In argumentation studies, almost all theoretical proposals are applied, in general, to the analysis and evaluation of argumentative products, but little attention has been paid to the creative process of arguing. Mathematics can be used as a clear example to illustrate some significant theoretical differences between mathematical practice and the products of it, to differentiate the distinct components of the arguments, and to emphasize the need to address the different types of argumentative discourse and argumentative situation in the practice. (...) I consider some issues of recent papers associated with mathematical argumentation in an attempt to contribute to the discussion about the role of arguing in mathematical practice and in the evaluation of the products of this practice. I apply this discussion to learning environments to defend the thesis that argumentative practice should be encouraged when teaching technical subjects to convey a better understanding and to improve thought and creativity. (shrink)

From the perspective of mathematical practice, I examine positions claiming that mathematical objects are introduced by human agents. I consider in particular mathematical fictionalism and a recent position on social ontology formulated by Cole (2013, 2015). These positions are able to solve some of the challenges that non-realist positions face. I argue, however, that mathematical entities have features other than fictional characters and social institutions. I emphasise that the way mathematical objects are introduced is different (...) and point to the multifaceted role that relations and interconnections play in this context. Finally, I argue that mathematical entities can be considered to be pragmatically real. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophical work directly concerned with the practice of mathematics has intensified, giving rise to a movement known as the philosophy of mathematical practice . In this paper we offer a survey of this movement aimed at mathematics educators. We first describe the core questions philosophers of mathematical practice investigate as well as the philosophical methods they use to tackle them. We then provide a selective overview of work in the philosophy of mathematical practice covering (...) topics including the distinction between formal and informal proofs, visualization and artefacts, mathematical explanation and understanding, value judgments, and mathematical design. We conclude with some remarks on the potential connections between the philosophy of mathematical practice and mathematics education. (shrink)

In this chapter I explore the reciprocal relationship between the metaphysical views mathematicians hold and their mathematical activity. I focus on the set-theoretic pluralism debate, in which set theorists disagree about the implications of their formal mathematical work. As a first case study, I discuss how Woodin’s monist argument for an Ultimate-L feeds on and is fed by mathematical results and metaphysical beliefs. In a second case study, I present Hamkins’ pluralist proposal and the mathematical research (...) projects it endows with relevance. These case studies support three claims: (1) the metaphysical views of mathematicians can shape what counts as relevant research; (2) mathematical results can shape the metaphysical beliefs of mathematicians; (3) metaphysical thought and mathematical activity develop in tandem in mathematical practices. This makes metaphysical thought an integral part of mathematical practices. (shrink)

In current philosophical research, there is a rather one-sided focus on the foundations of proof. A full picture of mathematical practice should however additionally involve considerations about various methodological aspects. A number of these is identified, from large-scale to small-scale ones. After that, naturalism, a philosophical school concerned with scientific practice, is looked at, as far as the translations of its epistemic principles to mathematics is concerned. Finally, we call for intensifying the interaction between both dimensions of practice and (...) epistemology. (shrink)

This article looks at recent work in cognitive science on mathematical cognition from the perspective of history and philosophy of mathematical practice. The discussion is focused on the work of Lakoff and Núñez, because this is the first comprehensive account of mathematical cognition that also addresses advanced mathematics and its history. Building on a distinction between mathematics as it is presented in textbooks and as it presents itself to the researcher, it is argued that the focus of (...) cognitive analyses of historical developments of mathematics has been primarily on the former, even if they claim to be about the latter. (shrink)

A phenomenological approach to mathematical practice is sketched out, and some problems with this sort of approach are considered. The approach outlined takes mathematical practices as its data, and seeks to provide an empirically adequate philosophy of mathematics based on observation of these practices. Some observations are presented, based on two case studies of some research into the classification of C*-algebras. It is suggested that an anti-realist account of mathematics could be developed on the basis of these and (...) other studies, locating the substance of mathematics in the various informal argument methods used by mathematicians. (shrink)

What sorts of epistemic virtues are required for effective mathematical practice? Should these be virtues of individual or collective agents? What sorts of corresponding epistemic vices might interfere with mathematical practice? How do these virtues and vices of mathematics relate to the virtue-theoretic terminology used by philosophers? We engage in these foundational questions, and explore how the richness of mathematical practices is enhanced by thinking in terms of virtues and vices, and how the philosophical picture is challenged (...) by the complexity of the case of mathematics. For example, within different social and interpersonal conditions, a trait often classified as a vice might be epistemically productive and vice versa. We illustrate that this occurs in mathematics by discussing Gerovitch’s historical study of the aggressive adversarialism of the Gelfand seminar in post-war Moscow. From this we conclude that virtue epistemologies of mathematics should avoid pre-emptive judgments about the sorts of epistemic character traits that ought to be promoted and criticised. (shrink)

In current philosophical research, there is a rather one-sided focus on the foundations of proof. A full picture of mathematical practice should however additionally involve considerations about various methodological aspects. A number of these is identified, from large-scale to small-scale ones. After that, naturalism, a philosophical school concerned with scientific practice, is looked at, as far as the translations of its epistemic principles to mathematics is concerned. Finally, we call for intensifying the interaction between both dimensions of practice and (...) epistemology. (shrink)

This Element introduces a young field, the 'philosophy of mathematical practice'. We first offer a general characterisation of the approach to the philosophy of mathematics that takes mathematical practice seriously and contrast it with 'mathematical philosophy'. The latter is traced back to Bertrand Russell and the orientation referred to as 'scientific philosophy' that was active between 1850 and 1930. To give a better sense of the field, the Element further contains two examples of topics studied, that of (...) mathematical structuralism and visual thinking in mathematics. These are in part presented from a methodological point of view, focussing on mathematics as an activity and questions related to how mathematics develops. In addition, the Element contains several examples from mathematics, both historical and contemporary, to illustrate and support the philosophical points. (shrink)

There is an urgent need in philosophy of mathematics for new approaches which pay closer attention to mathematical practice. This book will blaze the trail: it offers philosophical analyses of important characteristics of contemporary mathematics and of many aspects of mathematical activity which escape purely formal logical treatment.

This paper attempts to look at the contemporary mathematical practice through the lenses of the distributed cognition approach. The ubiquitous use of personal computers and the internet as a key attribute of the digital society is interpreted here as a means to achieve a more effective distribution of the human cognitive activity. The major challenge that determines the transformation of mathematical practice is identified as ‘the problem of complexity’. The computer-assisted complete formalization of mathematical proofs as a (...) current tendency is viewed as one of the strands along which the mathematical community responds to the challenge. It is shown that this tendency gives live to the project calling to revisit and rebuild the very foundations of mathematics to secure more effective communication and thus guarantee the reliability of contemporary mathematics. (shrink)

Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence. He analyses the (...) linguistic pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics both sensitive to mathematical practice, and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer a descriptive theory of analogical reasoning in mathematics, stating general conditions under which an analogy may provide genuine inductive support to a mathematical conjecture (over and above fulfilling the merely heuristic role of ‘suggesting’ a conjecture in the psychological sense). The proposed conditions generalize the criteria of Hesse in her influential work on analogical reasoning in the empirical sciences. By reference to several case studies, we argue that the account proposed in this paper does (...) a better job in vindicating the use of analogical inference in mathematics than the prominent alternative defended by Bartha. (shrink)

Mathematical practitioners in seventeenth-century London formed a cohesive knowledge community that intersected closely with instrument-makers, printers and booksellers. Many wrote books for an increasingly numerate metropolitan market on topics covering a wide range of mathematical disciplines, ranging from algebra to arithmetic, from merchants’ accounts to the art of surveying. They were also teachers of mathematics like John Kersey or Euclid Speidell who would use their own rooms or the premises of instrument-makers for instruction. There was a high degree (...) of interdependency even beyond their immediate milieu. Authors would cite not only each other, but also practitioners of other professions, especially those artisans with whom they collaborated closely. Practical mathematical books effectively served as an advertising medium for the increasingly self-conscious members of a new emerging professional class. Contemporaries would talk explicitly of ‘the London mathematicians’ in distinction to their academic counterparts at Oxford or Cambridge. The article takes a closer look at this metropolitan knowledge culture during the second half of the century, considering its locations, its meeting places and the mathematical clubs which helped forge the identity of its practitioners. It discusses their backgrounds, teaching practices and relations to the London book trade, which supplied inexpensive practical mathematical books to a seemingly insatiable public. (shrink)

Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as the Riemann hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. In recent decades, massive increases in computer power have permitted the gathering of huge amounts of numerical evidence, both for conjectures in pure mathematics and (...) for the behavior of complex applied mathematical models and statistical algorithms. Mathematics has therefore become (among other things) an experimental science (though that has not diminished the importance of proof in the traditional style). We examine how the evaluation of evidence for conjectures works in mathematical practice. We explain the (objective) Bayesian view of probability, which gives a theoretical framework for unifying evidence evaluation in science and law as well as in mathematics. Numerical evidence in mathematics is related to the problem of induction; the occurrence of straightforward inductive reasoning in the purely logical material of pure mathematics casts light on the nature of induction as well as of mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

Formal logic has often been seen as uniquely placed to analyze mathematical argumentation. While formal logic is certainly necessary for a complete understanding of mathematical practice, it is not sufficient. Important aspects of mathematical reasoning closely resemble patterns of reasoning in nonmathematical domains. Hence the tools developed to understand informal reasoning, collectively known as argumentation theory, are also applicable to much mathematical argumentation. This chapter investigates some of the details of that application. Consideration is given to (...) the many contrasting meanings of the word “argument”; to some of the specific argumentation-theoretic tools that have been applied to mathematics, notably Toulmin layouts and argumentation schemes; to some of the different ways that argumentation is implicated in mathematical practices; and to the social aspects of mathematical argumentation. (shrink)

On the one hand, I show that the later Wittgenstein's practice-based approach to meaning, including the idea that the meaningfulness of mathematics ultimately is rooted in the everyday ‘applications’ it emerged from, as well as his insistence on the variability in and contingency of mathematical and mathematics-like practices, foreshadows more recent work in Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (PMP), although Wittgenstein's approach was more radically practice-based than what is prevalent in present-day PMP. On the other hand, I also show (...) that Wittgenstein's work on mathematics is driven by a pervasive critical attitude towards some key characteristics (monism, foundationalism and exceptionalism) of mainstream philosophical discourse about mathematics (then and now), which is mostly absent from present-day PMP, and I argue that this aspect of Wittgenstein's work on mathematics could inspire present-day practitioners of PMP to rethink the identity of their discipline. (shrink)

This book provides a reading of Kant's theory of the construction of mathematical concepts through a fully contextualised analysis. In this work the author argues that it is only through an understanding of the relevant eighteenth century mathematics textbooks, and the related mathematical practice, that the material and context necessary for a successful interpretation of Kant's philosophy can be provided.

In the field of the philosophy of mathematics, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of two processes: intuition and visualization. History has shown us that great mathematicians in their inventions have used these processes to arrive at their most brilliant proofs, theories and concepts. In this article, we want to defend that both intuition and visualization can be understood as processes that contribute to the development of mathematical knowledge as evidenced in the history of mathematics. Like intuition, (...) visualization does not have a definition, and its role has become more prominent both in pure mathematics and in educational research. For us, both visualization and intuition are processes that start from the real world of those who “intuit” or “visualize,” require experience and knowledge of concepts and theories (the more expertise in the subject, the more profound the results will be) and must, in the end, be validated by the specialized academic community. In this article, we defend the importance of visualization in mathematical practice and its role in the advances of great scientists (Euclid, Euler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Maxwell, Riemann, Einstein, Feynman, among others) as an alternative and valuable way to symbolic thinking, which has “reigned” in the academic and scientific community. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of counterfactuals have had relatively little to say about counterfactual reasoning in mathematics. Partly this is because most mathematical counterfactuals seem also to be counterpossibles, in that their antecedents deny some necessary truth. In this chapter, I delineate several different categories of mathematical counterfactual (or “countermathematical”) and then examine in detail a case study from mathematical practice that features counterfactual reasoning about “spoof perfect” numbers. I argue that reasoning about spoof perfect numbers presents both a (...) challenge to philosophical analyses of counterfactuals and a resource for thinking more productively about the role of counterfactual reasoning in mathematics. (shrink)

A characteristic feature of the philosophy of mathematical practice is to attend to what people do when they do mathematics. But what does it mean to do mathematics? This question raises several issues regarding the nature of action, activity, and agency in mathematical practice. The present chapter reviews contributions in the field that have attempted to theorize about these notions. It begins with some motivations for taking agents seriously in the philosophical study of mathematical practice. The core (...) of the chapter discusses, in turn, what it means to carry out mathematical activities, do things with mathematical artifacts, engage with mathematical proofs, and perform mathematical actions prescribed by mathematical texts. Taken together, the various lines of work reported here provide an initial, but already sophisticated, picture of what it means to do mathematics. The chapter ends with some suggestions for future research on agency in mathematical practice. (shrink)

A number of examples of studies from the field ‘The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’ (PMP) are given. To characterise this new field, three different strands are identified: an agent-based, a historical, and an epistemological PMP. These differ in how they understand ‘practice’ and which assumptions lie at the core of their investigations. In the last part a general framework, capturing some overall structure of the field, is proposed.

In the mathematics education research literature, there is a growing body of scholarship on how mathematicians practice their craft. The purpose of this chapter is to survey some of this literature and explain how it can contribute to the philosophy of mathematical practice. We first describe how mathematics educators use empirical methodologies to investigate the behaviors of mathematicians and argue that findings from these studies can inform the philosophy of mathematical practice. We then illustrate this by summarizing research (...) on mathematicians’ understandings and mathematicians’ proof reading. (shrink)

Until recently, discussion of virtues in the philosophy of mathematics has been fleeting and fragmentary at best. But in the last few years this has begun to change. As virtue theory has grown ever more influential, not just in ethics where virtues may seem most at home, but particularly in epistemology and the philosophy of science, some philosophers have sought to push virtues out into unexpected areas, including mathematics and its philosophy. But there are some mathematicians already there, ready to (...) meet them, who have explicitly invoked virtues in discussing what is necessary for a mathematician to succeed. In both ethics and epistemology, virtue theory tends to emphasize character virtues, the acquired excellences of people. But people are not the only sort of thing whose excellences may be identified as virtues. Theoretical virtues have attracted attention in the philosophy of science as components of an account of theory choice. Within the philosophy of mathematics, and mathematics itself, attention to virtues has emerged from a variety of disparate sources. Theoretical virtues have been put forward both to analyse the practice of proof and to justify axioms; intellectual virtues have found multiple applications in the epistemology of mathematics; and ethical virtues have been offered as a basis for understanding the social utility of mathematical practice. Indeed, some authors have advocated virtue epistemology as the correct epistemology for mathematics (and perhaps even as the basis for progress in the metaphysics of mathematics). This topical collection brings together several of the researchers who have begun to study mathematical practices from a virtue perspective with the intention of consolidating and encouraging this trend. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the fundamental difference of the formal and the informal position in the philosophy of mathematics results from the collision of an object and a process centric perspective towards mathematics. This collision can be overcome by means of dialectical analysis, which shows that both perspectives essentially depend on each other. This is illustrated by the example of mathematical proof and its formal and informal nature. A short overview of the employed materialist dialectical approach (...) is given that rationalises mathematical development as a process of model production. It aims at placing more emphasis on the application aspects of mathematical results. Moreover, it is shown how such production realises subjective capacities as well as objective conditions, where the latter are mediated by mathematical formalism. The approach is further sustained by Polanyi’s theory of problem solving and Stegmaier’s philosophy of orientation. In particular, the tool and application perspective illuminates which role computer-based proofs can play in mathematics. (shrink)

The seventeenth century saw dramatic advances in mathematical theory and practice. With the recovery of many of the classical Greek mathematical texts, new techniques were introduced, and within 100 years, the rules of analytic geometry, geometry of indivisibles, arithmatic of infinites, and calculus were developed. Although many technical studies have been devoted to these innovations, Mancosu provides the first comprehensive account of the relationship between mathematical advances of the seventeenth century and the philosophy of mathematics of the (...) period. Starting with the Renaissance debates on the certainty of mathematics, Mancosu leads the reader through the foundational issues raised by the emergence of these new mathematical techniques, including the influence of the Aristotelian conception of science in Cavalieri and Guldin, the foundational relevance of Descartes' Geometrie, the relation between geometrical and epistemological theories of the infinite, and the Leibnizian calculus and the opposition to infinitesimalist procedures. In the process Mancosu draws a sophisticated picture of the subtle dependencies between technical development and philosophical reflection in seventeenth century mathematics. (shrink)

We describe recent developments in research on mathematical practice and cognition and outline the nine contributions in this special issue of topiCS. We divide these contributions into those that address (a) mathematical reasoning: patterns, levels, and evaluation; (b) mathematical concepts: evolution and meaning; and (c) the number concept: representation and processing.

Records of online collaborative mathematical activity provide us with a novel, rich, searchable, accessible and sizeable source of data for empirical investigations into mathematical practice. In this paper we discuss how the resources of crowdsourced mathematics can be used to help formulate and answer questions about mathematical practice, and what their limitations might be. We describe quantitative approaches to studying crowdsourced mathematics, reviewing work from cognitive history (comparing individual and collaborative proofs); social psychology (on the prospects for (...) a measure of collective intelligence); human–computer interaction (on the factors that led to the success of one such project); network analysis (on the differences between collaborations on open research problems and known-but-hard problems); and argumentation theory (on modelling the argument structures of online collaborations). We also give an overview of qualitative approaches, reviewing work from empirical philosophy (on explanation in crowdsourced mathematics); sociology of scientific knowledge (on conventions and conversations in online mathematics); and ethnography (on contrasting conceptions of collaboration). We suggest how these diverse methods can be applied to crowdsourced mathematics and when each might be appropriate. (shrink)

It is well known that Felix Klein took a decisive step in investigating the invariants of transformation groups. However, less attention has been given to Klein’s considerations on the epistemological implications of his work on geometry. This paper proposes an interpretation of Klein’s view as a form of mathematical structuralism, according to which the study of mathematical structures provides the basis for a better understanding of how mathematical research and practice develop.

Frank Quinn of Jaffe-Quinn fame worked out the basics of his own account of how mathematical practice should be described and analyzed, partly by historical comparisons with 19th century mathematics, partly by an analysis of contemporary mathematics and its pedagogy. Despite his claim that for this task, "professional philosophers seem as irrelevant as Aristotle is to modern physics," this philosophy talk will provide a critical summary of his main observations and arguments. The goal is to inject some of Quinns (...) remarks to the current conversation on mathematical practice. [1] Jaffe, Arthur, Quinn, Frank. "Theoretical Mathematics: Towards a synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society NS 29:1, 113. [2] Quinn, Frank. Contributions to a Science of Mathematics, manuscript, 98pp. [3] Quinn, Frank. "A revolution in mathematics? What really happened a century ago and why it matters today," Notices American Mathematical Society 59:1 31-37. (shrink)

Philosophers have paid little attention to mathematical explanations . I present a variety of examples of mathematical explanation and examine two cases in detail. I argue that mathematical explanations have important implications for the philosophy of mathematics and of science. ;The first case study compares many proofs of Pick's theorem, a simple geometrical result. Though a simple proof surfaces to establish the result, some of the proofs explain the result better than others. The second case study comes (...) from George Polya's Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning. He gives a proof that, while entirely satisfactory in establishing its conclusion, is insufficiently explanatory. To provide a better explanation, he supplements the proof with additional exposition. ;These case studies illustrate at least two distinct explanatory virtues, and suggest there may be more. First, an explanatory improvement occurs when a sense of "arbitrariness" is reduced in the proofs. Proofs more explanatory in this way place greater restrictions on the steps that can be used to reach the conclusion. Second, explanatoriness is judged by directness of representation. More explanatory proofs allow one to ascribe geometric meaning to the terms of Pick's formula as they arise. ;I trace the lack of attention to mathematical explanations to an implicit assumption, justificationism, that only justificational aspects of mathematical reasoning are epistemically important. I propose an anti-justificationist epistemic position, the epistemic virtues view, which holds that justificational virtues, while important, are not the only ones of philosophical interest in mathematics. Indeed, explanatory benefits are rarely justificational. I show how the epistemic virtues view and the recognition of mathematical explanation can shed new light on philosophical debates. ;Mathematical explanations have consequences for philosophy of science as well. I show that mathematical explanations provide serious challenges to any theory, such as Bas van Fraassen's, that considers explanations to be fundamentally answers to why-questions. I urge a closer interaction between philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science; both will be needed for a fuller understanding of mathematical explanation. (shrink)

Philosophy of mathematics today has transformed into a very complex network of diverse ideas, viewpoints, and theories. Sometimes the emphasis is on the "classical" foundational work (often connected with the use of formal logical methods), sometimes on the sociological dimension of the mathematical research community and the "products" it produces, then again on the education of future mathematicians and the problem of how knowledge is or should be transmitted from one generation to the next. The editors of this book (...) felt the urge, first of all, to bring together the widest variety of authors from these different domains and, secondly, to show that this diversity does not exclude a sufficient number of common elements to be present. In the eyes of the editors, this book will be considered a success if it can convince its readers of the following: that it is warranted to dream of a realistic and full-fledged theory of mathematical practices, in the plural. If such a theory is possible, it would mean that a number of presently existing fierce oppositions between philosophers, sociologists, educators, and other parties involved, are in fact illusory. (shrink)

Major shifts in the field of model theory in the twentieth century have seen the development of new tools, methods, and motivations for mathematicians and philosophers. In this book, John T. Baldwin places the revolution in its historical context from the ancient Greeks to the last century, argues for local rather than global foundations for mathematics, and provides philosophical viewpoints on the importance of modern model theory for both understanding and undertaking mathematical practice. The volume also addresses the impact (...) of model theory on contemporary algebraic geometry, number theory, combinatorics, and differential equations. This comprehensive and detailed book will interest logicians and mathematicians as well as those working on the history and philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

On the basis of a wide range of historical examples various features of axioms are discussed in relation to their use in mathematical practice. A very general framework for this discussion is provided, and it is argued that axioms can play many roles in mathematics and that viewing them as self-evident truths does not do justice to the ways in which mathematicians employ axioms. Possible origins of axioms and criteria for choosing axioms are also examined. The distinctions introduced aim (...) at clarifying discussions in philosophy of mathematics and contributing towards a more refined view of mathematical practice. (shrink)

It has been observed many times before that, as yet, there are no encompassing, integrated theories of mathematical practice available.To witness, as we currently do, a variety of schools in this field elaborating their philosophical frameworks, and trying to sort out their differences in the course of doing so, is also to be constantly reminded of the fact that a lot of epistemic aspects, extremely relevant to this task, remain dramatically underexamined. This volume wants to contribute to the stock (...) of studies filling this perceived lacuna. It contains papers by established, upcoming, as well as beginning scholars, covering general, metaphilosophical themes such as naturalism, semiotics, pragmaticism, or empiricism, next to more specific topics including the unity of mathematical theories, thruth-flow in mathematics, diagrammatic reasoning, erroneous argumentation, or numerical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a position in the ontology of mathematics which is inspired mainly by a case study in the mathematical discipline if-theory. The main theses of this position are that mathematical objects are introduced by mathematicians and that after mathematical objects have been introduced, they exist as objectively accessible abstract objects.

In the present contribution we look at the legacy of Hilbert's programme in some recent developments in mathematics. Hilbert's ideas have seen new life in generalised and relativised forms by the hands of proof theorists and have been a source of motivation for the so--called reverse mathematics programme initiated by H. Friedman and S. Simpson. More recently Hilbert's programme has inspired T. Coquand and H. Lombardi to undertake a new approach to constructive algebra in which strong emphasis is laid on (...) the use of finite methods. The main aim is to eliminate the ideal objects and in so doing obtain more elementary and informative proofs. We survey some work in commutative algebra---mainly about and around the Zariski spectrum and the Krull dimension of a commutative ring---which witnesses the feasibility of such a revised Hilbert's programme. (shrink)

The concept of infinity has a long and troubled history. Thus it is a promising concept with which to explore rejection, disagreement, controversy and acceptance in mathematical practice. This paper briefly considers four cases from the history of infinity, drawing on social constructionism as the background social theory. The unit of analysis of social constructionism is conversation. This is the social mechanism whereby new mathematical claims are proposed, scrutinised and critiqued. Minimally, conversation is based on the two roles (...) of proponent and critic. The proponent puts forward a proposal, which is reacted to and evaluated by those in the role of critic. There is a continuum of contexts in which such conversations take place from inner conversations the mathematician has within themselves, and casual face-to face interactions between mathematicians at the chalkboard, all the way to the formal responses of referees and editors to submitted journal papers. Such responses vary from unconditional acceptance, partial acceptance through to outright rejection. There may be disagreements between proponents and critics, among those in the joint role of critic, and broader, community-wide disagreements and controversies, according to specific mathematical proposal and the critical judgements of it. (shrink)

This work explores the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in relation to Lakatos’ philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematical practice. I argue that, while the philosophy of mathematical practice typically identifies Lakatos as its earliest of predecessors, the later Wittgenstein already developed key ideas for this community a few decades before. However, for a variety of reasons, most of this work on philosophy of mathematics has gone relatively unnoticed. Some of these ideas and their significance as (...) precursors for the philosophy of mathematical practice will be presented here, including a brief reconstruction of Lakatos’ considerations on Euler’s conjecture for polyhedra from the lens of late Wittgensteinian philosophy. Overall, this article aims to challenge the received view of the history of the philosophy of mathematical practice and inspire further work in this community drawing from Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. (shrink)

This title offers philosophical analyses of important characteristics of contemporary mathematics and of many aspects of mathematical activity which escape purely formal logical treatment.

This volume focuses on the importance of historical enquiry for the appreciation of philosophical problems concerning mathematics.

A cluster of recent papers on Frege have urged variations on the theme that Frege’s conception of logic is in some crucial way incompatible with ‘metatheoretic’ investigation. From this observation, significant consequences for our interpretation of Frege’s understanding of his enterprise are taken to follow. This chapter aims to critically examine this view, and to isolate what I take to be the core of truth in it. However, I will also argue that once we have isolated the defensible kernel, the (...) sense in which Frege was committed to rejecting ‘metatheory’ is too narrow and uninteresting to support the con-. (shrink)