In this essay I discuss a person’s freedom to choose whatever that person may reasonably prefer to choose. This type of freedom of choice may be regarded as a candidate for a social good, being a hybrid between freedom of choice and preference satisfaction utility. To separate this preference dependent freedom of choice from other types, we may call it opportunity. The essay is concerned with the question of how opportunity should be identified and (...) measured. I discuss what conditions an opportunity measure should satisfy and propose that an opportunity measure should satisfy at least four specific conditions. I then present a new class of measures which satisfy the four conditions (the Root measures). Last I prove that these measures are the only ones that satisfy the conditions, given the extra assumption that the measures are analytic functions with non-zero partial derivatives. (shrink)

Although the concept of equal opportunity has received scant attention from theological ethics, it attracts widespread approval in the U.S. popular culture and has been examined extensively by contemporary moral philosophy. Amartya Sen's conception of capabilities as "freedom" or "real opportunity" corrects deficiencies in both popular and philosophical conceptions of equal opportunity that ignore interpersonal variations in mental, physical, and psychological abilities beyond agents' control. Recent theologically informed conceptions of love and common grace affirm and revise (...) Sen's conception of equal capability as equal opportunity. The resulting understanding of equal opportunity is quite different from some uses of this concept and could be an important criterion for a just society. (shrink)

Liberals have often been attracted by contractarian modes of argument— and with good reason. Any system of social organization requires that some constraints be imposed on individuals' freedom of action; it is a central problem for any liberal political theory to show which constraints can be justified, and which cannot. A contractarian justification works by showing that the constraints in question can be understood as if they were the product of an agreement, voluntarily entered into by every member of (...) society. Thus, no one is required to give up his freedom for someone else's benefit, or in the pursuit of someone else's conception of the social good. (shrink)

In this article, we defend a normative theory of prenatal equality of opportunity, based on a critical revision of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity . We argue that if natural endowments are defined as biological properties possessed at birth and the distribution of natural endowments is seen as beyond the scope of justice, Rawls's FEO allows for inequalities that undermine the social conditions of a property-owning democracy. We show this by considering the foetal programming of disease (...) and the possibility of germ-line modifications. If children of lower socioeconomic background are more likely to develop in a poor foetal environment and germ-line enhancements are available only to the rich, initial inequalities between the rich and the poor would grow, and yet FEO would be satisfied. In order to avoid the problem, we propose a revised FEO principle omitting any reference to the comparison of natural endowments. Our revised FEO requires that institutions mitigate social class effect from reproduction and gestation to the greatest extent compatible with parental freedoms and the value of the family. (shrink)

The modern world space, which is affected by the post-pandemic consequences, is noted by the globalization of society, the increasing role of citizenship in making important state and international decisions has become possible in the context of the information revolution and has its own characteristics of communication in information and communication networks. The importance and need for a thorough study of the chosen topic is that the widespread use of various forms and methods of civil communication, free access of citizens (...) to information at all stages of decision-making and the functioning of central and local governments, the participation of civil society institutions in the work of expert, consultative, and advisory public councils on the expression and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens, public control, direct electronic receipt of public services, etc. are important factors in the democratization of government in post-pandemic modern times. After all, we are talking about a deliberate orientation to new values - the person and the collective, their direct participation in the democratic organization of life of the state and society. The main thing in this context is that the rational consensus of civil society and the state is a factor in universal social discourse and a strategic resource for democratic development in the context of post-pandemic modernity. The aim of the article is to consider the epistemological and sociocultural aspects of the functioning of the communication capabilities of civil society institutions in the context of revealing the possibility and significance of their involvement in the processes of implementing state security policy. (shrink)

The first domestic death from Ebola in the United States occurred in Texas in October 2014. Family members who were potentially exposed to the infected individual were legally and involuntarily quarantined. Quarantine may not be a recent normal practice in the United States, but it was used extensively during the influenza pandemic in the early 20th century. However, health care ethics comes into play when we quarantine someone whose infection status is unknown versus active. To prevent the spread of a (...) pathogen, one person may be held against his or her will and that person’s freedom is terminated. Quarantine may be acceptable in the case of Ebola, as it is particularly virulent and there have been more and more potential cases in the United States . As a result, the general population may understand how isolation and quarantine may help prevent the spread of Ebola. We must use this epidemic as an opportunity to educate the general population on ways to prevent the sprea .. (shrink)

The thesis of "Freedom of Communicative Action" is that Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action illuminated the deep structure of the First Amendment freedom of speech. Haberams's theory takes speech act theory as its point of departure. Communicative action coordinates indivudal behavior through rational understanding. Communicative action is distinguished from strategic action--the use of communication to manipulate, deceive, or coerce. Part I offers an introduction. Part II outlines a hermeneutic approach to interpretation of the First Amendent. Part III (...) explores and criticizes existing theories of the freedom of speech. Part IV explicates Habermas's theory of communicative action. Part V developes a theory of the freedom of expression based on Habermas's theory of communication. Part VI applies that theory to particular problems in free speech doctrine. Part VII draws some conclusions about the implications of this exercise for the development of doctrine and the theory of communicative action. "Freedom of Communicative Action" was published in 1989, and some of the views expressed in the article are no longer affirmed by the author. (shrink)

Domination as opposed to what? Michel Foucault’s works on power and subject formation uncover the subtle ways in which disciplinary power structures create opportunities for domination. Yet Foucaul...

The paper criticises a number of accounts of freedom, including those which analyse freedom in terms of affording individuals ever widening opportunities, those which mistake liberties for rights and those which identify freedoms with duties imposed on others. All these inflated notions of freedom are liable to produce a shrinkage of of freedom in its basic sense of referring to areas of life in which there are rules preventing others from interfering with individuals or groups in (...) doing things which are feasible for them. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Carl Knight and Andreas Albertsen argue that Rawlsian theories of distributive justice as applied to health and healthcare fail to accommodate both palliative care and the desirability of less painful treatments. The asserted Rawlsian focus on opportunities or capacities, as exemplified in Normal Daniels’ developments of John Rawls’ theory, results in a normative account of healthcare which is at best only indirectly sensitive to pain and so unable to account for the value of (...) efforts of which the sole purpose is pain reduction. I argue that, far from undermining the Rawlsian project and its application to problems of health, what the authors’ argument at most amounts to is a compelling case for the inclusion of freedom from physical pain within its index of primary goods. (shrink)

This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a 'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or not removing a real obstacle (...) to choice/action that impedes B's doing x. This responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate, in the given context, to ask A for a justification of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept. Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars, for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom; nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy. Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-, not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct, values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions of method. It is argued that the widely held essential contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical, and that it is methodologically possible to construct an authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and critical but non-relative. (shrink)

This is a penetrating reinterpretation and defense of Hegel's social theory as an alternative to reigning liberal notions of social justice. The eminent German philosopher Axel Honneth rereads Hegel's Philosophy of Right to show how it diagnoses the pathologies of the overcommitment to individual freedom that Honneth says underlies the ideas of Rawls and Habermas alike. Honneth argues that Hegel's theory contains an account of the psychological damage caused by placing too much emphasis on personal and moral freedom. (...) Although these freedoms are crucial to the achievement of justice, they are insufficient and in themselves leave people vulnerable to loneliness, emptiness, and depression. Hegel argues that people must also find their freedom or "self-realization" through shared projects. Such projects involve the three institutions of ethical life--family, civil society, and the state--and provide the arena of a crucial third kind of freedom, which Honneth calls "communicative" freedom. A society is just only if it gives all of its members sufficient and equal opportunity to realize communicative freedom as well as personal and moral freedom. (shrink)

There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determinism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of autonomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possibility (...) of knowledge, which opens up opportunities for planning, freedom of choice and ultimately 'self-choice'. Results of neurobiological research, especially Benjamin Libet's and more recently John-Dylan Haynes', seem to refute this: Actions are unconsciously initiated before conscious decision. But, as Libet has also shown, consciousness always has the possibility of a veto – and thus also of knowledge-driven action control. Ultimately, the idea of possible self-choice can thus become the determining condition. Only such a form of rational self-determination establishes a spiritual identity and at the same time represents the maximum of autonomy possible for human beings. (shrink)

Republicans consider freedom as non-domination an attractive political ideal for a modern pluralistic society that cannot be found in liberalism. This book shows how this view is untenable. By analysing freedom as non-domination as it is understood by contemporary republicans, the book rejects the widely held view that this freedom concept is superior to liberal understandings of freedom as non-interference. In fact, setting up institutions to promote non-domination is shown to also promote non-interference. The book demonstrates (...) how it is the focus on making an ideal suitable for a modern society that leads republicans to a view of freedom with no normative insight that cannot also be found in liberalism. However, the book also shows how republicans can adjust their freedom ideal so that it actually offers a distinctly republican contribution to political philosophy. By understanding freedom to require that citizens commit to an especially high level of political participation to deny powerholders opportunities to act against the common good, republicans can reject liberalism and freedom as non-interference. But this freedom ideal does not respect the many citizens in a modern society whose conceptions of a good life do not involve such a high level of political engagement. Republicans therefore face a dilemma: They can promote a freedom ideal suited for modern conditions, but they then end up endorsing a liberal theory promoting freedom as non-interference. Alternatively, they can promote a distinct freedom ideal, but this ideal will be unsuited for a modern society. (shrink)

Religious freedom is considered a fundamental human right and the cornerstone of human dignity. Islam, being a universal religion, protects the rights of every individual, and thus, preserves and upholds the dignity of human persons irrespective of their religious convictions. This study aims to understand Islamic perception of religious freedom from a historical point of view. It is based on textual analysis and historical interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. It also supports its case by analysing some Muslim (...) ruler’s treatment of other religions. The study shows that Islam provides complete freedom to every individual so long as it does not violate or interfere the right of others, and explicitly prohibits all kinds of intervention in matters of religious beliefs and practices. Though the Prophetic tradition “whoever changes his religion, kill him” seems contradictory to freedom of religion, this has been contextualised in particular situation by contemporary Islamic scholars. The study concludes that the Qur’anic teachings, the Prophetic practices and Muslim rulers’ treatment of other religions affirm that Islam provides equal opportunities to all regardless of their attachments to any religion or ideology, and Muslims can neither force any body to accept Islam nor impose anything against his/her will. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#71-72; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2022 P 1-27. (shrink)

Ideologues of the American Dream doctrine assume that state intervention aimed at providing social safety nets for citizens and reducing economic inequality, restricts freedom and undermines individual opportunity. This assumption is the result of empirical misinformation and, more fundamentally, a conceptual mistake. Robust empirical data indicate that economic equality, far from stifling initiative or undermining opportunity, is conducive to social mobility.

ABSTRACT Equality and freedom have been represented as conflicting values. In this paper, I propose to argue that the idea of freedom has clear egalitarian implications. Freedom is commonly represented as being negative or positive, but it has both senses in ordinary usage, and the distinction fails adequately to explain the relationship between views on freedom and poverty. An alternative representation of the concept distinguishes individual freedom, based on the autonomous individual, from social freedom, (...) which sees freedom as a social relationship. Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom. Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution. (shrink)

Amartya Sen cnticises the utilitanan philosophy that underpins neoclassical economics, and suggests the development of an economic theory grounded on a broad conception of freedom. Freedom includes for Sen two dimensions, namely the opportunity aspect and the process aspect. The opportunity aspect of freedom consists in the capability to achieve the goals that freedom provides us with, and, thus, can be seen in a consequentialist fashion. The procedural dimension of freedom, on the other (...) hand, highlights the role ofnghts and procedures, and is in line with deontological approaches to ethics. But since deontological (or procedural) and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often said to be incompatible, the article raises the question of whether Sen's conception is coherent or not. The author of the article argues that consequentialist and deontological approaches need not be incompatible, whereby he underlines in a special way the role of uncertainty as a key element in the understanding of the relationship between those two views of ethics. Finally, the article also assesses the coherence of A. Sen's conception of the economic agent, a conception that resorts both to the notion of "moral sentiments" developed by Adam Smith as well as to the notion of "moral imperatives" developed by Kant. A filosofia utilitansta subjacente à escola neoclássica de economia tern sido amplamente criticada por Amartya Sen, facto esse que, segundo o autor do presente artigo, nos pode sugerir o desenvolvimento de uma teoria económica baseada numa concepção ampla de liberdade. Para Sen, com efeito, o conceito de liberdade comporta duas dimensões bem explícitas, uma relacionada com as oportunidades proporcionadas pela liberdade, e a outra relacionada com os aspectos processuais da mesma. No que se refere à primeira dimensão, o artigo sublinha sobretudo o facto de a liberdade proporcionar a possibilidade de realizar determinados objectivos, numa perspectiva consequencialista. Por outro lado, a dimensão processual da liberdade evidencia a importância dos direitos e dos procedimentos, pelo que o artigo mostra igualmente até que ponto Sen se encontra também em linha com as éticas de cariz deontológico. Dado, porém, que as abordagens consequencialista e deontológica tendem a ser consideradas incompatíveis, o artigo não pode deixar de levantar a questão relativa à coerência da concepção ética do próprio Amartya Sen. No final de contas, a intenção do artigo é precisamente demonstrar que estas duas abordagens (consequencialista e deontológica) não são necessanamente incompatíveis entre si, pelo que o autor procura no conceito de incerteza o elemento necessáno a urna correcta compreensão da relação que existe entre esses dois tipos de abordagem ética. Finalmente, no sentido de evidenciar a coerência da concepção de agente económico defendida por Sen, o artigo recorre também, entre outros, seja ao conceito "sentimento moral" desenvolvido por Adam Smith, seja à noção Kantiana de "imperativo moral". (shrink)

This paper aims to draw attention to an important but underappreciated aspect of the instrumental value of freedom: its diagnostic value. This is the value freedom has insofar as it makes it possible for us to discover ourselves and improve ourselves in our capacity to make value judgements. Diagnostic value, I argue, has an important role to play in explaining the value we attach to freedom. Accordingly, this paper is aimed at elucidating this concept, examining its relevance (...) to our lives, and defending an account of how to measure the diagnostic value of opportunities and sets of opportunities. (shrink)

In my examination of Ahmadou Kourouma's satirical 'historiographic metafiction' Waiting for the Wild Beasts to Vote [1998], I argue that this narrative shows that in postcolonial Africa freedom from colonial rule has resulted neither in privilege nor power for the majority of African citizens. In the novel, Kourouma employs but also subverts the style of donsomana or praise poetry in his satirisation of postcolonial African ways of wielding political power. Largely narrated by Bingo, a satirical griot, the novel adopts (...) a mock-epic mode as a way of acknowledging but also subverting both traditional African and European modernistic conceptualisations of the historical and literary. Among other things, the title of the novel satirises the inadequacy of electoral processes imposed by the Western nations to bring about smooth power transitions and genuine freedoms to the African populace. The novel's title also mocks African rulers for undermining democracy and those who are ruled for their inability to seize the voting opportunities, which in the novel are sometimes presented as moments of genuine civil power, to rid themselves of the emasculating dictators. (shrink)

This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his (...) own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility. (shrink)

For the sake of developing a discussion on the problem of defining “freedom of conscience,” let us start by saying that, at first glance, there is no such problem at the surface. At least, when you have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with this topic in the textbooks on religious studies, where very often only the presence of this democratic institution in our society and the legal guarantees of its existence, or the political principles on which it is (...) based, are given. Meanwhile, the periodical and the scientific press have shown that in many cases the exercise of freedom of conscience in our country is far from what the law requires, as well as from the political demands that justify it. (shrink)

The paper aims to examine the extent of individual freedom of human being in relation to their instinctual bodily attachment. The starting point of examination is Gehlen’s biological anthropology which pointed to human freedom of instinctual pressures. Human freedom proves to be an opportunity to build one’s world through action. Freedom of action burdens human beings with constant decision-making. The automatism of habit, which provides solid patterns of unconscious behaviours, allows relief from freedom of (...) action. By their upbringing, social institutions additionally automate and thus stabilise individuals’ actions. In their world produced from freedom, human beings generate a second-degree, self-produced non-freedom. Freud points to the oppressive character of culture and civilisation, which requires the individual to sacrifice instinctual gratification for the sake of cultural prosperity. As instinctual repression grows with the development of culture, the modern human being becomes neurotic because they cannot tolerate the degree of renunciation that culture demands of them. (shrink)

A successful entrepreneur and internet marketer discusses opportunity, how to find and create it, and how to develop great opportunities in business, investing, health, relationships, personal development, and other areas of life.

We model opportunities in society as ‘chances of success’, that is as they are commonly described by practitioners. We show that a classical liberal principle of justice together with a limited principle of social rationality imply that the social objective should be to maximise the chance that everybody in society succeeds. Technically, this means using a ‘Nash’ welfare criterion. A particular consequence is that the failure of even only one individual must be considered maximally detrimental. We also study a refinement (...) of this criterion and its extension to problems of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

Investor-state-dispute-settlement is an arbitration mechanism to settle disputes between foreign investors and host-states. Seemingly a technical issue in private international law, ISDS procedures have recently become a matter of public concern and the target of political resistance, due to the power they grant to foreign investors in matters of public policies in the countries they invest in. This article examines the practice of ISDS through the lenses of liberal-statist theories of international justice, which value self-determination. It argues that the investor-state (...) arbitration system illustrates how liberal-statist theories of international distributive justice ought to care about relative socioeconomic disadvantage, contra the sufficiency principle that they typically defend. The sufficiency principle draws on a questionable conception of the freedom that self-determination consists in. (shrink)

The African continent has long suffered serious developmental relapse in a continually developing world. Lots of thinkers indeed term most of these African states“failed states”. One sees that that while many other nations of the world develop and as such interact conveniently in this global village, most African nations come merely as beggars in the global village having nothing to offer but begging for an opportunity for consumption. These nations therefore remain stagnated and continually retrogressive in all aspects of (...) human life. Where in lies the cause of these problems? Dukor opines that the problem is a re-echoing aftermath of the western deplorable actions against these Africans. Indeed Dukor concludes that there is no real honesty in the opportunities all member states have to take part in the process of global development. Africa seems to be cheated. This work does not seem to fully agree with Dukor that the western hegemony ALONE is the cause. This work submits that the complacency of most Africans equally play the role in their underdevelopment. (shrink)

This paper presents a non-preference-based approach to the analysis of negative freedom. It is argued that a proper understanding of (different conceptions of) negative freedom necessitates an examination of the consequences of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. For this reason the paper does not focus on freedom rankings of opportunity sets but on freedom rankings of opportunity situations, i.e., pairs consisting of a feasible set and an opportunity set. Three different (...) class='Hi'>freedom rankings of opportunity situations are axiomatically characterised. Each of the three rankings forms a generalisation of the purely cardinality-based freedom ranking of opportunity sets presented by Pattanaik and Xu (1990). (shrink)

Mill's conception of economic freedom extends his broader view of freedom to economic institutions in ways that have previously been overlooked. In his view, economic freedom involves not merely the absence of burdensome constraints on economic activities, but also the power of individuals to direct the course of their lives with respect to their economic activities and relationships. It encompasses opportunities and resources for individuals, acting independently of others, effectively to pursue their own life plans as well (...) as participation by associated individuals in governing economic enterprises. Accordingly, he is critical of the ‘restraints’ that existing capitalism imposes on the economic freedom of individuals and he favours significant reforms of existing capitalism to achieve greater economic freedom. This understanding of Mill's conception of economic freedom sheds new light on his place in the liberal tradition and on an important point of contact between the liberal and socialist traditions. (shrink)

Innovatively combining existentialist philosophy with cutting edge post-structuralist and psychoanalytic perspectives, this book boldly reconsiders market freedom. Bloom argues that present day capitalism has robbed us of our individual and collective ability to imagine and implement alternative and more progressive economic and social systems; it has deprived us of our radical freedom to choose how we live and what we can become. Since the Great Recession, capitalism has been increasingly blamed for rising inequality and feelings of mass social (...) and political alienation. In place of a deeper liberty, the free market offers subjects the opportunity to continually reinvest their personal and shared hopes within its dogmatic ideology and policies. This embrace helps to temporarily alleviate growing feelings of anxiety and insecurity at the expense of our fundamental human agency. What has become abundantly clear is that the free market is anything but free. Here, Bloom exposes our present day bad faith in the free market and how we can break free from it. (shrink)

As we near a time when robots may serve a vital function by becoming caregivers, it is important to examine the ethical implications of this development. By applying the capabilities approach as a guide to both the design and use of robot caregivers, we hope that this will maximize opportunities to preserve or expand freedom for care recipients. We think the use of the capabilities approach will be especially valuable for improving the ability of impaired persons to interface more (...) effectively with their physical and social environments. (shrink)

The article analyzes the key issues of the theology of the modern Greek theologian Chrysostomos Stumulis. Emphasizing the need for the development of Orthodox thought and a clear definition of its place and role in the modern world, the theologian raises issues that are a definite taboo not only for Orthodoxy, but for Christianity as a whole. The problem of the correlation of Eros love and Agape love acquires a new interpretation from theologian, which reveals new horizons for the creation (...) of the latest Christian anthropology. In this context, the view of the theologian is revealed on the relationship between the key anthropological categories of Christianity - faith, love and freedom. Violation of their interaction generates a distorted embodiment of these qualities, which necessitates degradation both of society and of man. The theologian emphasizes that the inability of the Church for millennia to boldly raise the question of the nature of Eros and give him a worthy place in the nature of incarnation limits both the Church and the understanding of Christ. Modern theological thought must respond to problems that are too acute in society, despite the fact that they can be a challenging task for Orthodoxy. The ability of theology to respond to them, generates a "high risk" theology, which has the determination to speak and show the morbidity of an idealized past, dare to point out that some aspects of universally accepted truths are obsolete. The formation of a culture of embodiment is the basis upon which the theologian develops the Theology of the Word of the Flesh. Spirituality, which denies incarnation, in the opinion of the author, appears as pastoral idolatry and leads to dehumanization of society. Understanding the culture of theology as a manifestation of the culture of the flesh, as an expression of all aspects of human life in the perspective of their transformations through the Person of the Incarnate, appears as a continuation and expansion of creation. Love requires the adoption of matter and the human body. Only in this sense disclosure of a human as a Person, in the full extent of his creative spirit. Holistic understanding and a fair assessment of love - eros describes it as an opportunity for revelation and knowledge of both human personality and divine. Violating questions of love, sexuality, desire and satisfaction, the theologian indicates that they have not only anthropological nature, but are a holistic manifestation of the essence of the church body. Consequently, the accusation of Eros by Orthodox theologians points to an inhuman society, full of objections and accusations in human existential self-consciousness. The theologian draws attention to the need for theological discourse in the 21st century in the context of the formation of modern anthropology, in the aspect of disclosure of its completeness, which was lost in the abolition of theology. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to design a conception of political poverty that can address the loss of the experience of political freedom. This form of political poverty is described as separate from poverty of resources and opportunities, and poverty of capabilities required for participation. The study aims to make intelligible how a person or a group can suffer from a diminishing and fracturing of social experience, which can lead to the inability to experience oneself as a capable (...) and credible political agent, political engagement as a meaningful field of action, and democratic politics as a meaningful avenue for changing things for the better. This is a phenomenon which has been heretofore neglected by political theorists. -/- The study presents a heuristic diagnosis of political poverty as loss of experiential freedom that involves four aspects of experience that have specifically political relevance: loss of trust, loss of expressivity, loss of a sense of access to the public world, and the loss of future temporality in experience. Diminishing and fracturing of these aspects of social experience can lead to politically impoverished persons and groups to become complicit in their own marginalisation by remaining unmotivated to challenge it. These aspects of social experience are approached through phenomenological portraits, chosen from literature on social exclusion and poverty. The diagnosis remains open to further development through exploration of other aspects of experience. -/- The study draws on the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Hannah Arendt to present an account of political freedom as only experienced in co-existence with others. Through a critical discussion of their work, a more comprehensive account of political agency is developed. The experience of having political agency involves not just the cognitive and communicative capacities of the subject, but also the entire perceptual and motor intentionality of their lived body. The experience of meaningfulness is approached by exploring the intersubjective constitution of the self in a dialectical process with their social environment. This experience is described as a form of faith in oneself as an agent and in the meaningfulness of political engagement. Such faith is a practical, meaning-giving intentional relationship of a lived body to their social environment. -/- This study emphasizes the experience of being a capable and credible political agent, and experiencing politics as a meaningful field for engagement, as important aspects of political freedom that should be considered alongside inclusivity of democratic processes, the equality of opportunity to participate, and the equality of the cognitive and communicative capabilities required for effective participation. In order to discuss political poverty as the loss of experiential freedom, we must go beyond objectivist models of social critique and approach the problem with the tools of existential phenomenology. (shrink)

Throughout Iran and various countries, the recent calls of the “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (in Persian), “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (in Kurdish), or “Woman, Life, Freedom” (in English) movement call for change to acknowledge the importance of women. While these feminist protests and demonstrations have been met with brutality, systematic oppression, and internet blackouts within Iran, they have captured significant social media attention and coverage outside the country, especially among the Iranian diaspora and various international organizations. This article, grounded in feminist (...) urban theories of the Global South, analyzes the digital feminist placemaking movement in Iran. As the first counter‐revolution led by women, the movement utilizes digital art, graffiti, and protest movements to embody women’s solidarity groups and sympathy rallies. Our analysis employs various digital research methods, including social media scrutiny and the study of protest illustrations. Analyzing the digital feminist placemaking in Iran will enable us to compare the commonalities, differences, challenges, and opportunities between the minorities and majorities in the world’s countries. The outcomes of this research can help international organizations such as Amnesty International and the United Nations Agency for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (UN Women), as well as policymakers, institutions, academics, and NGOs, to highlight the various ways in which broader public participation could be encouraged in the process of digital feminist insurgent placemaking. (shrink)

Many egalitarians believe that there is a pro tanto reason to remedy inequalities of opportunity in access to higher education. This consensus, I argue, masks practical disagreement among egalitarians: in many real-world choice contexts, egalitarians will disagree about which policies are to be endorsed, both from the point of view of equality and all things considered. I focus my discussion on a real-world case (the ‘big squeeze’ – so-called because the children of welloff families ‘squeeze out’ the children of (...) less well-off families from access to highly selective US universities) that has recently been discussed by Amy Gutmann. I argue that while (a) the ‘big squeeze’ is condemned by the ideal of equal opportunity, nevertheless (b) different egalitarians will favor different policies in response to the ‘big squeeze’, and (c) one intuitive, and apparently egalitarian, response lacks support from most plausible egalitarian views. (shrink)

An interesting phenomenon called “hidden opportunity cost of time effect” was detected in intertemporal choices. The majority of our participants preferred the smaller but sooner (SS) option to the larger but later (LL) option if opportunity cost was explicit. However, a higher proportion of participants preferred the LL to SS option if opportunity cost was hidden. This shift violates the invariance principle and opens a new way to encourage future-oriented behavior. By simply mentioning the ‘obvious’ opportunity (...) cost of alternatives, decision makers can be more informed in prioritizing their long-term goals rather than short-term goals. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Quantity of opportunity The Meritonia argument The practical argument Illustrating the practical argument The socialization principle The strong socialization principle Reply to the strong socialization principle I: Adam Smith Reply to the strong socialization principle II: Michael Walzer We should not limit opportunity.

There is a long tradition in economics of evaluating social arrangements by the extent to which individuals' preferences are satisfied. This is the tradition of welfarism, which has developed from nineteenth-century utilitarianism. Increasingly, however, the presumption that preference-satisfaction is the appropriate standard for evaluating social arrangements is being challenged by an alternative view: that we should focus on the set of opportunities open to each individual.

In recent years, the study of animal law has grown exceptionally in the U.S., along with an increased recognition and interest in this burgeoning field. A growing eagerness among students to study animal law, as well as strong academic and financial support are all important contributors to successful animal law programs. This article explores the development of animal law scholarship in U.S. law schools and provides an overview of the types of courses offered as well as various academic, professional, and (...) financial resources available to the next generation of animal law practitioners. (shrink)

I distinguish four different interpretations of ‘equality of opportunity.’ We get four interpretations because a neglected ambiguity in ‘opportunity’ intersects a well-known ambiguity in ‘equality.’ The neglected ambiguity holds between substantive and non-substantive conceptions of ‘opportunity’ and the well-known ambiguity holds between comparative and non-comparative conceptions of ‘equality.’ Among other things, distinguishing these four interpretations reveals how misleading ‘equal opportunity for advantage’ formulations of luck egalitarianism can be. These formulations are misleading in so far as they (...) obscure the difference between two separate claims about which inequalities are consistent with true equality. Luck egalitarianism claims that inequalities that have been chosen in some suitable sense are consistent with true equality, while the traditional ideal of equality of opportunity only claims that inevitable inequalities that have been determined through fair competitions are consistent with true equality. Obscuring the difference between these two claims therefore serves both to arrogate the rhetorical advantages of the traditional ideal to luck egalitarianism and to cover over a limitation to luck egalitarianism’s ambition to provide a comprehensive principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

In his recent book, Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European ideas (2021), Honneth has explained how he understands the French concept of recognition. This article places Honneth's latest interpretation in the context of his long-standing and evolving engagement with French theory over several decades. Honneth acknowledges his significant debt to a French tendency to view recognition as a problem for self-realisation (and not an opportunity). Bourdieu's and Boltanski's account of how ambitions become limited by the availability of (...) capital and the internalisation of class was a major breakthrough in Honneth's intellectual development. Other formative French influences included the articulation of denigration in existentialist phenomenology, and the idea of regulative power in Foucault, with “deconstructive” asymmetrical care presented as productive but comparatively less important. The discussion also reveals why Honneth presents the “German” concept of recognition as having basic explanatory force (as an opportunity for self-realisation), and why he resists what he views as a French-influenced tendency (also present in some contemporary German critical theory) to depict recognition as ambivalent. The discussion reveals, on one hand, how working across perceived divides can be immensely productive, and, on the other hand, why a French-German divide remains entrenched in contemporary thinking. (shrink)

Can you recognize an opportunity when it comes your way? Even though the concept seems fairly basic, most people harbor regrets about missed opportunities that in retrospect might have significantly improved their lives. This book will give you the critical tools to sort through the complexities that often obscure the perception of an opportunity and help you take full advantage of what author Donald Morris calls high-end opportunities - pivotal situations that can change your life for the better.Morris (...) begins by developing a model of opportunity in the abstract, analyzing its elements and the contexts and frameworks that affect our recognition of opportunities. Drawing from a wide range of applications, including investing, business, law, criminology, gambling, and even religion, he shows how opportunities can be defined in various contexts. He also examines highly undesirable situations, where opportunity is lacking, such as poverty and historical instances of slavery, to further illustrate, by way of contrast, the defining characteristics of opportunity.How does a significant opportunity differ from a simple option? How does taking advantage of opportunities differ from being an opportunist? Does our ability to predict the future affect our opportunities? What do we mean by equality of opportunity? By addressing these and other probing questions, Morris shows how to develop more critical perceptions of real opportunities.Donald Morris, CPA, Ph.D., is professor of accounting and chair of the Accounting, Finance, and CIS Department at Eastern New Mexico University. The former owner of an accounting firm and a onetime instructor of philosophy, he is the author of Dewey and the Behavioristic Context of Ethics. (shrink)

The thesis of this essay is that equal opportunity (EO) "strictly dominates" (in the game-theoretic sense) reparations. That is, (1) all the ways reparations would make our world more just would also be achieved under EO; (2) EO would make our world more just in ways reparations cannot; and (3) reparations would create injustices which EO would avoid. Further, (4) EO has important practical advantages over reparations. These include economic efficiency, feasibility, and long-term impact. Supporters of reparations should abandon (...) that ideal to support equal opportunity instead. (shrink)