Originally published in 1971, this volume examines the relationship between the history and sociology of education. History does not stand in isolation, but has much to draw from and contribute to, other disciplines. The methods and concepts of sociology, in particular, are exerting increasing influence on historical studies, especially the history of education. Since education is considered to be part of the social system, historians and sociologists have come to survey similar fields; yet each discipline appears (...) to have its own aims and methodology. (shrink)

Hoewel enorm invloedrijk in Duitstalig Europa, heeft de conceptuele geschiedschrijving (Begriffsgeschichte) tot nu toe weinig aandacht in het Engels gekregen. Dit genre van intellectuele geschiedschrijving verschilt van zowel de Franse geschiedschrijving van mentalités als de Engelstalige geschiedschrijving van verhandelingen door het concept. Aan de hand van practische voorbeelden in de geschiedschrijving wordt deze vorm toegelicht door Bram Kempers, Eddy de Jongh en Rolf Reichardt.

The history of concepts has partly replaced the older style of the `history of ideas' and can be extended to a critique of normative political theory and, thereby, understood as an indirect style of political theorizing. A common feature in Quentin Skinner's and Reinhart Koselleck's writings lies in their critique of the unhistorical and depoliticizing use of concepts. This concerns especially the classical contractarian theories, and both authors remark that this still holds for work by their (...) contemporary heirs, such as Rawls, Habermas and other contemporary normative theorists. Conceptual history offers us a chance to turn the contestability, contingency and historicity of the use of concepts into instruments for conceptualizing politics. The alternative, indirect mode of political theorizing Skinner and Koselleck practise consists of a `Verfremdungseffekt', which helps us to distance ourselves from thinking in terms of contemporary paradigms, unquestioned conventions, given constellations of alternatives or implicit value judgements. In the Skinnerian variant the conceptual changes are made intelligible through analysis of the rhetorical redescriptions among the political agents, whereas Koselleck thematizes the differences in the temporal index of concepts. The subversive aspect in the history of concepts consists of the explication and historical variation of the tacit normative content in the use of concepts. (shrink)

In a renowned essay, Odo Marquard’s set a cornerstone in defining anthropology from a history of concepts point of view. In the light of more recent researches, some of his conclusions are here reconsidered and criticised. The concept of anthropology, as developed by Herder, Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, romantic philosophers and physicians, and finally by Hegel and some of his followers, offers no evidence for Marquard’s alleged opposition between anthropology and philosophy of history. On the one side, (...) in Kant’s or Hegel’s work anthropology is not as peripheral as Marquard argued; on the other side, romantic anthropologists developed a deep interest towards historical perspectives. Rather, anthropology was quite often considered as a nonmetaphysical alternative to psychology. These results also suggest a revision as to the role of anthropology on a broader historical scale. (shrink)

The history of concepts is relevant in philosophy because conceptual distinctions fundamentally shape cognition. Because these conceptual distinctions are deeply entrenched in our way of thinking, we are not usually aware of this influence. How we view the world depends crucially on the concepts we have. These concepts, however, are the products of their history. Following Herbart, Gustav Teichmüller viewed philosophy as the systematic analysis and refinement of concepts. Refining concepts in such a (...) way allows us to make new distinctions, or to transform or abandon old ones. In contrast to Herbart, Teichmüller emphasized that this process presupposes detailed historical studies. This does not mean, however, that Teichmüller embraced a kind of historicism---the view that philosophy and its history are one and the same thing. On the contrary, he derogatorily referred to such a view as "historical psychology". Rather, the history of concepts in Teichmüller's sense has to be understood as a history of problems which are reflected in conceptual distinctions. This means that the history of concepts, which brings to light explicit and implicit distinctions, can be applied as a kind of hermeneutics of world views---as the basis on which we can systematically reconstruct concepts in a new light. It is the aim of this presentation to unfold such an understanding of the history of concepts in view of Teichmüller's contribution to it. (shrink)

A history of the concept of God through the lens of process thought.

Theodore Kisiel's outstanding translation premits English-speaking readers to appreciate the central importance of this text in the development of Heidegger's thought.

Why, for a long time, was there no linguistic means to distinguish between the concepts experience and experiment in many European languages, such as Italian, French, and Russian? Was the Russian case influenced by French culture? This article addresses these issues. The most important finding of the study is that no idea of personal experience existed in Russian literature before the second half of the eighteenth century, and the word opyt was later borrowed from the scientific lexicon for expressing (...) the meaning of experience. This is the opposite of what happened in other European languages. This suggests that the concept of experiment is more basic in the Russian mentality. Experience grows from experiment but not vice versa. All these aspects of the semantic history of “experiment” and “experience” are illustrated with extensive textual citations found in the Russian National Corpus and in the electronic library of Institute of Russian Literature. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the forgotten friendship between Georges Bataille and the Russian émigré poet and philosopher Boris Poplavsky. Comparing their solar metaphysics, I focus on conceptions of friendship, sacrifice and depersonalisation. First, I retrace Bataille’s relationship to early Surrealis and Russian circles in interwar Paris, with a focus on his friendship with Irina Odoevtseva. I then offer a novel reading of Poplavsky’s poetry through the lens of Bataille’s philosophy, analysing a recurring motif that I call ‘dark solarity’. Uncovering a hidden (...) intertextual dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I argue for Poplavsky’s lasting impact on Bataille’s anti-Icarian sun cult. Finally, my paper demonstrates how Poplavsky’s writings on solar sacrifice, excess and friendship left marks on Bataille’s vision of a solar community, embodied in the secret society Acéphale. The dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I finally suggest, is a missing piece in the entangled history of Russian and French philosophy, as well as an original contribution to discourses on friendship in twentieth-century continental thought. (shrink)

The book is a history of the concept of experience in philosophy. Minakov focuses mainly on Western 19-20th century philosophical movements and their use of the experience concept. Author uses topological method to describe growth of the conseptual content of experience, as well as decline in its use in the end of 20th century.

It is commonplace that the modern world is more international than at any point in human history. Yet the sheer profusion of terms for describing political orders above the nation-state-including "international," "global," "transnational," and "cosmopolitan," among others-is but one indication of how conceptually complex this topic actually is. Taking a wide view of international projects in Europe since the eighteenth century, Nationalism and Internationalism Intertwined explores discourses and practices to challenge nation-centered histories and trace the entanglements that arise from (...) international cooperation. In this volume, a multidisciplinary group of scholars in history, political science, philosophy, computer science, and other fields ask how internationalism and adjacent concepts have been experienced, understood, constructed, debated, and redefined across different European political cultures. (shrink)

Through a study of the history of the concepts of wealth and poverty, this paper investigates the onset of a transition in the conceptual architecture of epidemiological research concerning social differences in mortality rates from 1858 to 1914. It raises the question as to what the concepts of wealth and poverty meant to those who used them and what objects of interventions the conceptual architecture surrounding the concepts enabled the researchers to create. It argues that a (...) transition began in the late 19th century in which an important framework for the understanding of causal relations behind the mortality patterns changed and that this change in turn influenced the scope of what was conceived as relevant objects of intervention. (shrink)

The field of modern European Jewish history, as I hope to show, can be of great interest to those who deal with conceptual history in other contexts, just as much as the conceptual historical project may enrich the study of Jewish history. This article illuminates the transformation of the Jewish languages in Eastern Europe-Hebrew and Yiddish-from their complex place in traditional Jewish society to the modern and secular Jewish experience. It presents a few concrete examples for this (...) process during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The article then deals with the adaptation of Central and Western European languages within the internal Jewish discourse in these parts of Europe and presents examples from Germany, France, and Hungary. (shrink)

The article analyses different forms of the theoretical paradigm of German Begriffsgeschichte. It focuses on the coherently formalized proposal made by Reinhard Koselleck, showing its relevance for the main Italian schools of interpretation. Koselleck is able to move beyond the historicist framework of Begriffsgeschichte on the basis of a theory of the Sattelzeit or Schwellenzeit--located between the eve of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century--capable of orienting the reconstruction of the history of political concepts. This (...) presupposition, which refers to a theory of the 'Vorgriff' or historical conceptual reconstructions, draws upon and elaborates a key theme of the logic of the social sciences that was put forth by Max Weber. The possibility to adhere or not to this residual Weberian moment explains the two different modalities in which conceptual history has been interpreted in Italy: one pointing at the reconstruction of the conceptual framework of the nineteenth century, the other aiming at the philosophical-political reconstruction of the genesis, the historic limits and the crisis of the political concepts of Western modernity. (shrink)

Traces the development of the integral and the differential calculus and related theories since ancient times.

Digital intellectual history should concern itself with the history of words or constellations of words rather than the history of 'concepts'. In fact, this is what digital historians of concepts are already doing. We should begin to acknowledge this explicitly.

Reviewing: History of the Concept of Mind, Volume 1, Paul S. MacDonald (England: Ashgate, 2003). pp. ix + 398, ISBN: 978-0-7546-1365-7, £18.90; History of the Concept of Mind, Volume 2, Paul S. MacDonald (England: Ashgate, 2007). Pp. xvii + 460, ISBN: 978-0-7546-3992-3, £23.40.

Accounts of how the concept of temperature has evolved typically cast the story as ancillary to the history of the thermometer or the history of the concept of heat. But then, because the history of temperature is not treated as a subject in its own right, modern associations inadvertently get read back into the historical record. This essay attempts to lay down an authoritative record not of what people in the past thought about what we call ‘temperature’ (...) but of what they thought about what they called ‘temperature’ (or one of its cognates), from medieval times to today. I find that invention of the thermometer had little impact on the concept of temperature. Much more significant were Fahrenheit’s invention of a reliable instrument and William Thomson’s effort to make a degree of temperature a unit of measure. Overlapping definitions of temperature then emerged in the late nineteenth century, and twentieth-century scientific developments forced physicists to reconsider temperature’s conceptual boundaries. It turns out that the concept of temperature has evolved through stages that correspond to four increasingly sophisticated types of measurement. Its maturation and its maturity shed light on the philosophy of conceptual change. (shrink)

In this chapter we consider the tension between how pain researchers today typically define pains and the dominant, ordinary conception of pain. While both philosophers and pain scientists define pains as experiences, taking this to correspond with the ordinary understanding, recent empirical evidence indicates that laypeople tend to think of pains as qualities of bodily states. How did this divide come about? To answer, we sketch the historical origins of the concept of pain in Western medicine, providing evidence that during (...) large swaths of this history, medical experts characterized pains as laypeople tend to today—that is, as qualities of bodily states. The conception of pains as experiences that we find in contemporary definitions seems to be a relatively recent development corresponding with changes in the diagnostic tools available to doctors. We argue that this history is important and suggests that the most prominent current scientific definition of pain (IASP) is partly stipulative and fails to match how laypeople most often think of pain. We suggest that either we should acknowledge this stipulative character, or else should amend the IASP definition in a pluralistic fashion that notes both bodily and experiential conceptions of pain. (shrink)

The investigations of Aza A. Takho-Godi, devoted to the evolution of concepts and terms in European culture, were ahead of their time and, as it turns out today, paved the way for historical semantics, which turned out to be a kind of independent version of the “history of concepts”: a direction of humanitarian thought aimed at identifying cultural, social, and political functions concepts in their historical dynamics and in relation to a wide field of cultural interactions (...) of a particular era. The impressive results of “historical semantics” in the version of Takho-Godi are connected not only with the masterful and strictly substantiated identification of the developing conceptual core of lexemes, not only with the penetrating intuitions of the living word, but also with the vision of an absolute spiritual context in which semantic worlds are driven not by mechanical causality and not by historical chance, but by a kind of teleology. (shrink)

There are many strands in the thought of Charles Taylor, a gathering of philosophical interests diverse enough to embrace both political theory and philosophy of science, epistemology, and practical ethics, Nietzsche and Donald Davidson. If he has not succeeded in generating any supreme synthesis out of this diversity—if, indeed, he has sometimes finessed the material to fit a bigger picture, as in the controversial details of his grand intellectual history of modern consciousness, Sources of the Self—Taylor has nevertheless created, (...) within his own work, a lively conversation, a dialogue at least as expressive and interesting as the one he has repeatedly advocated as the centre of any vibrant intellectual and political life. In Taylor’s philosophical works, plurality is met not with the fractured incommensurability now so often in vogue, but rather with a compelling, if necessarily endless, attempt at deep reconciliation. (shrink)

For much of the past two centuries, religion has been understood as a universal phenomenon, a part of the “natural” human experience that is essentially the same across cultures and throughout history. Individual religions may vary through time and geographically, but there is an element, religion, that is to be found in all cultures during all time periods. Taking apart this assumption, Brent Nongbri shows that the idea of religion as a sphere of life distinct from politics, economics, or (...) science is a recent development in European history—a development that has been projected outward in space and backward in time with the result that religion now appears to be a natural and necessary part of our world. Examining a wide array of ancient writings, Nongbri demonstrates that in antiquity, there was no conceptual arena that could be designated as “religious” as opposed to “secular.” Surveying representative episodes from a two-thousand-year period, while constantly attending to the concrete social, political, and colonial contexts that shaped relevant works of philosophers, legal theorists, missionaries, and others, Nongbri offers a concise and readable account of the emergence of the concept of religion. (shrink)