What account is to be given of the nature of time? In this essay, I begin by outlining some of the central metaphysical questions in the philosophy of time and I then go on to set out and defend answers to those questions. The result will be a view of the nature of time that, as we shall see, lies between tenseless accounts of the nature of time and traditional tensed accounts.

Seventh in the New Dialogues in Philosophy series, this book discusses the concept of time and shows in the simplest ways how time informs discussions about causality, creation, physics, natural disasters, and much more. Creating a series of conversations between two fictional characters, Bradley Dowden uses the characters to explore nine metaphysical issues involving time.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83).

Most discussions of Leibniz's metaphysics of time and space begin and end with the correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, Newton's friend and defender. But Leibniz's ideas about time and space are far richer than this exchange suggests, and Michael Futch shows that the study of those investigations will enhance current discussion among philosophers and cosmologists. Futch's scholarly attention to a wide range of texts is matched by his philosophical acuity. His detailed expositions of texts are not tedious or (...) pedantic because he never fails to bring out their philosophical interest and pertinence. So, too, the book's bibliography is especially valuable.The book opens with a discussion of Newton's substantivalism, which treats time and space as substance-like structures that exist independent of the objects located in them, versus Leibniz's reductionism, which holds time and space to be merely relations, ontologically dependent on the things that exist: space is the order of coexistences, time the order of successions. Futch gives useful historical background that explains why the debate takes the form that it does and what. (shrink)

A selection of lively debates in the philosophy of time that outline, defend and object to contemporary issues in metaphysics, consciousness and God.

I defend in this paper the thesis that there is a complex relation between minimalist musical works and the metaphysics of time, involving ontological, epistemological and axiological issues. This relation is explained by means of three sub-theses. The first one is that minimalist musical works literally exemplify –in Goodman’s sense–the properties ascribed to time by the metaphysical static view: 1) minimalist works intrinsically possess those properties by being composed according to the technique of minimal repetition; 2) they extrinsically refer (...) to those properties in virtue of pragmatic processes of accommodation of disagreements on what is taken to be common ground in a particular musical context. The second sub-thesis is that, in exemplifying those properties, minimalist musical works are valuable from two perspectives: a formalist one, according to which minimalist works purify the concept of what a musical work is; and a cognitive one, insofar they allow us to obtain phenomenal knowledge of what it is like to experience time as the static view conceives it. The third sub-thesis is that each particular minimalist musical work is valuable insofar it achieves either the formalist or the cognitive goals in an original way. (shrink)

In the paper I offer a brief overview of main problems in the contemporary metaphysics of time: debates on tensed and detensed theories of time and presentism-eternalism debate. I systematically expose the solutions from the point of view that the truth is grounded in reality and consider the main arguments for each position.

We review the current situation in the philosophy of time, partly to investigate Michael Dummett’s complaint that the philosophy of physics has become too specialized and technical to be able to communicate with mainstream philosophy. We conclude that the situation in this case is different: there is no special difficulty of intelligibility---the obstacle for communication between science and philosophy here is rather that what physics, or science in general, tells us is prima facie in conflict with common sense and intuition. (...) We argue that this difficulty is indeed prima facie: on closer inspection it appears that the scientific B-theory may explain our intuition better than the A-theory, even though the latter at first sight seems to completely mirror our direct experience. (shrink)

This thesis introduces and defends a ‘C theory’ of time. The metaphysics of time literature is primarily concerned with the distinction between the A and B theories of time, with the disagreement concerning whether the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. I argue that the distinction between the B and C theories—in terms of whether time has a ‘privileged’ direction—is of more obvious relevance to the philosophy of physics than is the distinction between the A and (...) B theories. The thesis has three main contentions. (1) In order to maintain a substantial metaphysical dispute between the different theories of time, they must be defined in terms of structural properties, and the naturalistic metaphysics of time direction involves the assessment of these structures in light of contemporary physics. (2) The A theory of time requires a model with two temporal dimensions, and although such a model provides a resolution to a number of problems faced by standard A theories, it is not motivated by physical theory. (3) The dispute between the B and C theories of time is of direct relevance to the philosophy of physics: the B theorist’s assumption of the existence of a privileged temporal direction is of explanatory relevance to physics; and a comparison between unidirectional and adirectional explanations in physics can in principle shed light on whether time is B- or C-theoretic. (shrink)

Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to (...) block one drawing conclusions for the metaphysics of time from the nature of our emotions. (shrink)

What is the nature of time? Does it flow? Do the past and future exist? Drawing connections between historical and present-day questions, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time provides an up-to-date guide to one of the most central and debated topics in contemporary metaphysics. Introducing the views and arguments of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, this accessible introduction covers the history of the philosophy of time from the Pre-Socratics to the beginning of the 20th (...) Century. The historical survey presents the necessary background to understanding more recent developments, including McTaggarts 1908 argument for the unreality of time, the open future, the perdurance/endurance debate, the possibility of time travel, and the relevance of current physics to the philosophy of time. Informed by cutting-edge philosophical research, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time evaluates influential historical arguments in the context of contemporary developments. (shrink)

What grounds the standard claim that classical mechanics is time-reversal invariant? Hutchison (1993, 1995) challenges the conventional reasoning underlying the belief that classical mechanics is time reversal invariant and argues that it is not in any well-defined sense. I find a defensible criterion that will exclude his cases, thereby rescuing a sense in which we can say that classical mechanics is time reversal invariant.

Torrengo, Giuliano_Propositions and the Metaphysics of Time.

I argue that different views in the metaphysics of time make different observational predictions in both classical and relativistic cases. Because different views in the metaphysics of time differ over which facts are merely indexical facts, they make different observational predictions about certain self-locating propositions. I argue for this thesis by distinguishing the three main updating procedures that apply in cases of self-locating uncertainty, and I present a series of cases which cumulatively show that every one of these (...) updating procedures distinguishes eternalism and presentism in both classical and relativistic settings. (shrink)

I give a new and more general argument against presentism within relativistic spacetimes. This argument is untouched by different recent proposals designed to save presentism in a relativistic setting.

This chapter considers eternity, duration, time, and their interrelations, and aims to resolve a paradox in Spinoza's theory of the mind's eternity. Spinoza's metaphysics of time includes an endless series of virtuous regresses. Spinoza characterizes duratio as a “magnitude. Spinoza says that duratio is “conceived as being greater or lesser, and as composed of parts”. Spinoza addresses time and its relation to duratio in the Metaphysical Thoughts. Spinoza accepts Suarez's view that “duratio and existence are only rationally distinct”. Spinoza (...) holds, with some of the Scholastic philosophers, that extrinsic denominations are mind‐made. Spinoza also uses geometrical construction as a model for thinking about the relationship between eternity and time. Spinoza seems, prima facie, to think that the mind cannot ever be eternal, but also can become eternal, and moreover already is eternal. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that there can be no mental representation of objective ‘tensed’ features of reality of the kind that might be thought to occur when we experience time passing or think of times as past, present or future, whether or not such features are part of mind-independent reality. This, I hold, has important consequences for metaphysics; but (as will be most relevant to this volume) it is also likely to have important consequences for a correct semantics (...) for tense. In a nutshell, no correct semantics for tense can treat what philosophers call ‘A-properties’ (such as real pastness, presentness or futurity) as semantic values. (shrink)

In this brief note I argue that one’s position regarding the metaphysics of time constrains one’s conception of divine eternality. Specifically, temporalism entails commitment to the dynamic theory of time, and atemporalism entails commitment to the static theory of time.

In this paper I explore three related topics emerging from Prior's work on the logic of time. First, what is the proper province of logic, if any? Is temporal (modal) logic just logic, on a par with the paradigmatic case of first-order quantification theory or even simple propositional logic? Second, what counts as an interpretation of a formal system? In particular, can formal semantics provide an interpretation? Third, what is the proper role of the meta-theory? In connection with this last (...) question we will see how Prior's attitude towards instants of time may teach us something about the analogous case of possible worlds. (shrink)

In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise (...) serious objection due to David Armstrong. In addition the Mortmain theory enables me to argue against the ‘‘Parmenidean’’ or Block Universe position that future and past are both real. (shrink)

This paper concerns acting for reasons and how this can inform debates about the metaphysics of time. Storrs-Fox (2021) has argued against the A-theory of time on the grounds that it cannot adequately account for the explanation of actions. Storrs-Fox assumes that explanation is forever. He argues that this is incompatible with the A-theory because the reasons people act for are the explanantia of their actions, though according to the A-theory these reasons, that is facts, often do not obtain (...) forever and therefore nor do the explanations. I will argue that many particular explanatory relations are not forever because reasons for actions must often fade as a person cannot now have a reason to do something at an earlier time. Generally, people cannot affect the past and therefore cannot have rational obligations to do so. Therefore, the A-theory does not face the problem Storrs-Fox suggests. In fact, the A-theory says what ought to be said and accounts for the wider phenomena of responding to reasons better than the B-theory. It is often the case that an agent acts rationally only if that agent acts on the basis of a present tensed belief. This implies that present tensed beliefs capture facts that no tenseless beliefs do, because the rationality of an action is determined by the reasons an agent acts for, not the beliefs through which the agent is aware of these. However, the B-theory, unlike the A-theory, denies there are any facts thus uniquely captured by present tensed beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that presentism —the view that only present objects exist—can be motivated, at least to some degree, by virtue of the fact that it is more quantitatively parsimonious than rival views.

The main theme of this thesis is time travel; time travel cases—both from relativistic physics and science fiction—provide or highlight deep problems for certain positions in contemporary debates about the metaphysical nature of time and of how material objects persist through time. This thesis explores the implications of these discussions; more specifically, I draw attention to some of the interesting things we can learn about presentism and endurantism from discussions of time travel cases that have been raised recently in the (...) literature. In the end, I argue in favour of what I consider a non-standard theory of persistence, which I call transdurantism, according to which persisting objects are temporally extended simples. (shrink)

Lucretius points out a puzzling asymmetry in our attitudes towards our prenatal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence. Normally, we view birth as a happy occasion, and death as a sad event. Some philosophers argue that these asymmetry in our attitude is justified by the A-theory of Time, which reflects the common sense way of thinking about time, and so they discredit the B-theory of Time. In this paper I critically examine these claims and argue that this belief is false. Our (...) attitude is neither justified nor discredited by anything which is in debate between the A-Theory and the B-theory of time. Thus the existence of this asymmetry does not favor one theory over the other, and the dispute between the two theories will have to be settled on other grounds. (shrink)

Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.

In this book Ludlow uses the metaphysics of time as a case study and focuses on the dispute between A-theorists and B-theorists about the nature of time.

At first glance, every metaphysics of laws can be combined with every ontology of time. In contrast, the paper intends to show that Humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. growing block or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.

This is a review of 'Debates in the Metaphysics of Time' (Bloomsbury), ed. by Nathan Oaklander.

This book is a systematic investigation into the metaphysical foundations of identity over time. The author elaborates and evaluates the most common theory about the persistence of objects through time and change, namely the classical theory of spatio-temporal continuity. He shows how the theory requires an ontology of temporal parts, according to which objects are made up of temporally extended segments or stages. This ontology is criticized as unwarranted by modern space-time physics, and as internally incoherent. The author argues that (...) identity over time should be seen as a primitive or unanalysable phenomenon, and that the so-called puzzle cases and paradoxes of identity can be dealt with without recourse to such an ontology. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter (...) examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. (shrink)

The basic principles of Cipra's metaphysics (according to his book "Metamorphoses of Metaphysics") are analyzed with respect to Cipra's request for the revision of classical logical principles (of identity, excluded middle and contradiction). In Cipra's metaphysics, the principle of identity holds for being, necessity and past only, the principle of excluded middle does not hold for coming-to-be, possibility and present, and the principle of contradiction does not hold for the actuality, reality (freedom) and future. A propositional and (...) first-order temporal model and semantics are defined for such a concept of metaphysical time. The propositional ockhamistic branching time model is extended, in a first-order model, with a non-empty set of object shapes and an equivalence relation between object shapes in time, so that, for example, different, previously equivalent object shapes can in future contradict one another. (shrink)