Speculative logical theory, as provided in Hegel’s Science of Logic, consists of three main parts: the logic of being, the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. The peculiar character of each logic’s starting point determines the most general character of each logic’s development. The present paper aims at making explicit the character of the starting-point of the third logic, the logic of the concept. This starting-point is exemplified by (...) the category of universality. It is shown (a) that the fundamental determination of this category is the harmonious unit y of self-identity and full determinacy and (b) that this unity has necessarily the logical structure of “double shining.” The latter is described in detail and justification is provided as to why it is preferred from “single shining.” I conclude the paper by defending the structure of “double shining” against certain objections raised against it by Friedrike Schick and Christian Iber. (shrink)

Our paper addresses eight main and traditional issues of Philosophy: the issue of speculative logic; the issue of the fundamental premises of existence and thinking — which engages on the path of absolute ontological reduction; the issue of absolute Nothingness revealed as the ultimate result of the previous reduction; the issue of the realness and effectiveness of Nothingness; the issue of ontological Difference; the issue of the consistency and apodicticity of metaphysics; the issue of the nature of the (...) Absolute; and the issue of the Ontological Argument. The results that we gained at the end of our work show that the ontological Ground is the Absolute and that the Absolute is the transcendent instance of immediate identity of irreducible opposites. This instance is consistent with the traditional claims of philosophical and theological metaphysics and it supports the Ontological Argument through the overcoming of the formal logic principles. (shrink)

Our paper addresses eight main and traditional issues of Philosophy: the issue of speculative logic; the issue of the fundamental premises of existence and thinking — which engages on the path of absolute ontological reduction; the issue of absolute Nothingness revealed as the ultimate result of the previous reduction; the issue of the realness and effectiveness of Nothingness; the issue of ontological Difference; the issue of the consistency and apodicticity of metaphysics; the issue of the nature of the (...) Absolute; and the issue of the Ontological Argument. The results that we gained at the end of our work show that the ontological Ground is the Absolute and that the Absolute is the transcendent instance of immediate identity of irreducible opposites. This instance is consistent with the traditional claims of philosophical and theological metaphysics and it supports the Ontological Argument through the overcoming of the formal logic principles. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues that Hegel’s speculative logic has an essentially rhythmic structure. Rhythm shows up in paragraphs 56–61 of the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel introduces the speculative proposition and explains his speculative logic. The article begins by analyzing some critical sections in the Preface to show how rhythm secures the formal passage of the subject into the predicate within the speculative proposition. Then, I briefly explore how Hegel’s speculative (...) logic gets taken up in the writings of Gadamer and Nancy to show how each of these thinkers renews the rhythm of Hegel’s speculative logic in their own appropriations of it. The article concludes by extending the scope of speculation, taking it from the proposition to non-propositional forms of expression, and then finally to the sensible world. (shrink)

A study of shifts in scientific strategies for measuring the living body, especially in dynamic systems theory: sheds light on Hegel's concept of measure in The Science of Logic, and the dialectical transition from categories of being to categories of essence; shows how Hegel's speculative logic anticipates and analyzes key tensions in scientific attempts to measure and conceive the dynamic agency of the body. The study's analysis of the body as having an essentially dynamic identity irreducible to (...) measurement aims to contribute to reconceiving the body, in a way that may be helpful to overcoming dualism. (shrink)

1. There is a sense in which, quite generally, with his logic Hegel can be considered the forerunner of many projects taken up by successive (non-classical) logics—and this despite the fact that He...

Bridging from Husserl to Iamblichus, this book contributes phenomenological readings of Plotinus, Aristotle, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, in which prevalent misconceptions about the very identity of time in the phenomena of motion are corrected, and time's role in Greek philosophy recovered.

I outline the theoretical framework of, and three research programs within American speculative philosophy of science during the period 1900-1931. One program applies verificationism to research in psychology, one investigates the methodology of research programs, and one analyses scientific explanation and other scientific concepts. The primary sources for my outline are works by Morris Raphael Cohen, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Theodore de Laguna, Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., Harold Robert Smart, and Marie Collins Swabey. I also use my outline to (...) provide a partial comparison of American speculative philosophy of science and 1930s logical positivism. My comparison suggests that logical positivism was a proposal for substantially narrowing down and winding back American philosophy of science and was based on positions that were already problematized in the American context. -/- . (shrink)

This book offers new critical perspectives on the relationship between the notions of speculation, logic and reality in Hegel's thought as basis for his philosophical account of nature, history, spirit and human experience. The systematic functions of logic and pure thought are explored in their concrete forms and processual progression from subjective spirit to philosophy of right, society, the notion of habit, the idea of work, art, religion and science. Engaging the relation between the Logic and its (...) realisations, this book shows the internal tension that inhabits Hegel's philosophy at the intersection of logical speculation and concrete analysis. The investigation of this tension allows for a hermeneutical approach that demystifies the common view of Hegel's idealism as a form of abstract thought, while allowing for a new assessment of the importance of speculation for a concrete understanding of the world. (shrink)

_Peirce’s Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics _offers a comprehensive, philologically accurate, and exegetically ambitious developmental account of Peirce’s theory of speculative grammar. The book traces the evolution of Peirce’s grammatical writings from his early research on the classification of arguments in the 1860s up to the complex semiotic taxonomies elaborated in the first decade of the twentieth century. It will be of interest to academic specialists working on Peirce, the history of American philosophy and pragmatism, the philosophy (...) of language, the history of logic, and semiotics. (shrink)

Despite wide recognition that speculation is critical for successful science, philosophers have attended little to it. When they have, speculation has been characterized in narrowly epistemic terms: a hypothesis is speculative due to its (lack of) evidential support. These ‘evidence-first’ accounts provide little guidance for what makes speculation productive or egregious, nor how to foster the former while avoiding the latter. I examine how scientists discuss speculation and identify various functions speculations play. On this basis, I develop a ‘function-first’ (...) account of speculation. This analysis grounds a richer discussion of when speculation is egregious and when it is productive, based in both fine-grained analysis of the speculation’s purpose, and what I call the ‘epistemic situation’ scientists face. (shrink)

This paper contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative (...) issues relating to science and society and issues which later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers’ use of key institutions, including of journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism. (shrink)

In Process and Reality, Whitehead explicitly states what he conceives his task to be: “Speculative Philosophy,” he writes, “is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” He then goes on to explain what he means by the key terms in this passage. By ‘in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted’, “I mean,” he explains, “that everything of which (...) we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme.” This universality, or all-comprehensiveness, of the system is interpreted in terms of two characteristics: applicability and adequacy. Whitehead explains: “Here ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.” It is these two characteristics of the system which give an explication of the term ‘necessary’ as applied to the system of general ideas: “The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway.”. (shrink)

Since its inception in the late 2000s, supporters of Quentin Meillassoux tended to oppose the movement he founded, speculative materialism, to Derrida and the Derridean community. The arc of Meillassoux's later publications, however, did not support that opposition, especially when it became clear that he neither dismissed correlationism nor set aside literary concerns. These approaches might not be as incompatible as has been supposed. Still, if any affinity is to be established, a first need is to reassess the core (...) of Meillassoux's argument in After Finitude, which has continued to influence his publications. In this article, I attempt not merely to comment upon Meillassoux's argument, but to justify it from within, and so to demonstrate its logic. Then, using a method of re-reading that will be familiar to many, I will attempt to show how that logic reveals speculative materialism and Derridean concerns to be better treated as logical affiliates. Doing so will not presuppose agreement, but will set the stage for more thorough comparisons in future. (shrink)

Richard Rorty would have read these passages strategically as so much meta‐physical mumbo jumbo, yet they can "usefully" apply here. Derrida famously argued that differance was neither a word nor a concept. Rorty's dismissiveness here is typical of his transvaluative stylistics, presenting itself, as always, in commonsensical rather than counterintuitive attire. Yet Badiou's reworking of Derrida's non/concept can help us situate Rorty's philosophy in the nonplace between transvaluative legibility and illegibility, where it reads to this day. The eschewal of every (...) "conditions of possibility" rhetoric had consequences for Rorty's Critical reception – consequences that were already implicit in Consequences of Pragmatism, but which Rorty may not have foreseen. Rorty's peculiar tragedy is that he was not a proto‐cultural materialist, any more than he was a "conditions of possibility" antifoundationalist or a by now mythological logical positivist. Neither Rorty nor speculative realists are speculative, of course, in the sense that Hegel's philosophy is called "speculative.". (shrink)

ABSTRACT “Speculative cannibalism” names here some kind of transcendental logic that only works through figuration, in the specific form of an analogical matrix. This article tracks these configurations in the philosophical works of Jacques Derrida and in the anthropological foundations of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. This article states that as transcendental, this analogical matrix is the condition of possibility of the meaning of alterity and difference—but as analogical works as a transcategorial function that is neither beyond nor before (...) experience, only irreducible to a given explanatory category of judgment or being. This function is figurative, that is, constitutes meaning by an operation of comparison in Viveiros de Castro’s nomenclature, and of supplementation, in Derrida’s terminology. In both cases this function posits difference or equivocation as the main operator. Finally, this article argues that even though they are very similar speculative proposals, analogy works a bit differently for deconstruction and for post-structural anthropology: for the first, analogy is based on a supplementary logic that is only taken to be a formal operation, while for the former, analogy it is treated not only as a formal operation, but also as fixed within the material categories of Amerindian thought. (shrink)

Speculative politics is a method of interaction based on Hegel's concept of Science, as explained primarily in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. It is a method based on the unity of opposites, or the category of becoming, and is the only alternative to either modernism's 'politics of identity', or postmodernism's 'politics of difference'. Both of these latter forms of politics are in fact manifestations of 'abstract power', or its modern equivalent, 'the moral standpoint'.power is (...) basically the result of the application of Aristotle's fundamental laws of thought, viz. identity, non¬ contradiction and the excluded middle, to humanity's social, political and economic life, with the ultimate consequence being an ever expanding cycle of denial and annihilation. The moral standpoint is simply abstract power with the addition of Cartesian subjectivity and dualism. By grounding itself upon the principle of becoming and recognizing the essentiality of logic in and to all fields of human endeavour, speculative politics offers the real possibility of overcoming the abstract power of the moral standpoint without simply denying, or annihilating the concept of power in itself. This is because the method of transcendence put forth by Hegel is actually one of 'overcoming through yielding', which, unlike the Aristotelian based moral standpoint, allows for the possibility of a middle ground. Aside from the philosophies of Aristotle, Descartes and Hegel then, the thesis also analyses the philosophy of Fichte. For Fichte's system occupies the dubious position of being both the formal origin of German Idealism's concept of Science, from which the method of transcendence emerges, and the highest theoretical development of the moral standpoint. In short, his philosophy represents the transition between the moral standpoint and speculative politics. (shrink)

Speculation: Politics, Ideology, Event develops Hegel's radical perspective of speculative thought as a way of reclaiming and revitalizing the sense of the future and its possibilities. Engaging with such figures as Alain Badiou, Quentin Meillassoux, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Zizek, and Fredric Jameson, Glyn Daly articulates the distinctness of speculative philosophy and draws its implications for new debates in areas of science, politics, capitalism, ideology, ethics, and the event." -- Publisher's description.

The aim of this article is to clarify the critical role of Hegel's early logic, through an assessment of the dialectical process of sublation [Aufhebung] of the determinations of finite thinking at stake within its exposition. I want to show that the dialectical-critical work of logic has a speculative meaning for Hegel, thereby displaying the inward correspondence between critical and speculative aspects of philosophical activity. By pointing out the evidence from fragmentary texts on logic relating (...) to Hegel's teaching activity in 1801–1802, I will first put into question the idea of an introductory role of logic. In so doing I challenge a widespread reading which argues for the presence of a sharp separation between critical logic and speculative metaphysics. I will then focus on the texts on logic in the 1804–1805 Reinschrift, reading them as the worksite wherein the dawning form of a full-fledged dialectical logic is first prepared and elaborated. More generally, if this paves the way for establishing a continuity between Hegel's early and mature logic and his concept of dialectic, it is also paramount for understanding how the activity of systematic philosophy in the mature version of the system essentially constitutes an ongoing work on the forms of the finite. (shrink)

Resumen Se sostiene que la operación general de la silogística en la Lógica cumple con un programa trazado tempranamente por Hegel, consistente en concebir la unidad de la forma racional del silogismo y el contenido absoluto de la idea como resultado de una dialéctica inmanente a la propia forma del silogismo, mediante la cual éste abandona su carácter meramente formal y alcanza su propio concepto: ser forma objetiva o racional. Para esto se acude a la sección Subjetividad de la Doctrina (...) del Concepto, procurando reconstruir los antecedentes sistemáticos del capítulo sobre el silogismo, así como la operación específica que éste realiza en vista del tránsito a la sección Objetividad. El sentido de dicha operación consiste en la superación de un exceso que, al comienzo, la necesidad de la sustancia tiene por sobre la libertad del concepto, de lo cual resulta un exceso del concepto por sobre la sustancia. Para verificar esta operación se examinan los silogismos del estar y la necesidad, concluyendo con la determinación del tipo de objeto y de conocimiento que resulta del silogismo, y con la proyección del problema a estadios ulteriores de la Lógica, en los cuales el problema avistado adquiere un cariz marcadamente práctico.In this paper I argue that the general operation of syllogistic in the Logic fulfills a philosophical program that was early outlined by Hegel. This program conceives the unity of the rational form of the syllogism and the absolute content of the idea as a result of an immanent dialectic to the syllogism's form, by which it abandons its merely formal character and attains its own concept: being an objective or rational form. For the purposes of this argument, I analyze the Subjectivity section of the Doctrine of the Concept and reconstruct the systematic background of the chapter on syllogism, as well as the specific operation it performs in view of the transit to the Objectivity section. This operation consists in overcoming a certain excess that the necessity of the substance has, first, over the freedom of the concept, which results in an excess of the concept over the substance. To clarify this operation, I examine the syllogisms of qualitative existence and necessity. Finally, I show the determination of the type of object and knowledge that results from the syllogism and explain how this problem projects to later stages of Logic, in which the analyzed problem acquires a relevant practical aspect. (shrink)

Religion and philosophy as two mutually exclusive domains experienced a paradigm shift during the Middle Ages. Philosophy became a vehicle of religion through which both Islamic and Christian thinkers developed a rational understanding of faith to develop new philosophical ideas. Using the systematic literature review methodology, with rigorous inclusion and exclusion criteria, this study analyzed several research articles with the use of keywords in reliable databases like ERIC and Google Scholar. The investigation of the relationships between philosophical speculation and religious (...) belief in early Middle Ages exposed the philosophical underpinnings of religion. It was felt that a religious belief was a core conviction that can be upheld logically without having to draw conclusions from other beliefs. It was also found that the study of a wide range of aspects of life is the primary goal of philosophy, an ancient academic subfield. It is recommended that both religion and philosophy should have combined foundations to resolve all sorts of queries, responses, and arguments, which can be defended by various ideologies. Let religion and philosophy be practiced in wide range of contexts, both should study people’s beliefs and behaviors in response to different situations. (shrink)

Peirce promised but never delivered a theoretical system called "speculative rhetoric," therefore explication is synthesized from throughout his writings. bypassing nearly everything akin to standard rhetorical theory, he thinks of it as the "power of appealing to a mind" defined strictly in terms of logical processes. these "formal conditions of symbolic force" fall into two operations: "methodeutic" is an alternating inductive/deductive process beginning with imagined ideational relationships and ending with a specific claim or idea; "assertiveness" is a conjoining of (...) images ("icons") which, when directed upon the attention ("indexed"), provides compulsiveness to the idea. (shrink)

This work, by two of the most innovative and challenging of contemporary thinkers, pivots on a Remark added by Hegel in 1831 to the second edition of his Science of Logic. As a model of close reading applied both to philosophical texts and the making of philosophical systems, The Speculative Remark played a significant role in transforming the practice of philosophy away from system building to analysis of specific linguistic detail, with meticulous attention to etymological, philological, and rhetorical (...) nuance. The authors use their extended examination of the Remark to delineate certain overall strategies in several Hegelian texts that militate for language-oriented readings of Hegel, as shown in Nancy's redefinition of such key terms as aufhebung, mediation, and speculation. (shrink)

This article develops an interpretation of Hegel that aims to show how a proper understanding of the nature of speculative sentences might achieve what Kant set out to do: to vindicate our most fundamental claims to knowledge as actual knowledge, rather than mere acts of believing. To this end, it develops a conception of speculative geographies (or “maps”) as an interpretive tool and introduces an Hegelian-inspired distinction between empirical, generic, and speculative sentences. On this reading, Kant’s employment (...) of the “boundary concept” of a noumenon is bound to fail as it needs to employ a contrast between our human point of view and that of an omniscient God – which turns out to be an aperspectival “view from nowhere” and thus an incoherent notion. The artcile ends by suggesting ways in which Hegel’s logical analysis can help us to better comprehend the reflective ascent necessary to make our conceptual differentiations and typical ways of understanding intelligible to ourselves. (shrink)

This work, by one of the most innovative and challenging of contemporary thinkers, pivots on a _Remark_ added by Hegel in 1831 to the second edition of his _Science of Logic_. As a model of close reading applied both to philosophical texts and the making of philosophical systems, _The Speculative Remark_ played a significant role in transforming the practice of philosophy away from system building to analysis of specific linguistic detail, with meticulous attention to etymological, philological, and rhetorical nuance. (...) Nancy uses his extended examination of the _Remark_ to delineate certain overall strategies in several Hegelian texts that militate for language-oriented readings of Hegel, as shown in Nancy's redefinition of such key terms as _Aufhebung_, _mediation_, and _speculation_. Nancy's reading progresses from speculative words and propositions to registering the speculative itself. While he avoids analyzing Hegel's system as such, Nancy reconstructs the Hegelian trajectory on a basis of tropes, building from propositions rather than structures, elements, and cycles. The overview that emerges in the final chapter and epilogue constitutes a broad statement about Hegel's practice and significance, one nuanced by close attention to his deployment of rhetoric and linguistic play. _The Speculative Remark_ thus furnishes a model for a theoretically aware approach to all systematic philosophy, while providing a significant historical contribution to the evolution of contemporary critical theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that self-awareness emerges in organisms whose brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual sensory input of information related to the organism leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal “self-image”. After providing the basic mechanistic basis for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning, combined (...) with an organismal self-image, leads to the emergence of these various behaviors. This paper also discusses various tautologies that invariably emerge when discussing self-awareness. We continue with various speculations on manipulating self-awareness, and discuss how concepts from set and logic theory may provide a useful set of tools for understanding the emergence of higher cognitive functions in complex organisms. (shrink)

Hegel and Speculative Realism has two main objectives. Firstly, to assess the speculative realist formulations of the real regarding the ‘withdrawn’ object, radical contingency, the absolute register of extinction, and the current interest in ‘powers philosophy’, with special attention to their possible relation to the absolute scope of Hegelian philosophy. Secondly, to invite the reader to reconsider Hegel in a new way; uncovering rare insights into his thoughts on astronomy, actuality, the concrete and non-being. Johns’ inclination is to (...) not mistake the necessary path to the absolute as the only path. Johns argues that Hegel describes the unique trajectory of the dialectical relationship between Nature and Idea as a Spirit oriented by both logical and physical (spatio-temporal) dimensions. Johns reads this as a theory of singularity and makes the bold claim that there may be other paths not taken by the Hegelian spatio-temporal path synonymous with the dialectic; synthesis, sublation and unfolding. In-fact, speculative philosophy should not be satisfied to study only “what exists” but also what “could exist” or what it means to “inexist” and should entertain multiple modes of potential becoming between Hegel’s initial triad of logical categories; Being, Non-Being and Becoming. (shrink)

While Hegel's discussion of the ‘speculative sentence’ occurs in the ‘Preface’ to the Phenomenology of Spirit, commentators rarely link it to the larger program of this text. Instead, this discussion has typically been received as a guide to the Science of Logic's presentation, as an independent theory of judgment, or as a reflection on the constraints and capacities of language generally. In this paper I argue that the speculative sentence can and should be linked to the Phenomenology (...) itself. Specifically, I show that Hegel's discussion both mirrors and supplements the ‘Introduction's’ explication of immanent phenomenological method. Establishing this parallel in turn allows us to identify a class of sentences throughout the Phenomenology as properly speculative and methodologically substantive. At the same time, this interpretation helps clarify several characteristics that Hegel ascribes to the speculative sentence, but which have gone unaddressed by commentators. (shrink)

Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” and the “empirical side” of Whitehead’s metaphysics are paradoxical unless placed in the context of their unorthodox readings of empiricism. I explore this context focusing on their engagements with Hume. Both subvert presumptions of a categorical gap between external nature and internal human experience and open possibilities for a speculative empiricism that is non-reductive while still affirming experience as source for philosophical thinking. Deleuze and Whitehead follow Hume in beginning with events of sensation as primary but (...) do not presume the logic of (human) subjects and objects (of nature) as necessary structuring polarities for their interpretation. This challenges a basic distinction (between inner and outer or between self and world) that seems inherent in the ordinary concept of experience, thus earning the moniker speculative. The speculative empiricist studies how these abstractions arise from events of experience prior to their consolidation in representation. This includes a critical component: to what extent do unexamined assumptions about conceptual abstraction hinder, block, or prefigure experiential attention? This critical component has existential implications for how we attend to the affective, intuitive, and preconceptual. (shrink)

I argue against the use of general ‘ism’ terms such as ‘speculative realism’ and ‘correlationism’ by Harman. This use is contrasted with more nuanced readings of philosophers, referring to Bryant and DeLanda’s more subtle versions of materialism that do not fit the general label. Instead of general categories I defend Deleuze’s use of the concept of problem as studied by Bell. This argument is then developed through a close reading of Logic of Sense, against Harman’s denial of the (...) reality of relations and processes. I demonstrate that Deleuze is not a correlationist as defined by Harman, by following Sauvagnargues, Smith and Beistegui on the concepts of event and simulacrum in Logic of Sense. I then consider Deleuze’s study of language and his argument that designation, signification and manifestation rely on the concept of sense. This argument leads to a position which is neither idealism, nor materialism, because the differential processes at work in sense cannot be reduced to matter or to the subject, working instead between them and denying their independent reality. (shrink)

Through both an historical and philosophical analysis of the concept of possibility, we show how including both potentiality and actuality as part of the real is both compatible with experience and contributes to solving key problems of fundamental process and emergence. The book is organized into four main sections that incorporate our routes to potentiality: (1) potentiality in modern science [history and philosophy; quantum physics and complexity]; (2) Relational Realism [ontological interpretation of quantum physics; philosophy and logic]; (3) Process (...) Physics [ontological interpretation of relativity theory; physics and philosophy]; (4) on speculative philosophy and physics [limitations and approximations; process philosophy]. We conclude that certain fundamental problems in modern physics require complementary analyses of certain philosophical and metaphysical issues, and that such scholarship reveals intrinsic features and limits of determinism, potentiality and emergence that enable, among others, important progress on the quantum theory of measurement problem and new understandings of emergence. (shrink)

bk. 1. Tools for dialectic -- bk. 2. Historical-philosophical background materials -- bk. 3. Groundworks for dialectical logic.

Peirce’s Speculative Grammar is a masterful chronological reconstruction of Peirce’s work on logic as semiotics, or the study of signs and the purposes to which we put them. Peirce’s writings on these topics span more than fifty years. Moreover, his manuscripts number well over 100,000 pages, many of which have yet to be published. Patently, gaining a comprehensive overview of Peirce’s writings on logic is no small feat, and Bellucci is to be celebrated for his efforts. Peirce (...) wanted to be known foremost as a logician. He did not, however, want to be known primarily as a formal logician. In a drafted lecture from 1905, he tells... (shrink)

In this essay I critique the identification of contingency with sheer arbitrary possibility in Quentin Meillassoux's After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. After offering logical and metaphysical reasons for why such an identification is a limitation on the speculative potential of reason, I draw upon Charles S. Peirce, Gilles Deleuze, and Giambattista Vico to articulate the outlines of a view of contingency which can underwrite a different speculative position to one that is grounded upon an (...) absolute of unreason. This form of speculation, a realism of contingency without an axiom of unreason, is indicated in outline by the structure of divination practices. I thus propose, without defending its actuality, at least the possibility of a divinatory form of speculation that is adequate to the absolute status of contingency. (shrink)

The first volume of a projected three volume series, this book is at once a history of ancient philosophy and an attempt to explore and defend the thesis that "what is called Greek ontology was not only a strictly logical, but also a religious, concern." The following two volumes of the series will deal with medieval and modern philosophy from the perspective of the relation between speculation and revelation. Kroner argues that speculative philosophy and revealed religion, although exhibiting ineradicable (...) differences of approach, fundamentally deal with the same problem, viz., the "apprehension of the Ultimate"; and that the history of philosophy is best understood in terms of the relations between these approaches. The argument is rich in insight and is developed with real power; but at crucial points there is a lack of clarity which detracts somewhat from the force of the book.--A. C. P. (shrink)