In this study, I show how Plato in the Parmenides reprises the encounter with the Phaedo’s Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various tis that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the Parme­nides’ tis, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the logoi taken from “distant premises.” In the four logoi of the gumnasia, I highlight (...) how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any tis and how, despite his detached attitude, his hodos, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although appar­ently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa apresenta uma análise da filosofia de Antístenes sobre a epískepsis tôn onomáton – investigação dos nomes. Este tema está relacionado ao problema da orthótes onomáton, que esteve sempre envolvida nas atividades dos sofistas. Nesse aspecto, a orthótes de Pródico, possivelmente um precedente inspirador para a análise antistênica dos nomes, está relacionada com a epískepsis de Antístenes naquilo que convergem e divergem as duas perspectivas. Tanto Pródico quanto Antístenes convergem na mesma base filosófica do princípio do eikeîos lógos e, (...) consequentemente, se identificam na mesma hipótese de uma linguagem objetiva que está estritamente ligada às coisas. Mas, os dois pensadores divergem não só no problema da relação entre linguagem e realidade como também no problema da polissemia. Além do mais, expõe-se na conjectura textual o exame do pressuposto filosófico antistênico, a saber, o eikeîos lógos, concernente ao problema interpretativo da passagem que Aristóteles menciona Antístenes: “ eikeîos lógos hèn eph´ henós ”, ou seja, enunciado próprio para cada coisa. A questão debatida é se a expressão “ hèn eph´ henós ” faz referência ao ónoma ou ao lógos. (shrink)

Xenophon’s conception of the dialectical method shares many similarities with Antisthenes’ point of view regarding the relation between language and reality. The key element supporting this reading is the parallel between Xenophon’s method of dialegein kata genē and Antisthenes’ method of episkepsis tōn onomatōn. In this paper, I claim that a correct understanding of both methods yields a clear structural proximity between the two Socratics on the issue of dialectics. Although they present some significant differences, which I will also (...) explore, I will argue that both variants express a single Socratic motive with regard to dialectics. That is that dialectics, in its basic structure, consists of organizing reality through discourse in order to make it comprehensible. In particular, this is done through establishing unified instances capable of comprehending a multiplicity. This nuclear position could also be extended to include middle Plato’s concept of dialectics. This concurrence takes up different forms in Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes. Nevertheless, they share the same structure, which indicates quite plausibly a major characteristic of Socratic philosophies, as opposed to previous attempts by the Presocratics and the Sophists. (shrink)

En el Crátilo, Platón aborda la cuestión de la orthótes onomáton, la “exactitud” o “adecuación” de los nombres con respecto a aquello que nombrarían. Dos posturas se ponen en juego sobre tal adecuación (el convencionalismo de Hermógenes y el naturalismo de Crátilo), las cuales son desmontadas por el Sócrates platónico. ¿Pero solo dos? ¿No hay acaso en el Crátilo aunque sea la indicación de una posible “adecuación” platónica? Este artículo muestra esa posible “adecuación”. Para cumplir tal objetivo, se investiga la (...) diferencia entre el nombre (o nombre “natural”) y la palabra, la necesidad de anclar la denominación en las esencias, y se muestra sobre todo que es necesario pensar la cuestión del nombre en relación con la del lógos. Para eso, se articula una lectura del Crátilo con una revisión de algunos pasajes del Fedón y del Sofista. (shrink)