Volume 37, Issue 1-2, March - June 2024, Page 69-73.

I examine issues tied to the allegeddifficulties of mutual understanding betweenRussia and the West. I show that some of thebackground to these issues lies in thedifference of culturally grounded differencesin perceptual and conceptual schemata. In theWest, a broadly understood Aristotelianism andin Russia Neoplatonism designate dominantattitudes to the world. The Russian `lunar''consciousness, in comparison with the `solar''consciousness of the West, tends by and largeprecipitously to totalize the world, and theexperienced multiplicity of the real isreferred to its imagined center. The differencebetween (...) Russia and the West, limited to somedegree by mutual similarities, can become thebasis of an axiological and intellectualdialogue important for one side and theother. (shrink)

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.

Russia's war against Ukraine has had devastating human consequences and destabilizing geopolitical effects. This roundtable takes up three critical debates in connection with the conflict: Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union; the role of Ukrainian nationalism in advancing democratization; and the degree of human rights accountability, not just for Russia, but also for Ukraine. In addition to challenging conventional wisdom on each of these issues, the contributors to this roundtable make a second, critically important intervention. Each essay (...) explores the problem of concealed political and normative commitments within much of the research on Russia's war against Ukraine by unearthing biases intrinsic to particular conceptualizations. The collection also questions the perceived separation between “interests” and “values” that permeates policy analysis. This roundtable further draws attention to the ethical problems that scholars and policymakers bring to policy debates through the occlusion of their preexisting political commitments. It argues for greater transparency around and awareness of the ways in which values, not just evidence, inform research findings and policy positions. (shrink)

Russia’s relations with the European Court of Human Rights since the time of Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe have received a lot of attention on the part of academic scholars, practitioners, and media. Research on the ECtHR became especially important in the context of the twentieth anniversary of Russia’s acceptance of ECtHR jurisdiction that coincided with the unprecedented worsening of relations between Russia and the European countries due to the 2014 Crimea annexation. With voices (...) that consistently advocate Russia’s exit from the CoE, we believe it necessary to examine Russia-ECtHR relations as they are presented in the academic narrative. Drawing mostly on Russian-language sources, we want to highlight the variety of overarching themes and arguments relating to the crisis caused by the 2015 Constitutional Court Decision. We would like to examine various dimensions of this “crisis,” in order to be able to conclude whether Russia’s reaction to the Markin case and cases of non-compliance that followed was indeed part of a broader strategy of “backlash against international courts” we are currently witnessing worldwide. In the conditions when Russia’s exit from the Council of Europe is as likely as ever, the possibility of the “snowball effect” on the part of other member states threatens undermine the very raison d’être of the European human rights protection system. (shrink)

The word blat refers to the system of informal contacts and personal networks which was used to obtain goods and services under the rationing which characterised Soviet Russia. Alena Ledeneva's book is the first to analyse blat in all its historical, socio-economic and cultural aspects, and to explore its implications for post-Soviet society. In a socialist distribution system which resulted in constant shortages, blat developed into an 'economy of favours' which shadowed an overcontrolling centre and represented the reaction of (...) ordinary people to the social constraints they faced. In social and economic terms, blat exchanges became vital to the population, and to the functioning of the Soviet system. The book shows that the nature of the economic and political changes in contemporary Russia cannot be properly understood without attention to the powerful legacy of the blat economy. (shrink)

This book, focusing on the history of religious and political thinking in early modern Russia, demonstrates that Russia’s path toward enlightenment began long _before_ Peter the Great’s opening to the West. Examining a broad range of writings, G. M. Hamburg shows why Russia’s enlightenment constituted a precondition for the explosive emergence of nineteenth-century writers such as Fedor Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Soloviev.

China, the most populous country in the world after India with 1.4 billion people, shares a 4200 km (2600 mi) border with Russia, the country with the world’s largest geographical territory, roughl...

Russian neo-Kantianismʼs status in the history of the development of Russian philosophy is an important, but poorly presented in scientific publications, issue is revealed in the article. With some exceptions, which are represented by a number of few, but informative and informative articles and a monograph, the problem remains without proper reception in the scientific discourse of our time. Russian neo-Kantianism, however, leaving aside the question of what is the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism, it is impossible to productively and consistently (...) actualize the content of Russian neo-Kantians and, moreover, to show their significance in the history of Russian philosophical and socio-humanitarian thought in general. Three key difficulties stand out: 1) the question of originality and the related theme of the independence of the philosophical direction (originality, independence and originality – differ from each other, but are united in their immanent orientation); 2) Russian neo-Kantianism, which in many ways seems to be the most difficult task for researchers engaged in historical and philosophical reconstruction; 3) the question remains ambiguous as to whether Russian neo-Kantianism is a continuation of the German tradition or whether it is a direction of Russian philosophy of thought. Russian neo-Kantianism, the three difficulties identified in the reception of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism taken as a whole, are consistently revealed in the content of the proposed article, supplemented by a brief overview of the most systemic positions of Russian philosophers, ranked among Russian neo-Kantianism. Overcoming the indicated difficulties, which undoubtedly affect the objective disclosure of the creativity of each representative of Russian neo-Kantianism or thinkers related to them, seems appropriate not only from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, but also for actualizing the heritage of philosophers in the conditions of modern socio-humanitarian pragmatics. Russian neo-Kantianism The author of the article suggests that one of the ways to overcome the ambiguity of the definition of Russian neo-Kantianism in the history of Russian thought may be, firstly, a more detailed consecration of the activities of Russian neo-Kantians in the historical and philosophical literature, and secondly, a comprehensive representation of this direction, including studies of individual personalities and their works. Despite the controversial and polemical nature of the task, its formulation is necessary for the objectivity of the meaning of Russian thought in the global context. (shrink)

This article argues that combining elements of the sociological theories of Johann Arnason and Peter Wagner can contribute to an understanding of the causes of the ‘new Cold War’ on the European continent. Comparisons of today’s confrontation between Russia and the West with the original Cold War are largely misleading since the Soviet model of modernity represented a radical alternative to its liberal western version. Unlike the original Cold War, the current ideological confrontation is not connected with a clash (...) of different forms of modernity. Today’s Russia lacks a clear civilizational identity and does not follow an alternative project of modernity. The recent ‘conservative turn’ in Russian politics largely draws on a specific interpretation of European modernity. (shrink)

In this year of bicentennial celebration, there will no doubt take place several cultural analyses of the American tradition. This is only as it should be, for without an extensive, broad-based inquiry into where we have come from, we shall surely not foresee where we might go. Nonetheless, most cultural analyses of the American context suffer from a common fault - the lack of a different context to use for purposes of comparison. True, American values and ideals were partly inherited (...) from the European tradition. But that tradition is in many ways an inadequate mode of comparison. Without going too far afield, let us note two points: first, European culture was the proud inheritor of the Renaissance tradition, and, going back still further, of classical culture; second, the European countries are compact. Their land masses are such that the notion of "frontier" simply would not have arisen in the same way as it did in America. On the other side of the globe, however, there does exist a country capable of serving as a suitable mirror. We speak, of course, of Russia. That country also came relatively late onto the cultural horizon, and was not privy to the Renaissance tradition. Furthermore, her land mass is such as to be "experi mentally infmite" in character - not unlike the American frontier. It is hoped that much can be leamed about the present cultural context by com paring the two countries in their youthful stages. (shrink)

The 1990s are marked by a change of major landmarks in the cultural-historical self-awareness of the peoples of Russia, Europe, and perhaps the entire world. Not long ago at all, "post-Soviet" social science was celebrating its liberation from the "formation" dogma in favor of a civilizational approach. This meant, first, a way out of the socialist ghetto, which had been shut off from the rest of the world and had defended this isolation with the thesis of an "irreconcilable struggle (...) between two worlds," two lifestyles, and so forth. (shrink)

This study reopens the question of the nature of political commitment and its causes during a time that drastically altered the history of the 20th century, the 1920s and 1930s. Focused largely on a body of texts produced by Japanese female writer Miyamoto Yuriko who returned from a three-year long trip to the Soviet Union in late 1920s as a convinced communist, the study offers a comparison with communism renunciation writings produced by leftist Romanian French writer Panait Istrati, as well (...) as other communist and fellow travelers who experienced the same Soviet realities as Miyamoto but with opposite outcomes, such as French writer André Gide. What made those members of the intelligentsia so passionately embrace or renounce certain political ideologies that ultimately changed the face of modern history? (shrink)

One of the most significant changes in the medical professions in Europe is the trend towards feminization. Some of the patterns of gender inequality arising from the feminization of the European medical professions are clearly apparent within the Russian medical profession, which experienced feminization 70 years ago. Yet little is known about the processes by which these patterns of gender inequality emerged and were maintained. This article is based on interviews with female doctors in Voronezh, Russia in 1996. It (...) explores the attitudes of these women to gender divisions within the medical profession. This is placed within the wider context of Soviet and post-Soviet employment and family policies directed at women. It is suggested that the material and ideological focus on women’s role in reproduction had direct implications for the choices women made in relation to paid labour. (shrink)

The fragility of the post-war international order is threatened not only by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but even more tellingly, by the decisions that Western nations, the European Union, and NATO make in response to Russian aggression. This paper frames Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine within what Reinhart Koselleck calls ‘the sediments of time’ or Zeitschichten that contain different temporalities, speeds, and directions. Koselleck’s approach of parsing the ‘sediments of time’ is a heuristic device for (...) understanding how Western responses to the war in Ukraine are framed by very different historical markers. Just as one might parse the grammatical components of a sentence in order to understand its meaning, so one might parse Western responses within different historical timescales that include Zeitenwende, déjà vu, interregnum, and Never Again. (shrink)

This paper brings together the late Freud’s concept of the death drive and Dostoevsky’s vision of primordial suffering in order to analyze anti-Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian trends in today’s Russia. The paper encourages embracing the suffering that the death drive entails, instead of escaping it through the narrative of Russia’s ‘greatness’.

The paper discusses the perception of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s work by Yuly Aykhenvald (1872–1928), a famous literary critic of the first quarter of the twentieth century. It shows that Aykhenvald’s attitude toward Dostoevsky had undergone a certain evolution from a rejection via demands to “overcome” him to his recognition as one of the “spiritual leaders” of the thinking Russia alongside Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy. Yet Aykhenvald still had some controversy with Dostoevsky, above all over philosophy of history. The ques­tion of (...) Russia’s destiny and its relation to the West is addressed by Aykhenvald following the same algorithm that is used in the article by Thomas G. Masaryk (to which Aykhen­vald was reacting), namely through the prism of and in dispute with Dostoevsky. The pa­per proves that Aykhenvald focuses not on interpreting or analyzing Masaryk’s ideas, but on refuting the views of the Eurasianists and that Eurasian ideas are the very philosophi­cal context that serves as a background for his argument with Dostoevsky. In refuting Dostoevsky’s views on Europe and justifying his own historiosophic view of the entire world as a unified Europe, Aykhenvald eventually comes to the paradox that Dostoevsky, being the “denier of Europe”, is the “intercultural cross-link” that ties Europe and Russia even more closely together. In this way, Dostoevsky’s work turns out to be a starting point for Aykhenvald’s own historiosophic framework, which brings him closer to both Russian interpreters of the Silver Age (Vikentii V. Veresaev) and the European philosoph­ical and political tradition (Thomas G. Masaryk). (shrink)

The article provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the deportation of many Russian intellectuals abroad in 1922. It is known that such a vicious deed on the part of the Soviet authorities, in fact, turned out to be an act that saved many Russian intellectuals either from starvation or from repression and death in the camps. It is also widely known that the cultural activities of Russian emigrants after their arrival in the West were varied and intense. The article (...) also emphasizes that expulsion and its significance for the destinies of the country and the emigrants themselves remained a "blank spot" for a long time. It was only in the 1990s that research into the events of the 1922 exile, both in Russia and abroad, started to change. The author draws attention to the fact that the very nature of examination of the expulsion of the Russian intelligentsia has also changed over the years. At the beginning of studies in the 1990s, it was purely archival works aimed at recovering emigrants' cultural heritage and returning "forgotten" names. Over the last decade, we may observe a more critical reading of this heritage, supposing a more precise reconstruction of facts and contexts and a broader analysis of the significance of events in the history of the early 1920s. The study of the various cultural activities of the Russian migr intelligentsia allows us to strike a conversation on Russian philosophy, its peculiarity and originality, the mutual influences of the Russian and European philosophical traditions, and the meaning and significance of Soviet philosophy relevant again. (shrink)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has become a global city with a vibrant urban and cultural life-one of the most expensive capitals in the world with famous clubs and restaurants, as well as one of the most popular destinations for city workers and diplomats. Has corruption been instrumental in Moscow's development? The answer is complicated and in many ways a matter of definitions. It depends on whether one considers informal practices-inherited from Soviet times as well as new (...) ones-as corrupt and how one conceptualizes corruption. I will illustrate some of these complications for the case of the Soviet practice of blat, explain its "monetization" and its evolving relationship with corruption in the post-Soviet transition, and analyze the role of informal networks in present-day Russia. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1997) clarified constitutional (...) provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people’s minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state canonly be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom. (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

Russia’s October 1917 revolution had an international vector along with its domestic one. The idea of transforming not only a single country but the entire world into a dictatorship of the proletar...

The paper argues that the philosophy that was taught in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in late 16th – early 17th century and then became the ideological basis for the Moscow “Latinism” can be attributed to so-called Second scholasticism. The main features of Second scholasticism are the rejection of predestination in theology, usage of probabilistic approaches in logic and ethics and confrontation with absolutism in politics. These features made Second scholasticism unacceptable for absolute monarchies emerging in Europe (including the (...) Russian Empire) which utilized universal rationalism of the early Enlightenment as an ideological basis. Both in Western Europe and in Russia Second scholasticism became “a zone of cultural exclusion”. However prevalence of Second scholasticism in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concurred with making up of the Ukrainian cultural originality and in many respects defined characteristic features of the Ukrainian mentality. (shrink)

The exclusion of Russia from the Bologna process creates serious challenges for the higher education system. The beginning reform will affect the whole institution of higher learning of our country. This, in turn, opens up new opportunities to improve the efficiency of the entire system. The introduction of three basic elements, namely: a bank of pedagogical ideas, a triple helix model and a system for introducing creative technologies into the educational process, can allow us to form a qualitatively new (...) level of training of specialists in the country. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to analyze the change of the Russian Federation’s international image in the light of two significant events: the Olympic Winter Games in 2014 in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea. According to the first hypothesis, one of the main aims for hosting the Olympic Games was to improve the international prestige of Russia. Shortly after the Olympics Russia increased its activity in Eastern Ukraine, which resulted in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. (...) Therefore the article is also aimed to investigate whether by annexing Crimea Russia squandered the possible positive effects of hosting the Olympics in terms of its international image. (shrink)

As a mono-energy-economy, Russia’s fortunes are closely linked to the price of energy. That same link explains why when energy prices hit record highs, there was such strong public support for Vladimir Putin. But when energy prices plummeted in late 2008, Russia found itself with an economic downturn which brought with it, factory closings, worker layoffs and political grumbling. Because of Russia’s inexperience with economic upheaval, Russia is likely to go through greater turmoil and political uncertainty (...) if not unrest, than more traditional market economies which over the years have had to learn how to deal with economic cycles of this sort. (shrink)

The correctness of application of orientalist discourse of E. Said to the colonial policy of the Russian Empire is analyzed in the article on the example of P. I. Rychkov research. By studying integration of Bashkirs in the structure of the Russian state, the author came to the conclusion that Russia’s policy in the East was based on the experience of the management of non-Russian peoples, which was developed in the 16-17th centuries. The establishment of ‘cultural distance‘ is typical (...) only for a small group of educated administrators of past-Petrine era. Most of the officials of the region, as in the preceding period, and during the time of Rychkov and Tatishchev preferred to rely on traditional methods of Bashkir management, which was developed in the period of their voluntary accession. Managerial stereotypes of 16-17th centuries, had significant influence on policy towards South-Eastern peoples of Russia even in the 19th century. The Russian administration inherent in the desire to integrate the non-Russian peoples in the General class structure of the state on the basis of analogies or correspondences, the objective of which was social and cultural rapprochement of the two societies. (shrink)

Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, the history of Russia has been a succession of astonishing flights and falls. The sacrifices made by the Russian narod on the altar of development are so great, and the achievements so incommensurate with the efforts expended, that a number of questions must arise: Why do things happen this way? Why does Russia not develop "normally"? And what is "normal" development? Is it possible for Russia, and under what conditions? What (...) are the causes of the oddities in Russian development? (shrink)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the largest regional security and cooperation organization and has existed for nearly two decades. Since its inception China and Russia have acted as the driving force behind it, playing a leading role in its development. The main goals of the Big Two’s cooperation are to ensure the Eurasian corridor is developed, to promote collective security through regional cooperation organizations, including the United Nations, and to recast the world order on the basis of political dialogue, (...) mutual respect, equality and international law. Nonetheless there are disagreements between China and Russia and among the member states. China is keen to tackle terrorism, extremism and separatism and pursue economic collaboration, while Russia is more ambitious about transforming the SCO into a strategic counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. Looking forward, people may wonder how China, a rising economic power and military force, will continue to share liabilities within the SCO, particularly with Russia but also the other member states. There is no definite answer to that question at the moment. All we can say is that the SCO has steadily evolved into one of the most multilateral and dynamic organizations. But if progress is to be sustained, reforms and systematic change are necessary. (shrink)

Western perceptions of Russia have a long history, starting from the earliest reports in the fifteenth century. For some Westerners Russia appeared as a utopian, harmonious society. For others it appeared as an ideal monarchy. Some, however, saw it as a despotic Asian state. The Western images of Russia from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries were thus mixed and ambiguous. The positive image of Russia as the ideal Biblical society that stood outside of history somewhat (...) blurred the differences between Russia and the West. In contrast, for an increasing number of Westerners, especially from the more advanced proto-capitalist countries, Russia was part of the non-Western world, thus emphasizing its difference from the West. Russia was thus assimilated into the Western image of the Orient where repulsion combined with fascination, until, under the impact of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, its foreignness was articulated in terms of civilizational and religious differences. (shrink)

The article analyzes responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by philosophers on the left, like Balibar and Zizek, and feminist philosophers, such as Butler and Hark. A large-scale war in Europe proved to be a challenge for a number of feminist, pacifist, and leftist certainties, and this challenge was presented in philosophy and feminist theory as a series of antinomies that do not imply a simple solution. Some leading contemporary philosophers believe that Ukraine should stop resisting aggression in (...) the face of the threat of a world nuclear war or if the conflict turns into a war of extermination. An alternative solution was suggested by some left and feminist philosophers who argued that a true Ukrainian victory over an authoritarian aggressor would amount to preserving and empowering democracy in Ukraine, and that this was possible only on the basis of building broad transnational anti-Putin alliances, including alliances with the representatives of all forces opposing Putin in Russia and Belarus. (shrink)

In Russia, works on the philosophy of scientific knowledge formed the basis of science studies. In the West, the priority in the discussion regarding science studies was given to sociology. Over time, the problematic of the philosophical and sociological trends moved closer and the border between them shifted. As a result, understanding the role of science in society has changed substantially. Accordingly, there is a fundamental change both in the subject matter of epistemological investigations and in epistemological concepts.