The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism (...) might be true, then it is true. (shrink)

Although separated by the centuries, Anselm and Hegel represent two different developments of the ontological proof. This book guides the reader through an exploration of the perplexing ontological argument from a well-balanced analysis of the works of two significant, yet polar opposite thinkers, Anselm and Hegel.

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Focusing mainly on a number of unpublished texts by Collingwood, especially his “Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God,” the study examines the English philosopher’s innovative interpretation of the Anselm’s main contribution to the philosophical-theological tradition. Collingwood insightfully shows how the ontological argument can (...) be used in analyzing and discussing the religious experience, not in trying to formulate a logical proof of God’s existence. When abstracted from the individual’s practical religious life, that is, from the experience of prayer, worship, and the like, mind’s awareness of God cannot be understood. Resorting mainly to Anselm, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes, Collingwood argues that the externality of the Platonic absolute is that of an absolute transcendent whereas the Christian God is not only conceived as the transcendent cause of all things, but also as the immanent spirit in them. By asserting the unity of the mind—regarded as identical with its acts—this interpretation is meant to serve both as a means towards self-knowledge, and as a starting point for a future conceptual unification of religion and philosophy. (shrink)

In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B (...) is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. (shrink)

It is widely assumed among contemporary philosophers that Descartes’ version of ontological proof, among other weaknesses, makes an impossible and unjustified move from the mental world of concepts to the real world of things. Contrary to this opinion I will try to show that Descartes’ famous principle of clear and distinct perception suffices to find an adequate inferential connection between the contents of the human mind and extra-mental reality. In a clear and distinct way we cognitively grasp the (...) concept of supremely perfect being as the concept that we do not construct by an arbitrary definition of the word ”God’. (shrink)

Can God be the efficient cause of himself (causa sui,)? It is well known that Descartes answers this question in the affirmative, but it is considerably less clear why. The main contention of the essay is that Descartes advances the causa sui doctrine because he came to think that the ontological proof of Meditation V required it. We argue these contentions through a close analysis of Descartes' initial articulation of causa sui in response to Caterus, followed by attention (...) to the reformulation of the doctrine in response to the logical objections posed by Arnauld. Our understanding of causa sui as a move made within the horizon of the ontological proof not only illuminates why Descartes would have defended a doctrine as conceptually problematic as causa sui, but also provides an alternative to Jean-Luc Marion's view that causa sui constitutes a third, distinct proof for the existence of God. /// Pode Deus ser a causa eficiente de si mesmo (causa sui,)? É bem sabido que Descartes responde aflrmativamente a esta questão, mas é consideravelmente menos claro porquê. O principal conteúdo do ensaio é que Descartes apresenta a doutrina da causa sui porque pensou que a prova ontológica da Meditação V precisava dela. Demonstramos estas afirmações através de uma análise rigorosa da articulação inicial de Descartes da causa sui em resposta a Caterus, seguida de uma atenção à reformulação da doutrina em resposta às objecções logicas apresentadas por Arnauld. A nossa compreensão da causa sui como proposta feita no horizonte da prova ontológica não ilumina apenas porque é que Descartes teria defendido uma doutrina conceptualmente tão problemática como a causa sui, mas também providencia uma alternativa ao ponto de vista de Jean-Luc Marion de que a causa sui constitui a terceira, prova distintapara a existência de Deus. (shrink)

In this article I show how Schelling elaborates the fundamental topic of the ontological proof, from the first phase of his philosophy on. I make clear how he keenly penetrates the formulation of Descartes, establishing that it is insufficient in order to demonstrate the existence of God. The fact is, Descartes says that it would be contradictory with the nature of the prefect being that he existed only accidentally; so that it can exist only necessarily. But it is (...) different to say that God can exist only necessarily, and to say that He, in fact, exists necessarily. From the first sentence, descends only that He exists necessarily if He exists, but this does not imply that He exists in fact. To arrive to the existence, the only possible way is through experience: the reason gives the concept, the experience gives the existence. On this difference is based the hendiadys between negative and positive philosophy, the nature of which I cleared up in the last part of the article. (shrink)

"I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone, and would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists." - St. Anselm.

Shortly after the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s claim that the ontological proof of God’s existence contains all the probative force of the cosmological argument was discussed at great length by J. F. Flatt, J. F. v. Abel and J. A. Eberhard. These early criticisms do not seem to have received the attention they deserve, even though they are extremely relevant, cogent, and difficult to dispute. Regardless of whether their assumptions are accepted, these objections point (...) out certain obscurities and flaws in Kant’s argument, casting doubt, from a logical standpoint, on the success of the main Kantian criticism of the cosmological proof. (shrink)

After introductory reminder of and comments on Gödel’s ontological proof, we discuss the collapse of modalities, which is provable in Gödel’s ontological system GO. We argue that Gödel’s texts confirm modal collapse as intended consequence of his ontological system. Further, we aim to show that modal collapse properly fits into Gödel’s philosophical views, especially into his ontology of separation and union of force and fact, as well as into his cosmological theory of the nonobjectivity of the (...) lapse of time. As a result, modal collapse should not be conceived in Gödel so much as a deficit, but rather as a kind of the rise of modalities to the “perfect” being. We further show that, in accordance with Gödel’s ontology, the concepts of modality and time should be derived in terms of the “fundamental philosophical concept” of cause. To give an example of how a formalization of such causative Gödelian ontology and ontological proof might look, we propose the transformation of GO into a kind of causally re-interpreted justification logic. (shrink)

The core idea of the ontological proof is to show that the concept of existence is somehow contained in the concept of God, and that therefore God’s existence can be logically derived—without any further assumptions about the external world—from the very idea, or definition, of God. Now, G.W. Leibniz has argued repeatedly that the traditional versions of the ontological proof are not fully conclusive, because they rest on the tacit assumption that the concept of God is (...) possible, i.e. free from contradiction. A complete proof will rather have to consist of two parts. First, a proof of premiseGod is possible. Second, a demonstration of the “remarkable proposition”If God is possible, then God exists. The present contribution investigates an interesting paper in which Leibniz tries to prove proposition. It will be argued that the underlying idea of God as a necessary being has to be interpreted with the help of a distinguished predicate letter ‘E’ as follows:\\). Proposition which Leibniz considered as “the best fruit of the entire logic” can then be formalized as follows:\) \rightarrow \, E)\). At first sight, Leibniz’s proof appears to be formally correct; but a closer examination reveals an ambiguity in his use of the modal notions. According to, the possibility of the necessary being has to be understood in the sense of something which possibly exists. However, in other places of his proof, Leibniz interprets the assumption that the necessary being is impossible in the diverging sense of something which involves a contradiction. Furthermore, Leibniz believes that an »impossible thing«, y, is such that contradictory propositions like \\) and \\) might both be true of y. It will be argued that the latter assumption is incompatible with Leibniz’s general views about logic and that the crucial proof is better reinterpreted as dealing with the necessity, possibility, and impossibility of concepts rather than of objects. In this case, the counterpart of turns out to be a theorem of Leibniz’s second order logic of concepts; but in order to obtain a full demonstration of the existence of God, the counterpart of, i.e. the self-consistency of the concept of a necessary being, remains to be proven. (shrink)

Caramuels’ proof of non-existence of God is compared with Gödel’s proof of existence.

This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s Fifth Meditation ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the Fifth Meditation. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against (...) Descartes’ particular version of the proof. (shrink)

Anderson-like ontological proofs, studied in this paper, employ contingent identity, free principles of quantification of the 1st order variables and classical principles of quantification of the 2nd order variables. All these theories are strongly complete wrt. classes of modal structures containing families of world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and constant conceptual domains of the 2nd order. In such structures, terms of the 1st order receive only rigid extensions, which are elements of the union of all 1st order (...) domains. Terms of the 2nd order receive extensions and intensions. Given a family of preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order, non-rigid extensions of the 2nd order terms belong always to a preselected domain connected with a given world. Rigid intensions of the 2nd order terms are chosen from among members of a conceptual domain of the 2nd order, which is the set of all functions from the set of worlds to the union of all 2nd order preselected domains such that values of these functions at a given world belong to a preselected domain connected with this world. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial Possibility Claim: the claim that it is possible that something God-like exists. Gödel’s derivation starts off with a proof of the Possible Instantiation of the Positive: the principle that, if a property is positive, it is possible that there exists something that has that property. I argue that Gödel’s proof of this principle relies on some implausible axiological assumptions but it can be patched (...) so that it only relies on plausible principles. But Gödel’s derivation of the Possibility Claim also needs a substantial axiological assumption, which is still open to doubt. (shrink)

Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind ofafterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everythingneeded to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so whybother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far asto doubt his sincerity.1Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety andmagnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2The current discussion hasfocused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept (...) ofGod.3I wish to take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction ofhis argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the FifthMeditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God,which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends ona kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causalpositivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea ofhim and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the sameway as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must thinkof it.4We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there mustbe a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understoodin its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God containsnecessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In theprocess of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld,Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, interms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, whichpreserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand whyGod can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-groundingground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche andSpinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows usto see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously beenoverlooked.5While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Threeis central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘spower, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows theargument from his effects to his existence in the first place.The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence inMeditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion andthe Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understandingDescartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt totruly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet whileAnselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘sbeing, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be,Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positiveintuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on thisrecollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as thenecessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence ofevery finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinctideas. (shrink)

Michael Huemer claims to give an ontological proof of robust moral realism, the influential view that we have non-selfish, categorical, observer-independent reasons for action. This paper argues that one of Huemer’s premises – that knowing that baby torture is not objectively wrong would provide us with no first-person reasons to torture babies – is false of agents with sadistic desires. This in turn falsifies Huemer’s further premise that the premises of his “Antitorture Argument” are true independent of interests, (...) desires, or other attitudes. My refutation is then shown to not only deepen extant doubts about whether robust realists can adequately account for the first-person normative authority of morality. It also suggests that realists about categorical moral reasons must either complete a project – moral constructivism – which has never clearly succeeded, or else defend views on the nature of categorical reasons that strain credulity and beg the question against their opponents. (shrink)

Gödel’s ontological proof is by now well known based on the 1970 version, written in Gödel’s own hand, and Scott’s version of the proof. In this article new manuscript sources found in Gödel’s Nachlass are presented. Three versions of Gödel’s ontological proof have been transcribed, and completed from context as true to Gödel’s notes as possible. The discussion in this article is based on these new sources and reveals Gödel’s early intentions of a liberal comprehension (...) principle for the higher order modal logic, an explicit use of second-order Barcan schemas, as well as seemingly defining a rigidity condition for the system. None of these aspects occurs explicitly in the later 1970 version, and therefore they have long been in focus of the debate on Gödel’s ontological proof. (shrink)

Two questions concerning Anselm of Canterbury’s theistic argument provided in Proslogion Ch. 2 are asked and answered: is the argument valid? under what conditions could it be sound? In order to answer the questions the argument is formalized as a first-order theory called AP2. The argument turns out to be valid, although it contains a hidden premise. The argument is also claimed not to be ontological one, but rather an a posteriori argument. One of the premises is found to (...) be false, so the argument is claimed not to be sound and to fail to prove its conclusion. (shrink)

Amidst the array of criticisms levied against Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof, the critique by Randolph Rubens Goldman stands out for its unique emphasis on a hitherto overlooked yet pivotal weakness within the proof – its lack of an adequate applied semantics. Goldman’s perspective underscores a significant need: the connection of axioms, definitions, and theorems in the proof with the intended meanings of properties traditionally ascribed to God. However, as Goldman has shown, this attempt poses formidable challenges. (...) The endeavour to establish such a connection renders numerous sentences under the natural language interpretation of the proof meaningless, thus undermining the principle of bivalence. In this article, we analyse different methods to confront this problem. Our final solution is inspired by Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions: namely, we suggest construing sentences under the natural language interpretation of Gödel’s proof as conjunctions of formulas. In this way, we can eliminate meaningless sentences and uphold the once unsettled principle of bivalence. (shrink)

This paper presents detailed formalizations of ontological arguments in a simple modal natural deduction calculus. The first formal proof closely follows the hints in Scott’s manuscript about Gödel’s argument and fills in the gaps, thus verifying its correctness. The second formal proof improves the first one, by relying on the weaker modal logic KB instead of S5 and by avoiding the equality relation. The second proof is also technically shorter than the first one, because it eliminates (...) unnecessary detours and uses Axiom 1 for the positivity of properties only once. The third and fourth proofs formalize, respectively, Anderson’s and Bjørdal’s variants of the ontological argument, which are known to be immune to modal collapse. (shrink)

Now it cannot be denied, I think, that this argument has the appearance of being sound, that is, both true in its premises and valid in its conclusion. But one surely ought to harbor suspicions concerning an argument which establishes the most momentous of all conclusions upon nothing more than a few propositions. In this paper I shall attempt to show that these suspicions are well-founded by pointing out that the above "proof" derives whatever force it has from an (...) equivocation. (shrink)

Gödel's ontological argument is related to Gödel's view that causality is the fundamental concept in philosophy. This explicit philosophical intention is developed in the form of an onto-theological Gödelian system based on justification logic. An essentially richer language, so extended, offers the possibility to express new philosophical content. In particular, theorems on the existence of a universal cause on a causal "slingshot" are formulated.

There is a story related concerning Bertrand Russell that makes what I hope is anelegant introduction to the following paper. It is said that as a young man LordRussell, while out for a walk, became, in the course of his meditations, perfectlyconvinced of the validity of the ontological argument for the existence of God.Alas, he did not have a notebook handy and by the time he returned to his studyto write down his discovery found that he had completely lost (...) the train of thoughtwhich had led to so remarkable a conclusion . In the followingpaper I will attempt nothing so grand as the retrieval of Russell‟s lost insight. Iwill however, be attempting a recuperation of another kind. To be brief, I will beasking what the ontological argument meant to its originator, Anselm ofCanterbury, as well as how it might be significant for contemporary discussionsconcerning the so-called “negative theology.” Here I refer in particular to theongoing debate between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion to which, asMarion himself has recognized, Anselm‟s thought has a vital contribution tomake. (shrink)

In his final paragraph Nelson says that one could as well assert the possibility of God's nonexistence as of his existence. I can understand this only in the following sense: a positivist may well say that, for all we know at least, there may be nothing divine, since the idea of divinity cannot be shown to have consistent cognitive meaning. But an atheist, as I have defined the word, can only mean by the "possibility of God's nonexistence" that God might (...) in contingent fact not exist, and this is excluded by step 6 of the argument. Hence the non-positivistic opponent of theism must quarrel with one or more of the first six steps of the proof. He is free to do so. But some of us find these steps persuasive. (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza's highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant'€™s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza'€™s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza's definitions, the way (...) he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant's objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument'€™s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza'€™s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s version of the ontological argument was shown by J. Howard Sobel to be defective, but some plausible modifications in the argument result in a version which is immune to Sobel’s objection. A definition is suggested which permits the proof of some of Godel’s axioms.