History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics was first published in 1988. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. The fourteen essays in this volume build on the pioneering effort of Garrett Birkhoff, professor of mathematics at Harvard University, who in 1974 organized a conference of mathematicians and historians of modern mathematics to examine how the two disciplines approach (...) the history of mathematics. In History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, William Aspray and Philip Kitcher bring together distinguished scholars from mathematics, history, and philosophy to assess the current state of the field. Their essays, which grow out of a 1985 conference at the University of Minnesota, develop the basic premise that mathematical thought needs to be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. The opening essays study issues arising within logic and the foundations of mathematics, a traditional area of interest to historians and philosophers. The second section examines issues in the history of mathematics within the framework of established historical periods and questions. Next come case studies that illustrate the power of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of mathematics. The collection closes with a look at mathematics from a sociohistorical perspective, including the way institutions affect what constitutes mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

In considering the appropriate use of the terms “science” and “scientific instrument,” tracing the history of “mathematical instruments” in the early modern period is offered as an illuminating alternative to the historian's natural instinct to follow the guiding lights of originality and innovation, even if the trail transgresses contemporary boundaries. The mathematical instrument was a well-defined category, shared across the academic, artisanal, and commercial aspects of instrumentation, and its narrative from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was largely independent (...) from other classes of device, in a period when a “scientific” instrument was unheard of. (shrink)

This edited volume, aimed at both students and researchers in philosophy, mathematics and history of science, highlights leading developments in the overlapping areas of philosophy and the history of modern mathematics. It is a coherent, wide ranging account of how a number of topics in the philosophy of mathematics must be reconsidered in the light of the latest historical research and how a number of historical accounts can be deepened by embracing philosophical questions.

Every educational reform brings challenges, and ‘New Math’ is one of the most intriguing and influential reforms in mathematics education. New Math, which began to be implemented predominantly in t...

It can not be our purpose to give here a complete account of the phenomenological history of mathematical doctrine. It will be enough to refer to the battle of opinions in mathematical theory which was waged within the last eighty-five years, since Riemann's inaugural lecture on Non-Euclidean Geometry. Furthermore, the revolution which Einstein's theory of general relativity created is indicative of the complete absence of any general awareness that mathematics as a science has any relation to social reality. If (...) we are going to establish such relations, we are conscious of the fact that they would be hotly contended by many mathematicians. (shrink)

In Heidegger’ philosophical science writings the problematic of science occupies an important place. There are several periods in Heidegger’ articulating this problem. Among the most important are the 1930s, especially his lecture Modern Mathematical Science, which is seen by the author as one of the most considerable Heidegger’s works. Divided into two main parts it examines the relationship between the mathematical and metaphysics and Descartes’ relationship to metaphysics. In this lecture Heidegger showed himself as an excellent analytical philosopher, whose (...) focus is not on historical-philosophical reception of modern science , but on an original picture of the rise of modern science and its links with the origins of modern metaphysics as a metaphysics of subjectivity. To understand modern science means for Heidegger also a deep philosophical insight into Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence. And with this we have but to agree. (shrink)

The remarkable modern speculations concerning non-Euclidean sorts of space, of which Prof. Helmholtz gave some account in No. III. of MIND, are likely to be hailed as one of the chief difficulties with which the Kantian theory of space will have to deal. Digital edition compiled by Gabriele Dörflinger. Heidelberg University Library.

[pt. 1] Variables and quantities, with a discussion of the general conception of functional relation. 1916.

Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, systematic scientific abstracting played a crucial role in reconfiguring the sciences on an international scale. For mathematicians, the 1931 launch of the Zentralblatt für Mathematik and 1940 launch of Mathematical Reviews marked and intensified a fundamental transformation, not just to the geographic scale of professional mathematics but to the very nature of mathematicians’ research and theories. It was not an accident that mathematical abstracting in this period coincided with an embrace across (...) mathematical research fields of a distinctive form of symbolic and conceptual abstraction. This essay examines the historical, institutional, embodied, and conceptual bases of mathematical abstracting and abstraction in the mid-twentieth century, placing them in historical context within the first half of the twentieth century and then examining their consequences and legacies for the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. Focused on scale, media, and the relationship between mathematical knowledge and its forms of articulation, my analysis connects the changing social structure of modern mathematical research communities to their changing domains of investigation and resources for representation and collective understanding. (shrink)

The leaders of the Scientific Revolution were not Baconian in temperament, in trying to build up theories from data. Their project was that same as in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics: they hoped to find necessary principles that would show why the observations must be as they are. Their use of mathematics to do so expanded the Aristotelian project beyond the qualitative methods used by Aristotle and the scholastics. In many cases they succeeded.

The novel use of symbolism in early modern mathematics poses both philosophical and historical questions. How can we trace its development and transmission through manuscript sources? Is it intrinsically related to the emergence of symbolic algebra? How does symbolism relate to the use of diagrams? What are the consequences of symbolic reasoning on our understanding of nature? Can a symbolic language enable new forms of reasoning? Does a universal symbolic language exist which enable us to express all knowledge? (...) This book brings together a collection of papers that address all these and related questions which were initially posed at a conference held in Ghent (Belgium) in August 2009. Scholars working on philosophy of science, history of philosophy and history of mathematics provide an insight into the role and function of symbolic representations in the development of early modern mathematics. The papers cover the period from early abbaco arithmetic and algebra (14h century) up to Leibniz (early 18th century). (shrink)

This paper is on Aristotle's conception of the continuum. It is argued that although Aristotle did not have the modern conception of real numbers, his account of the continuum does mirror the topology of the real number continuum in modern mathematics especially as seen in the work of Georg Cantor. Some differences are noted, particularly as regards Aristotle's conception of number and the modern conception of real numbers. The issue of whether Aristotle had the notion of (...) open versus closed intervals is discussed. Finally, it is suggested that one reason there is a common structure between Aristotle's account of the continuum and that found in Cantor's definition of the real number continuum is that our intuitions about the continuum have their source in the experience of the real spatiotemporal world. A plea is made to consider Aristotle's abstractionist philosophy of mathematics anew. (shrink)

THE notion of quantity is basic and it is no surprise that Aristotle refers to it in many places. There are two main discussions, that in the Categories—a part of the Organon which is of great interest to modern logicians and that spread over the physical treatises. Naturally the two treatments overlap, but modern logic is at a far remove from classical cosmology and it is fairly easy to separate them at their sources. This I have attempted to (...) do by considering quantity as an attribute and as divisible. There follows a brief consideration of the notions arrived at for their relevance to modern mathematics with particular reference to the real number system and the notion of infinity. (shrink)

The present issue of Science in Context comprises a collection of articles dealing with various, specific aspects of the history of mathematics during the last third of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Like the September issue of 2003 of this journal, which was devoted to the history of ancient mathematics, this collection originated in the aftermath of a meeting held in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem in May 2001, under the title: “History of Mathematics (...) in the Last 25 Years: New Departures, New Questions, New Ideas.” Taken together, these two topical issues are meant as a token of appreciation for the work of Sabetai Unguru and his achievements in the history of mathematics. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe belief in the existence of eternal mathematical truth has been part of this science throughout history. Bourbaki, however, introduced an interesting, and rather innovative twist to it, beginning in the mid-1930s. This group of mathematicians advanced the view that mathematics is a science dealing with structures, and that it attains its results through a systematic application of the modern axiomatic method. Like many other mathematicians, past and contemporary, Bourbaki understood the historical development of mathematics as (...) a series of necessary stages inexorably leading to its current state — meaning by this, the specific perspective that Bourbaki had adopted and were promoting. But unlike anyone else, Bourbaki actively put forward the view that their conception of mathematics was not only illuminating and useful for dealing with the current concerns of mathematics, but that this was in fact the ultimate stage in the evolution of mathematics, bound to remain unchanged by any future development of this science. In this way, they were extending in an unprecedented way the domain of validity of the belief in the eternal character of mathematical truths, from the body to the images of mathematical knowledge.Bourbaki were fond of presenting their insistence on the centrality of the modern axiomatic method as a way to ensure the eternal character of mathematical truth as an offshoot of Hilbert's mathematical heritage. A detailed examination of Hilbert's actual conception of the axiomatic method, however, brings to the fore interesting differences between it and Bourbaki's conception, thus underscoring the historically conditioned character of certain, fundamental mathematical beliefs. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hegel has much to say to modern mathematical philosophy, although the Hegelian perspective needs to be substantially developed to incorporate within it the extensive advances in post-Hegelian mathematics and its logic. Key to that perspective is the self-referential character of the fundamental concepts of philosophy. The Hegelian approach provides a framework for answering the philosophical problems, discussed by Kurt Gödel in his paper on Bertrand Russell, which arise out of the existence in mathematics (...) of self-referential, non-constructive concepts (such as class). (shrink)

"With exceptional clarity, but with no evasion of essential ideas, the author outlines the fundamental structure of mathematics."--Carl B. Boyer, Brooklyn College. This enlightening survey of mathematical concept formation holds a natural appeal to philosophically minded readers, and no formal training in mathematics is necessary to appreciate its clear exposition. Contents include examinations of arithmetic and geometry; the rigorous construction of the theory of integers; the rational numbers and their foundation in arithmetic; and the rigorous construction of elementary (...) arithmetic. Advanced topics encompass the principle of complete induction; the limit and point of accumulation; operating with sequences and differential quotient; remarkable curves; real numbers and ultrareal numbers; and complex and hypercomplex numbers. 1959 ed. 27 Figures. Index. (shrink)

Hilbert’s unpublished 1917 lectures on logic, analyzed here, are the beginning of modern metalogic. In them he proved the consistency and Post-completeness (maximal consistency) of propositional logic -results traditionally credited to Bernays (1918) and Post (1921). These lectures contain the first formal treatment of first-order logic and form the core of Hilbert’s famous 1928 book with Ackermann. What Bernays, influenced by those lectures, did in 1918 was to change the emphasis from the consistency and Post-completeness of a logic to (...) its soundness and completeness: a sentence is provable if and only if valid. By 1917, strongly influenced by PM, Hilbert accepted the theory of types and logicism -a surprising shift. But by 1922 he abandoned the axiom of reducibility and then drew back from logicism, returning to his 1905 approach of trying to prove the consistency of number theory syntactically. (shrink)

François Viète is often regarded as the first modern mathematician on the grounds that he was the first to develop the literal notation, that is, the use of two sorts of letters, one for the unknown and the other for the known parameters of a problem. The fact that he achieved neither a modern conception of quantity nor a modern understanding of curves, both of which are explicit in Descartes’ Geometry, is to be explained on this view (...) “by an incomplete symbolization rather than by any obstacle intrinsic in the system.” Descartes’ Geometry provides only a “clearer expression” of themes already sounded in Viète’s work, one that perfects Viète’s literal calculus and gives it “its modern form”; it merely continues the “‘new’ and ‘pure’ algebra which Viète first established as the ‘general analytic art’.” It can seem, furthermore, that this must be right, that had there been some obstacle intrinsic to Viète’s system that barred the way to a modern conception of quantity and a modern understanding of curves, then Descartes’ Geometry would have had to have taken a very different form than it did. As it was, Descartes had only to improve Viète’s symbolism, free himself of the last vestiges of the ancient view of geometrical and arithmetical objects, and apply the new symbolism to the study of curves in order to achieve what Viète did not but could have. But what, really, is the status of this “could have”; what would it actually have taken for Viète to achieve Descartes’ results in the Geometry? The interest of the question lies in its potential to better our understanding of the nature of modern mathematics. (shrink)

Perspectival realists often appeal to the methodology of science to secure a realist account of the retention and continued success of scientific claims through the progress of science. However, in the context of modern physics, the retention and continued success of scientific claims are typically only definable within a mathematical framework. In this article, I argue that this concern leaves the perspectivist open to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian critique of the applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences. To support this (...) criticism, I present a case study on the conservation of energy in modern physics. (shrink)

The unified theory of dose and effect, as indicated by the median-effect equation for single and multiple entities and for the first and higher order kinetic/dynamic, has been established by T.C. Chou and it is based on the physical/chemical principle of the massaction law (J. Theor. Biol. 59: 253-276, 1976 (質量作用中效定理) and Pharmacological Rev. 58: 621-681, 2006) (普世中效指數定理). The theory was developed by the principle of mathematical induction and deduction (數學演繹歸納法). Rearrangements of the median-effect equation lead to Michaelis-Menten, Hill, Scatchard, (...) and Henderson-Hasselbalch equations. The “median” serves as the universal reference point and the “common link” for the relationship of all entities and is also the “harmonic mean” of kinetic dissociation constants. Over 300 mechanism-specific equations have been derived and published using the mathematical induction-deduction process. These equations can be deduced into several general equations, including the median-mediated whole/part equation, combination index theorem, isobologram equation, and polygonogram. It is proven that “dose” and “effect” are interchangeable, thus, “substance” and “function” are interchangeable, which leads to “the unity theory” (劑效、心物、知行一元論) in quantitative mathematical philosophy (數學的定量哲學) in functional context. Therefore, a general theory centered on the “median” and based on equilibrium dynamics has evolved. In other words: [「中」的宇宙觀： 以「中」爲基凖的動力學生態平衡]. Based on the median-effect equation of the mass-action law, the fundamental claim is that we can draw “a specific cure” for only two data points, if they are determined accurately. This claim has far reaching consequences since it defies the general held belief that two points can dray only a straight line. Remarkably, the unity theory (一元論) providesscientific/mathematical interpretation in equations and in graphics of Chinese ancient philosophy, including Fu-Si Ba Gua (伏羲八卦), Dao’s Harmony (和諧), the Confucian doctrine of the mean (儒家中庸之道), Chou Dun-Yi’s (周敦頤, 1017-1073) From Wu-ji to Tai-ji and Taiji Tu Sho (無極而太極及太極圖說). The moderntopological analysis for trinity yields an exact correspondence to the Ba-Gua, which was introduced over 4,000 years ago. Furthermore, the median-centered algorithm, promotes modern ecological content (生態學) in the equilibral dynamic state of harmony. It is concluded that Western science and Eastern philosophy are directly linked and complementary to each other. Since the truth in mathematical quantitative philosophy (數學的定量哲學) has no boundaries, East and West philosophies can flourish together for the common goal and ideal in science and in humanity (世界大同). (shrink)

Phenomena covered by the term duality occur throughout the history of mathematics in all of its branches, from the duality of polyhedra to Langlands duality. By looking to an “internal epistemology” of duality, we try to understand the gains mathematicians have found in exploiting dual situations. We approach these questions by means of a category theoretic understanding. Following Mac Lane and Lawvere-Rosebrugh, we distinguish between “axiomatic” or “formal” (or Gergonne-type) dualities on the one hand and “functional” or “concrete” (or (...) Poncelet-type) dualities on the other. While the former are often used in the pursuit of a “two theorems by one proof”-strategy, the latter often allow the investigation of “spaces” by studying functions defined on them, which in Grothendieck's terms amounts to the strategy of proving a theorem by working in a dually equivalent framework where the corresponding proof is easier to find. We try to show by some examples that in the first case, dual objects tend to be more ideal (epistemologically more remote) than original ones, while this is not necessarily so in the second case. (shrink)

Contents: Acknowledgements. Conventions. Preface. Biographical sketch. 1 Introduction. 2 The Contributions. 3 Early work in analysis. 4 The Theory of Science . 5. Later mathematical studies. A On Kantian Intuitions. B The Bolzano-Cauchy Theorem.

Review by A. Kanamori, Boston University (author of The Higher Infinite), review in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic: “Notwithstanding and braving the daunting complexities of this labyrinth, José Ferreirós has written a magisterial account of the history of set theory which is panoramic, balanced and engaging. Not only does this book synthesize much previous work and provide fresh insights and points of view, but it also features a major innovation, a full-fledged treatment of the emergence of the set-theoretic approach in (...) mathematics from the early nineteenth century. Much of history is in the details, and much of good history is in tone, emphasis, and the drawing together of different strands. Without being Whiggish, Ferreirós is never far from major synthetic themes, themes that in the main work toward balance and pull back from excesses of emphasis of some recent histories. The main criticism of the book would have to be on matters of broad interpretation. Yet, Ferreirós brings a considerable mathematical acuity and expertise to his enterprise, and this makes his viewpoints the more compelling.” . (shrink)

It is possible today to observe in hindsight the epistemological landscape of the twentieth century, and the work of Albert Lautman in mathematical philosophy appears as a profound turning point, opening to a true under- standing of creativity in mathematics and its relation with the real. Little understood in its time or even today, Lautman’s work explores the difficult but exciting intersection where modern mathematics, advanced mathe- matical invention, the structural or unitary relations of mathematical knowledge and, (...) finally, the metaphysical and dialectical tensions underly- ing mathematical activity converge. Well beyond other better-known names in philosophy of mathematics – who are focused above all on ques- tions concerning the logical problem of foundations, important but frag- mentary studies in the vast panorama of modern mathematics – Lautman broaches the emergence of inventiveness in the very broad spectrum of the development of the mathematical real. Group theory, differential geome- try, algebraic topology, differential equations, functional analysis, functions of complex variables and number fields are some of the domains of his preferred examples. He detects in them methods of construction, structu- ration and unification of modern mathematics that he connects to a precise Platonic interpretation in which powerful pairs of ideas serve to organize the edifice of effective mathematics. (shrink)