Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is (...) not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind (...) of definition, as they saw them, are briefly explained, mainly in a philosophical context. Finally, already in the kernel of the paper, some of the details of the model-theoretic view itself are shown, first in Peano, then in Pieri and Padoa, including in both cases some study of their semantic definitions of logicalconsequence. (shrink)

I endeavour in this article to present Ibn Taymiyya's theory of nominal definition as an alternative to logical definition. Ibn Taymiyya argues that nominal definition is based on concrete principles that are subject to experiment. Furthermore, the function of definition is akin to the 'name' because it aims at distinguishing any one object from others but not at reaching the entity of things. Nominal definition aims to define the name or the named, and this aim can be (...) achieved by translation or by interpretation. Translation is the movement from one name to another or from one named object to another. Interpretation is movement from a name to a named object or from a named object to a name. (shrink)

Many social scientists report that they find it difficult to frame adequate definitions of the important terms of the field. At present they are definition-shy. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this avoidance reaction is neither necessary nor desirable as a means for advancing social science. In order that this be made clear, an analysis of an important term will be presented. First, however, a few preparatory questions about the technique of defining must be asked (...) and answered. (shrink)

The paper is concentrated on Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics" and attempts to show that his account of the sciences is less uniform than it is usually taken to be but shows some awareness of important differences between the mathematical and the physical sciences.

The papers in this volume are updated versions of talks that were presented at the workshop QP structure, Nominalizations, and the role of DP that we organized at Saarland University, Germany, in December 2005. Although the connection between QP structure and definiteness, on the one hand, and nominalizations and definiteness on the other, were long observed in the literature, there has never been an attempt to bring the three together, and our aim at the workshop was to do exactly this: (...) to address recent developments in the area of quantifier phrase structure, nominalizations, and the linking definite determiner D. We invited discussions among the central approaches in syntax, morphology, semantics, and typology, paving the way towards a more comprehensive understanding of how quantification, definiteness and nominalizations are encoded in the grammar. (shrink)

Definition is an important scientific and philosophical method. In all kinds of scientific and philosophical inquiries definition is provided to make clear the characteristics of the things under investigation. Definition in this sense, sometimes called real definition, should state the essence of the thing defined, according to Aristotle. In another (currently popular) sense, sometimes called nominal definition, definition explicates the meaning of a term already in use in an ordinary language or the scientific discourse or specifies the meaning of (...) a new term introduced in an ordinary language of the scientific discourse. Definition combines the purposes of both real and nominal definition and is promoted by the Nyaya philosophers of India. Another important method of science and philosophy is induction. In a narrow sense induction is a method of generalization to all cases from the observation of particular cases. In a broad sense induction is a method for reasoning from some observed fact to a different fact not involved in the former. We understand induction in the broad sense though more often we shall actually be concerned with induction in the narrow sense. How can our limited experience of nature provide the rational basis for making knowlege claims about unobserved phenomena? (shrink)

This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality. Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states, and modes of character development that performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s uses of moral terms. However, these methods at best reveal a nominal definition of morality, since (...) moral appraisers may be ignorant about the referents of their moral terms. I propose a real definition of morality that characterizes moral systems as a natural kind—more precisely, a copied kind. I explain what it takes for a moral system to satisfy this definition, and I identify the sorts of evidence needed to distinguish moral systems from value systems of other kinds. (shrink)

The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti‐sceptic element of the Aristotelian‐Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth‐century Arabic philosophy: Faḫr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī, Šihāb al‐Dīn al‐Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt al‐Baġdādī. I focus on showing how (...) their refutation of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian‐Avicennian scientific definitions is a “nominal definition”. With this, Rāzī, Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it. (shrink)

Kant insists that definitions cannot be set in stone at the outset of a metaphysical investigation, but instead must be developed successively over the course of it, and should ideally be finalized only at the end. He even suggests that the task of a critical treatment of metaphysical concepts lies in an infinite approximation towards the essence of what they purport to designate. My focus is on this Kantian idea of approximating essence in definition. I begin with a reading (...) of Kant’s remarks on the methodology of definition in the Doctrines of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason and of the Jäsche Logic. On that basis I develop an account of what I take to be the most crucial application of that methodology, which nonetheless presents a lacuna in recent scholarship: Kant’s successive definition of the concept of the understanding in general, or the overall capacity for thought and cognition. I close by suggesting how this application might matter for Kant’s project of enlightenment. (shrink)

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying (...) definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors. (shrink)

In Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates frequently asks questions of the form “What is X?” seeking definitions of the substitution instances of X (e.g., Justice, Piety, and Courage). In attempting to elucidate Socratic definition, a number of interpreters have invoked a distinction between real and nominal definition (the distinction between the definition of a thing and the definition of a word. In using that distinction, several interpreters have pointed out that, when Socrates asked his “What is X” question (e.g., (...) “What is Justice?”), he was not seeking a nominal definition (a definition of the word ‘διχαιοσύνή’), but rather a real definition (a definition of the thing, Justice). My purpose in this paper is to argue that the preceding interpretation of Socratic thought is mistaken, i.e., I shall argue that there is no real/nominal distinction to be found in the Socratic dialogues. (shrink)

Spinoza scholars have claimed that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza's definitions in his Ethics are real, in spite of indications to the contrary, or the definitions are nominal and the propositions derived from them are false. I argue that Spinoza did not recognize the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Rather, Spinoza classified definitions according to whether they require a priori or a posteriori justification, which is a classification distinct from either (...) the real/nominal or the intensional/extensional classification. I argue that Spinoza uses both a priori and a posteriori definitions in the Ethics and that recognizing both types of definitions allows us to understand Spinoza's geometric method in a new way. We can now understand the geometric method as two methods, one resulting in propositions that Spinoza considers to be absolutely certain and another resulting in propositions that Spinoza does not consider certain. The latter method makes use of a posteriori definitions and postulates, whereas the former method uses only a priori definitions and axioms. (shrink)

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying (...) definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors. (shrink)

According to the received view, Russell rediscovered about 1900 the logical definition of cardinal number given by Frege in 1884. In the same way, we are told, he stated and developed independently the idea of logicism, using the principle of abstraction as the philosophical ground. Furthermore, the role commonly ascribed in this to Peano was only to invent an appropriate notation to be used as mere instrument. In this paper I hold that the study of Russell's unpublished manuscripts and Peano's (...) (and disciples) writings (as part of a larger investigation only pointed out here) shows, on the contrary, that Russell obtained the method to transform definitions by abstraction into nominal definitions and the general logicist idea from Peano (and his school). The only original insight from Russell, the principle of abstraction, partially derived from Moore's early philosophy, was finally abandoned because it was not of practical use. (shrink)

In this paper we reconsider the issue of free choice and the role of the wh-morphology employed in it. We show that the property of being an interrogative wh-word alone is not sufficient for free choice, and that semantic and sometimes even morphological definiteness is a pre-requisite for some free choice items (FCIs) in certain languages, e.g. in Greek and Mandarin Chinese. We propose a theory that explains the polarity behaviour of FCIs cross-linguistically, and allows indefinite (Giannakidou 2001) as well (...) as definite-like FCIs. The difference is manifested as a lexical distinction in English between any (indefinite) and wh-ever (definite); in Greek it appears as a choice between a FCI nominal modifier (taking an NP argument), which illustrates the indefinite option, and a FC free relative illustrating the definite one. We provide a compositional analysis of Greek FCIs in both incarnations, and derive in a parallel manner the Chinese FCIs. Here the definite versus indefinite alternation is manifested in the presence or absence of dōu, which we take to express the maximality operator. It is thus shown that what we see in the morphology of FCIs in Greek is reflected in syntax in Chinese. Our analysis has important consequences for the class of so-called wh-indeterminates. In the context of current proposals, free choiceness is taken to come routinely from interrogative semantics, and wh-indeterminates are treated as question words which can freely become FCIs (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). Our results from Mandarin and Greek emphasize that wh-indeterminates do not form a uniform class in this respect, and that interrogative semantics alone cannot predict either sensitivity of free choice to definiteness, or the polarity behaviour of FCIs. (shrink)

According to the Interface Hypothesis in the field of bilingualism, the interface connecting a linguistic module with a language-external domain (e.g., syntax-discourse) will present prolonged difficulties for adult bilingual learners, as compared with the interface connecting language-internal modules (e.g., syntax-semantics). This study tested whether the Interface Hypothesis is applicable to the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese as a heritage language. An internet-based acceptability judgment task (AJT) was administered to 58 advanced and intermediate adult Chinese heritage speakers to collect data in accuracy (...) and reaction time to investigate the adult heritage speakers’ mastery of referential nominal expressions regulated at the syntax-semantics and syntax-discourse interfaces, respectively, in Mandarin Chinese. The target linguistic phenomena involved three nominal expressions (i.e., the bare N(oun), the [Cl(assifier)-N], and the [Num(eral)-Cl-N]) under four interface-regulated referential readings (i.e., type-denoting, quantity-denoting, indefinite individual-denoting, and definite individual-denoting). In terms of accuracy, the results showed that (i) for the N and the [Num-Cl-N], regardless of the interface type, the advanced group acquired the target phenomena to a nativelike level, who significantly outperformed the intermediate group; (ii) for the [Cl-N], the advanced group exhibited nativelike attainment at the syntax-discourse interface but not at the syntax-semantics interface, and performed significantly better than the intermediate group at both interfaces. Regarding reaction time, no significant differences were reported between the advanced group and the native group for the target structures at either the syntax-semantics or the syntax-discourse interface, while the advanced group performed significantly better than the intermediate group, regardless of the interface type and the structure type. The findings suggest that the nature of the language interface, i.e., whether it pertains to language-external domains (i.e., the external interface) or not (i.e., the internal interface), should not be a reliable factor for predicting the (im)possibility of nativelike attainment of bilingual grammar knowledge, contra the predictions of the Interface Hypothesis. The present study provides new empirical evidence to show that language-external interface properties are not necessarily destined for prolonged difficulties in heritage language acquisition, and that it is possible for adult heritage speakers to make developmental progress in both accuracy and processing efficiency at different types of interfaces. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that the progressive interpretation in Ga is an effect of the interaction between the imperfective aspect and a definite description of events. Crucially, the data from Ga point to the consequences of the view that definite descriptions of events encode the familiarity of the discourse referent and its uniqueness in bearing the property in question. Namely, they yield direct evidentiality and the necessary ongoingness of the event at the topic time. Thus, the paper identifies previously unattested variation (...) in the semantics of the progressive in a cross-linguistic perspective and shows that not only lexical but also grammatical aspect exhibits striking parallelisms with the nominal domain. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in theTranscendental Doctrine of Method(TDM) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in theTranscendental Analytic. The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption (...) Kant makes in §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in theTDM. And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions. (shrink)

This paper analyzes argument formation in Nuosu Yi, a language that is typologically unusual in having classifiers as well as a definite determiner. Also unusual is the fact that demonstratives do not combine directly with nouns in this language but require the mediation of classifiers. Properties such as these are shown to pose a challenge to current accounts of argument formation. The Neocarlsonian approach of Chierchia explains the absence of definite articles in classifier languages as resulting from considerations of economy. (...) If nouns in classifier languages are names of kinds, they can occur directly as arguments of verbs, thereby obviating the need for extra structure to host a determiner. The data from Nuosu Yi alters the empirical generalization and calls for a modification of the explanation. The specific account of Nuosu Yi that is presented bears on current discussions about the nature of argument formation. Must arguments necessarily occur with overt or covert determiners or is it possible for languages to differ in this respect? Must bare nominal arguments necessarily denote kinds or can they denote properties? In this sense, the discovery of a new type of classifier language contributes to a theory of language variation and argument formation in general. (shrink)

This paper explores the link between number marking and(in)definiteness in nominals and their interpretation. Differencesbetween bare singulars and plurals in languages without determinersare explained by treating bare nominals as kind terms. Differencesarise, it is argued, because singular and plural kinds relatedifferently to their instantiations. In languages with determiners,singular kinds typically occur with the definite determiner, butplural/mass kinds can be bare in some languages and definite inothers. An account of singular kinds in terms of taxonomic readingsis proposed, with number marking playing (...) a crucial role inexplaining the obligatory presence of the determiner. The variationbetween languages with respect to plural/mass kinds is explained bypositing a universal scale of definiteness, with individual languageschoosing different cut-off points for lexicalization of the definitedeterminer. The possibility of further cross-linguistic variation isalso considered. (shrink)

Denommer, c'est appeler les etres et les choses par le nom qui leur a ete institue dans et par la langue. Assurant l'intercomprehension entre les locuteurs, la denomination constitue une propriete fondamentale du lexique et des terminologies. Si epistemologiquement, la denomination fait partie integrante des appareils conceptuel et methodologique de la Linguistique et de la Terminologie, dans l'une et l'autre discipline elle connait une situation paradoxale. D'une part elle souffre d'un deficit important de conceptualisation; de l'autre elle se revele etre (...) un puissant moteur pour la description semantique et referentielle du lexique et des terminologies. L'objet du present ouvrage est de proposer un reexamen systematique et explicite de cette notion et de lui assurer un positionnement valide dans l'appareil theorique de la Linguistique. Refusant une caracterisation monolithique, l'analyse opte pour une conception modulaire, articulee sur les differents parametres combinables et superposables qui definissent cette propriete: ontologiques, sociolinguistiques, juridiques et linguistiques. L'objectif de ce travail est egalement heuristique: envisager la denomination comme un levier en vue du reexamen du concept de polysemie, qui lui est consubstantiellement lie. Appliquee aux modeles categoriels et non categoriels, la denomination permet de distinguer entre emplois relevant effectivement d'une polysemie lexicale de ceux procedant d'effet impartis aux instanciations de vocables. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss some rather puzzling facts concerning the semantics of Warlpiri expressions of cardinality, i.e. the Warlpiri counterparts of English expressions like one,two, many, how many. The morphosyntactic evidence, discussed in section 1, suggests that the corresponding expressions in Warlpiri are nominal, just like the Warlpiri counterparts of prototypical nouns, eg. child. We also argue that Warlpiri has no articles or any other items of the syntactic category D(eterminer). In section 2, we describe three types of (...) readings— "definite", "indefinite" and "predicative"—which are generally found with Warlpiri nouns, including those which correspond to English common nouns and cardinality expressions. A partial analysis of these readings is sketched i n section 3. Since Warlpiri has no determiner system, we hypothesize that the source of (in)definiteness in this language is semantic. More specifically, we suggest that Warlpiri nominals are basically interpreted as individual terms or predicates of individuals and that their three readings arise as a consequence of the interaction of their basic meanings, which are specific to Warlpiri, with certain semantic operations, such as type shifting (Rooth and Partee 1982, Partee and Rooth 1983, Partee 1986, 1987), which universally can or must apply in the process of compositional semantic interpretation. (shrink)

This article presents empirical evidence of the high referential specificity of sound-symbolic words, based on a FrameNet-aided analysis of collocational data of Japanese mimetics. The definition of mimetics, particularly their semantic definition, has been crosslinguistically the most challenging problem in the literature, and different researchers have used different adjectives (most notably, “vivid,” since Doke 1935) to describe their semantic peculiarity. The present study approaches this longstanding issue from a frame-semantic point of view combined with a quantitative method. It was found (...) that mimetic manner adverbials generally form a frame-semantically restricted range of verbal/nominal collocations than non-mimetic ones. Each mimetic can thus be considered to evoke a highly specific frame, which elaborates the general frame evoked by its typical host predicate and contains a highly limited set of frame elements, which correlate and constrain one another. This conclusion serves as a unified account of previously reported phenomena concerning mimetics, including the lack of hyponymy, the one-mimetic-per-clause restriction, and unparaphrasability. This study can be also viewed as a methodological proposal for the measurement of frame specificity, which supplements bottom-up linguistic tests. (shrink)

A common criticism of Locke’s ideational definition of knowledge is that it contradicts his accounts of knowledge’s reality and sensitive knowledge. Here it is argued that the ideational definiton of knowledge is compatible with knowledge of idea-independent reality. The key is Locke’s notion of the signification. Nominal agreements obtain if and only if the ideas’ descriptive contents are the ground for truth; real agreements obtain only if their total denotation are the grounds for truth. The signification of the ideas (...) determine whether they denote real or fantastical objects. Three types of ideas, simple quality-ideas, modal ideas, and relational ideas, necessarily signify real objects. The fourth type, the ideas of substances, are real only if those particular combinations of qualitites have been perceived to co-exist. Locke’s ideas are intrinsically either real or fantastical and thus, it is argued, his models of truth and knowledge’s reality are far from typical correspondence theories. (shrink)

The philosophy of Confucius has often been accused of lacking classical definitions of its core concepts. However, as I shall argue, Confucius systematically used nonclassical definitions—to be precise, operational ones. The notion of operational definition comes from Percy Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics and means that the definiendum is defined by a set of operations that results in determining the meaning of the term in question. In the case of Confucian argumentation, operational definitions are mostly (...) class='Hi'>nominal and, in contrast to unambiguous methods of measurement, also context-dependent. This results in there being various yet not mutually inconsistent definitions of one term, and in “paradigmatic examples” playing a crucial role. As I show, this mode of defining things had major implications for the content of Confucius’ thought. In fact, many of its forms could be traced back to other Chinese philosophers, including those of non-Confucian provenance. (shrink)

Critics and champions alike have fussed and fretted for well over fifty years about whether Russell’s treatment is compatible with certain alleged acceptable uses of incomplete definite descriptions,[2] where a description (the F( is incomplete just in case more than one object satisfies its nominal F, as in (1).

The paper provides an analysis of two traditionally accepted distinctions between nominal and real definitions. The historical background is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s conceptions of definitions as well as remarks by other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy. The aim of the paper is to show that the analysed distinction, at least in Ajdukiewicz’s version, cannot be sustained.

On the few occasions that Kant addresses the subject of truth, he usually does so in relation to the problems involved in the nominal definition of truth and in the search for a truth criterion. The aim of this paper is to provide a synoptic view of the way in which Kant poses these two issues. In the first section of the paper I address the topic of the definition of truth. I begin by explaining what a definition is (...) and what does this entail for the definition of truth. I then present the consequences and problems that Kant draws from this. In the second section of the paper I develop the topic of the criterion of truth. First, I set out Kant's expectations for such criterion and show the limits he encounters. Then I provide a classification and an explanation of the truth criteria that he mentions throughout his work. -/- En las pocas ocasiones en que Kant aborda el tema de la verdad, lo suele hacer en función de los problemas implicados en la definición nominal de verdad y en la búsqueda de un criterio de verdad. El objetivo de este trabajo es ofrecer una visión sinóptica del modo en que Kant plantea estas dos cuestiones. En la primera sección del trabajo se aborda el tema de la definición de la verdad. Primero explico qué es una definición y qué implica esto para el caso de la verdad. Tras esto, expongo las consecuencias y problemas que Kant extrae al respecto. En la segunda sección del trabajo se desarrolla el tema del criterio de verdad. Para comenzar expongo las expectativas de Kant respecto de dicho criterio y los límites con que se encuentra. Tras esto ofrezco una clasificación y explicación de los criterios de verdad que menciona a lo largo de su obra. (shrink)

Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...) short. This conventionalistC explication of the a priori has been the target of sound criticisms. Arguments like Quine’s in “Truth by Convention” are in our view decisive: the truth of conventionalismC requires that the class of logical truths and logical validities be reductively accounted for as conventionally established; however, no such reduction is forthcoming, because logic is needed to generate the entire class from any given set of conventions properly so-called. Granted that conventionalismC is untenable, we want to take issue with a different, usually made criticism. Although the argument uncovers some difficulties for the way conventionalist claims are defended by some of its advocates, we will try to show that it fails. The criticism thus stands in the way of a proper appreciation of why the Carnapian account of the a priori is not correct. We will try to illustrate this by showing that the criticism we will dispute would dispose of conventionalist claims not only regarding philosophically problematic cases – logical and mathematical truths –, but also regarding cases for which they have some prima facie plausibility. One such case is that of truths that follow from mere abbreviations, “nominal” definitions; ‘someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried adult male’ can serve at this point for illustration. We will try to articulate a clear sense in which the contents of assertion such as this can be truths by convention. We do not need to prove that a conventionalist claim is true in those cases; it is enough for us to show that it is intelligible, for the arguments we will confront question even this. (shrink)

This essay argues that aristotle's doctrine of nominal definition is his semantic theory for natural-Kind terms. It offers a new interpretation of that doctrine. On this interpretation nominal definitions are initial working theoretical accounts of natural kinds which serve as starting points for scientific inquiry. As such, Nominal definitions have existential import. They make an implicit reference to the most familiar actual instances of the kinds they define and they define the essences of those kinds (...) by reference to those instances. Nominal definitions are, Thus, Accounts of real essences as much as real definitions. They are initial incomplete accounts of such essences and it is as such that they explicate the meanings of (natural-Kind) terms. (shrink)

On the basis of careful textual exegesis and philosophical analysis, and contrary to the received view, Mark R. Wheeler demonstrates that Aristotle presents and systematically explicates his definition of the essence of the truth in the Metaphysics. Aristotle states the nominal definitions of the terms "truth" and "falsehood" as part of his arguments in defense of the logical axioms. These nominal definitions express conceptions of truth and falsehood his philosophical opponents would have recognized and accepted in (...) the context of dialectical argument. On the basis of these nominal definitions, Aristotle develops his definitions of the essences of truth and falsehood--his "real" definitions of truth and falsehood. Aristotle's methodical exposition of his essential definitions of truth and falsehood in the Metaphysics serves as a well-developed example of how his philosophical inquiry starts with nominal definitions and ends with real definitions. Wheeler also argues for the novel claim that Aristotle defines the most fundamental kind of truth in terms of accurate measurement. Aristotle's metrical conception of truth serves as the theoretical basis for specifying the truth conditions of various assertions, for identifying the sorts of beings implicated in these truth conditions, and for explaining the nature of approximate truth and falsehood. Far from offering us a minimal account of truth, Wheeler shows how Aristotle offers us a sophisticated and metrical theory of truth. (shrink)

This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that (...) the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it. (shrink)

Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in the first Critique is thought to be contained within the claim that ‘existence is not a predicate’. This article maintains that this ‘digression’ on existence is not Kant’s main objection. Instead, Kant argues within the first eight paragraphs of this fourteen paragraph section that there is no meaningful predication – either logical or real – without a synthetic, existential judgment concerning the subject of predication. Thus, the very subject of predication of the proof (...) (God) is an empty concept and an indeterminate nominal definition (rather than a real possibility) that allows for neither meaningful predication nor the generation of a contradiction. I argue that this objection is significantly different than classical objections that are often identified with it and from Kant’s objection in 1763. I also argue that Kant’s target is not simply the Cartesian argument but is also his own pre-critical onto-theological argument. There is little evidence that Kant continues to accept the a priori onto-theological argument, and, in fact, he rejects its core claims in his discussion of the ontological argument and in the final paragraphs of the section on the Ideal of Reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an important role (...) in Ockham's philosophy of language. Ockham introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms. In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major claims concerning connotative terms.First, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms signify something primarily and something else secondarily. Paradigmatic examples of connotative simple terms are 'white' and 'father,' while instances of absolute terms are 'animal,' 'man,' and 'whiteness.' The term 'white' is connotative for it signifies something primarily while co-signifying something else secondarily .Second, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms do not have a real definition but only a nominal one. While a real definition is intended to capture the real essence of the defined thing, a nominal definition is none other than a linguistic explication of a name's signification. Only concrete and abstract terms of the category of substance, and abstract terms of the category of quality, can have a real definition. The reason is that, for Ockham, only individual substances and qualities can exist outside the mind, therefore only such entities can be grasped immediately and directly, by means of acts of intelligible intuitive cognition. Any other term can have only a nominal definition, for each of them can make reference to nothing but to fictive or only putatively existent entities. A nominal definition, in particular, is made in such a way that something is expressed in recto and something else in obliquo . Ockham indicates 'something having whiteness' as the nominal definition of 'white': in it, 'something' is expressed in recto, while 'whiteness' in obliquo.Third and finally, Ockham says that a connotative term has only one nominal definition, while an absolute term can have several real definitions.According to these claims, the problem of the existence of connotative terms in mental language might be reconstructed as follows. Ockham holds to two fundamental tenets about mental language and connotation: first, synonymous terms cannot be found in mental language and second, each connotative simple term can have only one nominal definition, as was said. Ockham is unequivocal about these principles in his works. But if an interpreter also supposes Ockham subscribing to the view that connotative simple terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions, the interpreter must conclude that, for Ockham, connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions cannot both be present in mental language. Nonetheless, since Ockham seems to admit the existence of both connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions in mental language, one of the previous sentences needs to be revised.Up to this day many proposals of revision have been put on the table, but it seems to me that they can be reduced to three principal ones.The first proposal suggests reconsidering claim , while preserving the reasoning -, since - are claims Ockham indisputably states. As is known, this was Paul V. Spade's initial position. The gist of Spade's influential argument was that connotative simple terms cannot exist in mental language for if they did, they would be synonymous with their fully expanded nominal definitions. According to , though, synonymy cannot be found in mental language. But Ockham grants the.. (shrink)

In this dissertation I explore Plato's views about the nature of language and thought, and their relations to the world. Plato is sometimes thought to hold that meaningful terms do not require referents at all. Others argue that he holds a referential theory of meaning according to which the meaning of a term just is its referent. I reject both of these views, arguing that Plato thinks that a significant term must have a referent but that the referent of a (...) term does not exhaust its signification: there is also a descriptive component. On my view, Plato embraces a mixed account according to which naming and thought are descriptive and object dependent. Moreover, according to Plato, language is prior to thought, and the way the world is---what objects there are---ultimately determines what we can talk and think about. ;I focus on the Cratylus, Theaetetus and Sophist, the dialogues in which Plato develops his most sophisticated discussions of language and thought. In the Cratylus , Plato articulates an account of the signification of names, and he reveals his views about the nature and role of nominal definitions---the clusters of descriptions that linguistically competent speakers have in mind when they use terms from their language. A name signifies a nominal definition by convention; it signifies a real nature by nature. Plato defends an account of the necessary conditions on thought in the Theaetetus where the account of thought Plato ultimately embraces is not, as some have argued, a form of Russellian acquaintance. For Plato, thought is object dependent and at the same time conceptual. The commitment to object dependence and to the fundamental status of the world is evident in all three dialogues, but it is only explicitly defended in the Sophist. Plato argues that discourse and thought are hostage to what there is. Actual, countable objects determine the possible contents of language and thought. (shrink)

This paper concerns the Aristotelian inquiry on φαντασία’ in De Anima iii 3. I argue for a systematic interpretation of the chapter, according to which iii 3 neatly instantiates what David Charles has called the Three Stage View on scientific inquiry. The first stage establishes the meaning of the term φαντασία so it provides a nominal definition of the object, the second stage dialectically confirms the existence of φαντασία as something different from other already known cognitive powers (perception, thought), (...) the third stage posits a hypothetical essence (real definition), then it tests its power of enabling us to derive from such an essence those manifest and apparent features of φαντασία, that had been previously individuated. On the basis of such reading, some general suggestions on the status and role of φαντασία are also proposed, on the basis of which we can take the definition of iii 3 to be consistent with any other explanatory uses of φαντασία in the corpus. (shrink)

Among the passages which are suggestive of a philosophy of language in Kant’s writings are his remarks and arguments on appropriate terminology for philosophical concepts. I ask what it is for Kant that makes some words more suitable than others. I reconstruct the arguments from the Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) that defend that there is no such thing as a proper, real definition for philosophical (...) concepts (only nominal definition and exposition); in addition, philosophical concepts are only represented by terms in abstracto, not in concreto. On these grounds, in the Inquiry, Kant sustains that the reference of a term to a philosophical concept is ultimately sanctioned by the term’s ‘linguistic usage’ (Redegebrauch). I argue that this is the basis for Kant’s criterion in the Critique of Pure Reason of employing traditional terminology, words from ordinary language, or even words from extinct languages, to refer to philosophical concepts, and for his rejection of coining new terms – even for distinctly new philosophical thoughts. (shrink)

In this ambitious study, Alexander W. Hall examines the two preeminent figures of the golden age of natural theology: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Hall is not so much concerned with retracing particular proofs of the existence of God and derivations of the divine attributes—well-worn paths in discussions of medieval natural theology—as with investigating the larger philosophical issues that are raised by the project of natural theology, such as the nature of scientia and demonstrative arguments, and accounts of signification (...) and the meaningfulness of theological discourse.Hall's opening chapter offers an overview of natural theology in the High Middle Ages, summarizing the conclusions he will defend at greater length over the course of the book. In chapter 2 Hall relies primarily on Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics to get clear on his account of scientia, or scientific knowledge. "For Aquinas," Hall writes,"paradigmatic scientia is the result of syllogistic reasoning . . . Syllogisms productive of scientia use either real or nominal definitions as their middle, and thus the conclusion tells us what belongs to the subject through itself or per se". (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of sensible qualities, an important, but underestimated topic in Leibniz's epistemology. In the first section, the confused character of sensible ideas is considered. Produced by the sensation alone, ideas of sensible qualities cannot be part of distinct descriptions of bodies. This is why Leibniz proposes to resolve sensible qualities by means of primary or mechanical qualities, a thesis which is analysed in the second section. Here, I discuss his conception of nominal definitions as (...) distinct empirical representations. The provisional and modifiable status of nominal definitions is then explained in the third section. Since nominal descriptions always contain sensible determinations, Leibniz claims that empirical knowledge is indefinitely changeable according to progress in sciences. In the final section, I address the criterion of coherence that enables us to approve of hypotheses that are based on both sensible and empirical properties. (shrink)

There has recently been a growing interest in the topic of vagueness and indeterminacy in contemporary metaphysics, with two views taking center stage. The semantic view holds that indeterminacy is due to vagueness in the extension of concepts, while the ontological view holds that indeterminacy is due to the vagueness of certain objects. There has, however, been little research on discussions of vagueness and indeterminacy in early-modern philosophy despite the relevance of vagueness and indeterminacy for issues such as real and (...) nominal definitions, clear and distinct ideas, and the principle of complete determination. In this paper, I survey discussions of vagueness in Locke, Leibniz, and Kant and point to ways in which the problem of vagueness and indeterminacy touches on broader issues in their respective philosophies. Although Locke, Leibniz, and Kant all suggest that vagueness is a semantic phenomenon, Kant also appears to countenance an ontological view according to which objects as appearances may sometimes be indeterminate. (shrink)

Aristotle examines emotions in different works and from different perspectives. Ontologically, they are categorized as passing qualitative states of the soul. Yet they have both a bodily and a psychological aspect. While a proper definition of any emotion would need to render both aspects, in his Rhetoric Aristotle merely offers nominal definitions of emotions in general and of single emotions. He produces a sophisticated analysis of anger, which he defines as a response to a perceived slight. The angry (...) person seeks revenge, which consists in his or her regaining his or her superiority. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that the victim, that is the person responsible for the earlier slight, recognizes that she or he is made to suffer the revenge of the angry person. Anger is therefore accompanied by pain and pleasure: pain because of the perceived slight, pleasure because of the hope for revenge. Anger is morally neutral, but there are good and bad ways of being angry. (shrink)

The goal of chapter 2 is to analyse Socrates’ method. Firstly, it is argued that theSocratic method is not able to reach definitive conclusions. Secondly, it is shown that this occurs because of the use of real rather than nominal definitions. Finally, it is noted that, although this method cannot provide any proper knowledge, it constitutes a very good starting point to address moral problems with great care.

The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham’s semantics and metaphysics can hardly be overstated---it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham’s famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: (1) there is no synonym in mental language; (2) a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal definition; and (3) there are simple connotative terms in Ockham’s mental language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate (...) all. (shrink)