In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. "Permissiveness" would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the function's designation of admissible strategies for the other players. Given permissiveness and (...) other appropriate constraints, solution sets must contain only Nash equilibria and at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, and there is no solution to games in which no symmetry invariant set of pure-strategy equilibria forms a Cartesian product. These results imply that the classical program is unrealizable. Moreover, the program is implicitly committed to permissiveness, through its common-knowledge assumptions and its commitment to equilibrium. The resulting incoherence deeply undermines the classical conception in a way that consolidates a long series of contextualist criticisms. (shrink)

Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or reified form of a given, (...) determining reality. Marx leaves unclear exactly how the process exerts and maintains its hold on agents, the nature of the reasons they might have for wanting to free themselves of it, and under what conditions they could do so. However, it is possible to abstract somewhat from Marx's specific concerns and to model a self-reproducing practice of reification that works through the informational environment of decision. Though of wider interest, this more general conception can shed light on the nature and critique of Marx's inverted world. It draws on conceptual resources from decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

Auf dem Gebiete des Gesichtssinnes gelten an der phänomenalen, absoluten Schwelle die begrifflichen, linearen ReizausdrückeL. t = Konstante bzw.L. f = Konstante, in denenL die physikalische Lichtintensität,t die Reizzeitdauer undf die Reizfläche bedeuten . Der zeitliche Gültigkeitsbereich des erstgenannten Ausdrucks erstreckt sich von ganz kurzen bis zu Zeitdauern von etwa 100σ, d.h. bis zu Zeitdauern die phänomenal eben noch als momentan empfunden werden. Entsprechend scheint sich der Gültigkeitsbereich des zweitgenannten Ausdrucks nur bis zu solchen Flächengrössen zu erstrecken, die phänomenal eben (...) noch als punktuell erscheinen. Bei phänomenal momentanen, punktuellen und minimalintensiven Gesichtserlebnissen, also bei in allen Hinsichten differentieller Phänomenalität gilt der trilineare ReizausdruckL. f. t = Konstante. Für überschwellige Lichtempfindungen gelten keine linearen Ausdrücke; alle aufgestellten sind kompliziert und ziemlich undurchsichtig . Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass auf dem Gebiete des Gehörssinnes ähnliche Verhältnisse wie auf dem Gebiete des Gesichtes vorliegen.Die einflache Linearität der begrifflichen Reizausdrücke einerseits, wenn sie differentielle, in allen Hinsichten phänomenal minimale Erlebnisse wiedergeben, und andererseits die komplizierte Struktur der Ausdrücke, wenn sie überschwellige Phänomenalitäten wiedergeben, bezeugen, dass hier ein Strukturproblem vorliegt, welches im Zusammenhang mit dem gegenseitigen Verhältnis vom Phänomenalen und Begrifflichen steht. Dieser Problemkomplex wird in dieser Abhandlung zu behandeln versucht.In the field of vision the absolute phenomenal threshold may be expressed by the conceptual linear stimulus equation:L. t = const., respectivelyL. f = const., in whichL denotes the physical brightness intensity of light,t the stimulus duration andf the stimulus area . For the former expression the temporal limits of validity extend from quite short durations up to 100σ i.e. up to duration of apparent momentariness. Correspondingly the validity of the second equation seems to extend barely to area values that appear phenomenally punctual . In case of phenomenally momentary and punctual visual perceptions and of those being phenomenally of minimal brightness,i.e. in case of an in every point differential phenomenality the trilinear equation holds true:L. f. t = const. Concerning the supraliminal visual perceptions no such linear expression is valid. If, however, it would be possible to construct an equation representing the phenomenality of supraliminal visual perceptions, it would be very complicated and of little clarity . It is pointed out, that in the field of audition there exist similar relations as in the field of visual perceptions.The simple linearity of conceptual stimulus equations, when they denote differential, in every respect phenomenally minimal perceptions and on the other hand the complicated structure of expressions corresponding to supraliminal phenomenalities, show, that there exists a structural problem connected with the phenomenal and conceptual field.An attempt is made to settle this complex of problems.Dans le domaine du sens visuel on peut appliquer au seuil phénoménal absolu les expressions d'excitation linéairesL. t = constante, respectivementL. f = constante. Dans ces expressionsL signifie l'intensité lumineuse physique,t le temps de l'excitation etf la surface de l'excitation . Le domaine de la validité du temps de la première expression s'étend d'un temps très court jusqu'à un espace de temps d'env. 100σ c'est-à-dire jusqu'à des périodes de temps qu'on peut encore percevoir comme phénoménalement momentanées. En analogie avec ceci le domaine de validité de la deuxième expression mentionnée semble s'étendre seulement jusqu'à de telles surfaces qui apparaissent encore phénoménalement ponctuelles. Dans les perceptions visuelles phénoménalement momentanées, ponctuelles et d'un minimum d'intensité, par conséquent dans une phénoménalité sous tous les rapports différentielle, on peut appliquer l'expression d'excitation trilinéaireL. f. t = constante. En ce qui concerne les sensations lumineuses dépassant le seuil il n′y a aucunes expressions linéaires pour les rendre; dans le cas oú l'on pourrait en établir, elles sont compliquées . Il est indiqué que dans le domaine du sens de l'ouïe il se présente des conditions analogues que dans le domaine du sens visuel.La linéarité simple des expressions d'excitation applicable aux cas des sensations différentielles, c'est-à-dire des sensations sous tous les rapports phénoménalement minimes, et de l'autre côté, la structure compliquée des expressions, correspondant à des phénoménalités dépassant le seuil, montrent, qu'il est question ici d'un problème de structure qui est associé à la relation réciproque des phénoménalités et des fonctionalités. Dans cet article l'auteur essaie d'élucider ce complexe de problèmes. (shrink)

Mind has played the starring role in the West's arts, humanities, and sciences, while an embodied notion of oneself, others, and the physical world has been customarily pushed under the rug. In view of radical new theories, methods and techniques that have emerged during the past century and a half, the notion of complementary, sympathetic co-participation, and its accompanying re-enchantment, merits attention. C. S. Peirce is at the crossroads between modernism, enchantment, and misplaced concreteness, on the one hand, and postmodernism (...) and its attendant poststructuralism, on the other. His categories of feeling, sensation, and thought, and his triadic, all-encompassing concept of the sign, can help bring all facets of human creativity, concrete living, and understanding into a proper balance. Three coined terms — homogeny, hierogeny, and heterogeny — serve to elucidate how Peirce's triadic vision can offer a middle path, a way of mediating between antagonistic modes of sensing, living, and thinking. This middle path follows traditional tenets of logic and reason — identity, non-contradiction, and excluded-middle — while at its fringes, it allows deviation — by way of process, inconsistency, and incompleteness — from the rigidity that lies therein. Studies of feminist postures and various cultural processes in Latin America bear out the premise that a dose of conformity accompanying a tendency toward resistance can synethnically help keep broad cultural processes on an even keel, balancing mind and body, conflicting theories and methods and modes of living, and styles of reason and unreason in equilibrium. (shrink)

Proust wrote vividly about grief, but he has not been recognised or studied as a philosopher of grief. It is time that he was. For a powerful and compelling philosophy of grief emerges from the pages of his magnum opus. Though philosophical work on Proust has not turned to this theory of grief, philosophers writing about grief have often drawn on Proust, both explicitly and implicitly, without an awareness of an underlying Proustian theory. This paper fills the gap by placing (...) this philosophically informed, Proustian theory of grief before our eyes. Proust builds on contemporary discussions of habituation (habitude), the process whereby new sensations and new actions become both less salient, intrusive or demanding of our attention, and more crucial for our equilibrium and our continued short-term functioning. Applying this to the social realm, Proust theorises love in terms of habituation to another person, and grief in terms of a sudden inapplicability or unsuitability of our habits to the world that person has left behind, followed by the painful, uneven and intermittent process of habituating to that new world. The paper explains this theory and charts its relation to some contemporary discussions of grief. Doing so places Proust back into a conversation he has already influenced. (shrink)

[In Czech] Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objective” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that (...) my body, in the sense of an object, results from the restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body understands itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then the "external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon appearing beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings appear. [In Czech language.]. (shrink)

The sense of balance remains a Cinderella among our senses. Although the vestibular apparatus and the apprehension of motion, equilibrium and orientation which it serves has now been studied extensively and descriptions abound in textbooks on perceptual psychology, its key role in our agency remains neglected in philosophical accounts of perception. Popularly received wisdom on the senses also largely ignores balance and it has recently even been called 'the lost sense'. -/- Recognition for the discovery of this sense should (...) probably be accorded to Thomas Reid and his contemporary William Charles Wells. Both made crucial observations before the close of the eighteenth century. Since there is now a tendency to emphasize the role of the agent, brain plasticity, and the development of motor skills in all perceptual tasks, some of Reid's comments in particular strike us as remarkably modern. Reid also differs from many authorities in crediting the sense with specific sensations, as would be expected given the role of sensations in his epistemological scheme. -/- In this paper some of the fascinating facts about the sense of balance are reviewed so that Reid's remarks can be evaluated in a modern context. Similarities and differences in the approaches of Wells and Reid are considered and the value that Reid's insights have even now in understanding perceptual processes is explored. It is suggested that Reid should indeed be counted among the hitherto unacknowledged discoverers of this fundamental sense. (shrink)

The eighteenth century, having inherited a pessimism from classical anthropology that its own ideology of progress had to absorb, seemed to have invented le mal de vivre. Clues to this condition are suggested by the etymology of the term vacuus: vacuousness of existence (“Everywhere I find a terrifying emptiness,” asserted the hero of a novel around 1769), and “a vague disquiet which permeates everything and finds nothing to calm it,” according to the definition of Jacques the Fatalist. Le mal de (...) vivre was indeed an invention because, despite a terminology that was inspired by the theory of humors (“hysterical vapors” among women; “hypochondriac melancholy” for men), the philosophers and doctors of the Enlightenment already had envisaged the fatality of an anatomical “limit” for the etiology of “afflictions of the soul.” In this way, according to the Eléments de Physiologie (Elements of Physiology) of Diderot, the agitation of the imagination actually represented the degree of irritability, or of erethism, of the nervous system: “the dreams of young people in a state of innocence come from the extremities of the fibres (meaning the nervous fibres) which are the original carriers of obscure desires, vague disquiet, a melancholy whose cause they do not understand.” If we believe the article on “delight” (jouissance) in the Encyclopaedia, a “vague and melancholy disquiet,” which is linked in particular with the physiological changes occurring at puberty, constitutes a general and “normal” state of sensation, all “delight” implying by this definition the absence of disquiet in comparison with its external object. Reduced to its vibratile intensities, the “perceiving body” that is deprived of its totalizing metaphor becomes pulverized and fragmented into so many “desiring monads.” Like Condillac's statue, it destabilizes itself through the fields of force of the phenomenal world, completely obedient to the energy economy of other bodies that define its external frontier, left to the contradictory universal laws of attraction and repulsion that govern them: “Here below, each part, through a higher impulse, combines toward the central harmony of a whole. We collide with one another and are thrown backward and forward by the force maintaining a general equilibrium and order, in which we participate mechanically.”. (shrink)

This working paper uses the works of philosophers like Hegel, Marx, and Rawls to explore political philosophy and estrangement.

Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of attempts to reconstruct Marxian theory in forms that can be assessed by reference to currently received standards in various disciplines. The work has even been said to establish a new paradigm: “analytical Marxism.” One doesn't have to endorse this claim to recognize a good deal of merit in the work. Through creative application of state-of-the-art methods to traditional Marxian issues, researchers have promoted productive cross-fertilization with non-Marxian programs and have revealed many problems (...) that must be resolved for fruitful development of Marxian theory. Marx's work can be relevant to today's problems only if it is examined from vantage points provided by subsequent scientific and philosophical achievements. Moreover, critical engagement with the best science of the day has been an essential part of the Marxian theoretical project from the beginning. (shrink)

Educational neutrality states that decisions about school curricula and instruction should be made independently of particular comprehensive doctrines. Many political philosophers of education reject this view in favor of some non-neutral alternative. Contrary to what one might expect, some prominent liberal neutralists have also rejected this view in parts of their work. This paper has two purposes. The first part of the paper concerns the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. I examine arguments by Rawls and Nagel and argue (...) that some of the same arguments they use to justify liberal neutrality also justify educational neutrality; thus, if we accept these arguments for liberal neutrality, we should also accept educational neutrality. The second part of the paper defends educational neutrality against objections that it is impossible and objections that it is undesirable. (shrink)

Born in 1838, Mach was a pioneer in the field of physics, having even made an impression on Einstein in his younger life who credited him with being the "Philosophical forerunner of relativity theory." His name is also associated with the speed of sound (as in traveling at Mach "insert-number-here") as well as the Doppler effect. Throughout his career, he was particularly interested in the biological and sensory relationship to physics and science, and naturally, this interest expanded to that of (...) the world of psychological perception and physiological psychology as well as philosophy. The Analysis of Sensations is about just that, the nature of the relationship of physics and the physical sciences to psychological phenomena of sense and perception. It's a fascinating read for anyone looking to expand their knowledge of how the two sides of the same coin meld harmoniously. (shrink)

This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...) understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position. (shrink)

Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication and reflective equilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory development. (...) The main results are: an adequate method of conceptual re-engineering must focus not on individual concepts but on systems of concepts and theories; the linear structure of Carnapian explication must be replaced by a process of mutual adjustments as described by Goodman; Carnap’s condition of similarity can be analysed into two components, one securing a relation to the specific extensions of the pre-existing concepts, one regulating the transition to the new system of concepts; these two criteria of adequacy can be built into Goodman’s account of reflective equilibrium to ensure that the resulting concepts promote theoretical virtues while being sufficiently similar to the concepts we started out with. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features RE must have to (...) meet the objection. We find that there is a conception of RE that promises to withstand all objections. However, this conception has some features that may be unexpected: it aims at a justification that is tailored to understanding and it is neither tied to intuitions nor does it imply coherentism. We conclude by pointing out a cluster of questions we think RE theorists should pay more attention to. (shrink)

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

The relevance of inner speech for human psychology, especially for higher-order cognitive functions, is widely recognized. However, the study of the phenomenology of inner speech, that is, what it is like for a subject to experience internally speaking his/her voice, has received much less attention. This study explores the subjective experience of inner speech through empathy for pain paradigm. To this end, an experimental phenomenological method was implemented. Sixteen healthy subjects were exposed to videos of sportswomen/sportsmen having physical accidents practicing (...) extreme sports. Immediately after the exposure to the stimuli, a phenomenological interview was conducted to gather data about bodily sensations, emotions, motivations, and inner speech of watching other people’s accidents. Participant’s inner speech expresses concern about the consequences the accident could generate to the sportswomen/sportsmen or about the participants themselves. Simultaneously, participants’ inner speech happened with negative emotional feelings, many sensations distributed throughout their bodies, and a felt knowledge coming from a meaningful but pre-reflective and pre-verbal bodily dimension. Our findings show that inner speech in empathy is not merely a psycholinguistic process or high-order cognitive function, but rather it is a complex experience that occurs deeply related to meaningful emotions, bodily sensations, and an implicit, somatically felt knowledge. (shrink)

We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.

The target article suggests that taste is not based on the traditional four basic tastes, but rather is a continuum subserved by cross-fiber integration. This commentary describes evidence indicating that the traditional concept is valid, and that with suitable precautions, it is possible to match natural substances using mixtures representing fundamental tastes.

We all have beliefs, even strong convictions, about what is just and fair in our social arrangements. How should these beliefs and the theories of justice that incorporate them guide our thinking about practical matters of justice? This wide-ranging collection of essays by one of the foremost medical ethicists in the USA explores the claim that justification in ethics, whether of matters of theory or practice, involves achieving coherence between our moral and non-moral beliefs. Amongst the practical issues addressed in (...) the volume are the design of health-care institutions, the distribution of goods between the old and the young, and fairness in hiring and firing. In combining ethical theory and practical ethics this volume will prove especially valuable to philosophers concerned with ethics and applied ethics, political theorists, bioethicists, and others involved in the study of public policy. (shrink)

It is common for philosophers to reject otherwise plausible moral theories on the ground that they are objectionably demanding, and to endorse “Moderate” alternatives. I argue that while support can be found within the method of reflective equilibrium for Moderate moral principles of the kind that are often advocated, it is much more difficult than Moderates have supposed to provide support for the view that morality’s demands in circumstances like ours are also Moderate. Once we draw a clear distinction (...) between Moderate accounts of the content of moral principles, and Moderate accounts of morality’s demands in circumstances like ours, we can see that defenses of Moderate views that include both of these components are subject to both methodological and substantive objections. I consider arguments for Moderate views that have been made by Samuel Scheffler and Richard Miller, and argue that both are methodologically problematic because they rely on appeals to intuitions that we have strong grounds to think are unreliable. I conclude that we must take seriously the possibility that Moderate principles, applied to well off people in circumstances like ours, imply demands that are much more extensive than Moderates typically accept. (shrink)

Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy. Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answer these questions by appealing to Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to this approach, defenders of (...) rival conceptions of, e.g. justice can disagree without talking past each other because they share the concept of justice. It is argued that this idea is attractive but limited in application and that it fails to do justice to the dynamic and normative aspects of concept formation. Reflective equilibrium is then suggested as an alternative approach. It replaces the static contrast between a conceptual ‘core’ and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation as a partly normative undertaking: pre-theoretic language use and commitments can provide a shared starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. This perspective provides a new understanding of how it is possible that different theorists defend rival accounts of, e.g. justice, without talking past each other. (shrink)

The Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium has been argued by Sober, Stephens and others to represent the zero-force state for evolutionary biology understood as a theory of forces. I investigate what it means for a model to involve forces, developing an explicit account by defining what the zero-force state is in a general theoretical context. I use this account to show that Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium is not the zero-force state in biology even in the contexts in which it applies, and argue based (...) on this that drift should not be understood as an evolutionary force. (shrink)

The intrinsic value of even the simplest hedonic sensations, sensations of physical pleasure and pain, is not quantifiable. It is not quantifiable because, in contrast to their duration, their intensity is not quantifiable. This is because sensory intensities do not have even a rough position on the same scale as their physical stimuli have a more precise position, as the durations of sensations have a rough location in time in which their stimuli have a more precise location. (...) Consequently, there is an argument which demonstrates the non-transitivity of the relation of sameness as regards sensory intensity, but which is not applicable to their duration. This non-transitivity rules out the existence of a numerical scale along which sensory intensity can be even roughly plotted. (shrink)

Traditional logical reconstruction of arguments aims at assessing the validity of ordinary language arguments. It involves several tasks: extracting argumentations from texts, breaking up complex argumentations into individual arguments, framing arguments in standard form, as well as formalizing arguments and showing their validity with the help of a logical formalism. These tasks are guided by a multitude of partly antagonistic goals, they interact in various feedback loops, and they are intertwined with the development of theories of valid inference and adequate (...) formalization. This paper explores how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used for modelling the complexity of such reconstructions and for justifying the various steps involved. The proposed approach is illustrated and tested in a detailed reconstruction of the beginning of Anselm’s De casu diaboli. (shrink)

This article begins with some preliminary remarks about the general features and basic varieties of reflective equilibrium in moral reflection. It then considers a couple of preliminary doubts about this method. One of these doubts claims that the most plausible interpretation of RE is so comprehensive that it risks paralyzing our thinking, while the other claims that this same version of RE is insufficiently determinate in practical contexts and will thus fail to be sufficiently action-guiding. The article then explicates (...) the sense in which RE qualifies as a coherence theory of justification, and considers several objections to RE that flow from its reliance on the putative connection between coherence and moral justification. (shrink)

Quoiqu’il en soit de la distinction cartésienne entre le moi et l’âme, les classiques, de Malebranche à Fénelon, de Leibniz à Locke, tendent à identifier celui-là à celle-ci, dans un oubli radical du corps, simplement uni à elle. À cet égard, Condillac représente un véritable tournant. Si les cadres de sa métaphysique paraissent reconduire un dualisme substantiel assez strict, son sensualisme permet de thématiser un mode original de présence du corps. Le moi est désormais incorporé, voire incarné. La présente étude (...) analyse la genèse du moi tout au long du Traité des sensations, en procédant à partir de l’impasse initiale à laquelle conduit la voie lockienne reposant sur la fonction de la mémoire, jusqu’aux analyses relatives à la fonction existentielle du toucher. (shrink)