While the postmodern critique of universals provides important insights, it also leaves us in an unacceptable position---lacking solid justification for moral judgments and political action, and unable to generalize about human experience. I argue that the best response to relativism lies in a new humanism. Any new humanism must be "post-humanist"---taking into account valid critiques of past humanisms, incorporating multicultural voices, and building upon an understanding of the common human condition that does not erase or ignore difference. My (...) project is to present a re-conceptualized notion of the "human condition" that meets these conditions, to serve as a basis for a new humanism. ;As a starting point, I take up the framework found in Jean-Paul Sartre's later Marxist-Existentialist works. These are helpful in two respects. First, as he attempts to reconcile Marxism and Existentialism, Sartre re-examines central categories of human experience and ultimately arrives at an understanding of the human that transcends both essentialism and anti-essentialism. Second, I argue that the methods Sartre develops anticipate crucial postmodern insights without losing moral and political ground, and that a reworking of these methods enables us to theorize beyond postmodernism today. My project also draws upon Feminism, Critical Race Theory, Postcolonialism, African Philosophy, and the Frankfurt School. ;The central elements of my articulation of the human condition include: a rethinking of the relationship of the individual and the social; an account of the social constitution of the individual; a new approach to understanding freedom and necessity in human experience; and a reconsideration of social identities such as race, class, and gender. I ask, given this understanding of the human condition, what problems remain inherent to human relationships, and what are the possibilities? Are we doomed to alienating and objectifying interactions with others, or are authentic love and cooperation also possible? Finally, I explore the ways in which we might achieve equality and reciprocity in a democracy necessarily built upon differences in identity and social power. (shrink)

At times, an individual in modernity can feel dehumanised by work, by administration, by technology, and by political power. This experience of being dehumanised can take the individual to an existential awareness of the priority of existence over essence. But what does this existential experience mean? Are there ways in which this experience can reconnect the individual to her being human, or to her being part of humanity? Any such reconnection is further complicated by the suspicion that universal presuppositions (...) concerning ‘humanity’ or ‘human being’ or ‘humanism’ carry pretensions of imperialist grandeur that must be challenged. How, then, might one proceed to connect existential vertigo with a culture of humanism that, while resisting such pretensions, nevertheless can find meaning for the dehumanised individual? In what follows I argue that a concept of modern metaphysics, with an aporetic logic of subjective experience, can carry this reconnection of the I and the We, offering meaning not in the resolution of their opposition, but in learning that the meaning of their opposition, and the meaning of humanity, is learning, is our education. I argue that it is only within modern educational metaphysics that humanity and the individual Know Thyself. (shrink)

In this volume, G. Marian Kinget's classic work, On Being Human, can be read for the first time in light of a second, previously unpublished work, Pleasure And Pain. Taken together, these two works offer a new generation of readers a comprehensive picture of the insights, principles, and goals of humanistic psychology. On Being Human, Kinget's pioneering work, which arose from the original humanistic revolution in psychology, systematically describes the characteristics that make human beings different from all (...) other forms of life. In this work, Kinget explores man in his full nature not solely as a biological organism modified by experience and culture. She presents a person as a symbolic entity capable of pondering his existence, and lending it meaning and direction. Man is the only animal who knowingly exists in space and time, manifesting transcendental and metaphysical concern throughout history and culture. On Being Human presents the fundamentals of any valid approach to psychology as well as to other fields concerned with the individuality of the human being. It describes the specific human capacities for reflective thought and declarative language, and it discusses the unique ability of humans to devise culture and question origins. Pleasure and Pain considers the interdependence of human pleasure and pain. This idea, which leads to unnecessary fears and unwarranted expectations, goes unrecognized in a contemporary western society focused on the accumulation of pleasure without any awareness of the duality of the pleasure-pain experience. Kinget refutes the widespread fallacy that fun lies in the means, when it actually lies in the subject, and she discusses the human potential for autonomous "management" of the pleasure-pain dimension of human existence. (shrink)

In early modern philosophy the motive of logical creation emerged in reaction to the Greek-Medieval legacy of a realistic metaphysics. The dominant nominalistic trends of thought since Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant explored its rationalistic implications. The latter drew the radical (humanistic) conclusion that the laws of nature are present in human thought a priori (i.e. before all experience). The irrationalistic side of nominalism emphasized the uniqueness and individuality of events – thus leading to the historicism of the 19th (...) century and the subsequent linguistic turn. Kant influenced Husserl who, in turn, provided the point of departure for the ideas of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann – compare the joint work of Berger and Luckmann: Social construction of reality (1967). The contemporary “postmodern” idea that we create the world in which we live (either through thought, through language or through social practices) merely continues core elements of (early) modern philosophy. The underlying idea of autonomy highlights the difference between modern Humanism and a Christian view of reality, for in the latter human subjectivity is appreciated as being correlated with universal and constant principles that can only assume a positive shape through human activities of positivization (form-giving). The autonomy ideal of modern Humanism reifies the typical human freedom to positivize underlying principles. At the same time this reification on the one hand collapses the distinction between conditions and being conditioned and on the other it does not provide a basis for supra-individual standards of behaviour. (shrink)

In "Existential Humanism and Moral Freedom in Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics" Tove Pettersen elucidates the close connection between Beauvoir’s ethics and humanism, and argues that her humanism is an existential humanism. Beauvoir’s concept of freedom is inspected, followed by a discussion of her reasons for making moral freedom the leading normative value, and her claim that we must act for humanity. In Beauvoir’s ethics, freedom is not reserved for the elite, but understood as everyone being “able (...) to surpass the given toward an open future.” By addressing the continuing friction between individual freedom and public interests, Beauvoir’s normative thinking remains highly relevant today. It also exemplifies the enduring importance of humanistic reflections and demonstrates how, through critical and creative thinking, the humanities can contribute to a free, well-functioning democratic society. (shrink)

This is one of the best written and most comprehensive studies of the development of Sartre’s thought yet to appear in English, which is not to say that it covers every facet of his variegated career. Written by the former editor of Yale French Studies and current chairman of the Department of Romance Languages at Wesleyan University, Connecticut, it emphasizes Sartre’s literary works and thus belongs most properly in the category of literary criticism or the history of ideas. Still, McMahon (...) does not ignore Sartre’s philosophical writings. Indeed, he gives particular attention to The Critique of Dialectical Reason, a volume often avoided by authors who approach Sartre from a literary tradition. But the philosophic sources are usually consulted to explain or illustrate the literary, which provide the object of the author’s prime concern. McMahon underscores three concepts which measure Sartre’s intellectual growth, viz., freedom, love, and history. Regarding freedom, Sartre has "completed" the unfinished analyses of Being and Nothingness with their excessive individualism by his growing awareness that freedom is more than the ability to say "No" to the Other; it has a positive content and requires collective action to be maintained. Likewise, love is now conceived as a bond of promises which envisages the achievement of common projects. McMahon labels this rather cold-blooded concept "pragmatic love." Finally, history, which emerges as Sartre’s absolute, is now understood as a force conditioning men and limiting the availability of their choices. Sartre has come under the sway of Engels’ dictum: "Men make their history themselves, but they make it within a given milieu which conditions them." Sartre relies heavily upon the power of dialectic to keep individual choice afloat in a sea of historical forces. Whether or not he succeeds is a current question. McMahon believes that he does not. Because what he calls the "shift of emphasis" in Sartre’s thought from the individual to the social involves a growing interest in the sciences humaines, McMahon’s failure to consider Sartre’s political writings at any length is the chief disappointment of this excellent study. And then there is that stepchild of Sartriana, Existentialism is a Humanism. Following Cumming and others, McMahon chooses to ignore this essay, probably because Sartre himself has repudiated it. But if anyone is to portray Sartre "warts and all," and McMahon does not hesitate to expose the blemishes, then the reckless and inconsistent statements of this short lecture are most revealing. They indicate the freewheeling motions of a "shift" underway. Each chapter is followed by a short but helpful discussion of related themes and works. To capture the world of Jean-Paul Sartre is a most ambitious project. McMahon has met this challenge with insight and style.—T. R. F. (shrink)

Darwinian humanism proposes that environmental philosophers pursue their work in full recognition of an irreducible ambiguity at the heart of human experience: we may legitimately regard moral action as fully free and fully natural at the same time, since neither perspective can be taken as the whole truth. A serious objection to this proposal holds that freedom and nature may be unified as an organic whole, and their unity posited as a matter of substantive truth, by appeal to (...) teleology. In particular, I consider Hegel's account of the emergence of Absolute Spirit, weigh its advantages and disadvantages as an approach to human moral experience and as a strategic move for environmentalists, and conclude with a refinement of Darwinian humanism and a clarification of its implications for environmental ethics. (shrink)

Humanism narrowly construed, is the secular thought of the Renaissance, involving the study of ancient philosophy, ethics, art and languages; broadly understood it is a progressive trend in social thought, which upholds the dignity, freedom and many-sided development of the individual and the betterment of man's relationships in society. The new and higher form of humanism — Marxist humanism is an aspect of the consistently scientific world view and practical activities of the working class, the object of which is (...) the liberation of working people of all races and nations from class and national oppression and inequality, and the institution of true human freedom and happiness by the establishment of a communist society in which the individual will enjoy all-round development and in which the most just of principles: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," will be carried into practice. Socialism is the first and lower phase of communism. (shrink)

The world of sports today is grappling with dehumanizing tendencies. New technologies are changing sport as we know it, altering the experience of being an athlete in radical ways. These tendencies call for new approaches to sport that consider the human elements of sport. To this end, and as a response to transhumanist and posthumanist arguments, I propose and draw the contours of a humanist theory of sport. I argue that it complements prevailing theories of sport like formalism, broad (...) internalism (or interpretivism), and conventionalism and is better equipped to tackle the pressing concerns of dehumanization in sports. It is rooted in a humanism of embodiment and underscores our corporeal embeddedness in a natural and social world. Taking this into the context of sport, I argue that sport humanism can inform an understanding of sport as a human engagement that involves embodiment, ambiguity, and repetition. On this basis, I outline an ethics of embodiment that can throw new light on moral questions and actions concerning dignity, freedom, and ecology to direct sport toward more sustainable and humane forms of practice. (shrink)

Medical, scientific and societal progress has been such that, in a universalist humanist perspective such as the WHO’s, it has become an ethical imperative for the primary endpoints in evidence based health care research to be expressed in e.g. Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). The classical endpoints of discrete health‐related functions and duration of survival are increasingly perceived as unacceptably reductionistic. The major problem in ‘felicitometrics’ is the measurement of the ‘quality’ term in QALYs. That the mental, physical and social (...) domains, each containing many dimensions and items, all contribute to QOL is uncontroversial. What is controversial, is the weight of the different dimensions in overall QOL. It has been shown to be very different between different patient populations. In human individuals, assuredly complex systems, the many dimensions and items of QOL observably interact, probably sometimes also in chaotic ways. In these conditions, the weights of isolated items in individuals become for all practical purposes meaningless. Therefore, the much used multi‐item questionnaires at best describe, but do not evaluate QOL, neither in individuals, nor in populations. For example, allergic patients treated with cetirizine scored better than those a placebo on all dimensions of the SF‐36, a standard QOL questionnaire. Here there is no serious doubt that the treatment improved QOL, because it is highly unlikely that any important dimension on which the patient groups would have scored otherwise is missing in the SF‐36. However, whether piracetam treatment of acute stroke, which improved the surrogate endpoints neurological and functional scores, also improved QOL is plausible, but will be proven only when comprehensive QOL measurement will have been done. And suppose in randomised populations of end‐stage metastatic solid cancer patients, one would compare palliative last‐line chemotherapy with only palliative care, and one would, as can be expected, find no significant differences in average survival, and chemotherapy superior for the mental domain, but inferior for the physical comfort domain: we would not know which treatment, on aggregate, would be the better. The problem is that QOL is an individual and emergent construct, the resultant of a great many intractions, and of a different order than its contributing components. Overall QOL can therefore best be captured only as the Gestalt of a global self‐assessment. Just as people in everyday life, while acting under uncertainty, make global assessments all the time, so they can seriously answer the serious question: ‘How have you been?’ A solemn, practical, non peer‐relativistic, non‐cultural, experiential, and well tolerated way to obtain such responses is Anamnestic Comparative Self Assessment (ACSA), in which the subjects' memories of the best and the worst times in their life experience define their individual scale of QOL. ACSA is thus both exquisitely idiosyncratic, and yet can in a universalist humanistic perspective be considered generic. Using both a multi‐item questionnaire and a global assessment allows by one logistic regression, to estimate the weights of the dimensions and items in populations, and thus identify those whose improvement would most contribute to the QOL of the greatest number. A combined approach to measurement of QOL is necessary to maximise the utility of QOL interventions. (shrink)

The Council for Secular Humanism identifies Secular Humanism as a "way of thinking and living" committed to rejecting authoritarian beliefs and embracing "individual freedom and responsibility ... and cooperation." The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commitment and insanity defense, that is, depriving innocent persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their crimes: the consequences of both are confinement in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment of mental diseases. Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every confinement of the person is (...) an 'imprisonment,' whether it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." Accordingly, I maintain that Secular Humanism is incompatible with the principles and practices of psychiatry. (shrink)

The Council for Secular Humanism identifies Secular Humanism as a "way of thinking and living" committed to rejecting authoritarian beliefs and embracing "individual freedom and responsibility... and cooperation." The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commitment and insanity defense, that is, depriving innocent persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their crimes: the consequences of both are confinement in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment of mental diseases. Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every confinement of the person is an (...) 'imprisonment,' whether it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." Accordingly, I maintain that Secular Humanism is incompatible with the principles and practices of psychiatry. (shrink)

Is freedom and capability enough to sustain our well-being? For human flourishing to progress, defer, and avoid decline, managers as persons must grow in virtue to transcend to the ultimate source of the good. In our definition of a person we develop an anthropology of gift through the communication of one self to another and whose form is love, the willing the good of the other. We ask four questions about the humanistic manager as a person: what is (...) the goal, end, good; what form, structure guides the manager; what materials, resources, technology, and context does the manager use within the structure to meet the end and exceed the goals, what is the means of effecting the change needed to meet the manager’s goals. Each of these questions form the basis to construct a philosophical anthropology of humanistic management. To these four questions we add three types of finality: the usual absolute terminal and horizontally immanent finalities plus the vertical finality of every growing and developing person among other persons in community. The need for a philosophical anthropology derives from a concomitant ethical requirement of what does and ought the manager, as person, undertake. What and how the person knows, wills, acts on provides the reality within which the manager, as person, operates. Along the way we will visit topics of transcendence, secularism, vulnerability, authentic personhood, and virtue. We conclude with a description, which is a dynamically evolving scheme of the meaning of a manager in the world, the social, and perhaps, the terminal goods of order. We move far from the _homo farber_ of a technology-led world whose thought conforms being. We have begun to extend our manager into the species _homo transcendens_ where being conforms thought and responsible action. We conclude with a sketch on the emerging role of spirituality in the workplace with connections to compassionate leadership, organizations as sites for healing and growth, and examples from the experience of humanistic organization who seem to have survived and thrived centuries of global operations. From an anthropology of gift we can identify several implications for managers. Humanistic management education would subsume the rational choice hegemony of economic modeling to a technological subset of tools, subject to the goals and nature of human persons. The scientism of thinking that psychology, sociology, political science, and economics would suitably describe, explain, and model human decisions would be replaced by an overarching framework leading to higher levels of knowledge, especially wisdom based educational experiences and content based on the natural integrity of human beings as learners. Since all technology follows, rather than leads, persons in an anthropology of gift, workplace practices would be founded in the structures immanent in persons and communities of persons. This would imply practices which transcend appraisal and assessment of performance to heights of contemplation and implementation of meaning in every task. Instead of beginning with a deficit of “what’s in it for me?” practices can begin with the surplus “how can I help you?” Proposed are practices which impound wisdom-based attributes of compassion, active listening, alterity, mercy, companionate and agapic love in decision analyses, interpretations of results, and incentives. The objective of the humanistically managed organization under the aegis of an anthropology of gift would be to minimize the maximum grief for the the most vulnerable. The objective would be applied as a policy across all authorities delegated by jurisdictions over organizations, and by boards, oversight groups, over decisions within organizations. This view from an anthropology of gift is consonant with emerging definitions of organizations as healing spaces where a balance of solidarity and subsidiarity guide decisions as opposed to simplistically applying supply and demand trade-offs. (shrink)

The following article considers K.N. Leont’ev’s religious and philosophical ideas concerning the historico-cultural process, its fateful direction and its eschatological end. The restriction of individual freedom in the domain of cultural history was assumed by Leont’ev due to his interpretation of faith in a personal God, the Owner of the world’s fate. A specific religious and philosophical thesis was made by Leont’ev that the cultural benefits of man are determined by his own choice between the sphere of obedience and (...) the sphere of revolt in regards to his relation to the Absolute. In the 19th century, humanity was inspired by the spirit of egalitarianism, but while attempting to challenge the divine authority, it will sooner or later find out that it was poorly mistaken and experience the restrictions of human nature in the face of the inevitable and catastrophic end of the cosmos. While being based on the hermeneutical teachings of H.-G. Gadamer, who philosophically rehabilitated man’s historicity and his pre-conceptions of cultural temporality, the author asserts that one should pay attention to the religious and philosophical schemes of Leont’ev in the context of the Sacred Tradition of the Church, which determined his thinking. It may be possible that the application of this method will lead to a more perfect understanding of Leont’ev’s religious metaphysics. (shrink)

Few words in both everyday parlance and theoretical discourse have been as rhapsodically defended or as fervently resisted as "experience." Yet, to date, there have been no comprehensive studies of how the concept of experience has evolved over time and why so many thinkers in so many different traditions have been compelled to understand it. _Songs of Experience _is a remarkable history of Western ideas about the nature of human experience written by one of our best-known intellectual historians. With (...) its sweeping historical reach and lucid comparative analysis—qualities that have made Martin Jay's previous books so distinctive and so successful—_Songs of Experience _explores Western discourse from the sixteenth century to the present, asking why the concept of experience has been such a magnet for controversy. Resisting any single overarching narrative, Jay discovers themes and patterns that transcend individuals and particular schools of thought and illuminate the entire spectrum of intellectual history. As he explores the manifold contexts for understanding experience—epistemological, religious, aesthetic, political, and historical—Jay engages an exceptionally broad range of European and American traditions and thinkers from the American pragmatists and British Marxist humanists to the Frankfurt School and the French poststructuralists, and he delves into the thought of individual philosophers as well, including Montaigne, Bacon, Locke, Hume and Kant, Oakeshott, Collingwood, and Ankersmit. Provocative, engaging, erudite, this key work will be an essential source for anyone who joins the ongoing debate about the material, linguistic, cultural, and theoretical meaning of "experience" in modern cultures. (shrink)

Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the anthropological and socio-philosophical dimensions of human existence of the older age group given the challenges of pandemic threats caused by COVID-19. To this end, it is planned to solve a number of tasks, among which one should distinguish the following: 1) to investigate the manifestations of age discrimination in the context of the social and labor areas of human existence; 2) to focus on the asymmetry of the behavior (...) of society and the state relative to persons of the older age group in the field of healthcare in the context of a pandemic crisis; 3) to represent the anthropological features of changes in the socialization and activity of older people under the current conditions of globalization-pandemic challenges. Theoretical basis. Despite such a broad representation of the age-related issue in public relations, there are still no practical guarantees that would apply to discriminatory aspects of older age groups in various areas of their manifestation. The synergistic evolution of social reality requires substantive analysis of the issue under the current conditions for the transformation of social life, which is affected by globalization crises caused by the pandemic threats of COVID-19. Originality. The stereotypical assumptions underlying legal policy and established social relations are based solely on the application of chronological age. The novelty is in justifying an individual approach to the elderly through the personification of the personal characteristics of a person. The study of anthropological and socio-philosophical dimensions of the existence of a person of the older age group in the face of the challenges of pandemic threats caused by COVID-19 has made it possible to analyze the destructive nature of age discrimination in the context of the social and labor areas of human existence. As well as focus on the asymmetry of the behavior of society and the state in relation to these persons in the field of health care, and emphasize the anthropological features of changes in the socialization and human activity under the current conditions of globalization-pandemic challenges. Conclusions. External threats to human existence call for special attention to the implementation and protection of human rights, freedoms, individual freedoms, and identity. Pandemic threats have transformed all dimensions of human existence, especially for those groups of society that are less socially protected. The pandemic crisis has created additional grounds for discrimination against older people in various areas of human existence. Equalization of persons by age without personifying the personal characteristics of an individual is discrimination on an age basis, which violates the principles of democracy and humanism in the society, leads to stigmatization of the person, is the cause of the anthropological crisis of a person. (shrink)

In recent years, calls for a new humanism have arisen from a variety of voices across the spectrum of philosophy, expressing frustration with outdated models of the human that cannot account for the richness of our social being. The postmodern deconstruction of the human now requires a reconstructive moment. In response, the author articulates a new and explicitly posthumanist humanism using the framework developed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his later Marxist-Existentialist works. Sartre's unique dialectical and hermeneutical methods allow (...) us to reconceptualize the human beyond traditional dichotomies of individual/social and freedom/necessity. The author argues that the individual and the social should be understood as existing within a dynamic, co-constituting interrelation, and that individual autonomy is not at odds with, but rather fundamentally enabled by, the social. (shrink)

A Confederacy of Dunces (Confederacy) by John Kennedy Toole portrays an interplay between competing definitions of humanism. The one school of humanism—called by some the Modernist Paradigm—saw the Italian Renaissance as the origin of nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernist views that celebrated science, technology, and individual human freedom. The other school, led by Paul Oskar Kristeller, sought to historicize humanism by establishing that Renaissance writers and thinkers were generally conservative and preserved the philosophical ideas of the medieval era. Kristeller (...) was the President of the Renaissance Society of America and was at the height of his influence at Columbia University during the late 1950s, when Toole studied for his Master’s degree there. The main character in Confederacy, Ignatius J. Reilly, presents a parody of Kristeller’s position, which he uses to critique modern society. Ignatius also plays the part of a child of the planetary god Saturn, both by acting out the ancient astrological tradition of associating Saturn with misfortune and disorder and by being a parody of the Renaissance concept of the Genius as a Child of Saturn begun by the Renaissance philosopher whom Kristeller studied most, Marsilio Ficino. Ignatius’s worldview is an antithesis of the Modernist Paradigm. Confederacy is critical of both Modernist humanism with its attendant materialism and its antithesis—Ignatius’s dysfunctional version of Kristeller’s Renaissance philosophy. When the community expels Ignatius as a scapegoat, Toole appears to gesture toward a dialectical synthesis of the two concepts of humanism in the novel’s happy ending. (shrink)

For more than fifty years, Yi-Fu Tuan has carried the study of humanistic geography—what John K. Wright early in the twentieth century called _geosophy_, a blending of geography and philosophy—to new heights, offering with each new book a fresh and often unique intellectual introspection into the human condition. His latest book, _Humanist Geography_, is a testament of all that he has learned and encountered as a geographer. In returning to and reappraising his previous books, Tuan emphasizes how the study (...) of humanist geography can offer a younger generation of students, scholars, and teachers a path toward self-discovery, personal fulfillment, and even enlightenment. He argues that in the study of place can be found the wonders of the human mind and imagination, especially as understood by the senses, even as we human beings deal with nature's stringencies and our own deep flaws. (shrink)

This paper examines whether non-human animals have a moral right not to be experimented upon. It adopts a Razian conception of rights, whereby an individual possesses a right if an interest of that individual is sufficient to impose a duty on another. To ascertain whether animals have a right not to be experimented on, three interests are examined which might found such a right: the interest in not suffering, the interest in staying alive, and the interest in being free. (...) It is argued that while the first two of these interests are sufficient to ground animal rights against being killed and made to suffer by experiments, the interest in freedom does not ground a general animal right not to be used in experimentation. (shrink)

In this dissertation I claim that Michel Foucault is a pro-enlightenment philosopher. I argue that his critical history of thought cultivates a state of being autonomous in thought and action which is indicative of a kantian notion of maturity. In addition, I contend that, because he follows a nietzschean path to enlightenment, Foucault’s elaboration of freedom proceeds from his critique of who we are, which includes a rejection of humanism’s experiential limits. At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, (...) I also suggest that Foucault articulates a posthumanist conception of finitude and being. To begin with, I show that on humanism’s path to edghtenment, which is established by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and currently advocated by Rawls and Taylor, a philosophy of the autonomous subject who desires self-actualisation through recogrution precedes the epistemologcal and political critiques which generate humanism’s objective, normative and subjective axes of experience. On the basis of Foucault’s archzological, genealogical and, when they operate together, critical historical critiques of these conditions of possibility for autonomy and recogrution, I maintain that humanism fails to teach us how to think or act freelythat is, as critical thought that delivers enhghtenment-and that humanism’s knowledge of the world and its justice in politics necessitate the confined exclusion of those who are different and the submission of subjectivity of those who are normal. In response to the immaturity that is at the heart of humanism, I illustrate that Foucault deploys archeology, genealogy and critical history to excavate his posthumanist, enlightenment alternatives of savoir, pouvoir and ethico-morality. After he relocates an explanation of cause and effect in the human sciences from savioir to the relations between savoir and pouvoir, I explicate how Foucault reconceives, firstly, the way pouvoir is exercised by productive mechanisms, which discipline the body and regulate the citizen, and, secondly, the nature of pouvoir, which he characterises as governmentality, or one’s action upon the actions of others. He then retlunks freedom as the vis-a-vis of pouvoir/savoir, and I demonstrate how critical history reveals that, prior to the hermeneutic relation to self wluch is at the centre of humanism’s conception of moral identity, ethical subjectivity in antiquity is formed through an ascetic, agonistic freedom that is based on a practical relation to self. Foucault uses this as a blueprint for the present, in which an ethico-political state of being autonomous in thought and action is constituted over against our limits of pouvoir/savoir. I thus claim that Foucault’s portrayal as an anti-enlightenment philosopher, who proffers nothing but anormative critique and amoral freedom, represents the perspective of those for whom to be anti-humanism is akin to being antienlightenment. These criticisms are exposed as misguided by the thesis that I verify in this dissertation, which is that critical history qua critique, thence an ontology, namely, Foucault’s critical ontology, brings about maturity and endorses an ehghtenment that is both contra- and post-humanism. (shrink)

The paper considers the freedom of choice, which is a conceptual problem for contemporary philosophical anthropology. It is argued that absoluteness, which is not a “given” (like the gift of life), is “clarified” in the reflection of the decision made, this formalizes human identity. This “sublimation” does not take place by nature, but by the decision of the individual; absoluteness is a certain existential state. It is proved that the “modes of self-affirmation” are conditioned and fragile, absoluteness comes (...) from freedom, transcendent in its foundation. It is stated that the deformation of the ontological and cognitive structures of experience (“personalized” knowledge) changes the meaning of the values of the “alienated” individual, who is not free in society; the Kantian antinomy (of freedom and necessity) receives an interpretation of the “existential drama” in “non-classical” philosophy. It is concluded that individuality is the result of a person’s free choice. (shrink)

The formulations of the argument for atheism from evil are quite formal in nature. One “solution” to the problem of evil would be to deny that evil exists. But Clive Staples Lewis, a philosopher, would have none of this. He believed that pain is intrinsically evil, and it is its evilness that ultimately gives rise to the problem of evil. Lewis' thoughts about pain and God's reason is the subject of this chapter. The chapter also discusses Lewis's treatment of the (...) problem of evil. Lewis held that the justification for allowing human beings to experience pain is ultimately connected to the good of perfect happiness, where the enjoyment of it can be had only if persons have the freedom to choose how they will become happy, to choose to die or not to die to self. Thus, Lewis articulated his theodicy in terms of the actual individual and his or her happiness. (shrink)

The principles of historical materialism involve Marx in making two crucial claims about freedom. The first is that the revolutionary proletariat is, in an important sense, more free than its class antagonist the bourgeoisie. The second is that the beneficiaries of a successful proletarian revolution—the members of a solidly established communist society—enjoy a greater freedom than even proletarians engaged in revolutionary praxis. It is perhaps natural to take Marx to be operating here with what might be called a (...) logically continuous notion of freedom, established communists enjoying to perfection what revolutionary proletarians merely imperfectly experience and what the bourgeoisie entirely misses. But whatever one's views might be about what Marx in fact says about freedom this cannot be what he ought to say for his theory of freedom to work. The kind of line Marx need to take finds a significant precedent in his economics where we find a theory implying two quite distinct logical dimensions in that the principles and concepts designed to apply to the transactions of capitalism necessarily lack descriptive purchase on communist economic reality. The existence of these two dimensions, and particularly Marx's comparative silence as to the nature of the second, reflect his conviction that the transition between the two systems must be marked by a profound conceptual as well as material break. Consequently it is not unreasonable, perhaps, to look for an analogous discontinuity in his metaphysics and to expect to find two distinct varieties of freedom, the one reflecting the nature of class society, the other of human community. (shrink)

The traditional philosophical questions around human freedom are to do with how to square freedom for human organisms with increasingly scientific understandings of the universe itself. At the beginning of Western philosophical consciousness, Plato, unlike later philosophers eligible of the label rationalist, maintained that there are obstacles to free and rational agency, owing in no small measure to pressures exerted by the human psyche from what later were referred to as biological drives and drives for (...) social status. In subsequent eras, these obstacles came under the heading of “weakness of will”—a conception shared widely in popular and traditional culture. Today the realities of addiction, social stresses, forces of habit, culture, social position, and group identity, together with psychological findings about cognitive biases, have come to dominate the landscape of empirically-based obstacles to agency. Can the image of the human being under the microscope of contemporary science, including cognitive and social science, be reconciled with the “manifest image” of human beings as sources of their individual behaviors (and held responsible accordingly), particularly if the scientific image is best construed in terms of governance by laws of nature? (The phrases manifest image and scientific image were coined by the twentieth-century American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, see Sellars 1962.) How is it possible to square the idea of laws of nature with the manifest image in which humans exercise free agency as they play their various parts in the drama that is life? Does the manifest image thus square better with a theistic image of the world, as both seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes and eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant seem to have thought, and by contrast the scientific image square better with atheism? A deterministic universe, such as was proposed during the Enlightenment, was early on thought to pose a threat to the idea of human freedom. (It does not pose the same threat to the idea of a sovereign creator, however, because the notion of a creator of the universe already puts the entity who qualifies for the office outside the regime of those laws, ahead of them both in time and in ontological status.) One traditional answer to the threat has been the notion of compatibilism— which simply asserts that freedom and determinism are not incompatible. The devil, of course, has been in the details of explaining how this can be so, and many schools of thought on the matter exist. It is worthwhile noting that there are enormously compelling reasons, from the quantum regime so well described by quantum theory, to reject determinism: the laws governing the universe are simply not fully deterministic. This, of course, vitiates the need to confront the threat as originally posed. However, the trouble, if one follows along this line of thought, is to make sense of the nature of freedom in a world governed partly by deterministic laws and partly by nondeterministic ones that admit of an element of chance. Is such a world itself any more compatible with the idea of human freedom? In this section we grapple with the question of human freedom, what it could mean, and whether it is best accepted in the context of a form of theism. We find that theism has no more resources for addressing these difficulties than atheism does. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful (...) or valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass Nietzsche und Dewey sich aus heutiger Sicht in ihren pädagogischen Konzepten ergänzen und wertvolle theoretische philosophische Hintergründe auf dem Weg der gesellschaftlich eingebetteten Selbstbestimmung bieten. Obwohl sich bei Dewey kein direkter Bezug zu Nietzsche findet, scheint dieses „In-Beziehung-Setzen“ insofern berechtigt zu sein, als gerade Dewey einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen Philosophie und Kultur bzw. Zivilisation sieht. Außerdem steht zu vermuten, dass Dewey durch die Reformpädagogik Nietzsches pädagogische Werteskala der Individualisierung kennenlernte. Auf jeden Fall aber (...) gibt es zwischen Nietzsche und Dewey denkerische Überschneidungen in Bezug auf ihre zentralen Werte wie z.B. Freiheit, Selbstbestimmung oder Individuum. Beide verstanden sich als Erzieher und sahen ihre Aufgabe darin, Hilfestellungen für die Steigerung des Selbst und die Individuation zu bieten sowie die Jugendlichen zum Selbstdenken zu ermutigen. Zentral ist für beide der Wert der eigenen Erfahrung, die im Rahmen des Konzepts vom freien Spiel, das die Vernunft des Leibes integriert, zur Individuation führt. In der „Erfahrung“ wird der Spannungsbogen zwischen „Schöpferischem“ und „Regel“ ausbalanciert. Das hängt damit zusammen, dass „Erfahrung“ sowohl durch eine aktive, kreative Perspektive gekennzeichnet ist, als auch durch eine passive, erleidende, in der das eigene Handeln in Beziehung zu der hervorgebrachten Veränderung gesetzt wird. Dadurch wird die dahinterliegende Regel erkannt. Deshalb führt die Reflexion des Erlebten, d.h. die Erfahrung, zu einem Zuwachs an Freiheit, wie Dewey festhält, der einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen Freiheit und Lernen deklariert. Eine wichtige Rolle als Informationsträger spielt dabei für Nietzsche und Dewey, im Gegensatz zu ihren zeitgenössischen Denkern, der Körper. Beide sind der Meinung, dass wir unseren Intellekt nur dann wirklich produktiv erschließen, wenn wir zu unserer Leiblichkeit zurückfinden. Da die Reflexion der Erfahrung eine Besinnung auf sich selbst voraussetzt, hat der „Rückzug auf sich selbst“ bei der Selbstbildung und bei der Entwicklung der inneren Freiheit einen hohen Stellenwert. Diese Phase muss aber für Dewey mit intensiven sozialen Phasen korrespondieren. Eine freie Haltung entwickelt sich aber nur dann, wenn das Individuum einen angemessenen Spielraum für Erkundungen und Experimente bekommt. Dieser Freiraum wird im Spiel gefunden. Das spielende Kind gilt als Metapher für das Leben in seiner höchsten Erfüllung, die die Zuwendung zum anderen ermöglicht. Nietzsches „Zauber des Dionysischen“, der die Menschen miteinander versöhnt, wird dabei mit Deweys demokratischen 'way of life' der Bürger und Bürgerinnen, den freien und gleichen Individuen, verglichen. Dieser Weg setzt nach Nietzsche bei jungen Menschen an, Dewey konkretisiert ihn für die Schule.This paper intends to show that, from today’s point of view, Nietzsche and Dewey are complementary in their pedagogical concepts and provide valuable theoretical and philosophical background for the path to self-determination in a social context. Although there is no direct reference to Nietzsche in Dewey’s work, this “making the connection” seems justifiable insofar as Dewey sees a close relationship between philosophy and culture or civilization. Also, one can assume it was through progressive reform pedagogy that Dewey became acquainted with Nietzsche’s pedagogical value scale of individuation. But in any case there are areas of overlap in the thought of Nietzsche and Dewey with regard to their central values, such as freedom, self-determination, or the individual. Both saw themselves as educators and understood their mission as offering support for self-enhancement and individuation and also encouraging the young to think for themselves. Central to both is the value of each person’s experience, which, within the conceptual framework of free play integrating the reason of the body, leads to individuation. In “experience” the tension between “what is creative” and “the rule” is balanced out. This relates to the fact that “experience” is characterized both by an active, creative perspective and a passive, receptive one, in which one’s own action is set in relation to the change resulting from it. This leads to recognition of the underlying rule. Thus experience, the reflection of what has been experienced, leads to an increase in freedom, as noted by Dewey, who asserts a close connection between freedom and learning. For Nietzsche and Dewey, as opposed their contemporaries, the body plays an important role in this as information carrier. Both of them believe that we only open up our intellect in a truly productive way when we find our way back to our physical being. Since the reflection of experience presupposes self-reflection, a high value is placed on the “retreat to the self” in self-cultivation and the development of inner freedom. But for Dewey this phase must correspond with intensive social phases. A free attitude can only develop when the individual is given appropriate latitude for investigation and experimentation. This free space is found in play. The playing child serves as metaphor for life in its highest fulfillment, which makes possible concern for the other. Nietzsche’s “enchantment of the Dionysian,” which reconciles humans among themselves, is compared here with the democratic “way of life” of Dewey’s citizens, the free and equal individuals. This path, according to Nietzsche, begins with the young. Dewey puts it into practice for the schools. (shrink)

This paper develops the notion of being right-with, a conceptual lens that underscores what happens when individuals turn to human rights law and other legal processes and proceedings to address injustices by the state. It does this through a critical multi-directional reading of two Uganda High Court appeal cases that overturned the decision of a lower court which at first instance had convicted Dr Stella Nyanzi of the offences of cyber harassment and offensive communications. Being right-with is a regulative (...) and coercive idea within human rights law that animates a violent irrepressible police drive. I use being right-with to assert that when individuals make rights claims under human rights law (however radical those assertions might be), they are still imbricated within a mode of liberal humanist subjecthood that is always conceptually unfree. In trying to move away from this conceptual and dialectical trap of being made right-with and unfree under liberal humanism, this paper tentatively considers Black feminist theorisations of care and freedom ‘to-come’, as well as Édouard Glissant’s notion of opacity to explore the concept of being with elsewhere as a way of articulating practices of Black life that make freedom elsewhere possible. (shrink)

André Comte-Sponville is a French philosopher-essayist, pondering the problems of morality and life wisdom. He develops the conception of ego-philosophy that is the theory based on the analysis of the subjective existential human experience. As an initial evidence of consciousness and a point of support for philosophical reasoning, he cites feelings of anxiety, despair and suffering. Ego possesses being, it is a subjective reality that is revealed to a man as a result of free and creative perception of the (...) world. This knowledge is always unique, situational, not amenable to formalization and unification, because it is a result of a personal relation of man to the absolute. Ego-philosophy is not a traditional scientific discipline, summarizing specific facts and formulating theories. Ego-philosophy expresses itself in a generally accessible language and appeals to all mankind. This is an art of life wisdom, indicating to the individual a path to true ideals, allowing one to gain dignity and happiness, to free oneself from temptations and passions. Comte-Sponville substantiates the ethical theory that, under the conditions of the crisis of traditional ideas about moral norms, a person must strive to fill the emptiness of the world with his own creative energy, give meaning to life, affirm positive values. The philosopher creates a theory of virtues in which he takes the leading role in sublime love (agape) as the apotheosis of generosity and mercy. In the area of politics, Comte-Sponville adheres to the position of socio-liberalism. Recognizing the economic efficiency of market relations and the principle of freedom action, the philosopher believes that the logic of economic activity does not coincide with socially important tasks and ethical values. In order for society to develop harmoniously, it is necessary to create a welfare state and reliable political institutions that ensure the observance of the principles of humanism, high culture and justice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decolonizing Universality:Postcolonial Theory and the Quandary of Ethical AgencyEsha Niyogi De (bio)Living in colonial India, the Bengali thinker and creative writer Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) often meditated on ways that "concord" (milan) and "harmony" (sāmanjasya) could be established between persons and cultures [BIC 450-51]. Noting that "ruptures in balance and harmony" (bhār sāmanjasyer abhāv) that once were more localized now affected the whole world, he maintained that these reinforced the (...) progressive message of the modern age that the local "problems of a people are a part and parcel of humankind's" (swajātir samasyā samasta mānusher samasyār antargata) [RC 279]. In his view, the means to reestablish harmony in this unequal world lay in social practices and ideas conducing "freedom" (mukti) rather than enforcing "power" (shakti) and "coercive discipline" (shāsan) [SaS 408-09]. He argued that such progressive trends of practice and thought would be found not in one culture alone but through traveling across different cultural "seas of knowledge (jnān)" [SwSm 699]. For only through such conceptual journeys would we enkindle in ourselves "arguments with and doubts about" (yukti tarka o sandeher udbhav) our own cultures, and also learn from all the "voyagers in the path of progress" (unnatipather yātri) who emerge in different locations and times [SJ 39-40].As these comments reveal, Rabindranath maintained that inequalities could be rectified by making individual and collective norms and actions accountable to and measurable in terms of a speculative notion of universal humanity. While alert to the injustices proliferating from European colonization, he insisted that coercive practices and imbalances of power could not be entirely localized, and that in order to correct multiple forms of coercion we must seek across cultures and societies for (partial) achievements of human freedom and harmony. In so viewing transcultural negotiations of a common humane proclivity as the means to decolonize the world, Rabindranath did not stand alone but in a diverse company of anti-imperialist thinkers who adapted modern humanism to their ends: W. E. B. Dubois—who lauded Rabindranath's appropriation of [End Page 42] such liberal notions as democracy and equal opportunity "for greater ends" than were allowed by the "inconsistencies" of a racist European perspective [74]—Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and from Rabindranath's own colonial context, the Bengali Anarchist poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (to name but a few). Reflecting upon worldwide experiences of subjection, these radical modern intellectuals tried above all to avoid reinventing separatism by declaring non-Western cultures to be unilaterally superior to Western imperialist culture. Driven by an activist ethics, they attempted instead to correct the roots of separatism through objectively evaluating, against a common frame of reference, right and wrong, relatively successful or failed practices of human empowerment and community.In this essay, I consider if and how we could characterize as "postcolonial" these evaluative ethics that rationally seek to correct coercive relations between persons and societies through referring to an affirmative idea of a human nature shared by all. If we take postcolonial agency to rest on a thorough critique of and resistance to all political and epistemic maneuvers that subordinate or exclude people and cultures, might this form of resistant agency reside in the ethical normativity of anti-imperialist humanism? This question elicits conflicting responses from contemporary postcolonial theorists.The argument, on the one hand, is that if postcolonial theory is to ethically address the multiple and interlocked hierarchies of a postimperial world, it indeed must take into account how people mobilize against separatism by working through critiques of ethnic divisiveness to negotiate a common human ground. Commenting on the universalism of thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore and W. E. B. DuBois, Edward Said, for example, suggests that "vital" critiques of chauvinistic separatism arise only from viewing "local identity as not exhaustive" but as elaborating in reference to "larger, more generous realities of community between cultures, peoples, and societies" [Culture and Imperialism 217, 229]. His implication is that only through evaluating ourselves on the basis of a notion of noncoercive universality are we able to think against the identity politics that pervade our world, stemming at once from a nativist... (shrink)

One cannot really speak of a school of personalistic economists. Moreover, there is a wide gulf between the economic philosophy of the personalists and the mathematical context of economic science. Since the thirties, philosophers such as Alexandre Marc, Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier and many others have been searching, on the basis of a personalistic view of man, for a `third way' between individualistic capitalism and statist socialism , but there was seldom interest from the side of the scientific economists.Fortunately, there (...) are some notable exceptions. François Perroux, Kenneth Boulding, Ernst Schumacher, Serge Christophe Kolm, and Amartya Sen are economists who, in various ways, have attempted to bridge the gulf between the personalistic view of man and economic rationality. By carrying out an immanent critique of some of the standard economic assumptions, they opened a path for a normative economics that was clearly distinct from a purely positive economics as well as from Pareto's welfare economics. One can affix various labels to these attempts: humanistic economics , socio-economics , moral economics . In what follows, I shall interpret these attempts as initiatives in the direction of a personalistic economics. I would also situate the current research in `economics and ethics', which is becoming part of the mainstream of economic thought, and which has received official recognition with the recent Nobel prize award to Sen, within this tendency towards a more personalistic economics.Attention to moral feelings, human rights, altruistic motives, justice and solidarity, non-profit organizations, etc., contribute to situating the economic problem in a field where economics, politics and ethics no longer function as three distinct domains but where their interaction is central.Yet does this interactive economics fit into a personalistic way of thinking? Is a generalized system theory not more attractive? System theory has a different focus than personalistic economics. System theory considers the axioms of system equilibrium and sustainable growth as the ultimate horizon, whereas a personalist sees them as merely important conditions for a good society and economy. However refined it may be, system theory views the person from an external point of view, while the personalist refers to the internal experience of human freedom and meaning as something that transcends and regulates the system's functionality.One could object that neo-classical economists do not use system theory as their point of departure. In their eyes, system equilibrium is the result of the utility-maximizing behaviour of individuals. These individuals subjectively determine what their preferences are and then act accordingly. Is this openness for a free, utility-maximizing actor — where there is room for both material and immaterial, egoistic and altruistic preferences — not sufficient to speak of a personalistic economics ? If this were true, then the discourse of personalism would be more or less superfluous.I take the term `personalistic economics' to refer to a normative economics that does not simply reconstruct the problem of efficient allocation as an individual or social problem of utility, but in the first instance as a problem of human dignity and social justice. To reduce the problem of human choice to a problem of subjective utility is in itself a far-reaching normative standpoint. As soon as one realizes this, there is no reason to exclude other normative assumptions, such as personalistic ones. (shrink)

The article contains an exposition of the moral philosophy of J. P. Sartre as well as a trial of its evaluation. The author presents the social basis and main theses of Sartre’s.philosophical system and stresses the questions of social conditioning, real contents, and functions of the situational ethics of Sartre. According to the author, the situational ethics of Sartre, being an expression of feelings of intellectuals, middle-class, and students in the period of violent changes in our civilization, simply describes a (...) certain type of man, peculiar to these conditions and this time. Therefore, this type cannot be considered a definite universal construction of a human subject. Pessimism, characteristic for the existentialism, as an expression of.certain social and political conditions, can be easily surmounted, provided that a possibility of definite social transformations can be demonstrated. This gives evidence of a positive alternative which proposes development of social democracy, elimination of the remnants of worship of the individual, as well as a more and more full realization of social humanism, that are limiting the experiments of existentialism. Together with an increasing conviction of a possibility to surmount and to abolish the capitalistic alienation and together with the development of socialist democracy, when marxist thinking comprises more and more effectively all aspects of human fates, the social basis of existentialism and its influence are losing ground. On the other hand, whatever might be said about arbitrariness and subjectivism of many theses of existentialism, it has raised many essential questions of particular importance in our time. These are: 1) subjective aspect of human freedom in situations of a choice of an action; 2) responsibility of an individual to himself, other people, and history; 3) contradiction between general systems of valuation and norms and of a definite situation in which a choice is taken; 4) danger of a non-authentic apparent communication; 5) danger of a lost of personality in conditions of consumptionist civilisation; 6) necessity of responsibility and engagement; 7) necessity of forbearance, tolerance and respecting the subjective world of other persons; 8) existence of conflict situations. According to the author, a resolution of the above problems, which are important for a modern man, can be done only basing on marxism which should be conceived in a creative way. It is necessary, however, to reject arbitrary assumptions of the existentialist metaphysics, ethical formalism, and, above all, ahistorical conception of freedom. The opinions of Sartre that the, good a priori cannot exist, that everybody should determine his own existence, and that in each situation he should maintain his creative attitude and moral alertness, are in a certain sense and within certain limits right and productive. However, depriving people of a possibility to build any system of values and norms of a super-subjective character is a risky thing and may lead to moral relativity and nihilism. The social function of the existentialism is also a double one. On the one hand, existentialism, which demonstrates a super-historical and unchangeable character of the drama of human existence, in some way confirms and justifies the social system submitted to critic. On the other hand, as it states a moral and idealistic outsidership, bareness, and loneliness of a human individual in a modern bourgeois 1society, existentialism presents an important ethical indictment directed to the capitalistic society and indirectly shows a necessity to create such relations which would remove the tragic gap between individual and society. This is the reason of a peculiar paradox that for same people the existentialism is a point of departure from the files of the revolutionary movement, and for others a point which leads into marxism – cum duo faciunt idem, non est idem. (shrink)

This book is an account of the philosophical movement named Lebensphilosophie, which flourished at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There many philosophers who participated in the movement, but this book concentrates on the three most important: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The movement was called Lebensphilosophie—literally, philosophy of life—because its main interest was not life as a biological phenomenon but life as it is lived by human beings. They regarded (...) class='Hi'>human life and experience as the fundamental reality, the basis of all knowledge and value, and disputed the relevance of any supernatural realm transcending human experience. The purpose of life was therefore life itself. Lebensphilosophie was the first modern philosophical movement in the Western tradition. It was “modern” in the sense that it was entirely humanist and secular, deriving all values from a non-religious perspective. Nietzsche, Dilthey and Simmel were either atheists or agnostics; they denied the relevance of any transcendent reality or being for human life. They abjured the traditional Christian concern with salvation and immortality. They also disputed the existence of natural law, teleology or a providential order; human beings created their own values and they did not conform to any made by nature. In anticipation of later existentialism, the Lebensphilosophen maintained that human beings are the makers of their own fate. Contrary to pessimism, they affirmed the great value of life while still acknowledging its frequent tragedy. The Lebensphilosophen were champions of an individualist ethics, which maintained that the highest good for a human being was self-realization, the development of a persons’s unique individuality. Their ethics was neither utilitarian nor de-ontological: it was not utilitarian because it did not regard the highest good as pleasure; self-realization could be a very unpleasant experience; and it was not de-ontological because it grounded moral norms upon the facts of human development and experience. The Lebensphilosophen were major advocates of historicism. They believed that human experience is formed by history, and that its horizons and limits are historical. Just as it was impossible to transcend human experience, so it was impossible to transcend history. All values and norms were therefore historical. In attempting to describe historical experience, the Lebensphilosophen developed the discipline of hermeneutics. They refused to accept mechanical explanation as a paradigm of explanation. This book attempts to describe and analyze the fundamental aspects of Lebensphilosophie by looking in detail at the views of its three leading figures. It examines their ethics, their religious background, their responses to pessimism and relativism, and their contributions to hermeneutics and historicism. (shrink)

The main objective of this text is to show that for Karl Jaspers all authentic philosophy is an attempt to express subjectivity in terms of the intersubjective categories of intellect. Subjectivity is understood as a plane of individual experience which ultimately comes down to the consciousness of freedom. Intersubjectivity on the other hand is perceived as a plane of expression of this experience, which can boil down to language. For it is only through the mediation of language that one (...) can illuminate its own being – its connection to the world and transcendence. Thus, the rational expression of experience is the essential condition for self-comprehension of any subjectivity. Ultimately, however, any attempt of rational inquiry reveals itself as insufficient. The human being, in his or her, pursuit of self-comprehension has to reach the boundary of language-based expression and therefore the boundary of all reasoning, where rational knowledge must give way to direct but inexpressible experiencing of what is the absolute source of all being. Thus, in the end, silence is the only true expression of transcendence. (shrink)

"Human beings are a part of nature and apart from it." The argument of Natural Law and Justice is that the philosophy of natural law and contemporary theories about the nature of justice are both efforts to make sense of the fundamental paradox of human experience: individual freedom and responsibility in a causally determined universe. Professor Weinreb restores the original understanding of natural law as a philosophy about the place of humankind in nature. He traces the natural (...) law tradition from its origins in Greek speculation through its classic Christian statement by Thomas Aquinas. He goes on to show how the social contract theorists adapted the idea of natural law to provide for political obligation in civil society and how the idea was transformed in Kant's account of human freedom. He brings the historical narrative down to the present with a discussion of the contemporary debate between natural law and legal positivism, including particularly the natural law theories of Finnis, Richards, and Dworkin. Professor Weinreb then adopts the approach of modern political philosophy to develop the idea of justice as a union of the distinct ideas of desert and entitlement. He shows liberty and equality to be the political analogues of desert and entitlement and both pairs to be the normative equivalents of freedom and cause. In this part of the book, Weinreb considers the theories of justice of Rawls and Nozick as well as the communitarian theory of Maclntyre and Sandel. The conclusion brings the debates about natural law and justice together, as parallel efforts to understand the human condition. This original contribution to legal philosophy will be especially appreciated by scholars, teachers, and students in the fields of political philosophy, legal philosophy, and the law generally. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The article aims to problematize the forms of correlation between the fundamental category of freedom and the phenomenon of resentment in the context of the formation of ethical discourse, as well as to consider the symbolic mechanisms of the collective imagination in the formation of a picture of the human world. _Theoretical basis__._ The study uses the method of historical and philosophical analysis and methods of the humanities – hermeneutics and phenomenology. _Originality._ An attempt is made to (...) comprehend the correlation between freedom as a category of philosophical anthropology and practical philosophy and the phenomenon of resentment. _Conclusions._ The ethical category of freedom, explicitly or implicitly, significantly shapes the content of the process of choice and social action by a person, which can be manifested in discursive practices and narratives of ideologies, public opinion and collective imagination. Symbolic mechanisms of human consciousness record the paradoxical correlation and at the same time the antithesis of reality reception and meaning generation between rational awareness and existential experience, humanization and appropriation of freedom and emotional-affective, reactive attitude of a person to narratives, motives, symbols and images of resentment. At the same time, freedom can presuppose the conscious content of resentment, while resentment deforms the concept of freedom into arbitrariness or violence, appealing not only to the archaic values of tribalism, but also to the rational basis of individual freedom of the individual, on which the philosophical tradition of the West is based. The resentful forms of thinking and emotional reception of reality function as symbolic constructions, that is, they can have a wide and internally contradictory field of interpretations. Western philosophical thought has a significant potential to reinterpret the challenges of the phenomenon of resentment based on the tradition of ontotheology and ethics of discourse due to the specific rationalism of the vision of the philosophy of freedom. (shrink)

A common quest among theoretical psychologists is the transformation of psychology to accommodate human agency and meaning. Several strong experimental methods are used in cognitive neuroscience but are based almost entirely upon a mechanistic ontology. A step toward rapprochement is proposed using precise and powerful experimental methods that are holistic, individualized, and compatible with an agentive ontology. Such methods must be applicable to all aspects of human experience, the subjective and agentive aspects, as well as the behavioural and (...) the neurophysiological Multivariate methods are capable of expressing and capturing the holistic isomorphism among multiple aspects of human existence and might even help provide insight into the mind-body problem. Results from a cognitive neuroscience study are used to illustrate this approach. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of HumanismSandra Rudnick LuftImperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism, by Tzvetan Todorov; 254 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, $45.00.Tzvetan Todorov begins Imperfect Garden with an arresting premise: that the greatest achievement of the modern age—the moderns' assertion of the freedom of the human will, unlimited by allegiances to God, nature, or reason—was the fruit of a pact with the devil. Though (...) a familiar idea, Todorov uses this premise to provide a richly detailed map of the intellectual currents of the age, illuminating in the process the dangers inherent in the age's acceptance of this pact.The price to be paid for human free will would become apparent only in the following centuries—a separation from God, leading to secularism and materialism; a separation from other humans, culminating in a loss of sociality and a fall into radical isolation; ultimately, a loss of self, its unity dispersed into an "anomalous collection of impulses." Todorov delineates the age's four responses to this bargain, and the acquisition of human autonomy. They account for the four families whose interrelations characterize modernity: the conservative, which considers the three-fold price of autonomy too high, rejecting it for the authority of tradition; the scientistic—a diverse set of responses derived from modern science, historicism, Marxism, Darwinism, all of which deny the existence of human freedom and emphasize some form of determinism based on the laws of nature, reason, or history; the individualist, for which the "loss" of God, society, and self represents merely an extension of human liberation; and the humanist, which, while valuing human autonomy, does not want to [End Page 425] pay its price. Believing it can maintain communal existence, shared values, and responsible selfhood while acting out of an autonomous will, the humanist family wants to have its cake and eat it too, a desire Todorov clearly shares.Todorov delineates the views of these four families through close readings of their representative figures. Limiting himself to French authors, he includes Bonald and Tocqueville as conservatives; Condorcet, Diderot, the Encyclopedists as scientistic types; Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, De Sade, and Helvetius as individualists. Among the humanists, who are his focus, he emphasizes Montaigne, Descartes, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Constant, and Tocqueville again. While for me the primary value of Imperfect Garden is its contribution to the history of ideas of French humanism from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Todorov himself has a larger, more ideological goal. His interest is not primarily historical, but typological. He wants to crystallize the insights of his authors, distilling an ideal type whose characteristics include the ability of humans to initiate their own actions, which he calls the "autonomy of the 'I'," the ability to make another person the end of one's acts, which he calls the "finality of the 'you'," and the belief that every human has these abilities, that is, the "universality of the 'they'." Together they constitute an anthropology based on sociality, which insures the compatibility of human autonomy with social existence, shared values, and the stability of the self. He associates this "type" with a politics which provides the institutional structure for the exercise of these abilities. This latter point, the compatibility of humanism with democratic political structures, is the subtext running through the book. Humanism is, for Todorov, the modern family most compatible with democracy, just as democracy is the political institution most able to retain the positive aspects of human autonomy (pp. 29–32). This is his defense of humanism, subjected, as it currently is, to challenges which suggest the devil is trying to collect on the debt.Todorov argues his case by taking up each of the "losses" supposedly suffered when the moderns asserted the autonomy of human will. If the strength and value of his book are Todorov's close readings of his representative authors—readings rich in insights for the educated generalist, however much scholars of individual authors may differ with particular interpretations—ultimately his defense of humanism's ability to "have it all" is far less satisfying.The first price to be paid for the autonomy of the will is the social world, the fall... (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Argentine philosopher Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907–1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It introduces to his contribution to phenomenology in the context of its early reception in Argentina and addresses the following issues: 1) the mission of philosophy, the various ways of accessing its essence, in particular those of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl, 2) his reception of Husserl as far as the ideals of science and reason are concerned, 3) the crisis of reason 4) his pluralistic (...) conception of reason and time, and finally, to 5) his humanistic stance. I argue that his conception of philosophy, which emphasizes the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice as well as the relentless search for unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, is underpinned by a pluralistic conception of reason, time and culture that confers Pucciarelli’s philosophizing a humanistic bias. Phenomenology as conceived by Pucciarelli becomes thus an active force by embracing multiple perspectives, such that its methodology can be applied to varying contexts and circumstances. Pucciarelli’s commitment to social justice and Latin American culture responds to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In short, Pucciarelli’s stance reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that does not neglect its militant and critical function, thus evidencing its relevance to the current sociopolitical situation in Latin America. (shrink)

In _The Long Emancipation_ Rinaldo Walcott posits that Black people globally live in the time of emancipation and that emancipation is definitely not freedom. Taking examples from across the globe, he argues that wherever Black people have been emancipated from slavery and colonization, a potential freedom has been thwarted. Walcott names this condition the long emancipation—the ongoing interdiction of potential Black freedom and the continuation of the juridical and legislative status of Black nonbeing. Stating that Black people (...) have yet to experience freedom, Walcott shows that being Black in the world is to exist in the time of emancipation in which Black people must constantly fashion alternate conceptions of freedom and reality through expressive culture. Given that Black unfreedom lies at the center of the making of the modern world, the attainment of freedom for Black people, Walcott contends, will transform the human experience worldwide. With _The Long Emancipation_, Walcott offers a new humanism that begins by acknowledging that present conceptions of what it means to be human do not currently include Black people. (shrink)

U tekstu se polazi od problemske konstatacije prema kojoj je kapitalizam kao način života toliko postao dominantan da sustavno prožima cjelokupno vrijeme pojedinca, i radno i slobodno vrijeme. Dakle, sustav je čovjekovo vrijeme u totalu stavio u zavjetrinu ekonomije. I njime upravlja i vlada .Dalje se u tekstu postavlja pitanje koliko će još proći »vremena da se deblokiraju potencijali čovjekove prirode zapreteni u ekonomiji slobodnog vremena« . U suprotnom »svaki napredak u proizvodnji s pasivnom proizvođačkom klasom može samo pospješiti izdvajanje (...) i jačanje nove gornje klase« . Tako nastaje dublja problemska situacija u kojoj se pojedinci pretvaraju u pasivne grupe i društvene zajednice i time cijelo društvo čine pasivnim i osrednjim.Rješenje se, prema Supeku, nalazi u izoštravanju »samosvijesti građanina« kojom bi se uspješno otklanjala pasivnost i nekritičnost čovjekove svijesti. Cijeli bi se taj proces mogao razvijati iz temeljne »usamljenosti« građanina, koja pretpostavlja sigurnu distancu od tržišnog konzumerizma. Samosvijest nastala usred vlastite usamljenosti, tj. usred kritičkog odmaka od svakodnevice, bila bi osnažena i kritički otvorena prema sebi i prema sredini u kojoj živi. I tada bi mogla »djelovati kako hoće«, a ne kako je diktirano odozgor.Ta temeljna i kritički distancirana usamljenost građanina razumijevala bi se kao kvalitetno novo iskustvo vremena u neovisnom i autonomnom prostoru slobode u kojem se konačno može ostvariti vlastito slobodno vrijeme bitno drugačije od pasivne besposlice.The initial concept of this text is the problem conclusion which claims that capitalism as a way of life has become so dominant that it systematically permeates the individual’s complete time, their working hours as well as their free time. In other words, man’s free time has been overtaken by the system and completely subjected to economy. And it is run by the government .Further in the text a question arises: How long “will it take to deliver the potentials of human nature which are entwined in the economy of free time” . Otherwise “every progress that is made in production using passive production classes can only help facilitate the separation and strengthening of the new upper class” . This leads to a deeper problem situation in which individuals are being turned into passive groups and social communities, which makes the entire society passive and mediocre.According to Supek, the solution is in sharpening the “citizens’ self-consciousness”, which could bring success in removing passivity and non-critical human consciousness. The entire process could be developed from the foundational “loneliness” of the citizen, which implies a safe distance from market consumerism. Self-consciousness, caused by personal loneliness, i.e., critical detachment from everyday life, would be strengthened and critically open toward itself and the society in which the person lives. And then it would be able to “do as it pleased”, and not as it has been ordered from a higher instance.This foundational and critically detached loneliness of citizens could be understood as a good and fresh experience of time in an independent and autonomous space of freedom, where a person could finally be able to achieve their own free time in a way that is largely different than just mere passive doing nothing. (shrink)

Aristotle -- Art and the artist -- Being -- The Christian life -- Christian philosophy -- The Church -- Culture and civilization -- Democracy and democratic society -- Descartes and Cartesian philosophy -- Philosophy of education -- Evil -- Ethics -- Faith -- Freedom -- God -- History -- Humanism -- Intellect and intelligence -- Knowing and knowledge -- Man -- Marx and Marxism -- Metaphysics and metaphysicians -- Moral philosophy -- Mystery and mysticism -- Natural law and (...) class='Hi'>human rights -- The person -- The person and the individual -- Personality -- Philosophers -- Philosophy -- Poetry and the poet -- Politics, society, and the state -- Prayer and contemplation -- Reason and reasoning -- Science -- Theology and the theologian -- St. Thomas and Thomism -- Truth -- Varia -- Wisdom. (shrink)

In my paper I examine the question of tolerance. In the first part of the discussion I follow up the process in the course of which the problem of tolerance appearing in connection to the practice of religious freedom in the 17th-18th centuries leaves the territory of religious morality and the relation of church and state, and is placed into the empirical sphere of a general human relation to the otherness of the other, and with it to the (...) private sphere of the individual. However, the intolerance continuously present in our life world still keeps the question in the forefront of theoretical interest. In the second part of the paper I examine the relationship of tolerance and intolerance, proving that the tolerance conceived as the experience of being tolerated induced intolerance. This situation can be exceeded by a change of attitude outlined by philosophical hermeneutics, the essence of which is the practical and behavioral application of the principle of “being thoughtful of the other”. (shrink)

Rudolf Steiner’s work contains many different claims about human freedom spread out in over three hundred books. A basic challenge for the research on Steiner is to create an overview of his idea of freedom, but also to consider potential conflicting claims. One of the main tensions in Steiner’s work is the one between his early philosophical and later anthroposophical accounts of freedom. The former focuses on individual freedom while the latter puts the emphasis on (...) the greater whole in which the human being exists. Hegel’s idea of freedom can be used to create a comprehensive and coherent understanding of Steiner’s different perspectives on freedom. In particular, using Hegel’s notion of being-with-oneself in otherness, the freedom that the individual can experience within the whole can be seen as an immanent development of the individual itself. (shrink)

Abstract. The Western conception of the individual as a rational, self-directing agent is a mythology that organizes and distorts religion, science, economics, and politics. It produces an abstracted and atomized form of engagement that is fatal to collective self-governance. And it turns democracy into the enemy of equality. Considering the meaning of democracy and autonomy from a perspective that takes the subject as truly social would refocus our attention on the constitutive contexts and practices necessary for the production of citizens (...) who are capable of meaningful self-governance. Under modern conditions, it is in the development of sexual autonomy that we learn how to take initiative with respect to our well-being and do so in concert with others. Where the view of rational agency as the defining characteristic of humanity yields a deracinated view of autonomy, a more realistic, humanistic view that we are, necessarily, social beings yields a view of freedom and self-governance as social phenomena that require empathy, negotiation, compromise, cooperation, and mutual recognition and respect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 123 become the origin of the norms of moral freedom and the formal origin of the laws os nature. The totality of the world may be interpreted in terms of the homo noumenon, or in terms of a totality of values, in terms of feeling or as the historical stream of experience. The interrelationship between the various aspects of reality is misconstrued by humanism when the (...) modal laws of the world are absolutized, and a single aspect is made the basic denominator of reality. The neo-Augustinian philosophy of Dooyeweerd recognizes the priority of faith and would unmask the alleged neutrality of theoretical reason as a dogma concealing the religious foundations of theoretical thought. The Archimedean point of Dooyeweerd's philosophy is not cogito ergo sum, nor vivo in [luxu continuo, etiam cogitans, but it is rather: Ego, in Christo regeneratus, etiam cogitans ex Christo vivo. The heart in its Biblical sense is the religious root and center of human existence, the center in which our temporal functions find their religious concentration and consummation of meaning. The Christian philosopher finds the ultimate origin of the world in God's sovereign and creative will, out of which originate all laws, and all things which are subject to law. The Christian philosopher finds the coherence of the modal diversity of the cosmos in a divine world order. The unity of the world is not a construction of philosophical thought, but is rather an enduring effect of God's sovereign power, so that each mode, each aspect of the cosmos is under divine law. Every aspect of the world is a sphere of law, sovereign under God in its own domain. God's laws constitute the universal valid determination and limitation of the individual things subject to them. Consequently, the Christian philosopher cannot hold to a theoretical conception of reality which is emancipated from the Biblical motive of creation, for all such conceptions are at least partially dominated by apostate religious motives. Nash does not attempt to refute Dooyeweerd's main thesis concerning the impossibility of a religiously neutral philosophy; however, his critical remarks do point out that more argumentation is needed in defense of that thesis, and that the introduction of a new terminology, shifts in the meaning of traditional terms, as well as vagueness and ambiguity, necessitate further elaboration on the part of Dooyeweerd and the members of his School. Nash's work successfully accomplishes a two-fold purpose: it calls attention to an important development within the Augustinian tradition of philosophy, and it raises issues which cannot be ignored by members of Dooyeweerd's own school as well as by philosophers who are self-critical of their own presuppositions. Nash's book deserves careful attention and it is to be hoped that it will direct the serious reader to a study of Dooyeweerd's own works and that it will stimulate others to take part in the critical study of a system of thought which "gives important and exciting direction to present and future thought and action and is, in the fullest sense of the word, a Christian Philosophy and a great one." DAWD H. FREEMAN University of Rhode Island Husserl et la pensde moderne--Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit. Edited by H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. x + 250.) This volume contains papers which were read at the Second International Colloquium on Phenomenology which was held at Krefeld in Germany, November 1-3, 1956, under the auspices of the Husserl Archives of Louvain and Cologne. Though the names which 124 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY appear in this volume are among the leading figures in European phenomenology, the content of the volume itself is somewhat disappointing. The editors note that the discussion of these papers was prolonged and lively but they regret that it was impossible to record and publish this part of the Colloquium. The reader of this volume can but share the regret of the editors in this case since many of the papers are but rough drafts, clearly meant to pose questions and lead into discussion and, of themselves, contain very little in the way of new or... (shrink)

This essay proposes that while a "Christian" democracy may be too idealistic, liberal democracy presupposes transcendent moral and spiritual norms, in particular a Judeo-Christian foundation for human dignity and human rights. A Biblical understanding of human nature as fallible and imperfect susceptible to worldly temptations, emphasizes free choice and personal responsibility, and the imperative to limit the temporal exercise of power by any man or institution. Maritain's concept of integral or Christian humanism is founded on personalism, the (...) unique value and dignity of each human being created in the image of God, and the need for community. The major challenge for literal democracy is how to reconcile individual freedom with socio-economic-political-legal institutions and processes which require the constraint of man-made laws and the exercise of authority and power The essay condudes that perhaps the major legacy of the American founding is the notion of the priority of liberty which offers the best prospects for conjoining reason and faith, the secular and the sacred, Athens and Jerusalem, The priority of liberty also animates Maritain's vision of a "Christianly-inspired" personalistic society capable of advancing both individual human flourishing and the common good. (shrink)

Much has been written about the need for trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI), but the underlying meaning of trust and trustworthiness can vary or be used in confusing ways. It is not always clear whether individuals are speaking of a technology’s trustworthiness, a developer’s trustworthiness, or simply of gaining the trust of users by any means. In sociotechnical circles, trustworthiness is often used as a proxy for ‘the good’, illustrating the moral heights to which technologies and developers ought to aspire, at (...) times with a multitude of diverse requirements; or at other times, no specification at all. In philosophical circles, there is doubt that the concept of trust should be applied at all to technologies rather than their human creators. Nevertheless, people continue to intuitively reason about trust in technologies in their everyday language. This qualitative study employed an empirical ethics methodology to address how developers and users define and construct requirements for trust throughout development and use, through a series of interviews. We found that different accounts of trust (rational, affective, credentialist, norms based, relational) served as the basis for individual granting of trust in technologies and operators. Ultimately, the most significant requirement for user trust and assessment of trustworthiness was the accountability of AI developers for the outputs of AI systems, hinging on the identification of accountable moral agents and perceived value alignment between the user and developer’s interests. (shrink)

Sir Thomas Browne's reflection on the synthesis between his Christian religion and his practice as a medical doctor, made over three centuries ago, leads into reflections on the present relation between religion and science in the personal experience of the writer. An account is given of how the actual practice of scientific investigation led the author to theistic inferences and how the study of DNA provoked questions concerning reductionism and emergence. This evoked the need for a map of knowledge, and (...) an attempt is presented in a figure which also serves to clarify what kind of realistic reference is involved in both scientific and humanistic contexts–especially with respect to personal language. Theological investigations thereby receive at least provisional legitimization and, with this encouragement, the article pursues the questions of the nature of the divine Source (“God”) of the world's being and becoming, of God's interaction and communication with the world, especially with human beings in that world. The penultimate section outlines why the writer considers an explicit communication from God to humanity in Jesus of Nazareth is coherent with the foregoing and what this implies for human fulfillment, individually and corporately. The article concludes with a plea for humility before God and nature in our inquiries in the spirit both of Sir Thomas Browne and of the arch “agnostic” T. H. Huxley. (shrink)

Rejecting an eternal, unchanging soul or essence, Jean Paul Sartre praises the beauty of the human experience and definitively declares his preference for a temporary life of change and transformation over an eternity of certainty. In The Good Place, Michael is an immortal demon called an architect, who takes on the ambitious task of designing a neighborhood that will prompt condemned humans Eleanor, Chidi, Tahani, and Jason to unknowingly torture each other. Sartre's existentialism is characterized by his rejection of (...) a pre‐given human essence as well as his focus on the power of individual freedom. In Sartre's view, there is no divine creator, no final judge, and no supernatural moral fabric holding everything together. Throughout the course of four seasons of The Good Place, Michael decides that the project of an eternal certainty is less preferable than a possibly limited lifetime of risk, change, and transformation. (shrink)