'Sense perception in current process thought' was the topic of a workshop organized by the 'Whitehead Psychology Nexus' (for more information see below) at Fontareches in spring 2003. This and earlier Fontareches meetings can be characterized by just a few elements: non-dogmatism, interdisciplinarity and overlapping approaches. Although the convergence point is Whitehead's philosophy, this is intended in the sense of an 'eschaton' rather than a 'telos'. The vivid discussions, occurring in a very thoughtful, yet relaxed, atmosphere in (...) the small village of Fontareches in Southern France, have amply testified for the promising paths and synergies that can emerge in such an environment. This year, the core intention was to examine relations between Whitehead's theory of perception and contemporary psychology. The individual contributions can be sorted into the three areas of philosophy, cognitive science, and mental health/psychoanalysis. Unsurprisingly, the question of temporality was addressed -- explicitly or implicitly -- in most of the papers. (shrink)

Chapter INTRODUCTION i. The Problem Why suppose that sense perception is, by and large, an accurate source of information about the physical environment? ...

In this essay I explore the controversial issue of sense perception in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Although scholars have not explicitly addressed this aspect of the Chinese text, a common assumption is that the Zhuangzi proposes a mysticism that undermines sense perception in favour of a transcendent self. After an overview of this interpretation, and after analysing some key passages of the text that deal with heart fasting (xinzhai 心齋), sitting and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘) and skill mastery, (...) I demonstrate that some interpreters of the Zhuangzi read the text as if it has a metaphysical bent, recommending that sense perception be transcended as a prerequisite to perfection. In contrast, my thesis is that the text does not propose a withdrawal from the senses and from the world, but rather warns about the danger of abiding to doctrinal knowledge, which has the consequence of a person losing their responsive awareness. Indeed, in the Zhuangzi, sense perception is not an impediment on the way to a supersensible reality, but an integral part of one’s own being in the world. Through my analysis, I object to the idea that the Zhuangzi proposes a mystical union with something not immediately available, which moreover needs to be achieved by transcending the lived world that is encountered through sense perception. My view is that such a move not only postulates union with a transcendent entity, it also forces a dualism between a person’s capacities. This is problematic because the Zhuangzi does not point to another world – in a two worlds theory – where one must ideally attain the condition of a transcendent self. On the contrary, in rejecting a univocal ethos, the text suggests one should keep responding to changing circumstances without turning one’s perceptual awareness into entrenched habits. Thus, the Zhuangzi shows how sense perception should be seen, not as a “problem” but as an ethical possibility through which the univocity of doctrinal knowledge can be undermined. (shrink)

The thesis is a philosophical and historical study of Plotinus' views on sense-perception. Chapter I contains an exposition of Plotinus' metaphysics. Chapter II deals with Plotinus' views on man and the soul in general. In Chapter III Plotinus' views on visual transmission are discussed. It is argued that his doctrine of visual transmission, which Plotinus describes in terms of sympatheia, is to be regarded as a synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic elements. Like other ancient philosophers Plotinus holds (...) that sense-perception involves an affection of the percipient. In Chapter IV his notion of affection in sense-perception is examined. It is argued that what Plotinus calls affections in this context are sensations, and differences between Plotinus' and certain modern views of sensations are pointed out. Plotinus has original views on the unity of the senses. In Chapter V these views, which Plotinus expresses in terms of the omnipresence of the soul as a whole in the body, are discussed and explained. It is also argued that though original Plotinus' position is to be seen as a development of views expressed by Plato and Aristotle, and in particular by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Plotinus' views on the objects of perception are a matter of debate. In Chapter VI it is argued that despite contrary appearances Plotinus consistently holds that the objects of sense-perception are external things. Chapter VI also contains an examination of Plotinus' notion of perceptions as judgements. Chapter VII deals with the notion of forms in Plotinus' theory of perception. Plotinus' view that the soul is active in perception is explained. It is suggested that in Plotinus' view the forms we are supposed to entertain when we perceive are developed from innate "unfolded forms", and that perceptual judgements are to be identified with the entertaining of forms. In the Appendix Plotinus' position on the mind-body relationship is discussed. It is argued that he rejects materialsm for interesting and original reasons. (shrink)

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is (...) a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem. (shrink)

This chapter considers an element of Plato’s account of sense perception. In particular, it poses the question of how widely Plato construes the content of the perceptual capacity. It argues that, based on what Plato says in the Theaetetus and the Timaeus there is good reason to think that sense perception is limited to just those simple sense qualities that are made available to the soul by the individual sensory powers, i.e., colors by sight, sounds (...) by hearing, etc. This, however, raises the question of how, according to Plato, the soul becomes aware of features that are often thought to be perceptible through more than one sensory power: features like shape, motion, rest, number, etc. The chapter addresses this issue by arguing that the awareness of these features requires the co-operation of sense perception with additional capacities of the soul, in particular the capacity for reflective thought; for recognizing these features requires the deployment of basic concepts like sameness and difference. An upshot of the position defended in this chapter is that, if correct, it indicates that, for Plato, rational capacities may be more widely distributed than is often thought. (shrink)

This paper discusses the role of innate concepts derived from Intellect in Plotinus’ account of cognition of the sensible realm. Several passages have been claimed as evidence for such innateness, but an analysis of them shows that they do not support this claim. It is tentatively suggested that, nevertheless, some very general concepts such as difference, sameness and being are integral to the faculty of sense and play a crucial role in concept formation. It is further argued that reasoning (...) about the sensible realm takes place to a large extent without the involvement of the higher realms of Plotinus’ hierarchy of being. Clearly, however, for value concepts such as those of goodness, justice and beauty human beings are dependent upon an illumination from Intellect. (shrink)

Several studies have approached sense perception in the encyclopaedias of Thomas of Cantimpré, Bartholomew the Englishman and Vincent of Beauvais. Yet a systematic overview and comparison of the arrangement of sense perception in these encyclopaedias is still lacking. The overview offered here shows that all encyclopaedias place sense perception beside expositions on psychology and anatomy. There are, however, significant differences in how they treat the objects of sensation. In the case of Bartholomew and Vincent, (...) I argue, these differences reflect two different readings of Aristotle. (shrink)

This chapter compares rationalist theories of sense perception to previously held theories of perception (especially of vision) and examines rationalist accounts of sensory qualities and sensory representation, of the role of the sense-based passions in guiding behavior, of the epistemological benefits and dangers of sense perception, and of mind–body relations. Each section begins with Descartes, the first major rationalist of the seventeenth century. The other major rationalists, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and also lesser known (...) figures such as Pierre Regis, Jacques Rohault, and Antoine Le Grand, were well acquainted with Descartes' work. Indeed, the first three were each deeply influenced by Descartes in their early years before developing their own philosophical systems, and the latter three were all advocates of Descartes' philosophy (perhaps with slight revision). Each of the major rationalists, while sharing some positions in common, developed a distinctive metaphysics of perception and of the mind–body relation. Earlier sections chart these differences and a final section sums up common features and touches on the continuing significance of their views. (shrink)

This thesis explores Epicurus' attempt to establish sense-perception as the primary or basic means by which we can gain knowledge about the world. In It is argued that it was this aim, along with his belief that perceptions are all equal in trustworthiness, which lead him to maintain "All perceptions are true", this being the thesis that all sense-perceptions present states of affairs which actually obtain. The heart of the thesis is then a discussion of how Epicurus (...) dealt with apparent counter-examples to "All perceptions are true", which aims to establish that, for him, all such counter-examples are in fact instances of being mistaken about what is being presented. The thesis then discusses Epicurus' account of how people are able to trust the judgements they make on the basis of sense-perceptions, and how knowledge of the perceptible world serves as a basis for making judgements about the non-evident.. (shrink)

This book is a philosophical analysis of Plotinus' views on sense-perception. It aims to show how his thoughts were both original and a development of the ideas of his predecessors, in particular those of Plato, Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Special attention is paid to Plotinus' dualism with respect to soul and body and its implications for his views on the senses. The author combines a historical approach to his subject, setting Plotinus' thought in the context of thinkers who (...) preceded and succeeded him, with a proper analysis of his ideas and, where appropriate, of those from which they derived. (shrink)

The Buridanian view of the concrete cognition as the general characteristics of sense perception was adopted by Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen. This theory was not accepted merely on the basis of authority, but it was argued against the competing view, which appeared as legitimate inside the late medieval school of via moderna.

Routledge is now re-issuing this prestigious series of 204 volumes originally published between 1910 and 1965. The titles include works by key figures such asC.G. Jung, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Otto Rank, James Hillman, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and Susan Isaacs. Each volume is available on its own, as part of a themed mini-set, or as part of a specially-priced 204-volume set. A brochure listing each title in the International Library of Psychology series is available upon request.

Sense-perception is a hackneyed topic, and I must therefore begin by craving your indulgence. I was moved to make it the subject of this evening's lecture by the fact that I have lately been reading the book in which the most important of the late Professor Prichard's scattered writings on Sense-perception have been collected by Sir W. D. Ross. Like everything that Prichard wrote, these essays are extremely acute, transparently honest, and admirably thorough. I shall not (...) attempt here either to expound or to criticize Prichard, but he may be taken to be hovering, perhaps somewhat disapprovingly, in the background during the lecture. (shrink)

Introduction In "search of instances where the American imagination demands the real thing, and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake," Umberto ...

Several studies have approached sense perception in the encyclopaedias of Thomas of Cantimpré, Bartholomew the Englishman, and Vincent of Beauvais. A comparative analysis of these encyclopaedias shows that all of them arrange sense perception in accordance with the expositions on the soul and with human and animal anatomy. Yet there are significant differences in how they treat the objects of sensation: Thomas does not refer to them at all, Bartholomew considers them to be “accidents,” and Vincent (...) deals with them separately when discussing the features of the sensible world. These differences, I argue, respond to two different readings of Aristotle. (shrink)

Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles’s account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a (...) red apple. Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view is that in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the controversial issue of sense perception in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Although scholars have not explicitly addressed this aspect of the Chinese text, a common assumption is that the Zhuangzi proposes a mysticism that undermines sense perception in favour of a transcendent self. After an overview of this interpretation, and after analysing some key passages of the text that deal with heart fasting (xinzhai 心齋), sitting and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘) and skill mastery, (...) I demonstrate that some interpreters of the Zhuangzi read the text as if it has a metaphysical bent, recommending that sense perception be transcended as a prerequisite to perfection. In contrast, my thesis is that the text does not propose a withdrawal from the senses and from the world, but rather warns about the danger of abiding to doctrinal knowledge, which has the consequence of a person losing their responsive awareness. Indeed, in the Zhuangzi, sense perception is not an impediment on the way to a supersensible reality, but an integral part of one's own being in the world. Through my analysis, I object to the idea that the Zhuangzi proposes a mystical union with something not immediately available, which moreover needs to be achieved by transcending the lived world that is encountered through sense perception. My view is that such a move not only postulates union with a transcendent entity, it also forces a dualism between a person's capacities. This is problematic because the Zhuangzi does not point to another world–in a two worlds theory–where one must ideally attain the condition of a transcendent self. On the contrary, in rejecting a univocal ethos, the text suggests one should keep responding to changing circumstances without turning one's perceptual awareness into entrenched habits. Thus, the Zhuangzi shows how sense perception should be seen, not as a “problem” but as an ethical possibility through which the univocity of doctrinal knowledge can be undermined. (shrink)

(2012). Speusippus on Cognitive Sense Perception: Sextus Empiricus M 7.145‐6. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 1183-1193. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.731246.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION by David Kelley Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986. 286 pp., $24.95.

There can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for Spinoza, completely passive. In this essay I argue argues that there is in the Ethics an elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain (...) a definite active component. This argument for activity in sense perception consists of two main parts: first, that ideas we form through sense perception have something adequate in them; second, that the adequate component is actively brought about. Discerning this line of thought connects to—and sheds some new light on—Spinoza’s general way of understanding ideas as entities involving activity. (shrink)

Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception & Consciousness. Edited By Coates Paul, Coleman Sam.. Price £76.00.).

In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual (...) experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it may be clear that ears play a role quite different from that of the other sense-organs. Unlike the eyes, nose and tongue, ears cannot be called genuine sense-organs. They only transmit the blow in the air to the brain and the blood in the head that receive the blow. Second, since hearing is defined as a motion extending from the brain to the region around the liver, there is a (...) possibility to assume that the same sound can be grasped by the rational and the appetitive parts of the soul. It gives rise to different emotions: joy in the wise and pleasure in the fool. Furthermore, if sound affects the brain and through the brain it reaches the rational soul, then one may suppose that human reason is open to direct influences from the sensible world and plays a central role in sense-perception. (shrink)