Considerations of accuracy – the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values – have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on specific ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety supports only weak propriety. But strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth directedness and additivity. So no further argument is necessary.

A reconsideration of the Confucian concept li (ritual or ritual propriety), one that references Western philosophers as well as the Chinese context. Geir Sigurðsson offers a reconsideration of li, often translated as “ritual” or “ritual propriety,” one of the most controversial concepts in Confucian philosophy. Strong associations with the Zhou period during which Confucius lived have put this concept at odds with modernity’s emphasis on progressive rationality and liberation from the yoke of tradition. Sigurðsson notes how the Confucian (...) perspective on learning provides a more balanced understanding of li. He goes on to discuss the limitations of the critique of tradition and of rationality’s claim to authority, referencing several Western sources, notably Hans-Georg Gadamer, John Dewey, and Pierre Bourdieu. An exposition of the ancient Chinese worldview of time and continuous change further points to the inevitability of li’s adaptable and flexible nature. Sigurðsson argues that Confucius and his immediate followers did not endorse a program of returning to the Zhou tradition, but rather of reviving the spirit of Zhou culture, involving active and personalized participation in tradition’s sustention and evolution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.1 (2001) 49-66 [Access article in PDF] The Propriety of the Past in Horace Odes 3.19 Barbara Pavlock ODES 3.19, A CELEBRATION FOR Murena's election as augur, is one of Horace's most vivid symposiastic poems, yet it has elicited surprisingly little critical discussion. 1 This ode is infused with wry humor and exuberance, from the poet's seemingly indignant rebuke to an unnamed man who (...) delays the proceedings with his interest in ancient Greek history to the call for the toasts and then to the conclusion with spirited revelry in a setting with fine wine and roses. A tension between the beginning and the end of the poem reveals an underlying dynamic revolving around the issue of time, past and present. Although his address to the unnamed individual at the beginning may simply indicate a need to get the festivities in motion, the poet devotes the first strophe to the man's discourse on subjects from the remote past: the kings of Athens, from first to last, the heroes of the line of Aeacus, and the Trojan War. The end of the poem, by contrast, reflects the essential thrust of Horace's symposia toward the importance of the present moment, with the pleasures of love a major element.The pressure of time, a familiar theme in the Odes, is often closely connected with propriety: Horace, for instance, urges Leuconoe to stop [End Page 49] wasting her time by trying to peer into the future through astrology but instead to "seize the day" (carpe diem, 1.11.8) since envious time has rushed on even as they speak. 2 Odes 3.19, I believe, reveals an interplay between the poet's insistence on the present moment in antithesis to the past and an underlying concern for propriety. This article will consider the scope of propriety: as a philosophical concept associated with moderation, it is relevant to the recipient of the poem; not only operating in the social sphere, it also applies to Horace's own poetics. After briefly looking at the poet's views on the impropriety of an absorption in the remote past for the occasion at hand, I will examine how he allows for a more appropriate inclusion of Homeric material in a subtle, oblique way within this ode. Finally, I will show that Horace's placement of the erotic lyric immediately following deftly responds to the problematic of Odes 3.19 through an imaginative fusion of past and present. 1 The first two strophes contrast the dry lecture on historical subjects with issues pertinent to the symposium at hand: Quantum distet ab Inacho Codrus pro patria non timidus mori, narras et genus Aeaci et pugnata sacro bella sub Ilio: quo Chium pretio cadum mercemur, quis aquam temperet ignibus quo praebente domum et quota Paelignis caream frigoribus, taces. (1-8) You recount how great a span of time separates Codrus, not afraid to die for his country, from Inachus and the family of Aeacus and the wars fought before sacred Troy. At what price we should buy a jar of Chian wine, who should heat the water, at whose house and at what time I may escape the Paelignian cold, you are silent. Horace calls attention to the lengthiness of the addressee's discourse on his recondite subject matter by the range of topics, including the chronology of the kings of Athens, the heroes in the line of Peleus [End Page 50] and Telamon, and the Trojan War, and by his use of the verb narras. 3 He furthermore hints at an element of tedium by his description of Codrus, the last Athenian king, with the prosaic phrase pro patria non timidus mori. 4 Horace here echoes his own description of a self-sacrificing patriot earlier in same book. There, however, he employed resonant, alliterative adjectives in the inspired phrase dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (3.2.13). In addition, Horace suggests that the core of the addressee's interests is Homeric material, since he alludes to Achilles and... (shrink)

We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then (...) argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case. (shrink)

In his most recent book, Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion, Henry Rosemont defends against those who would call his reading of Confucianism—he sees it as a type of Role Ethics—a misinterpretation. Rosemont contends that Confucian Role Ethics is important for challenging individualism, even if it is somehow unfaithful to pre-Qin texts. He writes that he could "simply re-title" his book "Role Ethics: A Different Approach to Moral Philosophy Based on a Creative (...) Misreading of Early Confucian Writings". In Confucian Propriety and Ritual Learning: A Philosophical Interpretation, Geir Sigurðsson... (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

This work is a thought experiment in re-interpreting the virtue of li or ritual/propriety for the contemporary, multi-cultural, world. Using Zhuangzi, the Lunyu, and Zhongyong as my primary points of departure, I re-interpret the Confucian ideas of hierarchy in terms of the Daoist conception of harmony. Many scholars today argue that Confucianism has a relational ontology, yet at the same time, we find that Confucian values can and do lead to rigid and harmful traditions that have historically oppressed marginalized (...) groups like women. As such, I re-imagine what li might look like if we take relational ontology seriously, Drawing from Zhuangzi, I argue that Confucian harmony and order do not necessarily arise out of hierarchy, and that harmony, the most primary goal of li and of the Confucian project, can be best attained through propriety that is influenced by Daoism and feminist values such as equality. (shrink)

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel (...) arguments against both claims. (shrink)

Confucians think ritual propriety is extremely important, but this commitment perplexes many Western readers. This essay outlines the early Confucian Xúnzǐ’s defense of ritual, then offers a modified defense of ritual propriety as a real virtue, of value to human beings in all times and places, albeit one that is inescapably indexed to prevailing social norms in a non-objectionable way. The paper addresses five likely objections to this thesis, drawing on but going beyond recent Kantian defenses of courtesy (...) and civility. The objections concern cultural relativity, insincerity, separating style from substance, elitism, and possible incoherence in the virtue itself. (shrink)

Given the persistent conception of rhetoric as effective persuasion by any means for individual success, it is desirable to describe an alternative standard for evaluating argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. I submit formal propriety as a key norm. Conceiving of form as a process of expectation and fulfillment offers a method of reconstructing argumentation that is both descriptive and normative. I illustrate the method by critiquing a sample of argumentation, and conclude by addressing the strengths and limitations of this (...) analytical approach. (shrink)

This study has assessed the psychometric proprieties of the Mental Toughness Inventory within the context of Brazilian sports. About 12 professionals participated in the process of adapting and translating the scale to Brazilian Portuguese. Subjects were 575 athletes who answered the MTI and the 10-item Connor–Davidson Resilience Scale. Data were analyzed through confirmatory factor analysis, Cronbach's alpha, composite reliability, average variance extracted, Spearman correlation, and model invariance tests. Results from CFA showed adequate fit for the original 8-item structure of the (...) scale [Chi-square = 27.041; p = 0.078; normalized chi-square = 1.50; comparative fit index = 0.988; Tucker–Lewis Index = 0.981; root mean square error of approximation = 0.03 [0.00–0.05]; standardized root mean residual = 0.030] assessing mental toughness as a single factor and the scale presented satisfactory internal consistency. MT was correlated with resilience, age, and time of experience in the sport. The MTI has also shown partial measurement invariance for sex and complete invariance across sport types. It was concluded that the MTI is a suitable tool for assessing MT in the present sample of Brazilian athletes; this instrument has potential practical application for researchers and sports psychologists who seek to develop the well-being and performance of athletes. (shrink)

In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range (...) of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity. (shrink)

The redefinition of rights of equality and liberty by radical and deliberative democrats during the last decades of the 20th century resulted in the denial that a consideration of property is integral to political philosophy. Theorizing property as intrinsically political demands a return to Marx but on terms he may not have recognized. I outline a politics of property in this paper contending that there can be no universal justification for any regime of property. Property is by definition the institution (...) of a wrong. The articulation of something as property establishes a border, determining what can be owned, how far ownership extends, where it is limited, as well as terms of use and terms of abuse. It establishes a set of property relations, and defines a vocabulary of the proper. Here sovereign state power is enlisted to enforce relations of property beneficial to some, but not all. A challenge to any political regime must of necessity put in to question both the forms of proper behaviour, and the regime of property. These are intrinsically related to each other. I conclude by arguing that democracy is always improper. Property, in all of its forms entails enclosure. Enclosure requires the drawing and the maintenance of boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. The sovereign determination of the proper, as well as of the exception to the proper defines trespass. Trespass is a form of democratic enactment when, and if, it destabilises enclosure. (shrink)

Propriety and self-command are distinctive and complex Smithian concepts. This essay attempts to shed more light on the meaning and significance of propriety and the virtue of self-command. After a brief introduction on the recent reappraisal of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, a short analysis of Smith’s crucial idea of sympathy follows. Then the relevance of propriety is discussed and some connections between propriety and the virtue of self-command are explored. Finally, the importance of Smith’s self-command (...) is reassessed, paying attention to its origins and philosophical implications. It is noteworthy that, through self-command and propriety, TMS stresses the role of intentions and motivations. By doing so, Adam Smith opens up new threads to rethink personal liberty and its ethical importance for political economy. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the Confucian concept of li or Ritual Propriety, and suggest a new philosophy of action and mind on the basis of the concept. To achieve this aim, I fo...

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

This essay examines the theory of ritual propriety presented in the Xúnzǐ and criticisms of Xunzi-like views found in the classical Daoist anthology Zhuāngzǐ. To highlight the respects in which the Zhuāngzǐ can be read as posing a critical response to a Xunzian view of ritual propriety, the essay juxtaposes the two texts' views of language, since Xunzi's theory of ritual propriety is intertwined with his theory of language. I argue that a Zhuangist critique of the presuppositions (...) of Xunzi's stance on language also undermines his stance on ritual propriety. Xunzi contends that state promulgation of anelaborate code of ritual propriety is a key to good social order (zhi) and that state regulation of language is a key to smooth communication and thus also good order. The Zhuāngzǐ provides grounds for doubting both contentions. Claiming that ritual propriety causally produces social order is analogous to claiming that grammar causally produces smooth linguistic communication, when in fact it is more likely our ability to communicate that allows us to develop shared rules of grammar. Humans have fundamental social and communicative capacities that undergird our abilities to speak a language or engage in shared ritual performances. It is these more fundamental capacities, not their manifestation in a particular system of grammar or ritual norms, that provide the root explanation of our ability to communicate or to live together harmoniously. The Xunzi-Zhuangzi dialectic suggests that ritual is indispensable, but normatively justified rituals will be less rigid, less comprehensive, less fastidious, and more spontaneous than a Xunzian theorist would allow. (shrink)

This study examines the normative foundations of early Confucian ethics and suggests that rather than attempting to understand Confucian ethics in the language of ‘morality’ a more productive way would be to appreciate Confucianism as an ethics of propriety that can be articulated in terms of social roles, ritual decorum, and relational dependence. I argue that Western notions of ‘morality’ betray a thicker, more culturally loaded concept that possesses a limited utility in regard to comparative study. We can appeal (...) to a kind of methodological charity where we not only maximize the sense of the text or subject's sayings but also privilege the categories of thought that are native to the text's or speaker's lexicon. With this in mind, we can understand Confucian ethics as an ethics of propriety that departs substantially from Western moral systems, including virtue ethics, and challenges our received views on justice, autonomy, and personal identity. (shrink)

I argue that an adequate semantics for physical theories must be grounded on an account of the way that a theory provides formal and conceptual resources appropriate for---that have propriety in---the construction of representations of the physical systems the theory purports to treat. I sketch a precise, rigorous definition of the required forms of propriety, and argue that semantic content accrues to scientific representations of physical systems primarily in virtue of the propriety of its resources. In particular, (...) neither the adequacy of those representations nor any referential relations their terms may enter into play any fundamental role in the determination of the representation's semantic content. One consequence is that anything like traditional Tarskian semantics is inadequate for the task. (shrink)

This paper takes behavioural propriety as the source of ritual or the ritualistic in indigenous philosophy in the Philippines. Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety is seen in what have been identified as elements or features of indigenous philosophy in the country. These features are stored in pre-hispanic era (pre-16th century CE) maxims or proverbs and myths. In this paper, I engage conception of behavioural propriety in Filipino philosophy with that in Confucian philosophy. In Confucian philosophy, it is (...) “li” 禮 which relates to ritual. Li encompasses ritual propriety and behavioural propriety. It is originally about ritual or ceremony and, as understood in contemporary scholarship, it has the general meaning of proper conduct; it refers first and foremost to rules of proper conduct. In this paper, I address the question of what each understanding offers for the enrichment of the other. I suggest that importantly, Confucian understanding of li offers the view of behavioural propriety as having an ennobling function, and that Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety offers a perspective on the debate in Confucianism about whether it is ren 仁 or li that is more fundamental in Confucius’s thought. A point that appears to be present in the Filipino understanding is that propriety in behaviour cannot be separated from humaneness (ren). The point comes from the view in the proverbs that a person of ren is necessarily a person of li. Accordingly, the perspective which the Filipino understanding offers proposes the view that behavioural propriety is a necessary condition for humanity (ren). (shrink)

This unorthodox approach results in an exceptionally imaginative and thought-provoking book as well as a strong defense of deontology.

Introduction -- Stoic ethics and rhetoric -- Eighteenth-century common sense and sensus communis -- Taste and sensus communis -- Propriety, sympathy, and style fusing individual and social -- Victorian language theories and the decline of sensus communis.

In Confucianism, ritual propriety 1 is commonly understood as an instrument for guiding people's actions. In this essay, however, I argue that taking ritual propriety merely as an instrument external to human beings fails to appreciate important aspects of Xunzi's conception of ritual propriety. Drawing on suggestions from Martin Heidegger's philosophy, I argue that ritual propriety in the Xunzi is analogous to language in Heidegger in important ways. For Heidegger, language is the "house of Being." For (...) Xunzi, ritual propriety could also be described as the house of the being of humanity. "House" refers to the medium in which human beings dwell. As the "house" of the morally refined person, ritual... (shrink)

Commented article: YANG, Wenpeng. Aroused by the odes, established by the rules of propriety, perfected by music: integrating aesthetic education in contemporary music education through Confucian aesthetic philosophy. Trans/Form/Ação: revista de filosofia da Unesp, v. 47, n. 6, e02400318, 2024. Available at: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/16092.

This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present (...) a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion. (shrink)

OVERVIEWWe ambitiously reexamine Smith’s moral theory in relation to Hume’s. We regard Smith's developments as glorious and important. We also see them as quite fully agreeable to Hume, as enhancement, not departure. But Smith represents matters otherwise! Why would Smith overstate disagreement with his best friend?One aspect of Smith’s enhancement, an aspect he makes very conspicuous, is that between moral approval and beneficialness there is another phase, namely, the moral judge's sense of propriety. With that phase now finding formulation, (...) Smith, if only implicitly, generates a spiral of beneficialness and propriety, a spiral shown in Figure 7 in the present paper. We consider Figure 7, illustrating the spiral, to be the most important arrival point in the present paper; it highlights the non-foundationalism of Smith's ethics. But to arrive at the spiral, we must engage in extensive exegesis.In Part IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents a foil against which he develops his own theory, a foil supposedly representing Hume. According to the foil, moral approval derives from ‘utility.’ But, in multiple ways, the foil is misleading. We provide an interpretation of Hume, notably his four-factor account of moral approval, before examining Smith's representation of Hume.One twist is that Smith used the words utility and useful differently than Hume did – Smith quietly stretched them to include species of agreeableness, thereby obscuring the importance of agreeableness in Hume’s theory.Another, more significant problem is that Smith allows the impression that in Hume moral approval derives quite determinately from beneficialness. In fact Hume conveys the interpretive and sentimental spaciousness of the operations that generate moral approval; here, Hume even speaks repeatedly of ‘proper sentiments’, thus almost using the term propriety himself.But the propriety phase in Smith opens up to a key facet of Smith’s development on Hume: He poeticizes a locus of sympathy not emphasized in Hume – namely, that between the moral judge and her own man within the breast; that locus enters the theory in addition to the sympathies emphasized in Hume, not in lieu of them. We distinguish lateral sympathy, which is important in Hume’s thought, and vertical sympathy, which is especially characteristic of Smith’s more inner-directed and allegorical thought. Smith embraces Hume’s lateral sympathy and enhances moral theory by adding formulations that elaborate vertical sympathy.Next, we come to something of a twist in the whole matter: We show that – as Smith well knew all along! – propriety is a species of agreeableness! Smith’s propriety phase represents another dimension within which such agreeableness lives: Smith’s vertical dimension thus gives rise to a spiral representing the diachronic development of the judge herself. It is a spiral of beneficialness and propriety: Each propriety phase in the next loop of the spiral engenders a species of agreeableness now as a part of beneficialness.Smith's developments on Hume, then, involve the following three facets: formulation of the propriety phase; the poetic elaboration of vertical sympathy; the diachronic spiral of propriety and beneficialness.The three facets come together, especially in Ed. 6 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The whole development goes beyond Hume, but, really, is agreeable to Hume – though Smith himself portrays his developments as disagreeing with features of Hume's moral theory.We speculate that Smith was more or less aware of all that that we say, including the absense of any really substantive disagreement. Why, in that case, would Smith have proceeded as he did? We address that question at the end of the piece. Our speculations suggest a method in the madness. (shrink)

인간에게는 도덕적 본성과 자연적 본성이 있다. 孟子는 도덕적 본성을 인간만의 본성이라고 보았고 荀子는 자연적 본성만을 인간의 본성으로 보았다. 인간에게는 도덕적 본성과 자연적 본성이 다 있다. 다만 孟子는 인간과 동물과는 다른, 인간만이 가지고 있는 도덕적인 면을 보고 본성을 말한 것이고, 荀子는 경험적으로 드러난 인간의 욕심과 이기심으로 다투기 쉬운 자연적인 본성만을 본성으로 본 것이다. 인간의 본성에는 도덕적 본성과 자연적 본성이 다 있으므로 도덕적 본성과 자연적 본성을 함께 봐야 인간의 본성을 총체적으로 본 것이라고 할 수 있다. 孔子의 ‘性相近 習相遠’론은 인간의 도덕적 본성과 자연적 (...) 본성을 함께 보고 논한 것이다. 性이 서로 가깝다고 한 것은 차이가 크지 않다는 것이다. 그러나 같은 것은 아니다. 인간의 도덕적 본성은 같으나 氣質에 따른 자연적 본성 때문에 차이가 있다. 차이가 있긴 하나 큰 차이가 없는 것은, 도덕적 본성이 같기 때문이다. 이런 까닭에 태어날 때는 본성이 서로 비슷하나 자라면서 환경이나 교육에 의해서 본성이 善해지기도 하고 惡해지기도 하여 차이가 많이 나게 된다. 그러므로 교육을 통하여 본래 善한 본성을 회복시켜야 한다. 이 때 智⋅德⋅體를 함께 교육시켜야 하니 六藝가 그것이다. 그 중에서도 禮樂을 통하여 도덕성을 확립시켜야 한다. 개인 하나하나의 도덕성의 확립이 가정⋅사회⋅국가⋅세계⋅만물에까지 미치기 때문이다. “六經의 道가 한 가지로 귀결되니 禮樂을 쓰는 것이 급하다”라고 한 것도 바로 이런 이유에서이다. 그러므로 禮樂敎育을 오늘날에 맞게 재구성하여 習性이 쌓이기 전인 어릴 때부터 시켜야할 것이다. (shrink)

This article examines some of the interactions between law, science, and society taking place during a trial. By focusing on a restricted set of scientific and nonscientific actors engaged in negotiating the meaning, relevance, and reliability of scientific evidence, the article illustrates how the categories—law, science, and society—are inextricably interrelated in the legal negotiations and outcome. The introduction of scientific evidence into adversarial legal settings produces strategies, opinions, and claims that are not shaped solely by scientists, lawyers, or legal processes. (...) The situated law-science negotiations provide a site where social order and scientific knowledges are mutually constituted. The outcome of specific law-science interactions will be open to a range of readings and constraints that are not reducible to some putatively correct scientific understanding nor adequately described as the distortion of scientific evidence by the legal system. (shrink)

There is something uncanny about the importance of a place we call “home” given that is a designation fraught with apparent arbitrariness, ambiguity, and polysemy. We need to have a better understanding of home. This disproportionality between its designation and its importance reflects an existential rift: the importance of being at any particular place we call home is not designated a priori, permanent, intrinsically meaningful, or valuable yet no one would deny its importance in our experience. The value of being (...) at home is lived. The meaning and value of home are expressions of propriety that are neither capricious nor given as such: they are institutions in the sense that Maurice Merleau-Ponty used that term. Our identity emerges in the context of the institution of home. These elucidations use Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of institution to foreground some insights in the nature of home in the works of fiction and non-fiction by the Nobel Prize-winning writer, Toni Morrison. Her literary work, intimately grounded in lived experience, as well as her critical insights, will help us understand what sets the institution of home apart from other institutions is its orienting propriety. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is a defence of the epistemic adequacy of the concept of creatio ex nihilo and of the position of metaphysical creationism. Three ontological possibilities concerning the world are distinguished: the world exists by itself; the existence of the world is depended upon a being that exists by itself; the existence of the world is a brute fact. On the basis of the intuitions of contingency and rationality the author attempts to refute the possibilities and . (...) Then he considers four positions concerning the relationship between the world and the being from endows it with existence: intentionalism, emanationism, creationism and nomologism. Eventually the author sets for creationism as the position more familiar than other ones. He also tries to resolve the problems formulated by the champions of alternative points of view who argue that the concept of creatio ex nihilo cannot be a part of a rational metaphysical theory. Key words CREATIONISM. (shrink)

A pervasive misunderstanding of Confucian philosophy’s concepts considers them to be directives that call for deference and subordination, principally associated with the concept Lǐ 禮 which is understood as rites, rituals, manners, or generally “propriety”. Imposing Lǐ 禮 is considered a path to social and personal harmony. However, an analysis of the conditions and implications of Lǐ 禮 in early Confucian thinking shows that authentic respect, not obedience, is considered the essential condition for good governance and an ordered society. (...) Significantly, authentic respect can only originate from within the self, it cannot be commanded. Based upon self-cultivation, participation in ritual and exemplary conduct establishes a commitment to respect, and the purposeful distinctions expressed through Lǐ 禮 make social order intelligible. Considering the essence of respect in depth, and comparing it to the ethics conceived by Immanuel Kant, neither Confucian nor Kantian ethics are truly deontological in the sense of a “duty that is owed to an external instance”, rather they both rest on the autonomy of the self. A synthesis of both implies that extending authentic respect to an other in an encounter within the context of Lǐ 禮 gives rise to “Existential Reciprocity”: a virtuous cycle which mutually affirms both the self and the other, while rejecting a dichotomous opposition between self-esteem and morality. This is not contingent on external factors, but accessible from a self-determined, autonomous engagement with self-affirming conduct and productive encounters. Benefits are immediate and personal, and this forms the conditions in which harmonious relationships are a natural outcome. (shrink)

Charts the history of the Jesuits in France, their organization, teaching methods and aims, with particular reference to La Flèche and the relationship between Christianity and Classical philosophy in the philosophical curriculum followed there by Descartes. This was the Jesuit version of the liberal arts, based mainly on works by Aristotle, including dialectic, natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics. Speculation as to Descartes's activities in the period 1614–1618, in between finishing his studies at La Flèche, his law studies, and joining (...) Prince Maurice of Nassau's army. (shrink)