My dissertation is a critical study of Jose Ortega Y Gasset's attempt to reconcile his notion of lived-experience , which is fundamentally immediate experience, with his idea of life as vital-reason. But life as vital reason is, itself, best understood as consisting of life as a rational-existential project. This, in effect is Ortega's manner of fusing idealism and realism. The result of this mediation is to be interpreted as the self-with-things or what amounts to: I-in-the-world. Man is never what he (...) is in his immediacy and therefore he must create his essence through a self-conscious existential project. Thus, Ortega's notion of life as radical reality is the culmination of an underlying dialectic that is present throughout his work. That is, man's self-awareness of his life as a pre-reflective extranatural phenomenon vis-a-vis the material world can only be understood through reflection and therefore never in its immediacy. Therefore I conclude that for Ortega the synthesis of these apparently antithetical notions culminates in a form of subjective idealism given that primacy is necessarily attributed to the self over the external world. Even though I accept the fundamental tenets of his argument concerning the synthesis of Realism and Idealism and Rationalism and Vitalism, I have focused upon the inherent tension that exists in any such reflective endeavor. I believe that due to Ortega's emphasis that all reflection must originate and therefore concern itself with life as phenomenon, his philosophy necessarily gives primacy to the self over the material world . In arguing "Yo Soy Yo Y Mis Circumstancias" Ortega stresses the character of the Rational Vitalism that results from my self-awareness of my life as a problem for reflection that is forged through my necessary dealings with the world. The result of this self-knowledge is the foundation of a metaphysics of life that is best understood as man as radical reality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y GassetBob SandmeyerHoward N. Tuttle. Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp. x + 200. Cloth, $59.95.This is a book which seeks to sketch out a coherent philosophy of life. By (...) arguing that "human life is radical reality," Professor Tuttle places the ontological priority of "my life" over and against that of every reality encountered in that life. Yet the life at issue in this book is no solus ipse, and the things or pragmata of this life do not therefore depend on the I for their being. As Ortega y Gasset asserts, I am myself and my circumstances. Neither subject nor substance exists independently of the other. As such, each bears the mark of this bi-polarity (40, 45). Hence human life, "my life," is not conceived here as a subjective immanence but rather as a carnate life that projects itself, i.e., its possibilities, into the concrete situation of its worldly circumstances. Indeed, the narrative structure of this projection expresses a central categorical feature of human life, its historicity. "Human life becomes here conceived as the historical stream of the inner and outer, the 'I' and its world" (155). Every reality takes its meaning from—in truth, has its status as a transcendent reality from—the manner and the guise in which it appears within the narrative of this self-construction of my life (5, 26, 40, 45, 88, 156, 171). This is a thesis, Tuttle argues, that has its roots in the writings of three figures: Wilhelm Dilthey, to whom the author refers as the "founder of the philosophy of human life," Martin Heidegger, the famous German philosopher whose explication of the structure of Dasein is central to the situated intersubjectivity of "my life" articulated in this book, and José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher whose writings arguably play the most central role in the work (6, 26, 142, 155, 166).Professor Tuttle ought to be commended for the breadth of his undertaking and the economy of his presentation. Given its ambition, this is a short work of no more than 179 pages excluding notes and bibliography. This pithiness and a general lack of technical jargon speak well of the work, especially as it seems likely to find its way into the hands of young scholars interested in existential phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and continental philosophy generally. Indeed, within this broad field there are too few efforts like this one which seek to examine the interconnection of these three philosophers. Yet the very attributes that make this book a favorable addition to any collection also contribute to a serious defect in the work. Where its brevity demands precise articulation, the book often falls into repetition. The discussion of the distinction between clock time and lived time, for instance, comes across as especially belabored. Throughout the work, there are passages which appear virtually identical in different sections. And where its accessible presentation offers an easy introduction to some very difficult material, its lack of focus leaves one to wonder about the efficacy of its message. As Professor Tuttle remarks in the last lines of the work, "this essay is at very best only a collection of abstract and skeletal thought forms that have been generated within my life in its relation to its circumstances" (178).Reading the work, then, one wonders if it is best suited for the young scholar, the accomplished academic, or both. A lack of sufficient background footnoting restricts the acceptability of this work as a tool for serious research. For instance, given the aims of the book one would expect that Heidegger's lectures on "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview" would have a prominent role in the essay, yet it is not even cited. The essay thus seems best directed towards more novice scholars. Yet the skeletal feel of the work and the unfocused integration of many of the themes from the different writings of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset... (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset,, Spanish writer, philosopher and revolutionary was noted for his humanistic criticism of modern civilization. His best known work, The Revolt of the Masses earned him an international reputation. In it, he decried the destructive influence of the mass-minded, and therefore mediocre, people, who, if not directed by the intellectually and morally superior minority, encourage the rise of fascism and totalitarianism.

Resumen El liberalismo de Ortega no se ha estudiado atendiendo a sus fundamentos filosóficos y en lo que serían las diferentes etapas del pensamiento del filósofo español. Desde el neokantismo de mocedad, Ortega entiende el liberalismo como “ideal” o ley de la moralidad. Posteriormente, desde la “fenomenología” y en la génesis del raciovitalismo, a la altura de 1914, la libertad no responderá ya a la idea del deber moral, sino del tener que ser personal en un “mundo vital”. En un (...) tercer periodo de su obra, desde 1929 en adelante, Ortega concibe la libertad como un sentimiento o idea radical sobre la vida en el contexto de su metafísica de la vida humana como realidad radical, primera y primordial.Ortega’s liberalism has not been studied taking into consideration its philosophical foundations and in the different phases of Ortega´s thought. From neokantism, Ortega thinks about liberalism as an ideal or law of morality. Later on, from “phenomenology” and in the origins of ratiovitalisms, in the period of 1914, Ortega did not conceive of freedom as a moral duty but as something related to the idea of having to be a person in a vital world. In a third period, from 1929 on, Ortega thinks about freedom as a sentiment or radical idea about life in the context of his metaphysics of human life as radical reality, the first one and essential. (shrink)

The analysis of cognitive-ontological and especially ethical concepts in Nietzscheʼs philosophy shows deprivation as an important component that compromises their status. The emptiness, in the form of purity, inevitably appears during the decomposition of Nietzsche’s thought. Under the influence of perspectivism, epistemology, along with the question of truth, have undergone radical deconstruction. The results significantly affect the existence of morality, values and the notion of good in general. Deprivation appears in values, which leads to pessimism. Pessimistic values move away (...) from the intensity of life instinct. As a reflection of life, man strives and destroys the aspirations for life. The whole reality, on the other hand, is in opposition and thus, necessarily, in dialectic and conflict. Nietzsche, however, does not strive for reconciliation opposites, but requires their enduring, which is, at the same time, overcoming. Conflict between pessimistic and life valuesinevitably arises. Pessimism precedes nihilism, which alternates the notion of truth, meaning, and foundation. In the concluding analysis, it becomes clear how the value creator is placed in relation to the concept of eternal return and overcoming nihilism. Emptiness and lack of sense are replaced by a dynamic and conflicting conception of life, i.e. existence, where the dynamics of life must not be understood in an organic or other bio-morphological sense, but in relation to the individual and his creative potential only in the form of change and reestablishment of reality. This, in turn, means that, ultimately, the focus is on the subject, man as will and his existential acts. (shrink)

Context: Johnson argues that because radical constructivism requires social constraints and therefore ontological assumptions, it is no different from constructive realism, which is comparatively mainstream. Results: While the distinction between these approaches appears slim, our concepts are not independent of us, and may need to change in spite of established traditions. Implications: Perhaps radical constructivism cannot be mainstream because it is essentially concerned with epistemological origins of concepts and consequently is not practical enough for the received consensus.

Book review of contributions from scholars of 19th-century German.

Anniversaries and funding crises prompt periodic calls to reevaluate the mission and public perceptions of the U.S. Land-Grant University system. One such call was issued by the Kellogg Commission on the Future of State Colleges and Land Grant Universities in their 1999 report, “Returning to Our Roots: the Engaged Institution.” Written by leaders of state universities and land-grant colleges, this report urges these institutions to engage more authentically and equitably in two-way relationships with their local constituents. Twenty years later, Land-Grant (...) Universities continue to struggle with building widespread public support for their missions and equitable involvement in research, teaching, and extension functions across diverse constituencies. While largely discounted by the Kellogg Commission, a fresh look at the role originally envisioned for the extension arm of the trifold land-grant mandate suggests that we may be conceiving of this system too narrowly. The establishment of statewide extension systems was once seen as a way to ensure that Land-Grant Universities would be accessible and responsive to all of a state’s residents. Extension systems continue to offer a front-door to a major public university in almost every county of the United States, but they tend to be viewed primarily as a way to translate science or distribute information from the university to the public. This discussion uses a historical and modern lens to reimagine the role that Extension could potentially play in catalyzing reciprocal, co-learning relationships between Land-Grant Universities and their diverse local constituencies. (shrink)

Augmented reality (AR) technologies function to ‘augment’ normal perception by superimposing virtual objects onto an agent’s visual field. The philosophy of augmented reality is a small but growing subfield within the philosophy of technology. Existing work in this subfield includes research on the phenomenology of augmented experiences, the metaphysics of virtual objects, and different ethical issues associated with AR systems, including (but not limited to) issues of privacy, property rights, ownership, trust, and informed consent. This paper addresses some (...) epistemological issues posed by AR systems. I focus on a near-future version of AR technology called the Real-World Web, which promises to radically transform the nature of our relationship to digital information by mixing the virtual with the physical. I argue that the Real-World Web (RWW) threatens to exacerbate three existing epistemic problems in the digital age: the problem of digital distraction, the problem of digital deception, and the problem of digital divergence. The RWW is poised to present new versions of these problems in the form of what I call the augmented attention economy, augmented skepticism, and the problem of other augmented minds. The paper draws on a range of empirical research on AR and offers a phenomenological analysis of virtual objects as perceptual affordances to help ground and guide the speculative nature of the discussion. It also considers a few policy-based and designed-based proposals to mitigate the epistemic threats posed by AR technology. (shrink)

This article attends to the intimate contradictions that differentially shape and limit caring capacities and relations in a violent world, and the embodied ethical and political transformations at the heart of learning to care otherwise. From manifestos calling for ‘universal care’ in defiance of the state-sanctioned horrors of the pandemic era, to the abolitionist politics of care developed by BLM organizers through movement building and healing, and the proliferation of mutual-aid infrastructures to meet needs and distribute resources in the face (...) of overwhelming crisis and neglect—these examples and so many others illustrate with undeniable clarity that radical care is finally on the agenda. In what follows, I hope to contribute to this urgent conversation by pointing to how care is shaped in fundamentally contradictory ways under conditions of entrenched structural violence, and the limitations of normative frameworks when confronting this reality. To unambiguously valorize care in ethical and political life is to risk occluding the constitutive violence of existing social structures and norms, its impact on the intimacies of caring relations, and ultimately the ways that communities mobilize alternate economies and practices of care towards healing and social change. While it is crucial to value care and work for a more caring society, I claim that efforts to transform patterns of relational harm and develop new sensibilities should also be highlighted as integral components of radical caring praxis. (shrink)

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that ‘‘quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events’’, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that ‘‘quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world’’. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately (...) embrace a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles. (shrink)

Can radical constructivism, with its agnostic stance towards any form of mind-independent reality, offer a way forward for sustainable development? Do fast thinking and heuristics facilitate or ….

Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating (...) it within broader historical monist debates about the mind and bringing attention to one of its central internal disputes regarding ‘mental chemistry’. By taking a closer look at how Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell address the question of whether and how our mental episodes are composed of more basic elements, it highlights deep differences among their conceptions of the fundamental ‘neutral stuff’ and its relations to ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest serve as a cipher for a radical rupture in the Flexnerian paradigm of medicine, and they can only be addressed if we recognize that health care is now practiced by institutions, not just individual physicians. By showing how "appropriate utilization of services" or "that which is medically indicated" is a function of socioeconomic factors related to institutional responsibilities, I point toward an administrative and organizational ethic as a needed component for addressing conflicts of interest. The argument (...) is developed by reviewing three important books. First, I consider Mark Rodwin's attempt to configure the economic structures of medicine so that classical fiduciary and scientific ideals can be fostered. Second, I consider E. Haavi Morreim's attempt to modify the classical ideals in order to account for new economic realities. Finally, by considering essays in a recent volume on conflicts of interest edited by Spece, Shimm, and Buchanan, I argue for a constructive dialectic between the approaches of Rodwin and Morreim. In order to properly address conflicts of interest, there must be a radical reassessment of medicine that accounts for the interrelation between scientific, ethical, and economic concerns. Until institutions come into view and professional ethics is developed to account for their role, legitimate interests and obligations of diverse parties cannot be harmonized. (shrink)

The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, (...) the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time. (shrink)

SummaryA dilemma concerning reference is posed: on the one hand it seems essential, if we are to give an account of truth, to first give an account of reference. On the other hand, reference is more remote than truth from the evidence in behavior on which a radical theory of language must depend, since words refer only in the context of sentences, and it is sentences which are needed to promote human purposes. The solution which is proposed is to (...) treat reference as a theoretical construct whose sole function is to serve a theory of truth. Since more than one relation between words and objects will serve a theory of truth equally well, this amounts to giving up the concept of reference as basic. (shrink)

Radical doubt about the truths that govern life has posed a problem for thinkers in many different cultures and periods. This study uncovers the solutions offered by a postmodern Western thinker, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and an early modern Indian thinker, Rupa Gosvami, each of whom offers a renewed postskeptical vision of a revitalized life that is firmly rooted in the transcendental truths of reality.

Context: Using radical constructivism, society can be considered from the perspective of asking the question, “Who conceives of society?” In Luhmann ’s social systems theory, this question itself is considered as a construct of the communication among reflexive agents. Problem: Structuration of expectations by codes operating in interhuman communications positions both communicators and communications in a multi-dimensional space in which their relations can be provided with meaning at the supra-individual level. The codes can be functionally different and symbolically generalized. (...) Method: More than Luhmann, I focus on the hypothetical status of the communication of meaning and the uncertainty involved. Meaning can be communicated because of reflexivity in interhuman communications; meaning cannot be observed. Results: The communication of denotations between semantic domains can generate “horizons of meaning” as reflexive orders that remain structurally coupled to individual minds. This elusive order contains a trade-off between “organization” at interfaces integrating expectations at each moment of time, and the potential of further differentiation among symbolically generalized codes of communication in a “self-organization” over time. Implications: One can model the coding in the communication of meaning as latent variables that evolve as an implication of the interacting intentions and expectations. The structure of expectations can be visualized and animated using semantic maps. The self-organizing horizons of meaning operate in a multidimensional space different from the network topology, and at another pace, since meaning is provided to events from the perspective of hindsight. Constructivist content: This perspective of the radical constructedness of social reality transforms the status of agency and organization in sociological theorizing from a source of change to a resource of communicative competencies and reflexive performativity. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of reality and the transformation concerning the complex approach to the modes of existence based on the interrelation between diverse actants that make up our world. Considering recent ontological debates and critiques of modernity, the article argues for a shift away from ready-made suppositions about reality and the desire for simplified answers. We propose a radical idea of an actant interaction perspective grounded in Bruno Latour’s and Hartmut Rosa’s ideas of exploring an (...) ontology embracing curiosity, imagination, and the importance of making mistakes as necessary attitudes in navigating the uncontrollable nature of reality. The article emphasizes the importance of embracing a sense of liberty when comprehending and interacting with the world. It encourages us to concentrate on the strengths and connections of living organisms. (shrink)

Prominent radical democrats have in recent times shown a vivid interest in the commons. Ever since the publication of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom, the commons have been associated with a self-governing and self-sustaining scheme of production and burdened with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social space independent from both the markets and the state. Since the commons prove on a small empirical scale that self-governance, far from being a utopian ideal, is and long has been (...) a lived reality, a few authors have attempted to turn them into the conceptual matrix of their own account of radical democracy. Negri and Hardt, on one hand, Laval and Dardot, on the other, have jointly coined the term ‘the common’ (in the singular) to suggest that the self-governance quintessential to the commons could be turned into a general democratic principle. Though this is an attractive theoretical prospect, I will contend that it fails to account for an important contradiction between the two theoretical frameworks it connects. Whereas the governance of the commons depends on harmonious cooperation between all stakeholders which in turn relies on a strong sense of belonging to a shared community, radical democracy is highly suspicious of any attempt to build a totalizing community and constantly emphasizes the decisive role of internal agonistic conflicts in maintaining a vibrant pluralism. I will further contend that the short-sightedness of radical democrats on this issue may be partially explained by the strong emphasis in the commons literature on a related but distinct conflict, that which opposes the commoners to the movement of enclosures. I will argue, however, that this conflict is not of an agonistic nature and does little to preserve the dynamism and the constant self-criticism proper to the radical democrat regime. (shrink)

Fairness of Artificial Intelligence decisions has become a big challenge for governments, companies, and societies. We offer a theoretical contribution to consider AI ethics outside of high-level and top-down approaches, based on the distinction between “reality” and “world” from Luc Boltanski. To do so, we provide a new perspective on the debate on AI fairness and show that criticism of ML unfairness is “realist”, in other words, grounded in an already instituted reality based on demographic categories produced by (...) institutions. Second, we show that the limits of “realist” fairness corrections lead to the elaboration of “radical responses” to fairness, that is, responses that radically change the format of data. Third, we show that fairness correction is shifting to a “domination regime” that absorbs criticism, and we provide some theoretical and practical avenues for further development in AI ethics. Using an ad hoc critical space stabilized by reality tests alongside the algorithm, we build a shared responsibility model which is compatible with the radical response to fairness issues. Finally, this paper shows the fundamental contribution of pragmatic sociology theories, insofar as they afford a social and political perspective on AI ethics by giving an active role to material actors such as database formats on ethical debates. In a context where data are increasingly numerous, granular, and behavioral, it is essential to renew our conception of AI ethics on algorithms in order to establish new models of responsibility for companies that take into account changes in the computing paradigm. (shrink)

From the constructivist perspective, science cannot transcend thedomain of experience. Scientific theories are seen as models that helpto order and manage that domain. As the experiential field expands,models are replaced by others based on novel conceptual constructs. Thepaper suggests the substitution of viability or functional fit forthe notions of Truth and objective representation of anexperiencer-independent reality. This by-passes the sceptics'incontrovertible arguments against certain real-world knowledge andproposes the Piagetian conception of cognition as the function thatgenerates ways and means for dealing (...) with the world of experience. (shrink)

As a technology and an art form perceived to be capable of reproducing the world, it has long been thought that the cinema has a natural affinity with reality. In this essay I consider the Realist theory of film history out forward by Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery from the perspective of Radical Constructivism. I argue that such a Realist theory cannot provide us with a viable approach to film history as it presents a flawed description of (...) the historian’s relationship to the past. Radical Constructivism offers an alternative model, which requires historians to rethink the nature of facts, the processes involved in constructing historical knowledge, and its relation to the past. Historical poetics, in the light of Radical Constructivism, is a basic model of research into cinema that uses concepts to construct theoretical statements in order to explain the nature, development, and effects of cinematic phenomena. (shrink)

There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry”, the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality (...) of the present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. (shrink)

In a brilliant series of studies, Roy Bhaskar, the originator of the influential, multi-disciplinary and international philosophy of critical realism, presents for the first time in published form, his new philosophy of Meta-Reality. The philosophy of Meta-Reality confirms many aspects of the great philosophical traditions of the past, while correcting their one-sidedness and transcending their dualism and dichotomies, representing what is valid in them in a radically new way, apt for our contemporary times of global crisis.

Alterity is in danger. It is a masterpiece in peril, an object lost or missing from our system, from the system of artificial intelligence and the system of communication in general.--from Radical AlterityWhere is the Other today? Can Otherness challenge our arrogant, insular cultural narcissism? From artificial intelligence to the streets of Venice, from early explorers to contemporary photographers, Jean Baudrillard and Marc Guillaume discuss the traces of radical alterity in our world. These provocative seminars, held in 1990 (...) and 1991, follow the multiple, intertwined trajectories first projected in Baudrillard's work and his reading of the "radical exoticism" posited by Victor Segalen--ideas Baudrillard extends into the realms of mass media, pseudonyms, technology, and that illusorily close yet radically foreign "primitive society of the future," America. In a world where no corner is unexplored, the Other remains a challenge to thought, a crack in the shell of universal understanding, impossible to communicate but potentially the linchpin of communication itself. Together, Baudrillard and Guillaume explore the threatened and fatal figures of radical alterity. This collection is no longer available in French, and this English edition includes an additional essay by Baudrillard, "Because Illusion and Reality Are Not Opposed."Jean Baudrillard will be remembered as one of the most provocative and renowned social theorists of the twentieth century. Economist and professor at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Marc Guillaume has published several works in French rethinking contemporary socioeconomics and has collaborated with such thinkers as Jacques Derrida and Jacques Attali. (shrink)

How should we conceive of conflicts that seem intractable? Is there any hope of a resolution? We observe impasses between various groups concerning the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, the Movement for Black Lives and racial conservatives, and Indigenous voices versus settler colonial states. Some aspects of these impasses can surely be explained by an unwillingness by one or more parties to the conflict to yield any ground. Might there also be room for misunderstanding generated by radically different ways of conceiving (...) the world? According to the different worlds thesis, people come to radically different understandings of the world because they inhabit incompatible conceptual realities. In this article, I endeavor to explore possible ways of understanding the thesis and its potential impact on certain normative practices we tend to take for granted. (shrink)

The race against COVID-19 has been intense and painful and many of us are now looking for a way to move on. We may try to seize a degree of comfort and security by convincing ourselves that we are among the “fittest”—that is, among those who have managed to survive—who can now hope for a “new-normal” time, relatively unscathed. But this isn’t what we should be hoping for. Our world, and ourselves, will never be free of COVID-19 or its insidious (...) effects. COVID-19, like climate change, is a threat multiplier and the challenges it has raised are now indelibly engraved in our vulnerable, interconnected lives. Rather than vainly hoping for a return to an imaginary, erstwhile “normal” what we need is something more fundamental: a new version of hope that embraces a courage to learn what we need to do, to enable us to live a future to which we aspire. Perhaps counter-intuitively, we need to accept that the COVID-19 experience has already changed us deeply and hope that we can learn from this and from the future changes that the pandemic will give rise to. We need to radicalize our responses to the challenges, enabling ourselves to learn new lessons about old but increasingly pertinent topics, such as the realities of human fragility, and inter-connection. (shrink)

'Social construction' is a central metaphor in contemporary social science, yet it is used and understood in widely divergent and indeed conflicting ways by different thinkers. Most commonly, it is seen as radically opposed to realist social theory. Dave Elder-Vass argues that social scientists should be both realists and social constructionists and that coherent versions of these ways of thinking are entirely compatible with each other. This book seeks to transform prevailing understandings of the relationship between realism and constructionism. It (...) offers a thorough ontological analysis of the phenomena of language, discourse, culture and knowledge, and shows how this justifies a realist version of social constructionism. In doing so, however, it also develops an analysis of these phenomena that is significant in its own right. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The paper attempts to investigate the constructivist approach to the social world and its implications for social forecasting. _Theoretical basis._ Social forecasting is mainly based on the idea that a human is "determined ontologically". Using the methodology of the natural sciences, most predictions and forecasts fail to encompass all the multiplicity and variability of the future. The postmodern interpretation of reality gave impetus to the development of the new approaches to it. A constructivist approach to social reality (...) began to compete with essentialism. Social constructivism asserts that reality is a set of mental constructs, that it is ultimately a text. Radical constructivism interprets reality as a specific system of meanings emphasizing the artifact aspects of our reality. An interpretation of the social actors’ behavior is based on the ways of understanding accepted in a given society/community and do not possess ontological universality. The creators of social space are also its creations. _Originality._ Within the framework of the postmodern approach to reality, the second-order forecasting, or forecasting of forecasting, is particularly relevant. That means that the observers-forecasters must be included in the forecast as a part of one-unified process. At this stage, a forecaster must realize that he/she is a part of a larger system, a part of the world he/she observes (and actually creates). The situation changes dramatically – the forecaster is forced to take responsibility for his/her own observations. This ultimately leads to the "humanization" of forecasting. Acting in our world full of uncertainty, unpredictability, and turbulence, modern researchers of the future should be mindful of powerful social constructs of reality. _Conclusions._ Social forecasting should be embedded in a wider context, which requires a joint effort of philosophers, foresight practitioners, historians, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, religious scholars, anthropologists, etc. To develop promising visions and scenarios of the future, it is necessary to answer the question "Why?", which is the task of philosophically oriented research, because without this answer, we will deal with the consequences; and the implementation of the negative scenarios will reproduce itself in new socio-cultural and historical conditions. An in-depth understanding of this "Why?" provides opportunities to be in the flow of transformations. The study of the deep mental processes of the actors of social changes, the multidimensional influence on the transformation of social structures can gradually expand an answer to the question "Why?", that can cause positive changes and, accordingly, allow to create fruitful projects of the future and form effective behavioral strategies that correspond to the desired level of social development. (shrink)

From Plato's eidos, to Descartes' cogito, to Kant's numenon, our understanding of reality has faltered at a seemingly impossible, double-edged, impasse. First, an ontological 'hard problem': If mind and matter are so radically different and separate, how do they ever interact? Second, a related epistemological conundrum: How is it possible for mind to ever know anything about matter--including whether it even exists? Then came Whitehead. By shifting the mind-matter relation from substances interacting in space to complementary phases in process, (...) he offered a way through, or at least around, the Kantian impasse. His panpsychist ontology came hand-in-glove with an epistemology of intersubjectivity: We can know the objective physical world because the actual world is not just physical, and because it necessarily and intimately informs and constitutes our subjective experience. But is this panpsychism or idealism? And how does it avoid the interaction problem that bedevils dualism or the problem of emergence that embarrasses materialism? (shrink)

Quayshawn Spencer argues for radical racial pluralism, the position that there is a plurality of natures and realities for race in the United States. In this paper, I raise two difficulties for Spencer’s argument. The first is targeted narrowly at his response to a potential objection to his argument, and the second is a more general difficulty to do with how the argument handles the social consequences of the authoritative categorization of people. Although the second difficulty is more serious (...) than the first, neither is insurmountable. I then sketch an alternative argument for radical racial pluralism, one that would be likely to succeed in the event that Spencer’s argument turned out to fail. Considering these two contrasting routes to radical racial pluralism highlights the fact that radical racial pluralism is a rather more modest metametaphysical position than it may have initially appeared to be. In virtue of this, I suggest that we should develop and assess a more radically pluralist metametaphysical account of race, which I term ‘ultra-radical racial pluralism’. (shrink)

This paper explores the limitations of neoliberal concepts of resilience and the possibilities of abolition in the discourses surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada. I locate Canada’s state discussions at the outset of the pandemic in 2020 in the neoliberal model of resilience that is rooted in ideologies of individualism and carcerality, rather than the deconstruction of the interdependent systems that create them – despite the temporary questioning of the status quo in political discourse. To contrast the mobilization of neoliberal (...) resilience, I introduce the Doctors for Defunding the Police collective and analyze how they mobilize a more radical praxis by approaching pandemic discourse through a framework of abolition and healing justice. Finally, I draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2023) analysis of the components of reworlding from the Global South, locating the praxis of Doctors for Defunding the Police in this tradition due to its rejection of neoliberal individualism, its embrace of alternative subjectivities, and its turn towards a politics of collective care. Ultimately, I argue that while the 2020 resilience discourse afforded an approach to the pandemic that did not fully abandon the population, it remained fundamentally tied to neoliberalism and racial capitalism, whereas the abolitionist response offered a more transformative praxis of reworlding through its commitment to deconstructing harmful systems and reviving a decolonial praxis of collectivity. To conclude, I examine how the contemporary politics of Covid-19 continue to embrace colonial and carceral realities, necessitating a continued abolitionist praxis of reworlding. (shrink)

In the 1960s, the strict opposition between the religious and the secular began to break down, blurring the distinction between political philosophy and political theology. This collapse contributed to the decline of modern liberalism, which supported a neutral, value-free space for capitalism. It also deeply unsettled political, religious, and philosophical realms, forced to confront the conceptual stakes of a return to religion. Gamely intervening in a contest that defies simple resolutions, Clayton Crockett conceives of the postmodern convergence of the secular (...) and the religious as a basis for emancipatory political thought. Engaging themes of sovereignty, democracy, potentiality, law, and event from a religious and political point of view, Crockett articulates a theological vision that responds to our contemporary world and its theo-political realities. Specifically, he claims we should think about God and the state in terms of potentiality rather than sovereign power. Deploying new concepts, such as Slavoj Žižek's idea of parallax and Catherine Malabou's notion of plasticity, his argument engages with debates over the nature and status of religion, ideology, and messianism. Tangling with the work of Derrida, Deleuze, Spinoza, Antonio Negri, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, John D. Caputo, and Catherine Keller, Crockett concludes with a reconsideration of democracy as a form of political thought and religious practice, underscoring its ties to modern liberal capitalism while also envisioning a more authentic democracy unconstrained by those ties. (shrink)

The significance of utopian thought for education can be made evident through reconceptualizing utopia and approaching it alongside the notion of dystopia. Awareness of dystopian elements of reality radicalizes the kind of critique that assists utopian thought and makes engagement with it more pressing. Awareness of the lurking danger of future dystopia goes hand in hand with a utopia that is cautious and vigilant of its own possible turn into catastrophe. If education is not just an institution of the (...) unreflective socialization and social integration of the young immersed in technicist and prudentialist goals, if it is about futurity and vision of a better world, it has to rely on, and renegotiate, utopian thought. Yet, all this presupposes a new descriptive account of the self and the world that breaks with the kind of anthropology and ethics that generated a particular conception of utopia as impossible and purely oneiric. (shrink)

Purpose: In the paper, I discuss how Ernst Glasersfeld worked as a scientist on the project, Interdisciplinary Research on Number (IRON), and explain how his scientific activity fueled his development of radical constructivism. I also present IRON as a progressive research program in radical constructivism and suggest the essential components of such programs. Findings: The basic problem of Glasersfeld's radical constructivism is to explore the operations by means of which we assemble our experiential reality. Conceptual analysis (...) is Glasersfeld's way of doing science and he used it in IRON to analyze the units that young children create and count in the activity of counting. In his work in IRON, Glasersfeld first conducted a first-order conceptual analysis of his own operations that produce units and number, and then participated in a second-order analysis of the language and actions of children and inferred the mental operations that they use to produce units and number. Further, Glasersfeld used Piaget's concept of equilibration in the context of scheme theory in a second-order analysis of children's construction of number sequences and of more advanced ways and means of operating in the traffic of numbers. Research Implications: The scientific method of first- and second-order conceptual analysis transcends our work in IRON and it is applicable in any radical constructivist research program whose problem is to explore the operations by means of which we construct our conceptions. Because of the difficulties involved with introspection, conducting second-order conceptual analyses is essential in exploring these operations and it involves analyzing the language and actions of the observed. But conceptual analysis is only a part of the research process because the researchers are by necessity already involved in creating occasions of observation. The "experimenter" and the "analyst" can be the same person or they can be different people. Either case involves intensive and sustained interdisciplinary thinking and ways of working if the research program is to be maintained over a substantial period of time as a progressive research program. (shrink)

Constructivism is the idea that we construct our own world rather than it being determined by an outside reality. Its most consistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC), claims that we cannot transcend our experiences. Thus it doesn't make sense to say that our constructions gradually approach the structure of an external reality. The mind is necessarily an epistemological solipsist, in contrast to being an ontological solipsist who maintains that this is all there is, namely a single mind within (...) which the only world exists. RC recognizes the impossibility of the claim that the world does not exist. Yet, RC has the potential to go much further. I claim that RC provides the foundation of a new world-view in which we can overcome hard scientific problems. Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RC further, not just on philosophical grounds, but also into the domain of science. (shrink)

One debate that metaphysicians of race have been consumed with since the 1990s is what we can call the US race debate, which is the debate about what the nature and reality of race is according to the dominant ways that ‘race’ and race terms are used to classify people in contemporary American English. In 2014, I contributed a defence of biological racial realism in the US race debate that utilized new results about human genetic clustering from population genetics. (...) In this paper, I will show that all US race theories have been wrong, including my own. This is because, as I will argue, the correct US race theory has a radically pluralist form. This is an instance of a metametaphysical position that I call radical racial pluralism. After defending radical racial pluralism in the US race debate, I explore valuable implications of the view for philosophers of race. (shrink)

This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might (...) relate to some grounding reality or thing-itself, and considers some of the personal and social consequences of becoming increasingly immersed in virtual realities. Although this chapter was published in 1998 and develops work published in 1990, it presents a form of “radical externalism” that anticipates many themes in current (2006) internalism versus externalism debates about the nature of mind. It is also relevant to an understanding of virtual reality “presence.”. (shrink)

The fifth chapter is a study of the emergence of ‘radical Cartesianism’ as an actor’s category in 1660s and 1670s, which prompted a further development of foundationalism as a reflection on the limits and proper method of philosophy. The key figure in this double process was De Raey, who in the late 1660s started to develop a new logic or metaphysics, intended to counter, on the one hand, the uses of Descartes outside natural philosophy and metaphysics itself, and on (...) the other, the erosion of Descartes’s metaphysical tenets. His writings thus turn out to be relevant as he offers a mapping of the interpretations of Cartesianism covering its uses in theology (as by Meijer and Spinoza) and the spreading of Hobbes’s materialist philosophy in the Low Countries. Moreover, his logical-metaphysical theories embody a novelty in determining the aim of these disciplines, both with respect to the Cartesian tradition (i.e. to Clauberg and Geulincx) and to the Scholastic one, and start to assume a reflective role as they assess the limits of scientific knowledge. In his hands, logic and metaphysics become one discipline, as they have the same function, i.e. the definition of the principles of scientific knowledge (viz. the notions of physical and mental realities), and of its scope and applications. On the one hand, therefore, he can overcome the reduplication of metaphysics and ontology of Clauberg, and the introductory or didactic function that logic played both in Clauberg’s and Geulincx’s philosophy. On the other, his logical and metaphysical systematisation can be read as the result of a long-standing debate over the objects of these disciplines (either mere concepts, or entities existing outside mind), in which De Raey places himself by dealing with the theories of Burgersdijk and Ramus. This chapter thus works as a junction in the account of the establishment of Cartesianism as the philosophy of the university, and its challenges by emerging, alternative worldviews, interpretations and uses. Together, these converging theoretical and historical factors shaped a new, reflective function for logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

Essays in radical empiricism: Does "consciousness" exist? A world of pure experience. The thing and its relations. How two minds can know one thing. The place of affectional facts in a world of pure experience. The experience of activity. The essence of humanism. La notion de conscience.--A pluralistic universe: The types of philosophic thinking. Monistic idealism. Hegel and his method. Concerning Fechner. The compounding of consciousness. Bergson and the critique of intellectualism. The continuity of experience. Conclusions. Notes. Appendix: On (...) the notion of reality as changing. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Direct realism can be better distinguished from objectivism and naïve realism, by recognizing the radical plurality of the incommensurable realities that can be enacted by living organisms in coupling with their environment.

Based on a condensed historical overview of management as an artifact, the article argues that management is still suffused by an implicit paradigm of value extraction that is ideologically and culturally tinted and that we need to find a new foothold in theory and practice, a more universally valid approach with an encompassing awareness of societal well-being and long-term impact. The radically new approach proposed is based on free energy minimization, a concept from computational neuroscience, as a universally valid principle (...) derived from the biological imperative to survive that holds true for individuals and social systems alike. In order to reduce harmful free energy from entropy and stochastic adversity, an amplified way of perceiving and being aware of reality is required that needs to be cultivated. This is achieved through the guiding principle of Minding, an ongoing process of inner and outer awareness and caring consideration of oneself, others and the world around us, routed in a comprehensive consciousness including awareness of Body sensations, Emotions, Thoughts and Action impulses (BETA). This comprehensive, strategic awareness is proposed as a unifying, contextual framework for individual and collective well-being rather than a categorical imperative, and therefore may, when and where indispensable, include value extraction and value maximization if required for the overall objective of shared, long-term flourishing. The article also presents examples of implementation of the proposed approach for both individuals and organizations and briefly introduces MBSAT-Mindfulness-based Strategic Awareness Training, a training protocol designed specifically to enhance the competence of Minding, the guiding principle. (shrink)