On creating a grammar for living together The article is about the question whether it is possible for South Africans to learn a new common moral language. Six well-known positions are considered: a common political language, a common economic language, a common Biblical language, a common Christian language, a common language of survival, and a common rational language.

O artigo defende a validade dos argumentos transcendentais. Hilary Putnam fez uso deste tipo de argumento para fixar uma condição metafísica para a semântica. Seu raciocínio segue o estilo de inferência desenvolvido por Kant, na refutação do ceticismo fenomenista e idealista. Segue-se da argumentação de Putnam a necessidade metafísica do princípio externalista em semântica. Com isso, desarmam-se as tentativas de fixar condicionamentos exclusivamente intersimbólicos para a constituição do significado.

We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that $\varphi $ ’ (where $\varphi $ is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula $\varphi $ . The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of (...) other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish two speaker perspectives: (Obs) an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, and (Ag) an agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system. We distinguish three addressee perspectives: (Cred) the credulous agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), (Skep) the skeptical agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and (Rev) the belief revising agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current, possibly conflicting, beliefs. The logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of their embedding in what is known as action model logic or in the extension of that logic to belief revision. (shrink)

Die voortgesette proses van implementering van nuwe materiaal wat gebruik word vir katkisasie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika vertoon 'n besondere trajek. Die proses het, in terme van geloof, begin met die formalisering van sowel die geloofsbegrip as die beskrywing van die inhoud van geloof. Dit is voortgesit deur 'n proses van die objektivering van die inhoud van geloof tot feite wat geleer kan word en is uiteindelik voltrek deur die implementering van 'n pragmatiese opvoedkundige doelwit waarin geloof (...) bloot 'n middel tot 'n doel geword het. Die trajek kan kortliks soos volg beskryf word: • Die Heidelbergse Kategismus Geloof is die aanneming van die beloftes van God wat vertroue in die lewende God skep. • 'Kortbegrip': Geloof is sekere kennis van God en sy beloftes en 'n hartlike vertroue dat al my sondes om Christus ontwil vergewe is. • Die belydenis van die Hervormers: Ek glo in God beteken dat ek al my vertroue op God stel en Hom op sy woord neem. • Geloofsleer: Geloof is kennis van die Woord van God en vertroue in die God van die Woord. • Geloof en Lewe 11: Geloof is die toe-eiening van kenbare geloofoorleweringe wat in die Bybel opgeneem is. Die kerk kan daarom kinders deur 'n proses van kategese begelei tot geloofsvolwassenheid. Vandag is die uitgangspunt van katkisasie en die motivering daarvoor in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika die oortuiging dat die kerk kinders deur 'n proses van kategese tot godsdienstige volwassenheid kan lei. Van Selms se kategismus pas nie in die trajek wat hier beskryf word nie. Die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika sou vandag heeltemal anders gelyk het as meer as een generasie van die lidmate van die Kerk aan hierdie kategeseboek blootgestel was. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Michel de Montaigne: Accidental PhilosopherZahi ZallouaMichel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, by Ann Hartle ; 303 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. $60.00.Ann Hartle's new book is arguably the clearest and most compelling interpretation of Montaigne as a genuine philosopher since Hugo Friedrich's masterful Montaigne (1949). Her study is indeed an emphatic response to Friedrich's call to read Montaigne philosophically. Hartle derives her almost oxymoronic title from Montaigne's own (...) self-description as "a new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher." Taking Montaigne's moment of self-discovery à la lettre, Hartle systematically proceeds to elucidate the full meaning of Montaigne's observation. What emerges from her reading is a radical thinker who breaks with ancient philosophy and medieval theology. Her Montaigne, however, does not disavow the past but ultimately enriches it, building upon prior models. In this respect, the essayist practices the Renaissance art of imitation—creative imitation that repeats but also alters its exemplary model in a move to rival it. While Hartle exhibits an outstanding knowledge of the history of philosophy—from Plato to Heidegger, passing through Machiavelli, Hume, and Rousseau—her book is not itself a historical study nor a work in the history of ideas: she insists that her interpretation is conceptual rather than historical.What is accidental philosophy? It is foremost a non-authoritative, thoroughly human philosophy, one which takes as a sine qua non the recognition of the world's contingency—an awareness that things might have been radically different. Accidental philosophy thus represents nothing short of a displacement and transformation of reason, a calling into question of its traditional sovereign and divine-like status. (One thinks here of Aristotle's notion of the active intellect [nous poetikos], which he considers to be divine in man in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics.) Rejecting the belief in an autonomous reason, Montaigne renders problematic the possibility of "deliberative philosophy" (accidental philosophy's counterpart): "the exercise of reason as rule within the soul, a place and function that reason claims for itself on the basis of its superiority with the hierarchy of nature." In his critique of reason—most eloquently displayed in the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," chapter 12 of [End Page 441] Book II of the Essays—Montaigne might be seen as proto-postmodernist, occupying a similar position as Nietzsche in a history of counter-Enlightenment thought. But such an interpretation, argues Hartle, is on the whole inaccurate, given Montaigne's commitment to truth.As would be expected in a book about Montaigne's philosophy, skepticism plays a major role in Hartle's positive assessment of the essayist. Skepticism has traditionally been interpreted in Montaigne scholarship either as a stage in the evolution of the essayist's thought, or as an expression of his fideism. The evolutionary reading was first championed by Pierre Villey in Les Sources et l'évolution des "Essais" de Montaigne (1933), in which he argued that Montaigne's thought evolved through three stages: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Naturalism (or Epicureanism). This now unpopular view was nevertheless recently reaffirmed by David Quint in his well-received Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy (1998). The essayist's fideism, on the other hand, is more readily accepted in Montaigne circles. It is commonly accepted that Montaigne's skepticism functions in a way that undermines reason's authority while leaving room for faith in religious matters. Hartle's understanding of Montaigne's skepticism differs in a major way from both of these accounts. She asks: "Does skepticism provide us with a complete and adequate understanding of Montaigne's philosophical activity?" Hartle offers a seemingly definitive answer: "Montaigne is not a skeptic" (p. 15). Yet, she makes her response more nuanced in several passage of her study, arguing again not for a clean break with ancient skep-ticism but with a profound transformation of this dominant philosophical school.What we have, then, is a "skeptical moment" rather than a full-fledged skeptical suspension of judgment. And it is in this moment that an openness to the possible—such as the discovery of the strange in the familiar—is made manifest. Hartle rightly points to Montaigne's discovery of his own... (shrink)

Heaven and hell. Any conversation on ‘heaven and hell’ is nothing else but a conversation about ‘life after death’. To understand the concept of heaven, earth and hell as described in the biblical context and surrounding cultures, it is important to understand their concept of the cosmos and creation. Different perspectives of the universe lead to different ideas about life after death. Apocalyptic thoughts brought new perspectives to the understanding of life after death. All these different views can only be (...) understood within the context in which they developed. Due to scientific results, the perception of the cosmos changed, urging us today to interpret ancient models metaphorically. (shrink)