We reconsider the nonlocal aspects of quantum mechanics with special reference to the EPR argument. We first confine our considerations to the correlations between the outcomes of measurements on spatially distant constituents, without worrying about the measurement problem. We pay particular attention to the relativistic aspects of the problem. Our first conclusion is that, when developed along the lines we follow, the EPR inference that quantum correlations and locality together imply incompleteness, is appropriate. We then investigate whether the other common (...) conclusion from the EPR argument, i.e. that standard quantum theory implies a spooky action at a distance, is correct. We emphasize the crucial role played by the locality assumption and we discuss the use of counterfactuals in the ‘relativistic’ reformulation of the EPR argument. We show that the above conclusion is false if understood as saying that standard quantum theory exhibits, at least with reference to possessed elements of physical reality, some sort of parameter dependence. Thus, in a sense, the coexistence of quantum mechanics with relativity is even more peaceful than commonly thought. We then go through a similar analysis by taking explicitly into account the measurement process. We point out the difficulties which one meets when confronting reduction mechanisms with relativistic requirements. This leads us to recognize the necessity of reconsidering the criteria for attributing objective properties to individual physical systems. Our final conclusion is that, in principle, it is perfectly possible to build up theories leading to the objectification of macroscopic properties which do not imply any spooky action at a distance. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present the ontic approach to the normativity of cognitive functions and mechanisms, which is directly related to the understanding of biological normativity in terms of normative mechanisms. This approach assumes the hypothesis that cognitive processes contain a certain normative component independent of external attributions and researchers’ beliefs. This component consists of specific cognitive mechanisms, which I call normative. I argue that a mechanism is normative when it constitutes given actions or behaviors of a (...) system. More precisely, it means that, on the one hand, it is their constitutive cause, and on the other hand, it determines a certain field of possibilities from which the system, guided by its own goals, preferences, environmental constraints, etc., chooses the appropriate action or behavior according to a given situation. The background for the analyses presented here is the predictive processing framework, in which it can be shown that at least some of the predictive mechanisms are in fact normative mechanisms. I refer here to the existence of a motivational relation which determines the normative dependence of the agent’s actions due to specific predictions and environmental constraints. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did (...) indeed contribute to the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.Keywords: Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev; Noble gases; Use-novel predictions; Heuristic account; Ad hoc hypotheses. (shrink)

A significant criticism of the anthropic principle as a scientific claim is that testable predictions cannot be derived from it. Brandon Carter has argued, however, that the principle can be used to predict on the one hand that the period of time biological evolution is intrinsically likely to require is very large, and on the other that the number of ‘critical steps’ that have occurred in the evolution of life on earth is related to the length of time life (...) can continue to evolve. I attempt to show that neither of Carter's arguments provides a convincing defence of the testability of the anthropic principle. (shrink)

The accuracy of proxies when they interpret advance directives or apply substituted decision-making criteria has been called into question. It therefore became important to know if the Andalusian Advance Directive Form (AADF) can help to increase the accuracy of proxies' predictions. The aim of this research was to compare the effect of the AADF on the accuracy of proxies' predictions about patients' preferences with that gained from informative and deliberative sessions about end-of-life decision making. A total of 171 (...) pairs of patients and their proxies were randomized to three groups. The control group's answers to the Life Sustaining Preferences Questionnaire (LSPQ) were compared with their proxies' answers to the same questionnaire. In one intervention group, the patients had already completed the AADF and given it to their proxies, who used it to guide their own answers to the LSPQ. In the second intervention (discussion) group, both patients and proxies attended two educative sessions guided by trained nurses and later filled in the LSPQ. Comparisons of accuracy and other variables showed a strong association with the discussion group. The findings show that promoting communication between patients and their proxies improves the accuracy of proxies' predictions much more than isolated use of the AADF form. (shrink)

The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...) H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself. (shrink)

I have argued not that economics has no predictive content, but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of an important episode in the twentieth century history of the subject I have given is both correct and representative, then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of (...) generic prediction. And at least some influential economists and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least they give no other reason than its power to produce such predictions as a justification for the character of economic theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of my paper, is generic prediction enough? (shrink)

Through essays by some of hip-hop's most interesting thinkers, theorists, journalists, writers, emcees, and DJs, Boogie Down Predictions embarks on a quest to understand the connections between time, representation, and identity within hip-hop culture and what that means for the culture at large.

Recently, a number of experiments have emphasized the degree to which subjects fail to detect large changes in visual scenes. This finding, referred to as “change blindness,” is often considered surprising because many people have the intuition that such changes should be easy to detect. Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, and Simons documented this intuition by showing that the majority of subjects believe they would notice changes that are actually very rarely detected. Thus subjects exhibit a metacognitive error we refer to as (...) “change blindness blindness.” Here, we test whether CBB is caused by a misestimation of the perceptual experience associated with visual changes and show that it persists even when the pre- and postchange views are separated by long delays. In addition, subjects overestimate their change detection ability both when the relevant changes are illustrated by still pictures, and when they are illustrated using videos showing the changes occurring in real time. We conclude that CBB is a robust phenomenon that cannot be accounted for by failure to understand the specific perceptual experience associated with a change. (shrink)

Research has established that exposure to a combination of diagnostic (i.e., relevant) and nondiagnostic (i.e., irrelevant) information results in predictions that are more regressive than predictions based on diagnostic information (Hackenbrack, 1992; Hoffman and Patton, 1997). This phenomenon has been labeled the dilution effect (e.g., Tetlock and Boettger, 1989) and has been documented when individuals make predictions. This study tests for the dilution effect when small groups make predictions, and examines the effect of using a procedure (...) designed to reduce the dilution effect. Results indicate that group predictions are influenced by nondiagnostic information in the same manner as are individual predictions, and allowing participants to rate the diagnosticity of information prior to making predictions does not reduce the dilution effect. (shrink)

Müller's target article aims to summarize approaches to the question of how language elements (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) and rules are laid down in the brain. However, it suffers from being too vague about basic assumptions and empirical predictions of neurobiological models, and the empirical evidence available to test the models is not appropriately evaluated. (1) In a neuroscientific model of language, different cortical localizations of words can only be based on biological principles. These need to be made explicit. (2) (...) Evidence for and against word class differences could be evaluated more rigorously. (3) All (and only) humans are able to learn languages with complex syntactic structures; it is, therefore, not appropriate to deny innateness and universality of syntactic principles. The real question appears to be the following: Which neurobiological principles are the linguistic principles based on? (shrink)

This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generatinginductive predictions. After discussing Carnap–Hintikka inductive logic,hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. Onepartition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the otherresults in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following theseexamples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductiveassumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately anyinductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on partitions makeclear that they do not suggest (...) any solution to the problem of induction.Hypotheses schemes provide the tools for making inductive assumptions, but theyalso reveal the need for such assumptions. (shrink)

Of the six sections composing «The Methodology of Posive Economics», the first one («The Relation between Positive and Normative Economics») is apparently the less discussed in the F53 literature, probably as a result of being the shortest one and the less relevant for the realism issue, all at once. In view of Milton Friedman’s subsequent career as a political preacher, it seems difficult not to wonder whether this first section ruled it the way the other five directed Friedman’s scientific performance. (...) After all, the role of prediction in defining positive economics was already advanced therein: when an economist predicts, her results are «independent of any particular ethical position or normative judgments». This is also why positive economics is a politically relevant discipline: as long as the differences about economic policy –among disinterested citizens– derive only from different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action, these differences could be eliminated by the progress of positive economics. Our plan in this paper is to present, in the first place, the role of political motivations in the development of Friedman’s methodological stance. As we will discuss in §2, Friedman was involved in the policy-making process right from the beginning of his professional career, and could experience at first hand the relevance of economic predictions in generating a consensus not only among politicians or the public opinion, but among the profession itself. Conversely, Friedman could also appreciate how difficult was to reach a consensus on a particular policy when the economists disagreed on its practical consequences. In this respect, as we will see, «The Methodology» attempted at guaranteeing the political efficiency of economic research. However, the sociological turn in science studies suggests to question on what basis can we deem a prediction neutral. Is it simply that economists produce these positive predictions disinterestedly, even while deeply engaged in political debates? In §3, we analyse how Friedman himself produced predictions immediately before «The Methodology» was drafted, and how this procedure lies at the core of his Marshallian approach, which he contrasted to the Walrasian strategy on the grounds of its higher political relevance.. (shrink)

I agree with Burns that an evolutionary theory is required, but I question his multifactorial premise. The arguments for an evolutionary theory are stronger, and one that is more precise than that presented by Burns has already been formulated. This theory, that schizophrenia is “the price that Homo sapiens pays for language,” (Crow 1997a; 2000b, 2004c), generates testable predictions absent from Burns' presentation.

Over the past two decades, Ginsburg and Jablonka have developed a novel approach to studying the evolutionary origins of consciousness: the Unlimited Associative Learning framework. The central idea is that there is a distinctive type of learning that can serve as a transition marker for the evolutionary transition from non-conscious to conscious life. The goal of this paper is to stimulate discussion of the framework by providing a primer on its key claims and a clear statement of its main empirical (...) predictions. (shrink)

Much has been said about the accuracy of the famous predictions of the Russian chemist Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev, but far less has been written on how he made his predictions. Here we offer an explanation on how Mendeleev used his periodic system to predict both physical and chemical properties of little-known and entirely unknown chemical elements. We argue that there seems to be compelling evidence in favour of Mendeleev genuinely relying on his periodic system in the course of (...) issuing his predictions—a point recently contested by Woody Science after the practice turn in the philosophy, history, and social studies of science, Routledge, Abington, 2014). In particular, by using the known properties of a number of near neighbours of the three entirely unknown elements, we seek to show how the very format of his table enabled it to function as a powerful tool for Mendeleev in arriving at his predicted values. We suggest that Mendeleev’s use of the periodic system in making his prediction gives an illuminative example of what Woody calls “theoretical practices” in science. (shrink)

The accuracy of proxies when they interpret advance directives or apply substituted decision-making criteria has been called into question. It therefore became important to know if the Andalusian Advance Directive Form (AADF) can help to increase the accuracy of proxies' predictions. The aim of this research was to compare the effect of the AADF on the accuracy of proxies' predictions about patients' preferences with that gained from informative and deliberative sessions about end-of-life decision making. A total of 171 (...) pairs of patients and their proxies were randomized to three groups. The control group's answers to the Life Sustaining Preferences Questionnaire (LSPQ) were compared with their proxies' answers to the same questionnaire. In one intervention group, the patients had already completed the AADF and given it to their proxies, who used it to guide their own answers to the LSPQ. In the second intervention (discussion) group, both patients and proxies attended two educative sessions guided by trained nurses and later filled in the LSPQ. Comparisons of accuracy and other variables showed a strong association with the discussion group. The findings show that promoting communication between patients and their proxies improves the accuracy of proxies' predictions much more than isolated use of the AADF form. (shrink)

Arguments are provided for the reality of the quantum vacuum fields. A polarization correlation experiment with two maximally entangled photons created by spontaneous parametric down-conversion is studied in the Weyl–Wigner formalism, that reproduces the quantum predictions. An interpretation is proposed in terms of stochastic processes assuming that the quantum vacuum fields are real. This proves that local realism is compatible with a violation of Bell inequalities, thus rebutting the claim that it has been refuted by experiments. Entanglement appears as (...) a correlation between fluctuations of a signal field and vacuum fields. (shrink)

Professor Aubert's ?three?stage rocket? (Inquiry, Vol. 26 [1983], No. 1) has reached periodic orbit. His comments on my earlier reply to his critique of my election predictions paper simply repeat arguments I have already refuted. In this note, I limit myself largely to pointing out Professor Aubert's misconceptions of what my position actually is. I find no reasons for revising the views stated in my original election predictions paper, nor any reasons for thinking that paper violated norms of (...) scientific method that prevail in the natural sciences. (shrink)

I discuss the epistemic status of algorithmic predictions in the legal realm. My main claim is that algorithmic predictions do not give us knowledge, not even probabilistic knowledge. The situation, however, is relevantly different from the one in which we find ourselves at the time of assessing statistical evidence in general, and it is rather related to the fact that algorithmic fairness in legal contexts is essentially undetermined. In the light of this, we have to settle for justified (...) beliefs and justified credences. I end by drawing some morals for the Knowledge Norm of action. (shrink)

This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generatinginductive predictions. After discussing Carnap–Hintikka inductive logic,hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. Onepartition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the otherresults in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following theseexamples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductiveassumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately anyinductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on partitions makeclear that they do not suggest (...) any solution to the problem of induction.Hypotheses schemes provide the tools for making inductive assumptions, but theyalso reveal the need for such assumptions. (shrink)

Recent accounts of the speed/accuracy relation for motor tasks have focused on the concept of motor output variability. We outline the advantages of this approach and the limitation of Plamondon's model in explaining movement error. We also examine and present complimentary data for rapid timing tasks. While these tasks do not meet the presented assumptions, the data still fit the model predictions.

The predictable rhythmic structure is important to most ecologically relevant sounds for humans, such as is found in the rhythm of speech or music. This study addressed the question of how rhythmic predictions are maintained in the auditory system when there are multiple perceptual interpretations occurring simultaneously and emanating from the same sound source. We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) while presenting participants with a tone sequence that had two different tone feature patterns, one based on the sequential rhythmic variation (...) in tone duration and the other on sequential rhythmic variation in tone intensity. Participants were presented with the same sound sequences and were instructed to listen for the intensity pattern (ignore fluctuations in duration) and press a response key to detected pattern deviants (attend intensity pattern task); to listen to the duration pattern (ignore fluctuations in intensity) and make a button press to duration pattern deviants (attend duration pattern task), and to watch a movie and ignore the sounds presented to their ears (attend visual task). Both intensity and duration patterns occurred predictably 85% of the time, thus the key question involved evaluating how the brain treated the irrelevant feature patterns (standards and deviants) while performing an auditory or visual task. We expected that task-based feature patterns would have a more robust brain response to attended standards and deviants than the unattended feature patterns. Instead, we found that the neural entrainment to the rhythm of the standard attended patterns had similar power to the standard of the unattended feature patterns. In addition, the infrequent pattern deviants elicited the event-related brain potential called the mismatch negativity component (MMN). The MMN elicited by task-based feature pattern deviants had a similar amplitude to MMNs elicited by unattended pattern deviants that were unattended because they were not the target pattern or because the participant ignored the sounds and watched a movie. Thus, these results demonstrate that the brain tracks multiple predictions about the complexities in sound streams and can automatically track and detect deviations with respect to these predictions. This capability would be useful for switching attention rapidly among multiple objects in a busy auditory scene. (shrink)