We critically investigate and refine Dunn's relevant predication, his formalisation of the notion of a real property. We argue that Dunn's original dialectical moves presuppose some interpretation of relevant identity, though none is given. We then re-motivate the proposal in a broader context, considering the prospects for a classical formalisation of real properties, particularly of Geach's implicit distinction between real and ''Cambridge'' properties. After arguing against these prospects, we turn to relevance logic, re-motivating relevant predication (...) with Geach's distinction in mind. Finally we draw out some consequences of Dunn's proposal for the theory of identity in relevance logic. (shrink)

There is an intuition, notoriously difficult to formalise, that only some predicates express real properties. J. M. Dunn formalises this intuition with relevance logic, proposing a notion of relevant predication. For each first order formula Ax, Dunn specifies another formula that is intuitively interpreted as "Ax expresses a real property". Chapter I calls such an approach an object language approach, since the claim that Ax expresses a real property is rendered as a formula in the object (...) language. On a metalanguage approach, on the other hand, the claim that Ax expresses a real property would be metalinguistic, mentioning but not using the formula Ax. ;Our Introduction begins by investigating Dunn's motivation for relevant predication, and argues that it implicitly presupposes some interpretation of identity. Indeed, part of the dissertation's work is to use relevant predication as a key to a coherent account of relevant identity. ;Chapter I re-motivates relevant predication. We consider P. Geach's distinction between real and "Cambridge" change, and suggest that there is an underlying distinction between real and Cambridge predicates. We further argue that no classical object language approach can formalise this distinction. So we turn to relevance logic, remotivating relevant predication, with Geach's distinction in mind. ;In light of this new motivation, we argue that relevant prediction relies on a logically weak notion of identity, according to which "x = y" means "x and y share all relevant properties". Identity is taken up in a more technical setting in Chapters IV and V. ;Subsequent chapters investigate technical issues that flow from Chapter I. Chapter II investigates metalinguistic grammatical characterisations of relevant predication. Chapter III concerns the semantics of first order relevance logic. Chapter IV investigates the identity in R and its relationship to relevant predication. In particular, Chapter IV argues against introducing the axiom, $\to$ Ay), in relevance logic, since the resulting systems are unstable, in a sense motivated by the notion of relevant identity underlying Dunn's notion of relevant predication. Finally Chapter V investigates the possibility of a coherent theory of identity in R's modal relatives ${\bf R}\sp\square$ and E. (shrink)

New developments in genetics could affect a variety of real property rights. Mortgage lenders, mortgage insurers, real estate sellers, senior living centers, retirement communities, or other parties in residential real estate transactions begin requiring predictive genetic information as part of the application process. One likely use would be by retirement communities to learn an individual's genetic risk for Alzheimer's disease. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on disability, but it is not clear that it would (...) apply to genetic risk assessments. Only California law explicitly applies to this situation and there have been no reported cases. (shrink)

In February 1828 a Royal Commission was appointed to examine the law of Real Property of England and Wales. The Commission sat for four years and examined a vast amount of material, recommended certain changes in the law, and drafted several bills for consideration by parliament. Four massive reports were eventually presented to parliament in May 1829, June 1830, May 1832, and lastly in April 1833. As a result parliament enacted a limited number of piecemeal reforms, but did not (...) attempt a major revision of the law. (shrink)

This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (...) (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged. (shrink)

We analyze combinatorial properties of open covers of sets of real numbers by using filters on the natural numbers. In fact, the goal of this paper is to characterize known properties related to ω-covers of the space in terms of combinatorial properties of filters associated with these ω-covers. As an example, we show that all finite powers of a set R of real numbers have the covering property of Menger if, and only if, each filter (...) on ω associated with its countable ω-cover is a P + filter. (shrink)

Most metaphysicians deny that dispositions are among the fundamental constituents of the world. The solubility of salt, for example, is regarded as derivative from more basic features of reality, such as the molecular structure of salt and the laws of nature. This is an initially plausible view: a disposition seems to be essentially a characterization of what its bearer can do, which seems to be wholly dependent on what that bearer is like. ;Nonetheless, I think that the most attractive view (...) of dispositions is that they are fundamental constituents of reality---in fact, almost all real properties are irreducibly dispositional. Following D. M. Armstrong, I call this view dispositionalism. In my dissertation, I address several major difficulties for dispositionalism. For instance, it is often argued that dispositionalism makes causal relations necessary, and is thus committed to an unacceptable theory of causation. In response to this worry, I defend the thesis that causal relations are necessary. A second objection is based on C. B. Martin's "finkish" cases. It is widely accepted that some accounts of dispositions are able to escape this objection by adopting David Lewis's response to it. Contra Lewis, I argue that dispositionalism can follow in their footsteps. Finally, I consider the objection that dispositionalism, by implying that it is dispositions all the way down, leads to a vicious regress. I think that this is the most serious problem for dispositionalism, and although I do not fully lay it to rest, I make some headway. ;I also survey a wide range of competing theories of dispositions. I argue that the difficulties they face are both far greater than has been recognized, and more serious than the difficulties that beset dispositionalism. The result is not a conclusive proof of dispositionalism, but a demonstration that this underdog theory is preferable to its more popular competitors. (shrink)

Our days are a vast, intricate, evolving dance of mutual understandings. We stop at a traffic light, offer a plastic card as payment for a meal, leave our weapons at home, or enter a voting booth. We live and work in close proximity, at high speed, with few collisions: on our roads and in our neighborhoods, places of worship, and places of business. Somehow, having all those people around is more liberating than stifling. The secret is that we know roughly (...) what to expect from each other. Knowing what to expect enables us to adapt to each other. Not being obliged to conform to expectations—being free to test the previously untested— is likewise a great benefit. The two benefits seem mutually exclusive, yet property rights, combined with freedom of contract, enable us to reap both at once. We can rely on being able to go to market and find someone selling cauliflower at an affordable price. We can also rely on being able to go to market and find someone rendering obsolete what a few years ago had been cutting-edge technology. We make progress by testing what has not previously been tested. We experiment. One problem with experiments is: many of them don’t work.1 Or, the ideas being tested turn out to be bad ideas. Thus a successful society encourages people not only to experiment, but also to shut down experiments whose inspiration proves unsound. What kind of framework encourages experimentation without at the same time perpetuating bad ideas? Here is one hypothesis: in societies that sustain progress over long periods, people are free to experiment at their own expense and free from having to pay for other people’s bad ideas. This is the true test of a system of property. It is natural to assume instead that the true test of a system of property is a question of whether the system is just. That is, philosophers should theorize about justice first, and only then begin to theorize about what can legitimately become a person’s property. I have become skeptical about this. (shrink)

This thesis is divided into three parts, the first and second ones focused on combinatorics and classification problems on discrete and geometrical objects in the context of descriptive set theory, and the third one on generalized descriptive set theory at singular cardinals of countable cofinality.Descriptive Set Theory (briefly: DST) is the study of definable subsets of Polish spaces, i.e., separable completely metrizable spaces. One of the major branches of DST is Borel reducibility, successfully used in the last 30 years to (...) solve and compare many classification problems. One of our goals is the classification of knots, very familiar and tangible objects in everyday life, which also play an important role in modern mathematics. The study of knots and their properties is known as knot theory. Our plan is to gain insight into knots using discrete objects, such as linear and circular orders. This approach was already exploited in [6]. The first part of this work is therefore devoted to countable linear orders and the study of the quasi-order of convex embeddability and its induced equivalence relation. We obtain both combinatorial and descriptive set-theoretic results. We also expand our research to the case of circular orders.Another objective of this first part is to extend the notion of convex embeddability on countable linear orders. We provide a family of quasi-orders of which embeddability is a particular case as well. We study these quasi-orders from a combinatorial point of view and analyse their complexity with respect to Borel reducibility. Furthermore, we extend the analysis of these quasi-orders to the set of uncountable linear orders.The second part of the project deals with classification problems on knots and $3$ -manifolds. The goal here is to apply the results obtained in the first part to the study of proper arcs and knots, establishing lower bounds for the complexity of some natural relations between these geometrical objects. We also obtain some combinatorial results which are particularly interesting when we restrict to the set of wild proper arcs and wild knots, classes which haven’t received much attention so far. These parts are included in the two preprints [4, 5] in collaboration with my supervisor Alberto Marcone, Luca Motto Ros (University of Torino), and Vadim Weinstein (University of Oulu).The second part of this work also includes the classification of non-compact $3$ -manifolds up to homeomorphism (the case of compact $3$ -manifolds has already been solved: indeed, there are only countably many $3$ -manifolds up to homeomorphism; see [7]), and that of Cantor sets of $\mathbb {R}^3$ up to conjugation (answering to Question 5.5 of [3]). Here we resort to algebraic tools. Stone duality gives a neat way to go back-and-forth between totally disconnected Polish spaces and countable Boolean algebras (see [1]). The main ingredient is the Stone space of all ultrafilters on a Boolean algebra. In this work we introduce a weaker concept which we call “blurry filter”. Using blurry filters instead of ultrafilters enables one to extend the class of spaces under consideration beyond totally disconnected. As an application of this method, we show that both homeomorphism on non-compact $3$ -manifolds and conjugation of Cantor sets in $\mathbb {R}^3$ are completely classifiable by countable structures. These results are part of an upcoming paper in collaboration with Vadim Weinstein.The last part of this thesis concerns the natural generalization of descriptive set theory that occurs when countable is replaced by uncountable, called Generalized Descriptive Set Theory (briefly: GDST). In particular, we focus on the case of GDST for a singular cardinal $\kappa $ of countable cofinality. The goal here is to study the generalizations of the Perfect Set Property and the Baire Property to subsets of spaces of higher cardinalities, like the power set $\mathcal {P}(\kappa )$. We consider the question under which large cardinal hypotheses classes of definable subsets of these spaces possess such regularity properties, focusing on rank-into-rank axioms, like I2, and classes of sets definable by $\Sigma _1$ -formulas with parameters from various collections of sets. The obtained results are included in [2], a joint work with my co-supervisor Vincenzo Dimonte and Philipp Lücke (University of Hamburg).Abstract prepared by Martina IannellaE-mail: [email protected]: https://air.uniud.it/handle/11390/1262824. (shrink)

Suppose you own a garden-variety object such as a hat or a shirt. Your property right then follows the ageold saw according to which possession is nine-tenths of the law. That is, your possession of a shirt constitutes a strong presumption in favor of your ownership of the shirt. In the case of land, however, this is not the case. Here possession is not only not a strong presumption in favor of ownership; it is not even clear what possession is. (...) Possessing a thing like a hat or a shirt is a rather straightforward affair: the person wearing the hat or shirt possesses the shirt or the hat. But what is possession in the case of land? This essay seeks to provide an answer to this question in the form of an ontology of landed property. (shrink)

Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such properties. In contrast, I think not only that negative properties are quite imaginable, but also that there are good reasons for believing that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I want to defend the reality and irreducibility, or genuineness, as I call it, of negative properties. After briefly presenting the idea of a negative property, (...) I collect commonly invoked tests for the realness of things and attend to the question whether negative properties pass any of these. Next, I try to segregate the many different notions of irreducibility, probing whether negative properties can be reckoned to be genuine in any sense of the word. In the final section, I rebut some frequent objections raised against negative properties. _German_ Wenige Philosophen glauben an die Existenz sogenannter negativer Eigenschaften. Die meisten halten solche Eigenschaften sogar für unvorstellbar. Ich dagegen halte negative Eigenschaften nicht nur für denkbar, sondern glaube darüber hinaus, dass solche Eigenschaften tatsächlich existieren. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich die Wirklichkeit und Irreduzibilität – oder Echtheit – negativer Eigenschaften verteidigen. Nachdem ich kurz die Idee einer negativen Eigenschaft vorstelle, ziehe ich geläufige Kriterien für die Realität von Dingen heran und überprüfe, ob negative Eigenschaften diese erfüllen. Als nächstes unterscheide ich verschiedene Begriffe von Irreduzibilität, um zu überprüfen, ob negative Eigenschaften als echt in irgendeinem Sinn des Wortes betrachtet werden können. Im letzten Abschnitt möchte ich einige häufige Einwände gegen negative Eigenschaften zurückweisen. (shrink)

We review some known results about the Ramsey property for partitions of reals, and we present a certain two-person game such that if either player has a winning strategy then a homogeneous set for the partition can be constructed, and conversely. This gives alternative proofs of some of the known results. We then discuss possible uses of the game in obtaining effective versions of Ramsey's theorem and prove a theorem along these lines.

We study regularity properties related to Cohen, random, Laver, Miller and Sacks forcing, for sets of real numbers on the Δ31\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{\Delta}^1_3}$$\end{document} level of the projective hieararchy. For Δ21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{\Delta}^1_2}$$\end{document} and Σ21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{\Sigma}^1_2}$$\end{document} sets, the relationships between these properties follows the pattern of the well-known Cichoń diagram for cardinal characteristics of the continuum. It (...) is known that assuming suitable large cardinals, the same relationships lift to higher projective levels, but the questions become more challenging without such assumptions. Consequently, all our results are proved on the basis of ZFC alone or ZFC with an inaccessible cardinal. We also prove partial results concerning Σ31\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{\Sigma}^1_3}$$\end{document} and Δ41\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{\Delta}^1_4}$$\end{document} sets. (shrink)

We investigate, within the framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, the interrelations between weak forms of the Axiom of Choice AC restricted to sets of reals.

Institutional investors and corporations increasingly recognize that extra-financial determinants of business performance can both create value and uncover significant risks within a business or investment portfolio. For companies that invest in, develop, own, or operate commercial real estate assets, this awareness of extrafinancial impacts has led to a significant interest in what has been called "responsible property investment (RPI)". Within the field of RPI, green real estate — real estate investment and management that seeks to reduce the (...) environmental impacts of building construction and operations — has begun to receive attention. This attention has been extended over the past decade to community property development projects, where both social and environmental considerations related not only to the building, but also the project site and surrounding community are integrated into management and investment decisions. Some examples of these projects include affordable and workforce housing, urban revitalization and brownfield redevelopment. More social-focussed issues such as labour and workplace considerations are also key components of responsible property investing, yet to date labour issues have received little attention in the RPI literature and workplace considerations are reflected indirectly through environmental considerations in the green building literature. This paper explores responsible real estate investment in Canada by taking an integrated approach in examining both environmental and social factors and their potential impact on such investments. A series of semi-structured interviews are conducted with key stakeholders in Canada to gain insight into how using environmental and social factors may influence long-term risk and financial returns in real estate investment in Canada with particular emphasis on institutional investors engaged in these practices. Data is used to analyse the impact that ESG considerations have on financial performance of these assets. Jantzi-Sustainalytics ESG ratings are used along with the stock price changes of fourteen real estate companies and REITs to interrogate this question. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant often remarks that phenomena consist only in relations. This is a highly puzzling thesis that is not easily reconcilable with the explanation of natural processes. More specifically, it is not clear whether and how a network of mere relations (such as ‘being higher than’, ‘being next to’, etc.) can give rise to genuine changes in nature. I call this the problem of global relationality. In this paper, I suggest a solution to this problem (...) by showing that Kant’s specific sense of relationality is ultimately grounded in the spatiality of phenomena and differs from the one usually assumed in the contemporary debate. I argue that a subset of empirical properties can be regarded as ‘comparatively intrinsic’ since they preserve a genuine sense of intrinsicness while being fully relational in space. As a result, real changes can take place in the phenomenal realm if they concern comparatively intrinsic properties of empirical objects. (shrink)

Economic principles operate in much the same way whether on land or in the oceans. It is the very same tragedy of the commons that almost wiped out the buffalo that is now endangering precious fish stocks. The answer to these challenges, in both cases, is privatization. Establishment of private property will not only solve the problems of the over fishing of the ocean commons, but will also create incentives for investors to use new technologies that could radically increase the (...) productivity of the ocean for fish and other resources. In order to make these gains however, we must make an irrevocable commitment to defining and defending these property rights as a permanent institution of the future of our oceans. (shrink)

Unauthorized appropriation of geneticresources has been described by the term``biopiracy.'' Technological breakthroughsincluding biotechnological applications canincrease considerably the instrumental value ofbiodiversity as new products or products withnew properties can be made. Nevertheless, itappears that, in most cases, the properties inquestion were already known to the indigenouspeople and used for centuries. The analysisdiscusses both from an economic and an ethicalperspective whether it is just that traditionalknowledge is rewarded. As the conflictintensifies over questions of ownership andcontrol of biological materials, IntellectualProperty Rights (...) are at the center ofcontroversies. The current global systemgoverning biotechnology has largely been shapedby Western expectations and valuations andconsequently has drawn severe criticism. Thecritics doubt both the stability andsustainability of the current patent system andargue for restructuring through benefit-sharingsystems in order to address some of theexisting inequalities. With the help of a casestudy (US patent no. 5,751 on ayahuasca) thetheoretical notion of biopiracy is applied toreal problems. (shrink)

We study the relationship between various properties of the real numbers and weak choice principles.

In _Real Natures and Familiar Objects_ Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we (...) are often able to determine by observation. The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load -- that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Elder calls this presumption "mildly controversial" because it entails that arguments are needed for certain widely assumed positions such as "mereological universalism". Elder begins by defending realism about essentialness. He then defends this view of familiar objects against causal exclusion arguments and worries about vagueness. Finally, he argues that many of the objects in which common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped by natural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection. (shrink)

In this volume, fourteen philosophers, economists and legal scholars and one computer scientist address various facets of the same question: under which conditions (if any) can intellectual property rights be fair? This general question unfolds in a variety of others: What are the parallels and differences between intellectual and real property? Are libertarian theories especially sympathetic to IP rights? Should Rawlsian support copyright? How can a concern for incentives be taken into account by each of the main theories of (...) justice? What's exactly wrong with free-riding, when dealing with non-rival goods? This requires a close examination of a variety of specific issues such as peer-to-peer file sharing, access to vital medicines, the interaction between copyright and freedom of expression, patents on genes, etc. It also involves bringing together state-of-the-art knowledge on legal, economic and technical issues with the most advanced state of our normative theories. (shrink)

Eliminativist metaphysicians have recently explored various arguments, including those about over-determination, colocation, the problem of the Many and ontological parsimony, for dispensing with kinds and their token continuants. Further, David Lewis’s missing “real temporary intrinsics” has paved the way to treating the sortal and the modal properties yielding the persistence conditions of continuants as unreal because they are extrinsic. In this paper I show, first, that none of the arguments mentioned above are decisive against the disputed entities. Second, (...) I argue that the sortal/modal properties, while extrinsic, are also real, because they are constitutive of kinds. The general point is that modal conceptualism should not be conflated with a cheap version of semanticism. The position advocated here is based on closing the gap between the metaphysical and the epistemic perspectives.Eliminativistički metafizičari u novije su doba istražili razne argumente, uključujući argumente pretjerane determininacije, kolokacije, problem mnoštva i ontološke štedljivosti, kako bi se riješili vrsta i njihovih primjeraka kontinuanata. Nadalje, Lewisova nedostajuća “stvarna privremena intrinzična svojstva” utrla su put shvaćanju sortalnih i modalnih svojstava koja pružaju uvjete ustrajavanja kontinuanata kao nestvarnih, budući da su ekstrinzična. U ovome članku pokazujem, prvo, da nijedan od spomenutih argumenata ne daje odlučne razloge protiv prijepornih entiteta. Drugo, tvrdim da su sortalna/modalna svojstva, iako su ekstrinzična, također stvarna, budući da su konstitutivna za vrste. Općenito, modalni konceptualizam ne treba brkati s jeftinom verzijom semanticizma. Stajalište koje se ovdje zagovara zasniva se na zatvaranju jaza između metafizičke i epistemičke perspektive. (shrink)

Secure property rights are considered a common institutional feature of rapidly growing economies. Although different property rights regimes have prevailed around the world over time, relatively little scholarship has empirically characterized the historical property rights of societies outside Western Europe. Using data from Egypt’s Mamluk Sultanate, this article provides a detailed characterization of land tenure patterns and identifies changes to real property holdings associated with an institutional bargain between Egypt’s slave soldiers—the mamluks—and the sultan. Although agricultural land was a (...) collective resource of the state, individual mamluks—state actors themselves—established religious endowments as a privatizing work-around to the impermissibility of transferring mamluk status to their sons. The article’s characterization of landholding patterns in medieval Egypt provides an empirical illustration of how Middle Eastern institutions differed from those in other world regions as well as an understanding for how and why regimes come under political stress as a result of their property rights institutions. (shrink)

We define a σ-ideal J D on the set of functions ω ω with the property that a real x ∈ ω ω is a Hechler real over V if and only if x omits all Borel sets in J D . In fact we define a topology D on ω ω related to Hechler forcing such that J D is the family of first category sets in D. We study cardinal invariants of the ideal J D.

In this work we give a complete answer as to the possible implications between some natural properties of Lebesgue measure and the Baire property. For this we prove general preservation theorems for forcing notions. Thus we answer a decade-old problem of J. Baumgartner and answer the last three open questions of the Kunen-Miller chart about measure and category. Explicitly, in \S1: (i) We prove that if we add a Laver real, then the old reals have outer measure one. (...) (ii) We prove a preservation theorem for countable-support forcing notions, and using this theorem we prove (iii) If we add ω 2 Laver reals, then the old reals have outer measure one. From this we obtain (iv) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + \neg B(m) + \neg U(m) + U(c))$ . In \S2: (i) We prove a preservation theorem, for the finite support forcing notion, of the property " $F \subseteq ^\omega\omega$ is an unbounded family." (ii) We introduce a new forcing notion making the old reals a meager set but the old members of ω ω remain an unbounded family. Using this we prove (iii) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + U(m) + \neg B(c) + \neg U(c) + C(c))$ . In \S3: (i) We prove a preservation theorem, for the finite support forcing notion, of a property which implies "the union of the old measure zero sets is not a measure zero set," and using this theorem we prove (ii) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + \neg U(m) + C(m) + \neg C(c))$. (shrink)

A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.

We define the ideal with the property that a real omits all Borel sets in the ideal which are coded in a transitive model if and only if it is an amoeba real over this model. We investigate some other properties of this ideal. Strolling through the "amoeba forest" we gain as an application a modification of the proof of the inequality between the additivities of Lebesgue measure and Baire category.

We show that the statement “every universally Baire set of reals has the perfect set property” is equiconsistent modulo ZFC with the existence of a cardinal that we call virtually Shelah for supercompactness. These cardinals resemble Shelah cardinals and Shelah-for-supercompactness cardinals but are much weaker: if $0^\sharp $ exists then every Silver indiscernible is VSS in L. We also show that the statement $\operatorname {\mathrm {uB}} = {\boldsymbol {\Delta }}^1_2$, where $\operatorname {\mathrm {uB}}$ is the pointclass of all universally Baire (...) sets of reals, is equiconsistent modulo ZFC with the existence of a $\Sigma _2$ -reflecting VSS cardinal. (shrink)

We present a model where ω1 is inaccessible by reals, Silver measurability holds for all sets but Miller and Lebesgue measurability fail for some sets. This contributes to a line of research started by Shelah in the 1980s and more recently continued by Schrittesser and Friedman, regarding the separation of different notions of regularity properties of the real line.

Response-dependent (R-D) properties have a big epistemological advantage: when we are the responders, they give us real knowledge of what their bearers can do or cause. But accounts vary substantially with respect to the underlying metaphysics, and the epistemological advantage is easily lost. In this paper, I explain how this occurs in Pettit’s influential account. I begin by outlining the epistemological motivation for dealing with R-D properties, in particular for some, more demanding, empiricist theories of knowledge. I (...) then explain how dispositional accounts of R-D properties, like Johnston’s, invite in accounts involving judgments, like Pettit’s. In Pettit’s account, responses are effectively judgments of salient similarities between objects, and thereby second-order, so that it is not the properties, but our concepts of the properties that are “response-privileging” and thereby ultimately R-D. This account is then extended to all concepts. Pettit thus gives us a R-D genealogy of concepts, but relinquishes the epistemological asset inherent in (first-order) accounts of R-D properties as consisting in (“real”) response events. (shrink)

Suppose you attend a seminar where a mathematician presents a proof to some of his colleagues. Suppose further that what he is proving is an important mathematical statement Now the following happens: as the mathematician proceeds, his audience is amazed at first, then becomes angry and finally ends up disturbing the lecture (some walk out, some laugh, …). If in addition, you see that the proof he is presenting is formally speaking (nearly) correct, would you say you are witnessing an (...) extraordinary event in urgent need of explanation? Surely, your answer would be yes. But do events of this type actually occur? The matter of the fact is, yes, they do. This paper presents the details of such an event, suggests a possible explanation and examines its implications for our understanding of mathematical practice. (shrink)

This paper begins an analysis of the real line using an inconsistency-tolerant (paraconsistent) logic. We show that basic field and compactness properties hold, by way of novel proofs that make no use of consistency-reliant inferences; some techniques from constructive analysis are used instead. While no inconsistencies are found in the algebraic operations on the real number field, prospects for other non-trivializing contradictions are left open.

Property in Human Tissue It seems that a recurring theme in our Recent Developments is the issue of property rights in tissue . This has most commonly been associated with access to reproductive material and begins from the presumption of no property in tissue. A recent decision for the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, whilst unsuccessful on largely procedural grounds, warrants a brief note because it adds to the general discourse on property in tissue and adopts a different approach. Piljak (...) Estate v Abraham 2014 ONSC 2893 addressed the question of whether or not the family of a deceased person could access liver tissue for genetic testing. The property question arose because the family applied for access to the tissue under Rule 32.01 and in order for the tissue to fall within the ambit of the Rule it must be defined as real or personal property.Background .. (shrink)

This book presents vigorous and wide-ranging arguments in defense of an Aristotelian metaphysical scheme along fairly orthodox Thomistic lines. The central claim is that the items that populate the world have real essences – natures that mind-independently define what each such item is. This Aristotelian essentialism, Oderberg begins by telling us, is a different doctrine from what has recently been called ‘essentialism’, and a more powerful one . For recent essentialism has treated a thing's essence as merely all those (...) properties that the thing takes with it across all possible worlds – and here modality gets presupposed in order to explain essentialness, when the order should be reversed.We can observe essences, Oderberg holds, even though the observation is indirect, and even though knowing what to make of our observations requires applying metaphysical knowledge. Positivism-inspired worries that there is something unfactual about modal claims, and hence about essences, are unfounded . Claims about essences do have factual content, but not because they merely express our concepts or our grammar, and not because they simply report empirical findings . True reports of the essences of objects articulate a metaphysical insight from Aristotle: an object's essence is a compound of its substantial form and its prime matter . Its form actuates potentialities of its matter . The laws of nature derive from essences, and hence are necessary rather than contingent . Artifacts are ‘accidental unities’ of individual substances and …. (shrink)

Perhaps we should entertain the idea that aesthetic properties are no less (but no more) objective than properties like weight or shape. Indeed, the weight and shape of something are themselves aesthetic properties of that thing. And we might speculate or (what the heck) assert that aesthetic properties are no more (but no less) socially constructed than size or material composition, for example. Indeed the size and material composition of something are aesthetic properties of it. (...) We might, that is, live in an aesthetic universe, live embedded in an aesthetic reality. Then, for example, to give a full description of any thing or phenomenon, we would have to resort to aesthetic categories: perhaps there is no natural science, for example, without aesthetics, and vice versa. On a good day, the universe might really, actually, truly be beautiful. (shrink)

Although we experience many cultural artifacts by way of reproductions, there remains a particular thrill in experiencing genuine objects—‘real things’. I argue that genuineness is a property that possesses many dimensions of value, including aesthetic value. Typically, aesthetic qualities are perceptual, but genuineness is not a perceptual property. I investigate the aesthetic dimensions of genuineness by considering the role of touch in encounters with old things, using the example of an ancient bronze figurine whose reputation as genuine has waxed (...) and waned, along with its aesthetic assessment. (shrink)

With every σ-ideal I on a Polish space we associate the σ-ideal I* generated by the closed sets in I. We study the forcing notions of Borel sets modulo the respective σ-ideals I and I* and find connections between their forcing properties. To this end, we associate to a σ-ideal on a Polish space an ideal on a countable set and show how forcing properties of the forcing depend on combinatorial properties of the ideal. We also study (...) the 1—1 or constant property of σ-ideals, i.e., the property that every Borel function defined on a Borel positive set can be restricted to a positive Borel set on which it either 1—1 or constant. We prove the following dichotomy: if I is a σ-ideal generated by closed sets, then either the forcing P I adds a Cohen real, or else I has the 1—1 or constant property. (shrink)

This article sets out a new conception of ‘property as an asset of resilience’. Building on Fineman’s emphasis on ‘webs’ of resilience, and applying insights from Actor-Network Theory and Resilient Property Theory, we examine how the rhetorical claims asserted by owners and non-owners, individually and collectively, and the ways that law recognizes and endorses those claims, affect the production of property-as-resilience. Applying Fineman’s framework, we argue that the ‘embodiment’ and ‘embeddedness’ of human vulnerability is revealed by the necessary and inevitable (...) relationship we have with land, housing and place. Everyone—including homeless people—must ‘be’ somewhere (embodiment); however, it is our ability to access ‘assets of resilience’ through our social embeddedness in institutional structures and relationships that mitigates (or not) our experience and life opportunities. In this article we analyze the nature of real property as an asset of resilience, the consequences of exclusionary concepts of ownership for how resilience is allocated, and the implications for how we think and talk about ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ in property theories and property law. We consider the roles that states perform in the allocation of property as an asset of resilience: both directly, through the protection and enforcement of private property rights and official narratives about the nature of private property; and indirectly, as owners leverage the hinterland of privilege extended to ‘ownership’ and owners to deepen their own networks of resilience. (shrink)

Brendle, J., H. Judah and S. Shelah, Combinatorial properties of Hechler forcing, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59 185–199. Using a notion of rank for Hechler forcing we show: assuming ωV1 = ωL1, there is no real in V[d] which is eventually different from the reals in L[ d], where d is Hechler over V; adding one Hechler real makes the invariants on the left-hand side of Cichoń's diagram equal ω1 and those on the right-hand side (...) equal 2ω and produces a maximal almost disjoint family of subsets of ω of size ω1; there is no perfect set of random reals over V in V[ r][ d], where r is random over V and d Hechler over V[r], thus answering a question of the first and second authors. (shrink)

Beginning with the well-knowncyber-rape in LambdaMOO, I argue that it ispossible to have real moral wrongs in virtualcommunities. I then generalize the account toshow how it applies to interactions in gamingand discussion communities. My account issupported by a view of moral realism thatacknowledges entities like intentions andcausal properties of actions. Austin's speechact theory is used to show that real people canact in virtual communities in ways that bothestablish practices and moral expectations, andwarrant strong identifications betweenthemselves and their (...) online identities. Rawls'conception of a social practice is used toanalyze the nature of the wrong and thestage-setting aspect of engaging in a practice. (shrink)

The Kolmogorov complexity of a finite binary string is the length of the shortest description of the string. This gives rise to some ‘standard’ lowness notions for reals: A isK-trivial if its initial segments have the lowest possible complexity and A is low forKif using A as an oracle does not decrease the complexity of strings by more than a constant factor. We weaken these notions by requiring the defining inequalities to hold only up to all${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$orders, and call the (...) new notions${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$-bounded K-trivialand${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$-bounded low for K. Several of the ‘nice’ properties ofK-triviality are lost with this weakening. For instance, the new weaker definitions both give uncountable set of reals. In this paper we show that the weaker definitions are no longer equivalent, and that the${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$-boundedK-trivials are cofinal in the Turing degrees. We then compare them to other previously studied weakenings, namelyinfinitely-often K-trivialityandweak lowness for K. We show that${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$-boundedK-trivial implies infinitely-oftenK-trivial, but no implication holds between${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$-bounded low forKand weakly low forK. (shrink)

Jeffrey Brower argues that Aquinas’s hylomorphic account of change entails a distinction between “property” possession and “property” characterization. Given that and Brower’s assumption that Aquinas’s fundamental hylomorphic compounds are material substances and accidental unities, it follows that material substances are not characterized by the accidents they possess. In order to avoid that counterintuitive consequence, Brower stipulates a form of derivative property characterization and a numerical sameness without identity relation, which together enable him to affirm that material substances are derivatively characterized (...) by the accidents they possess. I argue that, by affirming a plausible alternative to Brower’s account of Aquinas’s fundamental hylomorphic compounds, we can maintain that accidents characterize material substances in the primary sense without having to affirm the real existence of accidental unities or Brower’s objectionable numerical sameness without identity relation. (shrink)

This book gives an account of a full spectrum of property rights and their relationship to individual liberty. It shows that a purely deontological approach to justice can deal with the most complex questions regarding the property system. Moreover, the author considers the economic, ecological, and technological complexities of our real-world property systems. The result is a more conceptually sound account of natural rights and the property system they demand. If we think that liberty should be at the centre (...) of justice, what does that mean for the property system? Economists and lawyers widely agree that a property system must be composed of many different types of property: the kind of private ownership one has over one's person and immediate possessions, as well as the kinds of common ownership we each have in our local streets, as well as many more. However, theories of property and justice have not given anything approaching an adequate account of the relationship between liberty and any other form of property other than private ownership. It is often thought that a basic commitment to liberty cannot really tell us how to arrange the major complexities of the property system, which diverge from simple private ownership. Property and Justice demonstrates how philosophical rigour coupled with interdisciplinary engagement enables us to think clearly about how to deal with real-world problems. It will be of interest to political philosophers, political theorists, and legal theorists working on property rights and justice. (shrink)