Results for 'rational reflection principle'

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  1. The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.
    The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.
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  2. A Liar-Like Paradox for Rational Reflection Principles.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):292-300.
    This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction, and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.
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  3. New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    Numerous authors have defended the rough idea that it is irrational to fail to conform to one’s judgments about what it would be rational to do, or what doxastic states it would be rational to be in. This chapter examines rational reflection principles as an attempt to implement this idea in contexts of uncertainty about what credence distributions are rational. After outlining some problems with Old Rational Reflection, the chapter discusses what seems like (...)
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  4. Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
    This paper explores an initially attractive principle connecting beliefs in general with beliefs about what beliefs are rational. The principle turns out to be violated by intuitively rational beliefs in some situations. The paper lays out some options for reacting to this fact.
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  5.  67
    The Reflection Principle and the Ex-Ante Pareto Principle in Anna Mahtani’s Objects of Credence.Luc Bovens - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (2):478-484.
    First, Mahtani argues that both in the game The Mug and in the Sleeping Beauty we should not defer to a trusted person under a particular designation if they do not self-identify under this designation. This invites a more complex Reflection Principle. I respond that there are more parsimonious ways to avoid the challenges posed to the Reflection Principle. Second, Mahtani argues that preferences create a hyperintensional context, which poses a challenge to the Ex-Ante Pareto (...) that can be averted by supervaluation. I respond that such an appeal to supervaluation would block randomization as a fair allocation device. (shrink)
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  6. A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle.Stephanie Beardman - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
    Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic (...)
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  7. Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle.Brett Topey - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):478-488.
    One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a (...)
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  8. Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.
    Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, I (...)
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  9. Reflection, Introspection, and Book.Kevin Zollman & Kevin Dorst - manuscript
    The much-debated Reflection principle states that a coherent agent’s cre- dences must match their estimates for their future credences. Defenders claim that there are Dutch-book arguments in its favor, putting it on the same normative footing as probabilistic coherence. Critics claim that those arguments rely on the implicit, implausible assumption that the agent is introspective: that they are certain what their own credences are. In this paper, we clarify this debate by surveying several different concep- tions of the (...)
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  10.  33
    Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality.Günter Abel - 2023 - In Óscar Lucas González-Castán, Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. De Gruyter. pp. 149-158.
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  11.  22
    Reflective disequilibrium: a critical evaluation of the complete lives framework for healthcare rationing.Xavier Symons - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (2):108-112.
    One prominent view in recent literature on resource allocation is Persad, Emanuel and Wertheimer’s complete lives framework for the rationing of lifesaving healthcare interventions (CLF). CLF states that we should prioritise the needs of individuals who have had less opportunity to experience the events that characterise a complete life. Persadet alargue that their system is the product of a successful process of reflective equilibrium—a philosophical methodology whereby theories, principles and considered judgements are balanced with each other and revised until we (...)
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  12. “P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):737-760.
    I provide a taxonomy of the various circumstances under which one might reasonably say "P and I will believe that not-P" or violate the Reflection Principle.
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  13. Reflection, Disagreement, and Context.Edward Hinchman - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
    How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...)
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  14. Posthumous Love as a Rational Virtue.Theptawee Chokvasin - 2021 - In Soraj Hongladarom & Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives From East and West. Springer Singapore. pp. 141-151.
    Can posthumous love be rationally comprehensible for us to talk about? In this research article, I look into some Renaissance writings on Christian ethics that talk about posthumous love as if there are some virtues in it that deserve to be praised. I try to show that the most notable virtues that can be seen in posthumous love are honesty in love as well as the intention to keep a promise to cherish the eternal love in married couples even after (...)
     
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  15. Avoiding certain frustration, reflection, and the cable guy paradox.Brian Kierland, Bradley Monton & Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):317 - 333.
    We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our (...)
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  16. Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
    I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of internalism about rationality. Time-Slice Rationality conflicts with two proposed principles (...)
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  17.  99
    Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.
    There is a tension between normative and descriptive elements in the theory of rational belief. This tension has been reflected in work in psychology and decision theory as well as in philosophy. Canons of rationality should be tailored to what is humanly feasible. But rationality has normative content as well as descriptive content.A number of issues related to both deductive and inductive logic can be raised. Are there full beliefs – statements that are categorically accepted? Should statements be accepted (...)
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  18. Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior.Bernd Lahno - 2007 - Rationality and Society 19 (4):425-450.
    While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking (...)
     
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  19.  72
    Cultural Diversity in Business: A Critical Reflection on the Ideology of Tolerance.Teresa Escrich & J. Félix Lozano - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 142 (4):679-696.
    Cultural diversity is an increasingly important phenomenon that affects not only social and political harmony but also the cohesion and efficiency of organisations. The problems that firms have with regard to managing cultural diversity have been abundantly studied in recent decades from the perspectives of management theory and moral philosophy, but there are still open questions that require deeper reflection and broader empirical analysis. Managing cultural diversity in organisations is of prime importance because it involves harmonising different values, beliefs, (...)
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  20.  22
    The Case Method as Structured Rational Thinking for Learning Physics Principles in Engineering.Luis Jorge Benítez Barajas - 2025 - World Conference on Research in Teaching and Education Proceedings Berlin Germany 8 (1):1-23. Translated by Luis Jorge Benítez Barajas.
    Conceptual understanding is essential to learn physics principles, for this it is advisable to develop a method of thinking. The Case Method can develop it hence the objectives of research: test the viability of implementing Rational Thought and the Case Metod in classrooms and answer the questions: how does rational thought modify in students conceptualization? and how the Case Method modifies their thinking scheme for learning disciplinary principles? The first stage consisted of theoretically basing classical pedagogy, with the (...)
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  21. Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value (...)
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  22.  27
    Posthumous Love as a Rational Virtue.Theptawee Chokvasin - 2021 - In Soraj Hongladarom & Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives From East and West. Springer Singapore. pp. 141-151.
    Can posthumous love be rationally comprehensible for us to talk about? In this research article, I look into some Renaissance writings on Christian ethics that talk about posthumous love as if there are some virtues in it that deserve to be praised. I try to show that the most notable virtues that can be seen in posthumous love are honesty in love as well as the intention to keep a promise to cherish the eternal love in married couples even after (...)
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  23.  25
    Pragmatic arguments for rationality constraints.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - In Maria-Carla Galavotti, Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. CSLI Publications. pp. 139-163.
    My focus is on pragmatic arguments for various rationality constraints on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which she will act to her guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, she can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic Dutch (...)
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  24.  42
    Healthcare, Healthcare Resource Allocation, and Rationing: Pragmatist Reflections.Belayneh Taye & Andebet Hailu Assefa - 2022 - Contemporary Pragmatism 19 (3):245-272.
    This article approaches the ethical dilemma of healthcare allocation and rationing from the perspective of pragmatist ethics, mainly following John Dewey’s ethics. The moral dilemma of healthcare allocation arises whenever we allocate limited resources, and rationing is a necessary option for distributing available resources. In a broader sense, the moral problems of healthcare allocation also encompass the issue of access to primary healthcare, especially for low-income sections of communities. In this sense, allocation always entails rationing – denying service to someone (...)
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  25. (1 other version)Diachronic rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
    This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle (...)
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  26. A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...)
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  27.  62
    Rationality and/as Reasonableness Within Formal-Theoretical and Practical-Dialectical Approaches to Adjudication: Semiotic and Normative Perspectives.Ana Margarida Simões Gaudêncio - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (4):1033-1041.
    Rationality and reasonableness can be illustrated as Janus-faced concepts, not only in a descriptive diagnosis but also in a normative construction of adjudication, and in the analysis of its practical and rhetorical effects. Considering such an illustration, the present reflection returns to the discussion on the relevance of rationality and reasonableness in legal interpretation, aiming at distinguishing and/or connecting principles and criteria, beyond formally logical and/or procedurally argumentative decision-making, and, thus, within a normatively practical adjudication. Such an approach will (...)
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  28. (2 other versions)Kant, Kuhn, and the rationality of science.Michael Friedman - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):171-90.
    This paper considers the evolution of the problem of scientific rationality from Kant through Carnap to Kuhn. I argue for a relativized and historicized version of the original Kantian conception of scientific a priori principles and examine the way in which these principles change and develop across revolutionary paradigm shifts. The distinctively philosophical enterprise of reflecting upon and contextualizing such principles is then seen to play a key role in making possible rational intersubjective communication between otherwise incommensurable paradigms.
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  29. Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the (...)
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  30. Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.
    Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: ‘Buy me a drink; you can’t buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!’ How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives aren’t truth apt and so don’t stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used to (...)
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  31. Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points.Norman Daniels - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):83-103.
    In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our (...)
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  32. Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
    Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies (...)
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  33. (1 other version)Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a (...)
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  34. Rational Consensus and Coherence Methods in Ethics.Elvio Baccarini - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):151-159.
    The method of reflective equilibrium implies that moral principles received from philosophical reasoning and considered moral judgments received intuitively are finally justified if they cohere with each other. This idea is combined with the proposal of rational consensus (Lehrer), which shows the way in which divergences of judgements could be made to converge. This second method is used to the end of rendering more plausible the intuitions used in reflective equilibrium, and, so, to show the appropriateness of the coherentist (...)
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  35.  28
    Structured Rational Thinking as a Resource to Design a Binding Case of Physics with Engineering.Luis Jorge Benítez Barajas - 2025 - International Conference on Teaching and Education Proceedings London United Kingdom 2 (1):1-42. Translated by Luis Jorge Benítez Barajas.
    Designing Engineering Cases contributes to learning Physics principles. This involves a method derived from Structured Rational Thinking. The research objectives were: analyze the design process of the Case by the SRJU model: structure, review, judges validation, students evaluation, with the dimensions of: clarity, coherence, relevance, sufficiency. It was described the relationship of rational thinking with the SRJU model. The first stage consisted of theoretically basing pedagogy related with rational thought of ancient Greece; Secondly, was developed the test (...)
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  36. Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning.Richmond Campbell - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):1-19.
    It is more than a half-century since Nelson Goodman [1955] applied what we call the Reflective Equilibrium model of justification to the problem of justifying induction, and more than three decades since Rawls [1971] and Daniels [1979] applied celebrated extensions of this model to the problem of justifying principles of social justice. The resulting Wide Reflective Equilibrium model (WRE) is generally thought to capture an acceptable way to reconcile inconsistency between an intuitively plausible general principle and an intuitively plausible (...)
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  37. Rational a priori or Emotional a priori? Husserl and Scheler’s Criticisms of Kant Regarding the Foundation of Ethics.Wei Zhang - 2011 - Cultura 8 (2):143-158.
    Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori (...) being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value. (shrink)
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  38. Rationality and the Ideology of Disconnection.Michael Taylor - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    A powerful and provocative critique of the foundations of Rational Choice theory and the economic way of thinking about the world, written by a former leading practitioner. The target is a dehumanizing ideology that cannot properly recognize that normal people have attachments and commitments to other people and to practices, projects, principles, and places, which provide them with desire-independent reasons for action, and that they are reflective creatures who think about what they are and what they should be, with (...)
     
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  39. Rationality without reasons.Judith Baker - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):763-782.
    This paper challenges the assumption that reasons are intrinsic to rational action. A great many actions are not best understood as ones in which the agent acted for reasons--and yet they can be understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism. The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving, practical arguments in daily life presents a general philosophical problem. It reflects the existence of a class of ways in which reason can regulate action, which goes far beyond producing (...)
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  40.  14
    Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique.R. A. Duff (ed.) - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Five pre-eminent legal theorists tackle a range of fundamental questions on the nature of the philosophy of criminal law. Their essays explore the extent to which and the ways in which our systems of criminal law can be seen as rational and principled. The essays discuss some of the principles by which, it is often thought, a system of law should be structured, and they ask whether our own systems are genuinely principled or riven by basic contradictions, reflecting deeper (...)
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  41. Rationality and the Limits of Cognitive Science.Edward D. Stein - 1992 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    The observation that humans are often irrational has become commonplace. This observation has received empirical support from various experiments performed by cognitive scientists that are supposed to show that humans systematically violate principles of probability, rules of logic, and other norms of reasoning. In response to these experiments, philosophers have made creative and appealing arguments that these experiments must be mistaken or misinterpreted because humans must be rational. I examine these arguments for human rationality and show that they fail; (...)
     
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  42. Random and Systematic Error in the Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    A puzzle of an unmarked clock, used by Timothy Williamson to question the KK principle, was separately adapted by David Christensen and Adam Elga to critique a principle of Rational Reflection. Both authors, we argue, flout the received relationship between ideal agency and the classical distinction between systematic and random error, namely that ideal agents are subject only to the latter. As a result, these criticisms miss their mark.
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  43.  93
    Philosophy and the criminal law: principle and critique.Antony Duff (ed.) - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Five pre-eminent legal theorists tackle a range of fundamental questions on the nature of the philosophy of criminal law. Their essays explore the extent to which and the ways in which our systems of criminal law can be seen as rational and principled. The essays discuss some of the principles by which, it is often thought, a system of law should be structured, and they ask whether our own systems are genuinely principled or riven by basic contradictions, reflecting deeper (...)
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  44. Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.
    Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: he doesn't know it, but he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the (...)
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  45.  47
    The Rationality of Balancing.Carlos Bernal Pulido - 2006 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (2):195-208.
    Every modern legal system is made up of two basic kinds of norms: rules and principles. These are applied by means of two different procedures: subsumption and balancing. While rules apply by means of subsumption, balancing is the means of applying principles. Balancing has therefore become an essential methodological criterion for adjudication, especially of constitutional rights. However, balancing is at the heart of many theoretical and practical discussions. One of the most important questions is whether balancing is a rational (...)
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  46. Principles and Intuitions in Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.David O. Brink - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):665-694.
    This essay situates some recent empirical research on the origin, nature, role, and reliability of moral intuitions against the background of nineteenth-century debates between ethical naturalism and rational intuitionism. The legitimate heir to Millian naturalism is the contemporary method of reflective equilibrium and its defeasible reliance on moral intuitions. Recent doubts about moral intuitions—worries that they reflect the operation of imperfect cognitive heuristics, are resistant to undermining evidence, are subject to framing effects, and are variable—are best addressed by ethical (...)
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  47.  24
    Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse. Eine Theorie theoretischer und praktischer Rationalität [Enlightened Self-Interest. A Theory of Theoretical and Practical Rationality].Stefan Gosepath - 1992 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Suhrkamp.
    The subject of my dissertation is "rationality". In this book I undertake a comprehensive, systematic and independent treatment of the problem of rationality. This furthers progress toward a general theory of rationality, one that represents and defends a uniform conception of reason. The structure and general outline are as follows: Part I: General Definition of the Concept; Part II: Rationality in the Theoretical Realm; Part III: Rationality in the Practical Realm (parts II and III are divided respectively into A. Relative (...)
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  48.  3
    Kant’s (Rational) Conceptualization of Property Rights and Comparison in Private Law Theory and Civil Law Doctrine.Tomislav Nedić - 2024 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 44 (2):249-273.
    Kant’s (rational) understanding of possession and property rights is conceptually and ideally placed in a comparative relation to private law theory, civil law doctrine, and positive legislation. Property law in the objective sense as “a set of all the laws concerning real”, external “mine and yours” is enforceable exclusively in the civil state where the final acquisition of property rights occurs, the a priori of which is reflected in possession. According to Kant, control over things in possession is a (...)
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  49. Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups.Simon J. Evnine - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
    The thesis of the paper is that persons are similar to a kind of group: multiple-expert epistemic unities (MEUs). MEUs are groups in which there are multiple experts on whom other members of the group model their opinion. An example would be a group of children playing Telephone. Any child nearer the source is an 'expert' for any child further away. I argue that, with certain important qualifications, it is both rational and necessary for persons to treat their future (...)
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    Reflections on Insight: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, and Puzzles.Marga Reimer - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):85-89.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to motivate treatment adherence? She might then be trying to do the impossible; she might also (...)
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