Quantum Mechanics, Miscellaneous

This paper presents a falsifiable prediction based on A-theories of time, which require both an A-series (future/present/past) and B-series (earlier/simultaneous/later) of time. We make an unusual argument based on the temporal search parameters of YouTube videos, which requires *two* parameters. We make the falsifiable prediction that no interface with just *one* parameter can be made that has the same functionality (as would be asserted in B-theories). This circumstance applies to many areas of human endeavor. We extend this analysis to clocks, (...) showing how sundials, analog clocks, digital clocks, and atomic clocks all fundamentally operate using both temporal series. The progression from hardware to software clocks in computers reveals how both series persist through increasing levels of abstraction. These findings suggest that physics, being fundamentally based on clock measurements, must incorporate both temporal series rather than attempting to reduce one to the other. This approach offers new insights into the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity, suggesting that quantum mechanics primarily operates in A-series time while relativity operates in B-series time, potentially illuminating why their unification has proven challenging. (shrink)

In this short informal note we consider four Gedankenexperiments that show A-theories of time are compelling and can be leveraged to give a Presentist Fragmentalist realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. Each of these four involve roles for manifest time, relativistic time, and quantum mechanical time. The point is to give simple everyday situations where a new point of view leads to the consistency of all three. This is the MO of the early Einstein. Einstein's Train is one of the Gedankenexperiments (...) considered. (shrink)

ليس بالتفكير نخلق العوالم، بل بفهم العالم نتعلم التفكير. "الرؤية الكونية" هو مصطلح يجب أن يعني مجموعة من الأسس التي تنبثق منها فهم منهجي للكون، ومكوناته كالحياة، والعالم الذي نعيش فيه، والطبيعة، والظواهر البشرية، وعلاقاتها. إنه، بالتالي، مجال من الفلسفة التحليلية يغذيه العلوم، وهدفه هو هذا المعرفة المجمعة والمستدامة معرفيًا عن كل ما نحن عليه ونحتويه، وما يحيط بنا، وما يرتبط بنا بأي شكل من الأشكال. إنه شيء قديم قدم الفكر البشري، وبالإضافة إلى استخدام عناصر من علم الكونيات العلمي، فإنه (...) يشمل كل شيء في الفلسفة والعلوم الذي يشير إلى الكون والحياة. الرؤية الكونية ليست مجموعة من الأفكار والفرضيات والافتراضات بل هي نظام قائم على الملاحظة والتحليل والدليل والتوضيح. لا تهدف أي رؤية كونية إلى التعريف أو التأسيس أو الاقتراح بل فقط إلى الفهم والتحليل والتفسير. كل منا يبني وينقل رؤيته الكونية طوال حياته، دون إنشاء أشكال، كخلفية لتفكيرنا وسلوكنا. لغويًا، قد يشتق مصطلح "الرؤية الكونية" من الألمانية، ويعادل مفهوم "Weltanschauung"، كما استخدمه عدة فلاسفة. ومع ذلك، فإن هذه العلاقة اللغوية غير قابلة للتطبيق لأنها تتعارض مع ما نقترحه كرؤية كونية. تشير هذه الكلمة الألمانية إلى رؤية واقعية قبل منطقية أو أولية، ذات سياق حدسي وبعيدة عن المعرفة النقدية التي لم تكن موجودة بعد في وقت صياغتها. بلا شك، تحتوي الرؤى الكونية، بالمعنى الذي نفهمها، وتستخدم هذه العناصر الأولية أو قبل المنطقية التي تشمل التاريخ واللاوعي الجماعي وكل النماذج التي نحملها. ومع ذلك، في المفهوم الذي نطبقه هنا، تتجاوز الرؤية الكونية هذا المحتوى بكثير، أولاً من خلال إخضاعه باستمرار للتفكير النقدي الحالي، وأخيرًا من خلال جعل التجربة التحليلية (وليس التفكير نفسه أو الحدس) كونها الفعلي. يعرض أنطونيو لوبيس اتساع هذا المحتوى: "الرؤى الكونية ليست نتاج الفكر. لا تنبع من الرغبة البسيطة في المعرفة. إن استيعاب الواقع هو لحظة مهمة في تكوينها، ولكن، مع ذلك، هي واحدة فقط. إنها تأتي من السلوك الحيوي، ومن تجربة تقييم الحياة، ومن هيكل كليتنا النفسية. إن رفع الحياة إلى الوعي في معرفة الواقع، وفي التقييم، وفي الواقع الإرادي هو العمل البطيء والشاق الذي قامت به الإنسانية في تطوير مفاهيم الحياة. (ديلتاي، 1992 [1911]: 120)"(1) في هذا العمل، نسعى إلى تحديد رؤية كونية تستند إلى الحقائق التي تقدمها العلوم اليوم. لا نقترح، في أي وقت، أن نقوم بالعلم؛ أو نظري الفلسفة، لكننا سنسعى دائمًا لأن ندعم بها أو، على الأقل، نحتمي بها من التشوهات المعرفية التي نحملها عادة. (shrink)

Globalisation destabilises indigenous cultures from mining in rainforests to the erasure of indigenous identities due to the impact of globalising information technology (IT). Extinguishing these cultures means deleting strategies needed for the survival of humankind. Within its short time of existence, IT has already achieved the creation of virtual environments with virtual agents equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). As a leverage point for reconciling indigenous and globalised views the Simulation Hypothesis is proposed, which postulates that our world has been programmed (...) from a metalevel. This concept assumes a programmer, which is consistent with religion in general, including the rather complex Christian concept of salvation. The perspective of the universe being a complex programme is compatible with indigenous worldviews of the universe being created by the Creator, and thus, with spirituality. It is suggested that IT users should respect indigenous peoples, especially since they pay a very high price for something they hardly enjoy themselves. (shrink)

The mistake of quantum physics relying on classical physics with its concept of reality confined to mas and space. The mistake of viewing the photon as a particle. The mistake of ignoring the latent identities of entities.

According to the high-dimensional approach to quantum mechanics (a.k.a. wavefunction realism), the fundamental space of our world has an unfathomably large number of dimensions. This account is empirically adequate only if the three-dimensional manifest image can somehow be recovered from high-dimensional reality. A proper understanding of inter-level metaphysics (a.k.a. metaphysical explanation, grounding, etc.) shows that the manifest image can indeed be recovered, and answers the most concerning objections to high-dimensionalism. But it also shows that high-dimensionalism has disturbing consequences about the (...) objectivity of the manifest image. (shrink)

This manuscript delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the Special Composition Question (SCQ), focusing on the causal relationships between objects and their constituent parts. By distinguishing between Weak and Strong Causal Composition, the article explores how causal mechanisms underpin the composition of objects. Theories from notable philosophers, including van Inwagen and Leibniz, are evaluated. This study seeks to bridge the gap between common sense perspectives and principled ontological theories by introducing the concepts of Weak and Strong Causal Composition. The analysis (...) reveals how a causal approach can offer insightful resolutions to longstanding debates in mereology and ontology, emphasizing the role of causality in understanding the essence of material composition. The proposed causal perspective encourages further philosophical inquiry into the foundational principles governing the composition of objects. (shrink)

Pure shape dynamics (PSD) is a novel implementation of the relational framework originally proposed by Julian Barbour and Bruno Bertotti. PSD represents a Leibnizian/Machian approach to physics in that it completely describes the dynamical evolution of a physical system without resorting to any structure external to the system itself. The chapter discusses how PSD effectively describes a de Broglie-Bohm N-body system and the conceptual benefits of such a relational description. The analysis will highlight the new directions in the quest for (...) an understanding of the nature of the wave function that are opened up by a modern relationalist elaboration on de Broglie's and Bohm's original insights. (shrink)

One might suppose that Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is inhospitable to metaphysial indeterminacy (MI), given that, as A. Wilson (2020) puts it, "the central idea of EQM is to replace indeterminacy with multiplicity" (77). But as Wilson goes on to suggest, the popular decoherence-based understanding of EQM (henceforth: DEQM) appears to admit of indeterminacy in both world number and world nature, where the latter indeterminacy---our focus here---is plausibly metaphysical. After a brief presentation of DEQM (S1), we bolster the case for (...) there being MI in world nature in DEQM (S2). The remainder of the paper is devoted to a comparative assessment of the two main approaches to MI for purposes of accommodating this MI---namely, a metaphysical supervaluationist approach (as per Barnes and Williams 2011) and a determinable-based approach (as per Wilson 2013 and Calosi and Wilson 2018 and 2021). We briefly describe each approach (S3), then offer arguments in favour of a determinable-based approach to world nature MI in DEQM (S4). (shrink)

The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schrödinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so-called "measurement contexts." Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to "measurement." However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. (...) On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of "measurement" figuring into the account of collapse. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical work of Décio Krause. Non-individuality, as a new metaphysical category, was thought to be strongly supported by quantum mechanics. No one did more to promote this idea than the Brazilian philosopher Décio Krause, whose works on the metaphysics and logic of non-individuality are now widely regarded as part of the consolidated literature on the subject. This volume brings together chapters elaborating on the ideas put forward and defended by Krause, developing them in many different directions, (...) commenting on aspects not completely developed so far, and, more importantly, critically addressing their current formulations and defenses by Krause himself. Given that Krause’s ideas do connect directly and indirectly with a wide array of subjects, such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics, more broadly understood, the philosophy of logic and logical philosophy, non-classical logics, metaphysics, and ontology, this volume contains important material for the research on logic and foundations of science, broadly understood. All the invited contributors have already worked with the ideas developed by Décio (some of them still work with them), being also distinct authors and extremely relevant in their areas of expertise. The volume is aimed at philosophers, including those of physics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Scientific realists investigate the ontology of the world and explain the observed phenomena by using our best fundamental physical theories. These theories describe the behavior of fundamental objects in terms of their fundamental properties, which determine their behavior. This paper is the natural companion of another paper in which I propose an alternative to this traditional account of metaphysics, according to which fundamental objects have no other fundamental property than the one needed to specify their nature. In that paper I (...) argue that my view fares better than the traditional metaphysics both in the classical and in the quantum domain. In this paper I compare my view to structuralism. After discussing how my proposal shares many motivations with structuralism, I argue in which ways I think it is superior. (shrink)

The scientific realist wants to read the metaphysical picture of reality through our best fundamental physical theories. The traditional way of doing so is in terms of objects, properties, and laws of nature. For instance, there are families of fundamental particles individuated by their properties of mass and charge, which determine how they move around. One could call this view an object-oriented metaphysics grounded on properties. In this paper, I wish to present an alternative view that one can dub a (...) thin object oriented metaphysics grounded on structure: there are fundamental entities with no fundamental properties other than the one(s) needed to specify their nature. I argue that my view has several advantages over the received one. In particular, I compare my proposal to the traditional view in the quantum domain and I argue that my view provides a better fit for both approaches to quantum metaphysics, namely the primitive ontology programme and wave-function realism. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive at one (...) seemingly coherent formulation. (shrink)

According to orthodoxy, our best physical theories strongly support Eternalism over Presentism. Our goal is to argue against this consensus, by arguing that a certain overlooked aspect of our best physical theories strongly supports Presentism over Eternalism.

Brief discussion of Niels Bohr's place in the history of philosophy (including his philosophical forebears, Søren Kierkegaard, Rasmus Nielsen, and Harald Høffding).

According to our current conception of physics, any valid physical theory is supposed to describe the objective evolution of a unique external world. However, this condition is challenged by quantum theory, which suggests that physical systems should not always be understood as having objective properties which are simply revealed by measurement. Furthermore, as argued below, several other conceptual puzzles in the foundations of physics and related fields point to limitations of our current perspective and motivate the exploration of an alternative: (...) to start with the first-person (the observer) rather than the third-person perspective (the world). In this work, I propose a rigorous approach of this kind on the basis of algorithmic information theory. It is based on a single postulate: that universal induction determines the chances of what any observer sees next. That is, instead of a world or physical laws, it is the local state of the observer alone that determines those probabilities. Surprisingly, despite its solipsistic foundation, I show that the resulting theory recovers many features of our established physical worldview: it predicts that it appears to observers as if there was an external world that evolves according to simple, computable, probabilistic laws. In contrast to the standard view, objective reality is not assumed on this approach but rather provably emerges as an asymptotic statistical phenomenon. The resulting theory dissolves puzzles like cosmology's Boltzmann brain problem, makes concrete predictions for thought experiments like the computer simulation of agents, and suggests novel phenomena such as ``probabilistic zombies'' governed by observer-dependent probabilistic chances. It also suggests that some basic phenomena of quantum theory (Bell inequality violation and no-signalling) might be understood as consequences of this framework. (shrink)

In the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics, a simple direct proof of the Spin Geometry Theorem of Penrose is given; and the structure of a model of the ‘space of the quantum directions’, defined in terms of elementary SU-invariant observables of the quantum mechanical systems, is sketched.

A common discussion in philosophy of physics is about the realism vs instrumentalism debate on the nature of fields. We analyze the similarities and conceptual differences between quantum fields and the concept of Aristotelian materia prima, regarding the properties of intrinsic indeterminacy and its relation with forms. This leads to a different point of view of the realistic conceptions of fields, since this identification allows a realistic interpretation, but with the restriction of being incomplete entities.

This paper states and gives three applications of a novel ‘Presentist Fragmentalist’ interpretation of quantum mechanics. In a cognate paper it was explicitly shown this kind of presentism is consistent with special relativity and that it has implications for how to understand time as it relates to the Big Bang. In this paper we narrowly focus on three applications. These are surely the most important conundrums for any proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics: Schrodinger’s Cat, Bell non-locality, and the Born rule. (...) It will be shown that these can be handled in a consistent and intuitive way. (shrink)

Quantum theory offers mathematical descriptions of measurable phenomena with great facility and accuracy, but it provides absolutely no understanding of why any particular quantum outcome is observed. It is the province of genuine explanations to tell us how things actually work—that is, why such descriptions hold and why such predictions are true. Quantum theory is long on the what, both mathematically and observationally, but almost completely silent on the how and the why. What is even more interesting is that, in (...) some sense, this state of affairs seems to be a necessary consequence of the empirical adequacy of quantum descriptions. One of the most noteworthy achievements of quantum theory is the accurate prediction of phenomena that, on pain of experimental contradiction, have no physical explanation. It is the purpose of this essay to make clear why quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are complete physical descriptions that describe the metaphysical incompleteness of the physical world, then to press the negative implications of this fact for naturalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors (...) the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal “action at a distance”. Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation. (shrink)

This is Part 2 of a four part paper, intended as an introduction to the key concepts and issues of time directionality for physicists and philosophers. It redresses some fundamental confusions in the subject. These need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics and philosophy of physics students. Here we analyze the quantum mechanical time reversal operator and the reversal of the deterministic Schrodinger equation. It is argued that quantum mechanics is anti-symmetric w.r.t. time reversal in its deterministic laws. (...) This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric (reversible), and that we must adopt the anti-unitary operator (T*) instead of the unitary time reversal operator (T) for time reversal in quantum mechanics. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large metaphysical conclusions about the symmetry of time are drawn from it. But it is an error. (shrink)

This is Part 1 of a four part paper, intended to redress some of the most fundamental confusions in the subject of physical time directionality, and represent the concepts accurately. There are widespread fallacies in the subject that need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics students and philosophers. We start in Part 1 by analysing the time reversal symmetry of quantum probability laws. Time reversal symmetry is defined as the property of invariance under the time reversal transformation, T: (...) t --> -t. It is shown that quantum mechanics (classical or relativistic) is strongly time asymmetric in its probability laws. This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric or reversible. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large philosophical and scientific conclusions are drawn from it. But it is an error. The fact is that while quantum mechanics is widely claimed to be reversible on the basis of two formal mathematical properties (that it does have), these properties do not represent invariance under the time reversal transformation. A recent experiment (Batalhão at alia, 2015) showing irreversibility of quantum thermodynamics is discussed as an illustration of this result. Most physicists remain unaware of the errors, decades after they were first demonstrated. Orthodox specialists in the philosophy of time who are aware of the error continue to refer to the ‘time symmetry’ or ‘reversibility’ of quantum mechanics anyway – and exploit the ambiguity to claim false implications about physical time reversal symmetry in nature. The excuse for perpetrating the confusion is that, since it is has now become customary to refer to the formal properties of quantum mechanics as ‘reversibility’ or ‘time reversal symmetry’, we should just keep referring to them by this name, even though they are not time reversal symmetry. This causes endless confusion, in attempts to explain the physical irreversibility of our universe, and in philosophical discussions of implications of physics for the nature of time. The failure of genuine time reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics changes the interpretation of modern physics in a deep way. It changes the problem of explaining the real irreversibility found throughout nature. (shrink)

Eine Rezension des Buches "Every Thing Must Go - Metaphysics Naturalized" von James Ladyman und Don Ross.

Observations on why is there something rather than nothing, fine tuning, beauty, time, intelligent design, qualia, Zen, Bach, Jesus, poetry, consciousness.

Il existe trois problèmes majeurs dans la conception d'une théorie de la gravité quantique: la théorie quantique et la relativité générale présentent en elles-mêmes des problèmes conceptuels importants, les bases fondamentales disparates des deux théories génèrent de nouveaux problèmes majeurs en essayant de les combiner, et le contraste entre l'absence d'une théorie de la gravité quantique satisfaisante et des théories des ingrédients réussis soulèvent des questions sur la nature et la fonction de la discussion philosophique de la gravité quantique. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.31430.91203. (shrink)

We expect the laws of nature that describe the universe to be exact, but what if that isn't true? In this popular science article, I discuss the possibility that some candidate fundamental laws of nature, such as the Past Hypothesis, may be vague. This possibility is in conflict with the idea that the fundamental laws of nature can always and faithfully be described by classical mathematics. -/- [Bibliographic note: this article is featured on the magazine website under a different title (...) as "The fuzzy law that could break the idea of a mathematical universe" and on the magazine cover as "The Flaw at the Heart of Reality: Why precise mathematical laws can never fully explain the universe." It is a popular version of the article "Nomic Vagueness" that can be found on arXiv: 2006.05298.]. (shrink)

The paper portrays the influence of major philosophical ideas on the 1935 debates on quantum theory that reached their climax in the paper by Einstein, Podosky and Rosen, and describes the relevance of these ideas to the vast impact of the paper. I claim that the focus on realism in many common descriptions of the debate misses important aspects both of Einstein's and Bohr's thinking. I suggest an alternative understanding of Einstein's criticism of quantum mechanics as a manifestation of the (...) same methodological principles that served him in the construction of the special and the general theories of relativity. These principles address, in a very specific way, the relation of the theoretical mathematical representations to the represented physical systems. These ideas, I claim, played a key role in the influence of the paper on later works that changed our understanding of quantum theory despite the rejection of EPR's central conclusion. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has recently indicated that, at the fundamental level, temporal order is not fixed. This phenomenon, termed Indefinite Causal Order, is yet to receive metaphysical or theological engagement. We examine Indefinite Causal Order, particularly as it emerges in a 2018 photonic experiment. In this experiment, two operations A and B were shown to be in a superposition with regard to their causal order. Essentially, time, intuitively understood as fixed, flowing, and fundamental, becomes fuzzy. We argue that if Indefinite Causal (...) Order is true, this is good evidence in favor of a B‐theory of time, though such a B‐theory requires modification. We then turn to theology, suggesting that a B‐theoretic temporal ontology invites serious reconsideration of the doctrine of salvation. This paper concludes that the best explanation for salvation given a B‐theory is mind‐dependent salvific becoming, a type of psychological soteriological change that occurs through downward causation. (shrink)

This opinion revolves around the discussion of matters that are beyond the realm of space-time. For instance, it discusses parallel universes, wormholes, and extrasensory perception or psi. Rationality is operationally defined. The opinion throws light on the manner in which the lines of rationality become unclear when it takes into consideration extrasensory phenomena. In addition, it contends that psychiatric disorders such as Schizophrenia are the result of contact from different parallel universes. Hence, Schizophrenia according to this paper is not a (...) disorder by itself but rather just a communication of messages from an alternate reality. Also, another psychological disorder called Dissociative Identity Disorder is also the result of different souls in one person or communication from different souls from parallel universes. Whether atoms are conscious or not is debatable but can be a possibility due to their eerie and unpredictable nature. The concept of parallel universes introduces a paradoxical manner of thinking, which is dealt with in the paper. The paper concerns itself with issues in quantum physics, clubbed with extrasensory perception in parapsychology. It subtly emphasizes rational thinking in the debate about space-time and beyond. Rationality as a concept is dealt with from different angles. Finally, quantum cognition is used to explain an all too familiar, pervasive yet inexplicable domain of knowledge, which is human behaviour. (shrink)

The main claim of this study is that, contrary to Latour’s view about the need to leave aside epistemology to deal with anything valuable about science, Mario Bunge has consistently built up a detailed and thorough epistemology. The argumentative strategy will be to show that (a) it is not true that we have never been modern (b) epistemology is here to stay, and (c) Mario Bunge endorses a strong scientific realism, a brand of materialism, systemism and emergentism, including a moral (...) dimension (there are objective values like, truth, peace and justice that deserve to be respected). Then, Bunge’s realism rejects axiological neutrality making scientists responsible for their actions. Bunge has always been modern and keeps enriching his own views. (shrink)

Tous les chercheurs intéressés aux fondements de la théorie quantique s’entendent sur le fait que celle-ci a profondément modifié notre conception de la réalité. Là s’arrête, toutefois, le consensus. Le formalisme de la théorie, non problématique, donne lieu à plusieurs interprétations très différentes, qui ont chacune des conséquences sur la notion de réalité. Cet article analyse comment l’interprétation de Copenhague, l’effondrement du vecteur d’état de von Neumann, l’onde pilote de Bohm et de Broglie et les mondes multiples d’Everett modifient, chacun (...) à sa manière, la conception classique de la réalité, dont le caractère local, en particulier, requiert une révision. (shrink)

Cette étude défend l’idée que, contrairement à l’opinion de Latour sur la nécessité de laisser de côté l’épistémologie pour traiter de tout ce qui a de la valeur pour la science, Mario Bunge a systématiquement construit une épistémologie détaillée et approfondie. La stratégie argumentative consistera à montrer (a) qu’il est faux que nous n’avons jamais été modernes (b) que l’épistémologie est là pour de bon et (c) que Mario Bunge soutient un réalisme scientifique fort, une version du matérialisme, du systémisme (...) et de l’émergentisme, comportant une dimension morale (il existe des valeurs objectives comme la vérité, la paix et la justice qui méritent d’être étudiées). Ensuite, le réalisme de Bunge rejette la neutralité axiologique rendant les scientifiques responsables de leurs actions. Bunge a toujours été moderne et continue à enrichir ses propres positions. (shrink)

We live in a world full of mysteries. How do our brains create consciousness? Which animals are conscious, and which are not? How can we have free-will in a deterministic universe? What are the fundamental Laws of Nature? What caused the Big Bang? How can we make sense of Quantum Mechanics? Why is the universe so finely-tuned for Life? And how did Life begin? Despite investigating such mysteries for decades or more, scientists and philosophers are no closer to finding clear (...) and convincing answers that everyone can agree upon. The big question is: why do such mysteries exist, and can they ever be solved? -/- In Life, the Universe and Consciousness, A. T. Bollands introduces us to twelve so-called intractable problems, demonstrating how each one arises from a conflict between beliefs. And yet, beliefs that are in conflict cannot all be true, which means that one or more of them must be false. To solve each problem, therefore, all we need to do is work out which of our beliefs are false and correct them. This may sound easy, but these beliefs include the most fundamental assumptions of modern science. If that wasn’t enough, it turns out that these twelve intractable problems are related, such that we cannot solve any one of them satisfactorily until we have solved all twelve within the same coherent worldview. -/- Examining each of these problems in turn, we finally arrive at our twelfth intractable problem: What is Life? A. T. Bollands proposes a new definition for Life, and with it a new way of understanding the physical world – a scientific worldview he calls Universal Life. Armed with this new worldview, he proceeds to solve all twelve intractable problems one by one, thereby developing the Theory of Universal Life and the solution to the “Big Problem of 20th Century Science”. By successfully solving each problem, he shows that Universal Life offers us a simpler, more natural, more coherent and hence more credible explanation for ourselves and the world we live in than our current scientific worldview ever can. (shrink)

We define and develop a notion of spacetime that incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series that is consistent with special relativity. This 'McTaggartian spacetime' or 'AB-spacetime' requires *five* not *4* variables. The interface of two AB-spacetimes from different *ontological perspectives* is quantum mechanical. This note concentrates on the physics and not the philosophy. This is an invitation to contribute to a theory that is a work in progress.

We motivate and develop a new theory of time and apply it to a few thought experiments in physics.

The purpose of this note is to show how an 'AB-series' interpretation of time leads, surprisingly, apparently, to AdS_5 geometry. This is not a theory of 2 time dimensions. Rather, it is a theory of 1 time dimension that has both A-series and B-series characteristics. To summarize the result, a spacetime in terms of (1) the earlier-to-later aspect of time, and (2) the (related) future-present-past aspect of time, and (3) 3-d space, it would seem, gives us the AdS_5 geometry.

The philosopher of chemistry Andrea Woody has recently published a wide-ranging article concerning the turn to practice in the philosophy of science. Her primary example consists of the use of different forms of representations by Lothar Meyer and Mendeleev when they presented their views on chemical periodicity. Woody believes that this distinction can cast light on various issues including why Mendeleev was able to make predictions while Meyer was not. Secondly, she claims that it can clarify the much-debated question concerning (...) the relative values of prediction and accommodation of data in the way that the periodic system was accepted. Thirdly, Woody believes that such differences in the representation of periodicity can be used to argue for the explanatory nature of the periodic table in contrast with the more traditional view that the periodic table is not explanatory. (shrink)

Since 2015, incredible many have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas published between 2002-2008!!! There were others who published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas even earlier (since 2008, in general), but the number has an incredible jump after 2014. Why? In 2014, I have sent emails to thousands of people (many countries, many domains (Physics, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science)) regarding the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between my ideas (2002-2008) and Markus Gabriel’s ideas (his book from 2013). Is it this a (...) coincidence? I don’t believe so… Why so many people from so many countries from so many domains on so many topics have published UNBELIEVALBE similar ideas to my ideas (2002-2008 and later)? Because I have changed EVERYTHING! (shrink)