kingdom functioned according to the legislative systems they had belonged to before 1918. Thus came the necessity of establishing the unitary status for the minority cults, which, given the diversity of their religious doctrines, rituals and interests, posed new problems to be settled for the government policy. This also should be the focus of the debates surrounding the forthcoming law of the cults in Romania. (shrink)

The article considers the features contemporary transformations narratives official Russian Orthodoxy in the years 2015-2016. At the end of 2015 and in 2016 narrative "Russian world" Patriarch and his entourage tried to upgrade using the ideal of "solidarity." The ideas of "solidarity" in the XX century evolved differently in Catholic social teaching and fascism. Spokesman of the Russian Orthodox Church sees the embodiment of the ideals of solidarity in the best manifestations of Soviet mentality. "Solidarism" in the (...) rhetoric of the Patriarch and his entourage are a means of legitimizing Russian nationalism and revanchism. According to the Patriarch of core values and "Russian world" is "faith, state, justice, solidarity and dignity." These values must be an alternative to liberal values - freedom, rights, human rights. According to Patriarch values should determine the policy, and especially value the unity of the Russian people and state. This means that the patriarch claim to symbolic power over the politicians of Russia and neighboring countries. Іn rhetoric of patriarch the West, with its core value of freedom, embodies evil. Russia tempted by Western values, and this is the cause of many crises. The role of savior in this narrative belongs to the church and its leadership. Present rated as the culmination of the struggle between good and evil. The future victory of good patriarch linked not only to preserve the unity and uniqueness of Russia, but the triumph of traditionalism in Europe, the adoption of the values of solidarity society. (shrink)

This text will comment on some of the important aspects of the connection between Eastern Orthodoxy and contemporary civilization, the historical development of which has been designated as post-modernity. Being neither modern, nor postmodern, nor anti-modern, Orthodoxy has to answer the question as to whether globalization is analogous to the “cosmic liturgy” sought by the Christian religion as a whole, or to the contrary, is moving away from it. The other basic problem of Orthodoxy – especially in what were (...) formerly designated as East European societies – is that it should be identified with nationality. To be Orthodox often means to be a Bulgarian, a Serb, a Russian, a Romanian, etc. Ethnic affiliation and Orthodox affiliation are often interchangeable. Thus, the nationalization of Orthodoxy is becoming a major problem that the Church must resolve. (shrink)

Religion has an essential effect on the development of any society since it impacts religious norms and models of behaviour, establishes priorities and values, influences gender relations, predetermines gender roles, and influences the establishing of certain traditions, laws, and customs. This article is a review of the historic position of the Russian Orthodox Church – the dominant religion in Russia – its past and current status in Russia, and the issues relating to women in Russian socio-cultural and religious (...) community. While there is a lack of research on the Russian Orthodox Church and its influence on Russians and, particularly, Russian women, the increased religiosity in Russia within the last decade requires us to study the Russian Orthodoxy and its impact on people’s lives and its attitude to gender. This article provides a deep analysis of the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on the image of women in Russia. It has been argued that Russian national character and heritage was formed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the existing gender stereotypes in Russia have been significantly impacted by the Russian Orthodox Church and have mainly been derived from the interpretation of the New Testament by the Russian Orthodoxy and its clergy. Particularly, gender roles and the perception of family, and marriage are understood to be in compliance with the values of the Russian Orthodox faith. For the faith the most important purpose of marriage is the birth and raising of children and the chief responsibility and duty of a woman is to care for her husband and children as these are considered as a way of the woman’s service to society and to God. (shrink)

The article analyzes the interaction of Orthodoxy and the state and its role in asserting national identity in the context ofRomania’s modernization process. I have developed the concept of tendential modernity for studying the distinctive nature of Romanian modernity Modernity in Romania focused primarily on national and geostrategic problems, due to the absence of a state encompassing all Romanians. The Orthodox Church had been recognized as a symbol of national identity, therefore it was included among the basic institutions (...) that would support the national project, in order to serve the new purposes imposed by modernity. In the context of the modernization process undergone by Romanian society, the church is not separated from the state, but becomes a church of the state, a church whose prerogatives are established by the secular power; thus the church is defined as an institution that is embedded in the process of modern change decided by the state. As a matter of fact, modernity itself was ambivalent and ambiguous, which influenced decisively the role of Orthodoxy in the assertion of Romanian identity. (shrink)

The polemical literature of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, comprehensively covering the issue of unification, had already outlined most of the important issues surrounding the transition of part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy to the union with Rome. However, their resolution raises a lot of controversy and ambiguous estimates of this controversial event. Therefore, actualization of this problem in modern science is a natural phenomenon. Today, as V. Shevchenko rightly points out, “the passionate relevance of the unified (...) issue has already acquired the importance of historical urgency”. In addition, the role of the two most influential dioceses of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, Lviv and Peremyshka, which actually defined the fate of both Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Greek Catholicism, has not yet been properly considered and objectively assessed in these processes. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may seem (...) unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Isaac Newton an Arian?Thomas C. PfizenmaierHistorians of Newton's thought have been wide ranging in their assessment of his conception of the trinity. David Brewster, in his The Life of Sir Isaac Newton (1831), was fully convinced that Newton was an orthodox trinitarian, although he recognized that "a traditionary belief has long prevailed that Newton was an Arian."1 Two reasons were used to defend his conclusion that Newton (...) was orthodox. The first was a letter from John Craig, a friend of Newton, written shortly after Newton's death to John Conduitt, the husband of Newton's niece. In this letter Craig remarked that Newton's theological opinions "were sometimes different from those which are commonly received" but that he hoped Conduitt would publish Newton's theological papers, "that the world may see that Sir Isaac Newton was as good a Christian as he was a mathematician and philosopher."2 The second reason with which Brewster defended his conclusion was his acknowledgment that the doctrine of the trinity itself had variations.I had no hesitation when writing the Life of Sir Isaac Newton in 1830, in coming to the conclusion that he was a believer in the Trinity; and in giving this opinion on the creed of so great a man, and so indefatigable a student of scripture, I was well aware that there are various forms of Trinitarian truth, and various modes of expressing it, which have been received as orthodox in the purest societies of the Christian Church.3L. T. More in his biography Isaac Newton gently chided Brewster for not publishing some of the crucial manuscripts, which eventually became [End Page 57] part of the Keynes collection.4 From these additional manuscripts More reached the conclusion that Newton was not orthodox but an Arian. He proceeded to say that Newton was not only an Arian but, because of the manner in which he understood Jesus' role as prophet, a Unitarian.5More recently the famous British economist John M. Keynes, who considered it a great "impiety" that the Portsmouth family's collection of Newton's non-scientific manuscripts were dispersed at the Sotheby's auction in 1936 and who recovered about half of them creating the "Keynes" collection at Cambridge, provided yet a third interpretation of Newton's thought.Very early in life Newton abandoned orthodox belief in the Trinity. At this time the Socinians were an important Arian sect amongst intellectual circles. It may be that Newton fell under Socinian influences, but I think not. He was rather a Judaic monotheist of the school of Maimonides. He arrived at this conclusion, not on so-to-speak rational or skeptical grounds, but entirely on the interpretation of ancient authority. He was persuaded that the revealed documents give no support to the Trinitarian doctrines which were due to late falsifications. The revealed God was one God.6Among contemporary scholars, the consensus is that Newton was an Arian rather than a Socinian.7 This view is clearly expressed by Richard [End Page 58] Westfall who writes, "Well before 1675, Newton had become an Arian in the original sense of the term. He recognized Christ as a divine mediator between God and man, who was subordinate to the Father who created him."8 Yet Frank Manuel, in his The Religion of Isaac Newton (1974), advises that we not try to push Newton into a theological categorization too quickly. He reminds us that Newton was, if nothing else, an original thinker.It is an error to seize upon his antitrinitrianism in order to pigeonhole him in one of the recognized categories of heresy—Arian, Socinian, Unitarian, or Deist.9So how did Isaac Newton conceive of the trinity? In exploring his writing on the subject we will be guided by two principles mentioned above. The first is Brewster's insight that the trinitarian doctrine has in fact been understood with a certain degree of variety within the sphere of orthodoxy. The second is from Manuel's reminder, that we must resist the temptation to make Newton "fit" some predetermined category or school of trinitarian thought. We will begin by looking at the resources available for studying... (shrink)

The article describes evolutionary process of the ideas about the state, which were formed by Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals in the end of the XVI - the first half of the XVII century. Established, that on the development of these ideas had considerable influenced political circumstances of Ukrainian Cossack state in the second half of the XVII century. Varied Nation orientations available in Ukrainian political elite caused at that time the political split of Ukrainian society which reflected on the (...) class='Hi'>church life. Some part of Church leaders tended to association with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the convergence with the Greek Catholic Church, the rest were supporters of political union with Moscow and rapprochement with Moscow Orthodoxy. However, both groups of Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals defended the independence of the Kyiv Metropolis. Accordingly, representatives of both political orientations in church circles had their own opinion on the nature of the state, the governor responsibilities, composition of nation and its political rights, the relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical authority in the ideal state. Two outstanding representatives of these viewpoints were Sofonovych F. and I. Gisel. There are many ways where their views are identical, so: both agreed about the priority of ecclesiastical authority over secular, Kyiv's role as a center of Orthodox state, about the existence of a sovereign Ukrainian nation as an ethnic and religious communities. However, they also had fundamental differences: in F. Sofonovych's "Chronicle" sense of the state's existence and first responsibility of the governor was to ensure the public good, the conception of political nation extends to the whole society, the governor is the monarch in the European sense, who should be accountable to his lieges. Instead of that in I. Gisela's "Synopsis" meaning of the state was described in citizens' association in a single church, the governor is autocrat that answers only to the face of God, as the political nation was described only a minor group of nobility and its features were limited. In that way, we can assume that the concept of state, represented in work by Sofonovych F. indicates the beginning of the transition from early modern to modern Ukrainian nation and the continuation of the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty. Theory by Gisela I., whereas, the initial point of departure of Enlightenment concept of absolutism, which later was developed by Prokopovich F., and embodies the idea of an Orthodox empire which in the political sense coincides with the Russian Empire and in the spiritual one - is a continuation of Kievan Rus, where Kiev clergy plays a significant role. Both concepts were actively developing in future and had some mutual influence; also they greatly influenced the political life. (shrink)

The sequence and escalation of Russian–Ukrainian political and military conflicts since 2014, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have reopened interest in and debates on just war theory and practice in general and specifically in historic and modern Eastern Orthodox cultures and Orthodox-majority states. These debates have significant repercussions in areas like church–state and church–military relations in these cultures; ecclesial involvement in these conflicts has varied from war-justification rhetoric (in the case of the (...) Russian Orthodox Church) to reiterations of the inherited traditions of ecclesial pacifism/condemnation of all violence (the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, a number of Orthodox Churches, clerical and theological networks, etc.). The Russian ecclesial involvements in the justification of war/military necessity and formulation of just war narratives have triggered divisions and antagonisms in the Eastern Orthodoxy. The development and course of the ecclesial conflicts involving Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishes (and other Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies) will show whether Orthodox religious actors may begin to play a more significant role in the articulation and application of newly emerging trends in areas like the theology of just peace, just peace-making and Christian realism, Orthodox social ethics and the dynamic praxis of just peace-making. (shrink)

The Serbian Orthodox Church has been described in scholarship as having had a significant impact onto the social and political life of Serbia, especially since the wars of the nineties. With the coming of the age of the Internet and social science automation, however, more options have gradually become available to researchers in the recent years. For this reason, this article will tackle the official rhetoric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in relation to the (...) sociopolitical with the assistance of social science automation. Forming an examination via the methodological lens of Operational Code Analysis, this article delves into the Church’s discourse on Kosovo, via heavy vetting of all official statements given on the website of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It also expands upon the initial methodology – Operational Code Analysis – to an analysis of an institution with a uniform discourse, which has so far not seen light in scholarly production. (shrink)

The present study represents a preliminary theoretical attempt to analyse the socio-political influence and impact of the Romanian Orthodoxy within the Romanian public life and political culture since 1990, both through the relation between the Orthodox Church and the state, and its impact on the wider society. An open-ended reflection on a constantly unfolding reality, the approach focuses on demonstrating the profound “modernity”—not backwardness—of Orthodoxy’s implicit political theology and derived ideologies and their “modern” destructiveness. The pivotal segment of (...) the study is the relation between modernity and a theory of exclusion derived from a rather unorthodox (brief) interpretation of its emergence from the main carriers of modernity, namely Enlightenment and humanism. Instead of conclusion, the final section compiles and comments a few reformist initiatives and some possible philosophical-theological ways out of the deadlock of ideological self-centrism that still dominates our Orthodoxy. (shrink)

Is it possible and whether it is necessary to consider the events of the inter-church and inter-church Orthodox life of Ukraine through the prism of national security? What are the pain points in relations between the Ukrainian state and the Orthodox Churches? Does the legislation in Ukraine regulate state-church relations in Ukraine and whether it is Ukrainian-centric? These and other issues were the subject of consideration of the Expert Round Table on "Fighting Identities in Orthodoxy (...) of Ukraine after the" Revolution of Dignity ": an aspect of national security", which took place in Kyiv on July 1, 2014. The organizers of the event were the All-Ukrainian Society "Prosvita" named after Taras Shevchenko and the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies. In the work of the Round Table, in addition to the representatives of the organizers of this conference, experts from the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Brotherhood of Andriy Pervozvannogo of the UOC-KP, scholars and public figures from different cities and regions of the country, and other interested persons took part. (shrink)

‘The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights’ has been a constant source of controversy since its release in 2008. While most scholars debated the document for its political implications, little attention has been paid to its anthropological consequences, particularly those deriving from linking a dignified life with the ethical use of freedom. The article highlights that if the sole criteria for living a dignified life is freedom then the most vulnerable categories in society (...) (persons with severe cognitive disabilities or those struggling with addictions) can claim only basic dignity. Engaging constructively with the work of Romanian theologian Dumitru Stăniloae, it will be argued that the source of human dignity is not a specific capacity, but the recapitulation of all human beings in Christ’s death and resurrection. The dignity that belongs to Christ is transferred through recapitulation to all humans irrespective of their abilities or sins. In fact, what changes with the use of freedom is not the dignity of the person, but our ability to perceive that dignity. (shrink)

Considering this issue to be particularly significant as a research challenge for the sociologies of religion in the so-called post-socialist countries, the subject of this research has been to determine the character, status and direction of religious changes in predominantly orthodox territories of Yugoslavia and Russia that became evident in the last decade of the twentieth century marked by turbulent socio-political changes in those countries. With the subject of the research being defined in that way, the main goal of (...) the research has been to identify and examine basic tendencies in religious changes. Relying on the huge empirical material on the changes in question, an attempt has been made to precisely detect the scope of these changes in the various areas of religious, spiritual and social lives of people in the period of the so-called post-socialist transformation. Therefore, the goal of the research has not been just to determine the scope and direction of changes of religiousness with people, but also to try to set the above mentioned religious changes into the proper social context, which is the starting point in their theoretical explanation. Smatrajuci da je predlozena tema posebno znacajana kao istrazivacki izazov za sociologije religije u zemljama tzv. postsocijalizma, predmet ovog istrazivanja je odredjen kao utvrdjivanje karaktera, stanja i smera religijskih promena na pravoslavno dominantnim prostorima Jugoslavije i Rusije aktuelnim u poslednjem desetlecu burnih socijalno-politickih previranja u njima. U ovako odredjenom predmetu istrazivanja glavni zadatak istrazivanja sastoji se u identifikovanju i preispitivanju osnovnih tendencija u religijskim promenama. Oslanjajuci se na obiman empirijski materijal o pomenutim promenama, u radu treba uciniti pokusaj preciznog detektovanja obima tih promena u razlicitim sferama religijskog, duhovnog i drustvenog zivota mnostva ljudi u tzv. postsocijalistickoj transformaciji drustva. Stoga cilj istrazivanja nije samo utvrdjivanje obima i smera promena religioznosti gradjana, nego je jedan od glavnih ciljeva istrazivanja pokusaj smestanja navedenih religijskih promena u odgovarajuci drustveni kontekst od koga se polazi u njihovoj teorijskoj eksplikaciji. (shrink)

Although social anthropologists have mostly abandoned the essentialist view of?culture? and?tradition?, these static notions are still frequently used in Serbian public discourse regarding women?s rights. I believe that analysing the production of cultural meaning and knowledge among different social actors and the state is important when exploring the implementation, transformation and protection of women?s rights at a local level. In this article, I shall investigate how?culture? and?tradition? are being constructed and used by certain right wing groups, political leaders, intellectuals (...) and by the Serbian Orthodox Church. On one side, arguments of?culture? and?tradition? are used in order to?preserve the national identity? and save it from?imposed Western norms? and?Western imperialism?, while on the other, they are used to explain the cultural obstacles regarding the effective protection of women?s rights.?Tradition?, often constructed as a linear project of inherited?cultural? and?moral? values and practices, stands in opposition to the EU; therefore, it calls to be nurtured and protected or changed and abandoned. Consequently, I see women rights issues trapped into a pro-EU or against EU, pro-traditional values or pro-liberal values discourse. I conclude that women rights in Serbia are and probably will be affected more by the use and abuse of different concepts of?culture? and?tradition?. nema. (shrink)

A major goal of the Republic of Serbia's foreign policy since 2000 has been the country's integration into the EU. In this respect, in 2012, Serbia became a candidate for EU membership. However, there has been a growing skepticism among the Serbian people about this objective. This ambivalence can be correlated not only with the recent economic crises in some EU countries but also with what are regarded as profound differences in cultural and religious values between Serbia and the (...) EU. This is particularly significant since the majority of Serbia's population are adherents of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is widely regarded as the defender of traditional values, as well as a staunch opponent of Kosovo's independence, secularization and “so called’ modern Western values. Nevertheless, my recent research among a sample of Serbian Orthodox believers regarding their attitudes about the cultural ramifications of Serbia’s EU integration is far more nuanced than these attitudes might otherwise appear to be. (shrink)

The present state of our spirituality is a consequence of the influences of particular circumstances of life. Undoubtedly, the general changes in the social, political and economic orientations of society significantly influence the nature of the processes taking place in the spiritual sphere. The transition to the rails of market reforms, the affirmation of the principle of pragmatism as a kind of measure of the effectiveness of human life, the priority of economic values ​​over others, including spiritual values, leads to (...) a deepening crisis of spirituality, crisis of man. And in this connection M. Berdyaev's words appearing to warn him against uncritical perception of the values ​​of Western civilization, which, incidentally, is quite characteristic of modern Ukrainian society, appear to be quite correct: the loss of the spiritual center. " And further: “The autonomy of economic life led to its dominance over the entire life of human communities. Mammonism has become the defining force of the age. ”. (shrink)

The essay examines the central role that pleasure plays in a wide range of conceptualisations of happiness or ‘good life’, from Epicurean hedonism, to Christian asceticism, to contemporary cases of pastoral and philosophical counselling. Despite the apparent moral chasm between hedonists and ascetics, a look at the practices promoted by Epicurus and the Christian monastic fathers reveals striking similarities. The reason is that, at a fundamental level, both parties agree that one should reject the vulgar pleasures that society glorifies, (...) and develop a refined attitude that seeks the appropriate and natural pleasures, while ignoring the harmful or unnecessary ones. And such an attitude can only be acquired through moral training, either by philosophical instruction and reflection, or by pastoral counselling. We highlight some important parallels regarding the connection between pleasure and happiness, as conceived by Epicureans and monastic fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. We begin by discussing elements of Epicureanism that can also be found in its rival philosophical schools and Christianity, mainly the emphasis on forming the right conception of happiness and acting in accordance with it. We then examine the connection between morality and happiness in the Christian Orthodox monasticism. We argue that Christian ascetic ethics not only condone some types of pleasures, but in fact require them as elements of happiness in this life that play an instrumental role for the Christian soteriological dogma. The argument has wider philosophical significance because it shows that pleasure is indeed a fundamental conceptual ingredient of happiness across different normative ethical contexts. (shrink)

The relationship between Eastern Orthodoxy and the political ethos of the West is of crucial importance for contextualizing the Church’s social engagement in the present day. Aristotle Papanikolaou and Vigen Guroian highlight points of tension in their respective accounts of the relationship between the Orthodoxy and western democratic social orders. Analysis of their argument provides a context for examining their contrasting understandings of human rights as a dimension of the public engagement of Orthodox Christians with the political realm. (...) While neither completely rejects appeals to human rights, neither claims that such rhetoric manifests the full truth about the dignity of the human person according to the theological anthropology of Orthodox Christianity. Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos of Albania, the statements of the Council of Crete (2016), and several other contemporary Orthodox voices place appeals to human rights in a theologically nuanced context that affirms their legitimacy while refraining from identifying them with the fullness of the moral and spiritual vision of Orthodox Christianity. Analysis of the debate between Papanikolaou and Guroian gives rise to a tentative affirmation of the critical use of the language of human rights in Eastern Orthodox social ethics. (shrink)

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis (...) of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it. (shrink)

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

Fourth-century Christianity and the Council of Nicaea have continually been read as a Constantinian narrative. The dominancy of imperial Christianity has been a consequent feature of the established narrative regarding the events within early Christianity. There is a case for a revisionist enquiry regarding the influence of the emperor in the formation of orthodoxy. The role of bishops and its political characterisation had definitive implications upon Christianity as it would seem. Recent revisions on Constantine by Leithart and Barnes incited the (...) enquiry. The enquiry was made possible through document analysis; this mainly took the form of a literature study. The orthodoxy that emerged at Nicaea in 325 CE was reflective of the political–orthodoxy trajectory that Christianity took beyond the 4th century. Between imperial intervention and clerical polities, one was a definitive dynamic to the then emergent Christianity. The influence of the emperor, which was an apparently definitive feature characterising the era, was compositely relevant as a catalyst in the formation of the Christianity that emerged during the 4th century. The implication that centuries before the Council of Nicaea Christianity had been characterised by significant phases of socio-cultural dynamics relegates the influence of the emperor. The emperor Constantine and his association with the Council of Nicaea characterised an era of imperial ecclesiastical politics in Christianity, and so did the Jewish–Christian Schism and a monarchical episcopate that shaped the orthodox matrix of the church. This research deduced that the function of imperial intervention should be analysed in conjunction with diverse factors characterising the Christianity emergent at Nicaea, particularly ecclesiastical polities. (shrink)

The Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest centralized religious institution in the post-Soviet space, has been going through major changes in the 2000s. These are connected to qualitative changes in the composition of believers and clergy as well as legal registration of rights on church property obtained from the government in the 1990s. This has led to substantial changes in internal policies, particularly a sharp decrease in the influence of fundamentalists, which had been rising over the previous decade. (...) Moreover, the years of Putin's rule were years of failure in the church's relations with the government, which consistently denied the ROC's most important requests. In this paper we will examine the principal social developments that have been taking place within the Church in the first years of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Ukrainian and Yugoslav Orthodox clergy may often be able to meet at various international religious forums and celebrations held in Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and other countries. Here communication was established between them, which complemented the general tradition of international cooperation of the Ukrainian and Yugoslav public.In recent years, there has been a revival in various forms of relations between the Orthodox Churches of the Slavic countries. This actualizes the study of the history of these relations, the recognition in it (...) of the positive that could carry out a diverse form of night inter-church visitors, the search for ways to unite world Orthodoxy. The study of the directions of inter-church relations indicated by us is necessary because they have in fact fallen out of the field of view of domestic historical science. Only a few works of Ukrainian scientists indirectly address this issue.Thus, OV Pavlyuchenko considers the relations of the Serbian Metropolitan Mykhailo with the Orthodox circles of Ukraine. However, chronologically, his research covers the period only at the end of the XIX century. Thoroughly studying the history of all Orthodox churches, ON Sagan in his study also invites to the interaction of the Ukrainian and Yugoslav Orthodox communities. But, like the previous researcher, ON Sagan mainly deals with issues that took place in the nineteenth century. Various aspects of the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church are also presented in the services of domestic and foreign researchers: EM Chaltseva, KE Skurat, M.N. Bessonova, R. Roberson and others. Their work helps to reveal the influence of other facts from the history of the Serbian PC on the international activities of the Yugoslav Orthodox clergy.Due to the limited research work, our conclusions are based on extensive archival material, which is still little applied to the scientific department. The analysis of archival documents allowed us to trace the interest and needs the sphere of cooperation of the Ukrainian and Yugoslav peoples, who represent a significant part of the Orthodox world, which in general forms our new study. (shrink)

One of the interesting aspects of Russian self‐definition in opposition to the West is its attitude toward Western science. Russian distrust of scientific and technological progress in the West is an important force shaping contemporary Russian identity. This article touches on these issues in four parts. The first section characterizes two main conservative circles that are active in today's disputes over the significance of scientific development for Russian identity. The second demonstrates certain Russian contemporary concerns related to scientific (...) and technological progress, which will enable us to explain the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. The third section presents the political, religious, and identity context for the suspicion toward science expressed by Russian conservatives. The final section, on the other hand, discusses the way in which Russian Orthodox neoconservatism uses Orthodox anthropology to raise suspicion toward scientific and technological achievements. (shrink)

In the context of the development of information society, we see changes in all components of social life. The author analyzes the extent of technology usage within specific religious expressions of Christian traditions and elaborates on consideration of information technologies used by the Orthodox Church. Taking as the example Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the content of its information activities and the way of adaptation to modernization processes are revealed. There is need to have expert discussions and amendments (...) on the list of the reasons that contribute to the slow movement towards modernization of Orthodox worship. (shrink)

Many Slavists will be familiar with Pål Kolstø as a scholar of nation-building and ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet space. Heretical Orthodoxy represents a return to his early, doctoral research...

Introduction. Judgments on church authority have been transformed depending on the changing posi- tion of the Church in society and its relationship with the state. In the process of rethinking, there have developed special traditions of its understand- ing, which reflected the specifics of the existence of Christian communities in different cultural and legal conditions. The purpose of the study is to outline the traditions of understanding church authority in three Christian denominations and offer grounds for their (...) comparison in the philosophical and canonical aspect. Methods. A comparative method is used on the basis of analyzing philosophical literature and canon-legal sources. Scientific novelty of the research. The article for the first time systematizes confessional differences in interpreting the form, content and levels of church authority. Results. It is shown that the decisive factor de- termining the differences between confessional traditions in the understanding of church authority is the nature of the boundary between the sacred and government authorities. Catholicism, consider- ing the governmental power established by God, includes it in the sacred, along with the teaching and sacramental. Protestantism, on the contrary, radically opposes it to the sacred, recognizing it as the prerogative of the state. Orthodoxy, as a rule, does not recognize government power as sacred, but it does not separate it from the church. Conclusions. An analysis of the positions ex- pressed by representatives of various Christian denominations regarding church authority makes it possible for us to conclude that the Orthodox tradi- tion tends to defend a position equidistant from polar opinions. (shrink)

This article analyzes Orthodox influence on developing national identity in modern Ukraine. The authors state that the factor of national specificity of Christianity is evident if we consider nations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Christianity influences the development of national cultures and has acquired the national characteristics of a particular community. Also, the war in Ukraine, which was started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, has significantly impacted socio-cultural processes in Ukraine, the functioning of (...) national identity, and the religious situation, especially regarding the Orthodox churches. Authors pay attention to the reference to the topic of national identity in the documents and sermons of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to show how the Orthodox hierarchies treat these issues. In addition, they study the ideologies that the Russian Orthodox Church creates and tries to impose through the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church churches of the Moscow Patriarchate as a dominant cultural, religious, and political discourse. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to highlight the content and logic of formation the concepts of the state that emerged among the Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals in the end of XVI - early XVII century. During this period was decisive for the formation of early modern Ukrainian nation as a new community and the beginning of its struggle for statehood. Major political role in the formation of Ukrainian nation at that time played Cossacks, but the Orthodox clergy (...) not only gave ideological support Cossack, but had his own concept of nation. As the main creators of the concept were Meletius Smotrytsky, Zachariy Kopystensky, Jov Boretskiy, Petro Mohyla. His complete registration it has acquired at the time of the restoration of Orthodox Metropolis of Kyiv and the metropolitan of Petro Mohyla (1620-1646). The principal features of this concept is defined as follows: State Orthodox intellectuals understood as a voluntary association of people of all classes around one idea. This idea was determined public good that church leaders perceived primarily as a transcendent grace. The symbol of grace was heavenly Jerusalem, which advocated earthly projection Kyiv. Orthodox church leaders deliberately refused confession from the ideal state for aggressive ideal spiritual state. This identified a fundamental difference from the then existing state ideologies of the Rzeczpospolita and Moskovia. Ruler of the concept of the ideal state is determined Orthodox hierarchs not a person but a state, personified in its most charismatic spokespersons. At first, the prince, then the gentry, then the Cossacks. The main objective is the defense of the state governor and care about the welfare of his subjects. At the same time Ukrainian clerics fundamentally alien to the idea of autocracy, they differ greatly from contemporary Moscow clergy. Another important feature of the state concept Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Cossack era is persistent assertion priority of the spiritual over the secular government that does not coincide with the ideals of the Cossacks and was often a source of conflict. The main conclusions of the note is the fundamental notions of state formation in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the difference between these concepts from Moscow-Byzantine ideology and proximity to European humanistic model of the state than is largely due to the role of the Orthodox Church in the national liberation revolution led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and conflicts Kyiv Metropolis with the Moscow Patriarchate in the future. (shrink)

Though foreign—and perhaps shocking—to many in the west, the doctrine of theosis is central in the theology and practice of Eastern Orthodoxy. Theosis is “the ultimate goal of human existence”1 and indeed is “a way of summing up the purpose of creation”:2 That God will unite himself to all of creation with humanity at the focal point. What are human persons, that they might be united to God? That is the question I explore in this paper. In particular, I explore (...) an account of human nature inspired by an Eastern Orthodox conception of theosis. In section 1, I present a theological vision of theosis in the Eastern Church. In section 2, I offer an interpretation of what it might mean for human nature to become deformed by the fall and transformed by the Incarnation. Then, in section 3, I present an (admittedly speculative) account of human nature, based on a robustly metaphysical reading of an Orthodox conception of theosis. On that account—to overly simplify things, and postponing important qualifications—we might say that a human being is the union of soul and body with God. Finally, given that account of human nature, I offer in section 3 some brief reflections on the prospects of a scientific anthropology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Klossowski, Deleuze, and OrthodoxyEleanor Kaufman (bio)Among the many strange and wonderful things to be found there, Pierre Klossowski's oeuvre is a preeminent illustration of what divides univocity and equivocity and therefore serves as one of the twentieth century's most instructive models for thinking the complexity of the dialectic. Univocity and equivocity are significant both in their roots in Scholastic philosophy, as the idea that Being is expressed in either (...) one or several senses, and as belonging to a longstanding framework that helps demarcate the differences, nuanced yet significant, among members of the extraordinary generation of French intellectuals of which Klossowski was a part. Thus, these terms, apart from their theological and philosophical import, will serve as a heuristic for renarrating points of filiation and divergence among a series of prominent French thinkers, primarily Bataille, Klossowski, and Deleuze, but also extending backward to Sartre and forward to Badiou to frame the series. I will approach this in segmented fashion, first opposing Bataille's dialectic of transgression to Klossowski's more univocal method of disjunctive synthesis. When juxtaposed with Deleuze's Spinozist affirmation of univocity, however, Klossowski would seem to be more on the side of the equivocal. Whereas Deleuze criticizes the realm between the univocal and the equivocal as the lukewarm space of the analogical, my contention is that this middle realm allows for a space of movement and reversal that escapes the pitfalls Deleuze locates in the dialectic, and does so without a strict adherence to Spinozist univocity. Whereas Bataille and Deleuze remain closer to Klossowski in the tenor of their thought, I will nonetheless suggest in conclusion that Sartre and Badiou are actually closer to Klossowski on a formal level, in that each poses a similarly analogical challenge to the thought of the dialectic.For many reasons Bataille and Klossowski can be paired together. They were contemporaries, both born around the turn of the century, both writing in a variety of literary and philosophical genres, including pornographic or semi-pornographic fiction, and working outside the academy. Both wrote studies of Nietzsche, of Sade, and radical economic treatises. They were friends and fellow members in the late 1930s of the College of Sociology, which was modeled after a secret society, the members taking great interest in such topics as sacrifice and headlessness. Bataille and Klossowski wrote about each other. Both were at different points obsessed with Roman Catholicism, both at different points prepared to enter monastic orders, both in different fashions fell away. As might easily be imagined, their fiction is an outrageous mixture of the sacred and the profane, including sexual encounters and other desecrations staged at church alters and the like. Both work in that realm where pornography and theology come together. Yet while the more familiar Bataille uses pornography toward transgressive aims, the lesser-known Klossowski uses a more nuanced and interesting mechanism of boredom to elaborate an intrinsically disjunctive structure.Even boredom, for Bataille, partakes of the transgressive. In his novella The Story of the Eye, the narrator describes offhandedly how he and his companion Simone have just found their friend Marcelle's body. She has hung herself. The narrator and Simone [End Page 47] take the body down and have sex for the first time next to it. Then the narrator describes the boredom that ensues even in the face of death: "We were perfectly calm, all three of us, and that was the most hopeless part of it. Any boredom in the world is linked, for me, to that moment and, above all, to an obstacle as ridiculous as death. But that won't prevent me from thinking back to that time with no revulsion and even with a sense of complicity. Basically, the lack of excitement made everything far more absurd, and thus Marcelle was closer to me dead than in her lifetime, inasmuch as absurd existence, so I imagine, has all the prerogatives" [59–60]. This is actually an unusually meditative moment in Bataille's story of murder, priests, bullfights, and constant sex.1 Here his narrator links boredom to death, and to a reflection on the absurd boundary between life and death. But by commenting on boredom... (shrink)

The Orthodox Church in the Arab World 700–1700: An Anthology of Sources. Edited by Samuel Noble and Alexander Treiger. Orthodox Christian Studies. Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014. Pp. viii + 375. $35.

The article explores the semantic potential of social narratives associated with the creation and constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which caused a interpretations conflict, marked by conflicting interpretations and differences in meanings that are applied in different contexts. The narrative arranges events in a certain time sequence, accumulates and translates meanings, individual and social experience. The presence of meanings in the interpretation of the narrative depends on the perspective, interpretation horizons and the subject's ability to analyze (...) information and its correct application. The social narrative accumulates a set of stories and messages that are fragmentary and disordered, constructs a coherent plot aimed at finding and defining meanings, and forming social discourse. Social narratives materialized in social structures, orientations, expectations, and stereotypes of their bearers due to everyday modification in the form of simple images, attitudes, and principles. Since each social narrative claims to be exclusive and correct in its own way of understanding events, a clash of narratives and their interpretations is inevitable. A large-scale event determines the modification of social structures, standards, and evaluation criteria, is accompanied by the transformation of everyday life, reveals deep mental layers, and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary event that was marked by the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is accompanied by diametrically opposite assessments from the clergy, believers, politicians, experts – from the statement about autocephaly as the only opportunity to achieve unity and recognition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the political subtext justification of the new religious organization creation. Church circles represented by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claim that the state interferes in the internal Affairs of the Church. The Constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine takes place in the context of the confrontation of two social narratives – the «ukrainian world» and the «russian world». The social narrative «ukrainian world» is based on values rooted in the national soil, but the social narrative «russian world» denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. Under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expression of the ideas of the «russian world» is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which enshrines in the minds of believers ideologies about «the common origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples», «the common baptismal font», «the unity of the historical space of Holy Rus», «the identity of the East Slavic Orthodox civilization». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not support the decision of patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufriy did not give his blessing to the hierarchs to participate in the Unification Council, which is called «a non-canonical assembly of schismatic groups». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to its primate, has de facto autocephaly, so it is the only canonical local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the face of the conflict of public narratives, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, along with meeting the spiritual needs of believers, contributes to the formation of national identity, the formation of a worldview matrix that will determine the vision of the future development of the country. (shrink)

The article analyzes the key issues of the theology of the modern Greek theologian Chrysostomos Stumulis. Emphasizing the need for the development of Orthodox thought and a clear definition of its place and role in the modern world, the theologian raises issues that are a definite taboo not only for Orthodoxy, but for Christianity as a whole. The problem of the correlation of Eros love and Agape love acquires a new interpretation from theologian, which reveals new horizons for the (...) creation of the latest Christian anthropology. In this context, the view of the theologian is revealed on the relationship between the key anthropological categories of Christianity - faith, love and freedom. Violation of their interaction generates a distorted embodiment of these qualities, which necessitates degradation both of society and of man. The theologian emphasizes that the inability of the Church for millennia to boldly raise the question of the nature of Eros and give him a worthy place in the nature of incarnation limits both the Church and the understanding of Christ. Modern theological thought must respond to problems that are too acute in society, despite the fact that they can be a challenging task for Orthodoxy. The ability of theology to respond to them, generates a "high risk" theology, which has the determination to speak and show the morbidity of an idealized past, dare to point out that some aspects of universally accepted truths are obsolete. The formation of a culture of embodiment is the basis upon which the theologian develops the Theology of the Word of the Flesh. Spirituality, which denies incarnation, in the opinion of the author, appears as pastoral idolatry and leads to dehumanization of society. Understanding the culture of theology as a manifestation of the culture of the flesh, as an expression of all aspects of human life in the perspective of their transformations through the Person of the Incarnate, appears as a continuation and expansion of creation. Love requires the adoption of matter and the human body. Only in this sense disclosure of a human as a Person, in the full extent of his creative spirit. Holistic understanding and a fair assessment of love - eros describes it as an opportunity for revelation and knowledge of both human personality and divine. Violating questions of love, sexuality, desire and satisfaction, the theologian indicates that they have not only anthropological nature, but are a holistic manifestation of the essence of the church body. Consequently, the accusation of Eros by Orthodox theologians points to an inhuman society, full of objections and accusations in human existential self-consciousness. The theologian draws attention to the need for theological discourse in the 21st century in the context of the formation of modern anthropology, in the aspect of disclosure of its completeness, which was lost in the abolition of theology. (shrink)

The main article is devoted to the historical and philosophical reconstruction of controversy between Vladimir Solovyov and the authors of the “Faith and Reason” - a magazine of the Kharkov Theological Seminary. This controversy took its place in the “theological and journalistic” or the “theocratic” period of Solovyov’s works. Particular attention is paid to the disputes of Solovyov and T. Stoyanov, A.P. Shost'in and the French Orthodox priest Fr. Vladimir Gette on the theory of dogmatic development in the (...) class='Hi'>church. In the context of this controversy, the arguments for the “defense” of Solovyov's position, cited in the magazine “Orthodox Review” by a theologian and Konstantin Leontyev's follower Ivan Kristi are also analyzed. The reception of Solovyov's theocratic ideas and reaction to his ecclesiastical views in both the Catholic and Orthodox circles of Russian and Western society is shown. Especially it concerns the criticism of Solovyov’s ideas in the pages of the French magazines “L’Univers”, “L'Union Chrétienne”, “Revue d’Eglise greque-unie”, etc. The evolution of Solovyov's views on the problem of the union of Eastern and Western churches, the renewal of church communication between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, the main result of which was his fundamental but unfinished work “The History and Future of the Theocracy” was demonstrated. A conclusion about the “superficiality” of the judgments of the majority of Vladimir Solovyov's ideological opponents, as well as later interpreters of his legacy, following the French Jesuit Michel d'Erbigny, who tried to present him as a “Russian Newman” who converted from Orthodoxy into the Catholic faith is drawn. It is shown that Solovyov’s projects of the “religion of the Holy Spirit” and the “Universal Church”, created on its basis, should be considered primarily in the context of his own philosophical quest, and not in connection with the confessional and ideological divergences of his time. (shrink)

After the fall of Communism, the Romanian Orthodox Church was forced to face its recent past, scarred by its collaboration – harshly criticized in the early 1990s – with the Ceauşescu regime. The Church’s turn to its memory of the interwar period in order to legitimize the (re)casting of Orthodoxy as a public religion was also problematic. Based mainly, but not solely on the analysis of public discourses originating with the Orthodox Church hierarchy and clergy, (...) this paper will address the discursive strategies the Orthodox Church adopted in order to tame the memory of its recent past. We propose to investigate the main issues at stake, and the consequences of the choices the Church makes in re-weaving the memory of its recent past(s). It will be shown that the memorial reconstitution of the two periods remains unbalanced. On the one hand, the Church has used to its advantage some parts of the memory of each period. Yet in both cases, efforts to obscure potentially problematic facets of memory, such as the choice of collaboration/accommodation with the communist regime or the close connexion between prominent Church personages and the Legionary movement remain eminently counter-productive. However, such proceeds fail to exorcise the remaining skeletons in the closet and bar the path to the ‘appeasement’ of memory. (shrink)

Fake news is created as ordinary news stylistically but it consists of deliberate disinformation or hoaxes. The text is generally constructed to cause negative emotions and feelings in readers: fear, panic, distrust, and paranoia. It is done to manipulate the opinion and consciousness of a large number of people and eventually leads to changes in the values, ideas and attitudes that already exist in the public awareness. The result is a schism that has already gone beyond the usual spiritual strife. (...) Moreover, its expansion has weakened the defining feature of Russian Orthodoxy which lies in trust and support of the state and authorities. The Russian Orthodox Church has to deal not only with public health crisis but also with profound differences within its ranks over the churchgoers’ behavior in the conditions of a pandemic. The article analyzes legal regulations and mechanisms for countering fake news about the Russian Orthodox Church, and provides examples from the judicial practice. It also determines the mechanisms of the worshippers’ reaction to the fake news involving the Russian Orthodox Church. Using semiotic methodology, the author reveals re-encoding of the symbolic meaning of such signs as “Russian Orthodox cross” and “red cross”. The connotative meaning of these signs leads to contradictions in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Besides other changes that have taken place in the Russian Federation in our times, the process of constitution of an ideology, which is accompanied by different competing value-systems, is one of the crucial tendencies. This process also occurs in the area of the development and construction of religious institutions and religious consciousness. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominant position among the other religious institutions in the country. Unfortunately, it has not and does not serve the (...) role of promoting a democratic change, but is rather an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarian past of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyze different factors that contribute to these characteristics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on the political culture of Russia. (shrink)

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the “external belief” results in the fact that the (...) religion tends to become a matter of personal choice and an individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function and to become an ideology. As a result, the political elite considers religion as a means of achieving different non- religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, the official church, is compelled to take this fact into consider- ation and even support it. This is why religious intolerance and religious nationalism in modern Russia are often directed towards religion. (shrink)

"As Eastern Europe struggles to emerge from its communist past, the public moral witness of its Orthodox Churches has assumed a special importance for those seeking a truly just world order. Yet few Americans know what these vast and ancient Christian bodies stand for, especially on crucial issues of freedom, human rights, and war and peace. In this compelling look at the Orthodox Churches in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and the United States, Alexander F. C. Webster mines the primary (...) sources to reveal a story of both betrayal of the Church and fidelity to its moral tradition. He reflects on what is needed for these churches to become forceful and consistent voices of moral witness in society."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at various stages of Ukrainian state (...) formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Utopia and Modernity in China: Contradictions in Transition ed. by David Margolies and Qing CaoArtur BlaimDavid Margolies and Qing Cao, eds. Utopia and Modernity in China: Contradictions in Transition. London: Pluto Press, 2022. 176 pp. Paperback, £19.99, ISBN 978 0 7453 4739 4In recent years, numerous publications have appeared focusing on the until now little known non-Western utopias and utopianism.1 Utopia and Modernity in China is a most (...) welcome addition, offering a highly informative survey of Chinese utopias and utopianism combined with an insightful discussion of their formative role in the making of modern China. The book consists of seven chapters introducing different aspects of the opposition of utopia and modernity as exemplified by various cultural productions and their impact on the social and political life of the country. Its publication has acquired a special relevance today not only due to China’s increasingly major role in the contemporary world, but also in connection with its official support of the [End Page 143] Russian invasion of Ukraine, contradicting its repeatedly declared adherence to the principles of international law and the ideals of national sovereignty, noninterference, and harmony in international affairs.Although the term utopia appeared in Chinese discourse only at the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of a radically better society has always existed in China, assuming different forms and shapes. The contributors to the volume trace the functioning of the broadly conceived phenomenon of utopian thinking in various domains of Chinese cultural, social, and political life, paying special attention to literary and cinematic works. The declared aims of the book are not only cognitive but also pragmatic as the editors believe that recent Chinese history involving “fundamental conflict of values,” the country’s experiences with economic systems that fail to supply the needs of the population, and the emergence of a society based on inequality, can be seen as highly relevant in the Western context also, to the extent that—as the editors convincingly argue—it “can provide English-language readers with a perspective useful for making sense of their own condition” (2).The editors see the opposition of utopia and modernity as less significant in the Western context than in China, where modernity became essential for preserving the integrity of the state torn by the conflict between the traditional values of nonconfrontation and continuity and the urgent need for significant change. Unlike in the West, where the dominant view of modernity was largely influenced by the Platonic model of the society in which the class of rulers was protected by the military class controlling the rest of the population, the Confucian model of social relations prevalent in China was based—at least in theory—on the principle of harmony rather than force. Other factors defining the Chinese variety of utopianism were Taoism, emphasizing the importance of nature and “The Way,” and Buddhism, advocating the limitation of needs and control of desires. The editors see this as “the reverse of the West’s view: for China, utopia (in the aspect of harmony) is the expectation, the desired normal, while modernity is the disrupter” (4) which is responsible for the predominance of the nostalgic utopia looking backwards to the idealized harmony of the past. The revolutions taking place in China in the twentieth century led to the decline of traditional ideals and brought with them experiments with the implementation of various Western ideologies, ranging from liberalism and democracy to socialism and communism. As a result, there are three main tendencies in the value system of contemporary China: orthodox communism, market-based liberalism, and [End Page 144] values derived from traditional Chinese culture. Nevertheless, the state continues to be generally seen in Confucian terms as an extension of the family based on moral authority rather than as “necessary evil.”The first chapter, “The Lure of Utopia: Reinterpreting Liang Qichao’s Xinmin Shuo, 1902–1906,” proposes a new perspective on the ideas of Liang Qichao, a highly influential early twentieth-century political activist, journalist, and intellectual, by focusing on the ways in which he advanced a utopian vision of the West as a radical alternative to the traditional Chinese social views. Liang... (shrink)

One of the most interesting phenomena of our religious-political life is the considerable difference in attitude toward religion between the popular masses and the political elite. In our survey of public opinion, the respondents had to express their attitude to two alternative statements: "There are national, traditional religions in our country. They should have more rights than representatives of religions that are new to our country "; and "All religions should have absolutely equal rights." Only 9 percent agreed with the (...) first statement, while the vast majority agreed with the second. Even among the Orthodox, adherents of the Moscow patriarchy, only 13 percent were supporters of special patronage by the state for the traditional religions, while those who advocated an equality of religion made up 69 percent. Thus, the idea of a state church is alien to the contemporary popular consciousness. The evolution of mass consciousness is toward an even greater amorphousness and indefiniteness with regard to religion and further away from the idea of a national, state church. The data confirming this have already been presented. Let me just recall that the percentage of persons who approved of the church's participation in political life decreased from 74 percent to 48 percent from 1990 to 1991. (shrink)

In a span of twenty years, two of the autocephalous churches of the Orthodox Christian world released documents addressing the social realities of contemporary life: the Russian Orthodox Church's Basis of the Social Concept (2000) and the Ecumenical Patriarch's For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (2020). This article offers a side-by-side comparison and analysis of the documents’ treatments of matters of birth and death, including childbirth, abortion, (...) miscarriage, end-of-life care, euthanasia, suicide, and a vision of a good death. Detailed comparison demonstrates remarkable accord between the two churches on many of these matters. Differences of omission and emphasis appear to be indicative of contrasting demographic and historical situations, with the exception of one, notable divergence between the churches, all of which are discussed. The striking degree and depth of consonance between the documents offers potential for cooperation and unity as the two churches negotiate their conflicts while also seeking to guide their flocks and offer Orthodox Christian witness in an increasingly desacralized world. (shrink)