Philosophical luminaries including Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill have all theorized that our human capacity of reason calls us to become the best that we can be by developing our “natural abilities.” This article explores the thesis that the development of our talents is not a moral duty to oneself and suggests that it may be avoided for other reasons than failures of rationality. In the face of the opportunity-costs associated with different life-goals, resistance to developing (...) our powers may spring from an informed and perfectly rational choice in favor of an equally valuable alternative to talent development as a way of life. Thus, the arguments in this essay suggest that the predominant, rationalistic view in defense of a duty to develop one’s talents ignores a distinctively human capacity, namely, the capacity for reasoned moral choice. The paper argues, however, that we do well in viewing the development of one’s talents as worthwhile. In other words, it is correct to sustain that the individual would be acting in a morally deficient manner if she declined to develop her abilities for the wrong reasons even if no duty to self to avoid that course of action exists. (shrink)

It is often observed that there is little or no moral philosophy in classical Indian Buddhist thought. This is sometimes believed to be surprising since obviously there is an ethical teaching in Buddhism and clearly there are other forms of Buddhist philosophy. In my view, there is something that can plausibly be called moral philosophy in Indian Buddhism, but it is not quite what many people have expected because they have approached the issue from a specific understanding of philosophy that (...) is too limited. I propose to defend this interpretation by reshaping Mark Siderits’ concept of fusion philosophy. The fusion I will propose reveals a form of moral philosophy that may be called self-cultivation philosophy. I will argue that this was a common activity in ancient Chinese, Greek and Indian cultures—including especially early Buddhist thought and practice. (shrink)

As ardent followers of Mencius and Zhu Xi, virtually all Korean Neo-Confucians during the Chosŏn dynasty rejected the Way of the Hegemon by understanding it as directly opposed to the Kingly Way, a humane government allegedly conducted by ancient sage-kings. However, Yi I [Formula: see text]珥 (1536–1584), a prominent Neo-Confucian scholar-official in sixteenth-century Korea, endorsed the Way of the Hegemon as compatible with the Kingly Way by reconceptualizing it, otherwise predicated on strong consequentialist ethics, in a way consistent with Confucianism’s (...) deepest concern with the well-being of the people. In Confucianizing the Way of the Hegemon through the creative re-reading of the Book of Rites from a Xunzian standpoint, Yi I proposed a new method of moral self-cultivation specifically tailored for a Confucian ruler—called political self-cultivation in this paper—that combined the traditional Neo-Confucian recovery model of self-cultivation with a strong sense of political responsibility. (shrink)

A concise and accessible introduction to the evolution of the concept of moral self-cultivation in the Chinese Confucian tradition, this volume begins with an explanation of the pre-philosophical development of ideas central to this concept, followed by an examination of the specific treatment of self cultivation in the philosophy of Kongzi ("Confucius"), Mengzi ("Mencius"), Xunzi, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen. In addition to providing a survey of the views of some of the (...) most influential Confucian thinkers on an issue of fundamental importance to the tradition, Ivanhoe also relates their concern with moral self-cultivation to a number of topics in the Western ethical tradition. Bibliography and index are included. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper aims to offer a new perspective on role modelling by examining adolescents’ own efforts to lead a morally virtuous life. While traditional approaches to moral education emphasize the importance of teachers as role models, this study proposes a shift in focus towards adolescents’ own role models. Drawing on the philosophical concept of moral self-cultivation and psychological insights on identity development and social cognitive learning, it is argued that adolescents have the ability to cultivate their moral (...) character by emulating others. However, empirical evidence suggests that adolescents often do not perceive teachers as their role models. Consequently, moral educational theories are advised to demand less of teachers as role models. Teachers could invest more time in understanding students’ personal role models and encourage them to compare these role models with their own behavior. By acknowledging and addressing students’ role models, teachers can facilitate the moral self-cultivation of adolescents. (shrink)

In this essay Mordechai Gordon begins to address the neglect of humor among philosophers of education by focusing on some interesting connections between humor, self‐transcendence, and the development of moral virtues. More specifically, he explores the kind of humor that makes fun of oneself and how it can affect educational encounters. Gordon begins his analysis by discussing the nature and purpose of humor in general, while distinguishing it from laughter and amusement. In the next part of the essay, he (...) takes a close look at the characteristics and benefits of the type of humor that we use when we make fun of ourselves. He then turns his attention to exploring the relation between laughing at ourselves, self‐transcendence, and a number of moral virtues. The final part of this essay briefly examines what might happen to the quality of educational encounters when teachers become more comfortable with laughing at themselves. (shrink)

In this thesis, I have explored, explicated and argued for some specific areas of commonalities between the philosophy of John Dewey and the teaching of Confucius. Both theories start with the same fundamental assumption that there is no such thing as immutable human nature, and their shared emphasis on education is based on this supposition. John Dewey and Confucius agree that the self mainly consists of habits and that the transformation of the self implies growth, i.e., the acquisition (...) of new and intelligent habits. The Deweyan conception of growth overlaps the Confucian doctrine of self-cultivation in that both concepts focus on the obtainment of inner moral qualities that are of great communal import. Dewey's construal of freedom seems to parallel jen, the Confucian ideal, because both thinkers maintain that human perfection is the ultimate goal for which we should strive unceasingly. (shrink)

The present chapter examines the philosophical problem of how it is possible, metaphysically and practically speaking, to develop a good moral character when one adheres to the view that a persisting self does not exist. It extracts answers from two thinkers who reject the concept of enduring identity, the Indian philosopher Vasubandhu (4th to 5th centuries CE) and the Western philosopher Derek Parfit (1942–2017). The first section of the chapter outlines some of Vasubandhu’s and Parfit’s shared assumptions concerning the (...) nature of the self and that of personal identity. In section 2, the focus shifts to the distinct ways in which each philosopher advances his understanding of the moral agent. Section 3 suggests that besides formulating different accounts of selfless agency, the ways in which Vasubandhu and Parfit grappled with the problem of agency reveal different approaches to addressing the question of human nature, and consequently, different ways of resolving the difficulties involved in becoming a good person. These differences become apparent in two practices that are relevant to crafting a moral character and that the two thinkers treat, moral commitment and the cultivation of virtue, which are discussed in the final part of the chapter. (shrink)

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ (...) requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this chapter, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology. (shrink)

Self-cultivation is a topic that has been largely ignored by Western moral philosophers. In contrast, it is a central concern of philosophers in the Confucian tradition. In this brief and highly readable book, Ivanhoe introduces the theories of self-cultivation of some of the most important figures in the Confucian tradition. (See the table of contents, below.) Although Confucianism is sometimes presented as a monolithic movement, Ivanhoe stresses the diversity within the Confucian tradition over more than 2,000 (...) years. In addition to being a work of sound scholarship, this book is an excellent source for anyone seeking a philosophical introduction to the Confucian tradition as a whole. (shrink)

Interpretations of Nietzsche as a virtue theorist have proliferated in recent years as commentators have sought to read him as a modern eudaimonistic philosopher while also attempting to show what makes his contribution to this tradition valuable and distinctive.1While some commentators still contend that interpreting Nietzsche as a eudaimonist is antithetical to his overtly-stated philosophical aims,2 over the last decade there has been a upsurge of support for such readings, especially from commentators who emphasise what they claim is the pervasive (...) influence of the Hellenistic tradition on his work. Keith Ansell-Pearson has argued that Epicurus was a key influence on Nietzsche’s middle period, for example; whereas Michael Ure has claimed that the Stoic thought of Seneca and Epictetus was also highly influential.3 Nevertheless, even those commentators who agree that Nietzsche can be informatively situated, or is even best situated, within the Hellenistic tradition cannot agree on two seemingly-intractable puzzles which any virtue-theoretical reading must solve in order to give a full account of his moral philosophy. The puzzles can be stated as follows: Puzzle 1: Which character traits does Nietzsche endorse as virtues? Puzzle 2: What is Nietzsche’s ethical ideal? This article offers an exegetical strategy to shed light on both puzzles, especially the first one regarding which character traits Nietzsche endorses as virtues which, as we shall see, is tougher to answer by a straightforward appeal to his texts. To elucidate this puzzle, I will propose that his approving comments regarding excellence-based moral philosophy indicate that his own ethics is also structured in terms of an ethical ideal with a requisite set of virtues which, following his ancient philosophical influences, he views as fundamentally connected. As Julia Annas notes, one the most distinctive ‘assumptions which ancient theories make [is] the relationship of [our] virtues to our final end’,4 and given Nietzsche’s interest in, and apparent endorsement of, ancient eudaimonism – especially compared to his invariably scathing remarks on the modern deontological and utilitarian traditions – we have reason to think that he shares this view.5 What is significant for this article, however, is that Nietzsche’s commitment to a kind of eudaimonism modelled on the ancient world offers a potential way to solve both puzzles. If his virtues and ethical ideal are connected in a similar way to ancient eudaimonistic theories, then understanding his ethical ideal allows us to infer which character traits he endorses as virtues, and vice versa. Although it might be objected that a method tackling both puzzles in tandem would be unworkable if their solutions were contained in each other, in what follows I will show that Nietzsche’s extensive comments on his ethical ideal of ‘becoming what one is’ positions us in a strong position to infer which character traits he prizes most highly. I will call these character traits ‘virtues of self-cultivation’. (shrink)

This paper reports part of a longitudinal research project, which sought to capture students’ conceptualization of caring practice as they progressed to different levels of study in a nursing diploma programme in Hong Kong. Model emulation was found to be an effective means of focusing students’ learning processes on the moral aspects of nursing practice. The theory of model emulation from a Chinese perspective and how it is applied to create a learning context to allow students to acquire a moral (...) sense of nursing are discussed. The participating students are invited to be sincere enquirers in the pursuit of the good embedded in practice through introspective self-examination and dialogue. They are asked to describe and share their experience of positive and negative examples of nursing in written accounts. Van Kaam’s phenomenological method was adopted to explicate the good and bad constituents of nursing from these examples, with the students assuming an active role in the explication process. The explication reveals that the students were able to articulate the good and bad practices in a variety of patient care situations. (shrink)

The twelfth-century Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhu Xi, has often been compared to the thirteenth-century Christian philosopher, Thomas Aquinas. In this essay, I explore the similarities between these two thinkers, focusing on their respective accounts of the metaphysical foundations of moral self-cultivation. I suggestthat both philosophers play similar roles within their respective traditions and share similar aims. In general, both philosophers seek to appropriate ideas of rivalintellectual traditions in order to extend the moral vision of their home traditions, and both (...) hope to achieve their goals without denying the primary orientationsof those traditions. Zhu Xi and Aquinas are shown to employ similar strategies, and to make use of similar metaphysical principles, to unite the humanistic andspiritual dimensions of moral self-cultivation into one synthetic vision. I will conclude by offering some reflections on the following questions: (1) what can the Neo-Confucian and the Thomist ethical traditions learn from one another? And (2) what can those of us engaged in inter-cultural philosophical and religiousdialogue learn from the masters of these traditions? (shrink)

This essay is a case study concerning the problem of rethinking the relationship between Neo-Confucian (Cheng-Zhu school) and Chan schools of thought. The study builds a comparative perspective on two representative texts assembled during the Song dynasty that concern methods of self-cultivation. My theoretical framework is hermeneutical and involves a twofold articulation of correlatives: “inward-outward” and “procedural morality-substantive morality.” By presenting a comparative interpretation of ideas developed in these texts, this analysis highlights the following two components: (...) first, the existence of explicit confluences between major ideas of the influential Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian school, which most virulently criticizes the Buddhist tradition, and Chan’s practical methods of self-cultivation; second, it calls attention to the presence of Chan influences in the Neo-Confucian text. Through comparative analysis, this essay intends not only to bring to light Chan influences insightfully integrated by Neo-Confucians within their own discourse on self-cultivation, but also to understand the multidimensional relation between Song-dynasty Neo-Confucian and Chan practices. (shrink)

The aim of Ethics and Self-Cultivation is to establish and explore a new 'cultivation of the self' strand within contemporary moral philosophy. Although the revival of virtue ethics has helped reintroduce the eudaimonic tradition into mainstream philosophical debates, it has by and large been a revival of Aristotelian ethics combined with a modern preoccupation with standards for the moral rightness of actions. The essays comprising this volume offer a fresh approach to the eudaimonic tradition: instead of (...) conditions for rightness of actions, it focuses on conceptions of human life that are best for the one living it. The first section of essays looks at the Hellenistic schools and the way they influenced modern thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hadot, and Foucault in their thinking about self-cultivation. The second section offers contemporary perspectives on ethical self-cultivation by drawing on work in moral psychology, epistemology of self-knowledge, philosophy of mind, and meta-ethics. (shrink)

The author reflects on the anthropological role of the “self-cultivation” category in the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant, for whom self-cultivation stood as the central idea of the Enlightenment. Kant believed that it was man alone who created himself to a rational being, that his rationality was not a granted good but something he had to mature to by way of multiple disciplinary, civilizing and moralizing measures. An interesting avenue in Gernot Böhme’s approach is his assumption (...) that this conceptual perspective applied to all three Kantian Critiques, e.g., that Critique of Pure Reason propounds the disciplining of human cognition under the banner of subordinating the sphere of intuition to the categories of intellect. These categories are not inborn in the human mind, but are built by the willful disciplining of the perceptual elements of cognition anchored in the animal fundaments of the humanum. Towards the close of his essay Böhme attempts a critique of Kant’s philosophy, accusing it of reductionism and depreciating many anthropological powers. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the philosophical thought and moral practice of a Korean neo-Confucian female scholar named Kang Chŏngildang 姜靜一堂, who not only believed in moral equality between men and women and the possibility of female sagehood but actually empowered herself to become a moral paragon. Furthermore, Chŏngildang’s strong faith in moral equality between men and women enabled her to engage in social criticism of the existing educational system and social norms which discriminated against women, not by overcoming neo-Confucianism, (...) commonly understood as essentially androcentric and patriarchal, but by wholeheartedly embracing and further re-appropriating it in the service of women’s moral self-empowerment and moral perfectibility. After explicating why Chŏngildang nonetheless subscribed to gendered roles and female virtue with reference to her neo-Confucian worldview, I suggest that she can be called a harbinger of Confucian feminism. (shrink)

Whereas Western moral philosophy has mainly accounted for recurrent failed or irrational actions through the concept of weakness of will, many early Chinese texts on self-cultivation, notably the Zhuangzi, stand for a philosophical position that explains our frustrations and failures as an "excess of the will." Leaving aside external factors such as accidents or mistakes, this essay explores the sources of thwarted plans and frustrated expectations that are due to factors internal to the individual—more precisely, to the nature (...) of intentional conscience. Such a view was generally inadmissible in Western moral philosophy, which revolves around the paradigm of a causal agent endowed with a 'muscular ethics' for which all that is desired, and indeed all that is achieved, may only be a direct effect of the will. In striking contrast to this orientation, the Zhuangzi presents a variety of situations in which things do not happen as planned because we were too aware of the plan that guided us. Here, I will use Jon Elster's concept of by-product states in order to explore this contrast between two contending models of action that, far from being culturally rooted, express an inner criticism in both traditions, European and Chinese. (shrink)

This article explores the specific role of courage in the context of the Anthropocene’s moment; it first examines Aristotle’s conception of virtues, focusing on courage, before comparing it to Confucian thought and analyzing the historical dialogue between Western and Chinese traditions on ethics through the works of François Noël (1651–1729). Aristotle views moral cultivation as a social process wherein habits shape inner dispositions; in his view, courage is linked to other virtues, such as temperance and justice. For Aristotle, courage (...) implies the appropriate balance between extremes and must be directed toward a worthy end, such as promoting positive change within a community. This Aristotelian perspective was later incorporated into a biblical framework by Aquinas and Suarez, emphasizing dichotomies between body and soul, as well as between humans and other living beings. These dichotomies must be challenged in the face of the Anthropocene’s emergencies. The second part of this contribution proceeds to a detour examining Confucian ethics, which rests on a different anthropology, emphasizing continuities rather than discontinuities. Like Aristotelian thought, Confucian thought also underscores moral education within a community; it prioritizes humanity, embodied through empathy and loyalty. In the Analects, courage is balanced by a sense of rituals and righteousness. Mencius further distinguishes several types of courage, stressing self-cultivation and the ruler’s responsibility to make empathetic, appropriate decisions for the community’s sake. From this perspective, courage is understood as the continuous perseverance in self-cultivation, coupled with a firm intention oriented toward the good of the community. Zhu Xi’s comments on Zilu’s courage in the Analects extend this Confucian tradition. Finally, this article highlights how a dialogue between Aristotelian and Confucian ethics began four centuries ago, particularly through Noël’s Philosophia Sinica, which combined these traditions. This inter-religious approach to ethics, enriched by figures such as Aquinas, Suarez, Zhu Xi, and neo-Confucian thinkers, requires re-evaluation because the understanding of personal ethics and nature has evolved. The modern naturalistic approach, with its emphasis on dichotomies, has contributed to a mechanistic view of nature, fostering its exploitation, and a devaluation of the body. This contrast highlights the urgent need for renewed dialogue between Western and Chinese ethical traditions to address contemporary challenges, with François Noël serving as a historical witness of these exchanges. (shrink)

Many writers have commented on the striking similarities between Chinese philosophy and the depth psychology of Carl Jung following Jung's own interest in the topic. Although previous studies have focused almost exclusively on the Taoist classics, remarkably, the Confucian tradition is potentially even more affirmative of Jung's ideas. Confucian humanist philosophy is commonly perceived to be a rigid system of social morality, when it is really concerned with nurturing authentic individuality in order to influence the world and establish universal (...) harmony. The Confucian ChungYung, a classic work usually translated as the Doctrine of the Mean, presents an account of transformative growth that is surprisingly close to Jung's central theory of individuation. The integral metaphysics of ChungYung resonates with the spirit of archetypal psychology, which also sees that harmony on a universal scale is influenced by the whole, authentic self. ChungYung and Jung are practiced as methods of transformative self-cultivation, maintaining universal harmony as the ultimate goal. Both recognize that developing inherent characteristics will connect the individual to society, nature, and destiny. This dissertation describes the main themes relating to self-cultivation, first in the ChungYung, then in Jungian depth psychology, in both cases incorporating commentary from relevant secondary sources into the narrative. These accounts are completed with a comparison of the two systems alongside each other to demonstrate in which areas they are most similar. (shrink)

By the late Ming, the concept of ‘the mind/heart-cum-principle’ 心即理 had generated confusion in the relations between xing (human nature) and xin (mind/heart). Moreover, with the increasing interpenetration of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, some scholars became gravely concerned that the perversion of traditional Confucian thinking had resulted in the degeneration of the moral and social order. Li Cai (1529–1607) was one of these concerned scholars. Wielding the two concepts of ‘zhizhi’ (knowing the ultimate end) and ‘xiushen’ (...) (self-cultivation) in the Great Learning, Li wrestled with Wang Yangming’s teachings by reasserting the primacy of xing, insisting that moral reality must involve direct individual action in order to preserve the unity of substance and effort. Li’s keen awareness of the inner tension between the mind/heart and xing not only prompted his critical reflections on Wang ’s thought but also on Zhu Xi’s. In so doing, he sought to address the fundamental question of what Confucianism is by clarifying the boundaries between the three teachings, and reshaping the spiritual values of Confucianism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why Do We Climb? Why Should We Climb? Building the Best Person Climbing and Self‐Cultivation The Only Rule Is There Are No Rules (Except the Ones That Matter) Courage Humility Reverence for the Natural World Cultivating Virtue in a Domesticated World Why Climb? Notes.

This paper discusses the accounts of self-cultivation and self-denial of Archibald Campbell (1691–1756). It analyses how he attempts to make room for moral self-improvement and for the control of the passions in a thoroughly egoistic psychological framework, and with a theory of moral motivation that focuses on a specific kind of self-love, namely the desire for esteem. Campbell's views are analysed in the context of his criticisms of both Francis Hutcheson's benevolence-based moral philosophy and of (...) Bernard Mandeville's version of an egoistic psychology. The paper explores the key role of Campbell's distinction between true and mistaken self-love, and it discusses how his account of self-cultivation reflects both his optimistic view of human nature as being naturally disposed to virtue and his moral rehabilitation of self-love – two points on which he is in conflict with the period's orthodox Calvinism. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss Korean artists’ multi-layered, internal motives for engaging in artistic practices: their artistic devotion derives from their desires for moral self-cultivation, self-enjoyment, and self-forgetting. I speculate that these tendencies were intensified in Korean cultural traditions by distinctive sociopolitical circumstances of the Joseon period under the dominance of Neo-Confucianism, such as a fixed social hierarchy and Sino-centrist perspectives. This interpretation provides a useful lens for better understanding contemporary Korean artistic practices in both the (...) fine and popular arts. (shrink)

"Chapter One lays out the dominant views of self, agency, and moral responsibility in early Chinese Philosophy. The reason for this is that these views inform the ways early Chinese thinkers approach mental illness, as well as the role they see it playing in self-cultivation as a whole. In this chapter I offer a view of a number of dominant conceptions of mind, body, and agency in early Chinese thought, through a number of philosophical and medical texts"--.

Challenging the popular perception that Confucianism provides mostly a moral defense of political hierarchy, this article demonstrates that Confucianism is more than compatible with democracy and f...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Significance of Music for the Moral and Spiritual Cultivation of VirtueDavid CarrIs There any Virtue in Music?Given its time-honored place, along with other arts, in many if not most past and present school curricula it would seem that at least some forms of music have been widely credited with educational value. Beyond the general association of music with high culture and, notwithstanding the evident discipline involved in (...) learning to play musical instruments, however, it is less clear what sort of value this might be. Despite the considerable ethical complexity of much art and the vexed nature of any relationship between the moral and the aesthetic, one may clearly regard very many works of literature, much representational painting, and even some dances as having some moral educational significance. That said, it may be less clear how other arts or art genres—such as music or abstract painting—could be said to have much significant moral import or content (as well as being unreasonably procrustean to insist that they should). Indeed, recalling the well-known point of Richard Peters about the inherently normative character of the concept of education—that it would be hard to regard a man as educated [End Page 103] who had not in some sense been made 'better'1 —one way of posing the present question might be to ask whether, regardless of its potential for pleasure, there is much if any real virtue in music?Plato and Scruton on Music and MoralsThere is, to be sure, a long tradition of reflection on the moral implications of music, and questions about the effects of music on moral development and character are of course raised in several Platonic dialogues. Thus, in one part of the Republic, Plato explores in some detail what he takes to be the effects on character of the various Greek musical modes, arguing for the moral superiority of those that foster courage and self-discipline over those that promote sensuality and self-abandon.2 Such claims also seem mostly consistent with a general Platonic aesthetics that precludes any role for the arts beyond service to a strict morality of individual self-control and social order. There are also, however, other sections of the Republic in which Plato envisages another softer role for music (broadly construed to include also literature and poetry) as a counterbalance to an excess of physical education, which can produce "savagery and hardness."3 Still, to whatever extent Plato might here be trying to have his case and eat it, his explicit claim that only the Dorian and Phrygian modes are suitable for moral consumption are probably more consistent with the broad drift of Platonic aesthetics. Generally, Plato's view appears to be that music—in the narrower rather than broader (Greek) sense—is a kind of ordered affect-charged auditory experience, that some forms of musical order are more conducive to the harmony or balance of the soul than others, and that a healthy human soul or character should in some way reflect the harmony of appropriate or approved forms of music.Although the logical and/or psychological status of such bygone claims is far from easy to evaluate, something of the spirit of Platonic thought on music and virtue seems discernible in more recent writings on the philosophy of music. Thus, Roger Scruton's case for the musical and moral superiority of serious classical works over much latter day popular music would appear to rest mainly on considerations relating to the greater structural order, organization, and complexity of the former over the latter.4 Like Plato, Scruton would seem to regard musical form, order, and organization as directly linked to emotional discipline, so that whereas the classics may be expected to cultivate ordered passion and sensibility, the unmelodic, discordant, and rhythmically unsubtle sounds of much modern popular music can only be expected to engender crude, disorganized, and uncontrolled feelings. Scruton makes much of the decline of dance under the influence of such contemporary musical anarchy, as precisely exhibited in the abandonment of conventions governing the control, for individually and [End Page 104] socially significant purposes, of physical gesture and bodily movement. Hence, although Scruton... (shrink)

The interdisciplinary group of authors featured in this focus issue contribute to conversations at the intersection of anthropology and ethics by exploring ethical self‐making and moral experimentation among faith‐based actors in a range of humanitarian settings. Kari Henquinet describes the genealogies of American evangelical humanitarianism by focusing on the ethical self‐formation of early World Vision leaders. Rachel Schneider and Sara Williams each explore practices by which relatively privileged individuals seek to cultivate virtue by engaging with those on the (...) margins, in poor, urban neighborhoods in South Africa, and through packaged tours in Israel/palestine, respectively. Sarah Tobin describes projects of Islamic self‐making among displaced refugee women in Jordan. Although they examine a wide range of subjects and settings, they explore a common set of themes, two of which I discuss here: moral experimentation, and engagements with suffering, poverty, and inequality. (shrink)

“Heart-mind” has almost become the standard English translation of Mengzi’s concept of xin 心. However, it remains largely unsettled (1) on what basis xin can be regarded as possessing a mind aspect that allows it to function as a faculty that both feels and thinks, and (2) what role this mind aspect of xin plays in Mengzi’s ethics, which revolves around character formation. This paper aims to address these two questions through a detailed analysis of the original text and a (...) critical review of the relevant secondary literature. First, the paper argues that it is through the ability to si, which literally means “to think,” “to reflect,” and “to contemplate,” that xin can be understood as both an emotional and a rational faculty. Then, the paper demonstrates that si has the functions of being “attentive,” “associative,” “evaluative,” and “corrective,” which enable it to contribute to the process of self-cultivation by identifying, intensifying, and approving primitive moral feelings in an appropriate and self-regulating way. (shrink)

This thesis offers an original theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments based on the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. Recently Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf have argued that practical philosophers must direct more attention to how our passionate attachments radically affect our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. By neglecting this topic, these thinkers argue, we overlook some of the strongest and most distinctively human motivations that guide (...) our practical lives, ones that have a powerful effect on our capacity to flourish. Not only should philosophers explain how our moral obligations and prudential concerns guide our conduct, they should also explain how and why we are guided by deep-seated passionate attachments, considerations that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf argue provide the conditions for leading a life with a sense of meaning and purpose. Despite viewing passionate attachments as being vitally important, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf offer separate accounts of either why we cannot actively cultivate them, or why we cannot form a philosophical theory of doing so. If there is a way in which we can cultivate our passionate attachments, then these thinkers argue that we must look outside philosophy: to the contingency of personal preference, to self-help instruction manuals, to guidance from religious traditions, or in extremis to clinical psychology. My study aims to show that this attitude is overly pessimistic. Not only do we have reason to view passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. Only by understanding this process can we construct a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. Focusing on Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s respective accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation, provides vital conceptual tools to formulate a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. First, their accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offer the conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. This takes the exercises of self-cultivation beyond their historical use, as well as beyond their role in the respective projects of these Francophone thinkers. Doing this brings out a significantly new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life: not only are they valuable in the way Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, but we can offer theoretical and practical accounts how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic conception of self-directed character change. (shrink)

The Analects is a series of glimpses into how Confucius and his students engaged in their projects of moral self-cultivation. This chapter seeks to describe the way in which the outlines of a moral psychology arises from the text and how the text poses issues that came to be central to the Chinese philosophical tradition. It will be argued that the text provides exemplars of moral self-cultivation, that it makes emotion central to virtue and therefore makes (...) emotional self-cultivation a central focus of moral development, that it highlights the relational nature of moral cultivation as a process that is conducted with others, that it raises difficult and crucial issues about the relation between intuitive and affective styles of action on the one hand and on the other hand action based on deliberation and reflection, and that it has some useful approaches to the problem of situationism that has recently been raised for virtue ethics. (shrink)

In this article we describe four previous Tai-Chi models based on the I-Ching and their limitations. The I-Ching, the most important ancient source of information on traditional Chinese culture and cosmology, provides the metaphysical foundation for this culture, especially Confucian ethics and Taoist morality. To overcome the limitations of the four previous Tai-Chi models, we transform I-Ching cultural system into a psychological theory by applying the cultural system approach. Specifically, we propose the Jun-zi Self-Cultivation Model, which argues (...) that an individual can become an ideal person, or jun-zi, through the process of self-cultivation, leading to good fortune and the avoidance of disasters. The state of jun-zi is that of the well-functioning self, characterized by achieving one’s full potential and an authentic, durable sense of wellbeing. In addition, we compare egoism and jun-zi as modes of psychological functioning. The JSM can be used to as a framework to explain social behavior, improve mental health, and develop culturally sensitive psychotherapies in Confucian culture. Finally, an examination of possible theoretical directions, clinical applications, and future research is provided. (shrink)

This article examines the reasons early Confucians offer to support the belief that clothing is formative of its wearer’s character, as well as the arguments other early Chinese texts raise to object to it. It focuses on early Confucian discourses about three representative items of clothing, including the cap used in the coming-of-age ceremony, the accessories made by jade, and a style of clothing named shenyi 深衣. These cases demonstrate that, in early Confucian thought, clothing is said to be able (...) to shape the wearer’s character by registering in the wearer its moral symbolism with both psychological-cognitive and bodily means. While this emphasis on symbolism also invites objections that undermine the normative status early Confucians want to ascribe to a specific style of clothing, their discourses still enrich the current understanding of Confucian self-cultivation, in terms of both its method and goals. (shrink)

Moral resilience is an emerging concept that has not been fully acknowledged. The aim of this study is to explain lived experiences of moral resilience in intensive care units nurses. This is a qualitative study with a content analysis approach guided by the method of Elo and Kyngäs and based on the theoretical framework of Defilippis et al. Data were collected through 17 in‐depth, individual, and semi‐structured interviews with 17 nurses, who were selected by purposeful sampling. The results of the (...) present study support the theory of Defilippis et al. while adding another category to it. Three categories of self‐awareness, harmonized connection, and moral well‐being, which are consistent with the result of Defilippis et al. were extracted deductively, while the category of moral agency was also extracted inductively from the data. The explanatory theory resulting from Defilippis et al.'s study can be used as a guide to cultivate and improve the moral resilience of nurses working in intensive care units. Moral resilience is fostered in nurses by nurturing and improving their capacities, such as self‐awareness, self‐efficacy, self‐confidence, and self‐reflection. These traits can help maintain and promote moral agency while establishing harmonized connections. Acquiring moral resilience skills can lead to positive outcomes and reduced moral distress. (shrink)

Despite shared philosophical beliefs about the primacy of action, its interdependence with thought, and the importance of future practical consequences, the classical pragmatists James and Dewey may be contrasted.1 Attention is often drawn to the fact that James emphasized the individual, while Dewey’s tendencies were toward the social. In this regard Dewey, more than James, resembles the school’s founder. But Peirce was more interested in applying the pragmatic maxim to “intellectual concepts” (CP 5.467), appropriate for the laboratory mind of one (...) “saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences” (CP 1.3). For Dewey, however, moral problems are central. The humanist element in his thought.. (shrink)

Book review of Neither Heroes Nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation by Rebecca Stangl.

This paper discusses certain conceptual tensions in a set of archeological texts from the Warring States period, the Guodian corpus. One of the central themes of the Guodian corpus is the disanalogy between spontaneous, natural familial relationships and artificial political relationships. This is problematic because, like many early Chinese texts, the Guodian corpus believes that political relationships must come to be characterized by unselfconsciousness and spontaneity if social order is to prevail. This tension will be compared to my earlier work (...) on the “paradox of wu-wei (effortless action),” and the Guodian corpus’ “solution” to the problem of teaching spontaneity—drawing upon the transformative power of music—will be placed within the landscape of early “Confucian” and “Daoist” theories concerning human nature and self-cultivation. (shrink)

Virtue, Narrative, and Self connects two philosophical areas of study that have long been treated as distinct: virtue theory and narrative accounts of personal identity. Chapters address several important issues and neglected themes at the intersection of these research areas. Specific examples include the role of narrative in the identification, differentiation, and cultivation of virtue, the nature of practical reasoning and moral competence, and the influence of life's narrative structure on our conceptions of what it means to live (...) and act well. This volume demonstrates how recent work from the philosophy of mind and action concerning narrativity and our understanding of the self can shed new light on questions about the nature of virtue, practical wisdom, and human flourishing. This book will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in virtue theory, moral philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, and moral education. (shrink)

In recent decades, social psychology has produced an expansive array of studies wherein introducing a seemingly morally innocuous feature into the situation a subject inhabits often yields morally questionable, dubious, or even appalling behavior. Several fascinating lines of philosophical enquiry issue from this research, but the most pragmatically salient question concerns how we ought most effectively to develop and maintain the virtues so that such putatively morally problematic behavior is less likely to occur. In this paper, I examine four empirically (...) embedded accounts of virtue cultivation: Hagop Sarkissian’s social signaling, Mark Alfano’s virtue labeling, Nancy Snow’s self-punishment, and Peter Railton’s implementation intentions. But none of these accounts of virtue cultivation provides adequate resources for regulating our affective states, whose attention-constricting and behavior-priming functional roles are likely at the root of much of our less than virtuous behavior. Instead, I defend an account of virtue cultivation that proceeds via meditation, which can help us to identify and regulate our emotions and moods. Further, meditation enables us to develop the attentional focus, emotional intelligence, and sense of social connection that ground the virtues and, thus, our virtuous behavior. (shrink)