This paper addresses the question of what the nature of science is. I will first make a few preliminary historical and systematic remarks. Next, I shall give an answer to the question that has to be qualified, clarified and justified. Finally, I will compare my answer with alternative answers and draw consequences for the demarcation problem.

Metaphysics and science have a long but troubled relationship. In the twentieth century the Logical Positivists argued metaphysics was irrelevant and that philosophy should be guided by science. However, metaphysics and science attempt to answer many of the same, fundamental questions: What are laws of nature? What is causation? What are natural kinds? -/- In this book, Markus Schrenk examines and explains the central questions and problems in the metaphysics of science. He reviews the development of (...) the field from the early modern period through to the latest research, systematically assessing key topics including -/- dispositions, counterfactual conditionals, laws of nature, causation, natural kinds, essence, necessity. -/- With the addition of chapter summaries and annotated further reading, Metaphysics of Science is a much-needed, clear and informative survey of this exciting area of philosophical research. It is essential reading for students and scholars of philosophy of science and metaphysics. (shrink)

In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge: (...) regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. He compares his view with positions on the question held by philosophers from Aristotle to Nicholas Rescher. The book concludes with an exploration of some consequences of Hoyningen-Huene's view concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science. (shrink)

Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science?

Donald Davidson contributed more deeply to our understanding of language, thought, and reality than perhaps any other recent philosopher. His discussions of skepticism are sometimes seen as peripheral to those contributions. As I read him, Davidson argued against three skeptical worries. First, beliefs are true or false relative to a conceptual scheme. Second, beliefs generally are false. Third, other minds and an external world do not exist. Call those worries ‘conceptual relativism’, ‘falsidicalism’, and ‘solipsism’, respectively. I investigate how Davidson’s arguments (...) are connected. I then show that those connections are so systematic that Davidson ultimately offers a single, master argument with two premises. Premise one is that I think. Premise two is an application of his account of radical interpretation. Focusing on the systematicity of Davidson’s anti-skeptical arguments demonstrates that discussions of skepticism were more central to his views than often appreciated and shines fresh light on his project overall. (shrink)

This paper explores the use of Popper's philosophy of science by cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical taxonomy. Three schools of biological systematics fiercely debated each other from the late 1960s: evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics or numerical taxonomy, and phylogenetic systematics or cladistics. The outcome of that debate was the victory of phylogenetic systematics/cladistics over the competing schools of thought. To bring about this "cladistic turn" in systematics, the cladists drew heavily on the philosopher K.R. Popper in order (...) to dress up phylogenetic systematics as a hypothetico-deductivist, indeed falsificationist, research program that would put an end to authoritarianism. As the case of the "cladistic revolution" demonstrates, scientists who turn to philosophy in defense of a research program read philosophers with an agenda in mind. That agenda is likely to distort the philosophical picture, as happened to Popper's philosophy of science at the hands of cladists. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is a paradigm of contemporary intellectual rigor. It offers a challenge of clarification, a promise of systematic understanding, and an invitation to innovative conceptual exploration. Such is its appeal. The occult traditions are steeped in antiquity. They reach us with an atmosphere of mystery, a whisper of wisdom, and a hint of beckoning unknown. Such is their appeal. This is an attempted to bring the two together.

Hermann's Weyl Das Kontinuum has inspired several studies in logic and foundations of mathematics over the last century. The book provides a remarkable reconstruction of a large portion of classical mathematics on a predicative basis. However, diverging interpretations of the predicative system formulated by Weyl have been proposed in the literature. In the present work, I analyze an early formalization of Weyl's ideas proposed by [Casari, E. 1964. Questioni di Filosofia Della Matematica, Milano: Feltrinelli] and compare it with other, more (...) well-known, accounts, such as those proposed respectively by Feferman and Avron. In this way, I fill a gap in the literature on Weyl's predicative mathematics by shedding light on an interpretation that has never been studied. Moreover, Casari's work is plausibly the first systematic reconstruction of Weyl's system. In particular, I highlight the different insights about predicativity that can be found in Weyl's work. Casari's reconstruction focuses on the logical and mathematical processes described by Weyl in the first part of his book. Through the analysis of this unexplored perspective, I shed light on fundamental aspects of Weyl's work and elucidate the alleged ambiguities it presents. In particular, in line with Avron's most recent reconstruction of Weyl's ideas, this analysis supports a stronger conception of predicativity than what is commonly attributed to Weyl in the literature. As a result, this work not only provides an analysis of a neglected interpretation of Das Kontinuum, but also contributes to elucidating Weyl's classical conception of predicativity. (shrink)

Through a consideration of the philosophical debates occurring in the Dutch and Dutch-related intellectual framework in the early modern period, in the present study some alternatives in the foundation of philosophy and science have been highlighted and analysed. In conclusion, it is time to assess them in a more systematic manner. Each alternative entails a different view on foundational arguments, which may be grouped into theological, metaphysical, and logical ones. This research reveals the essential features of a philosophical milieu (...) created by Descartes and constituting the framework for the dissemination of Newtonian science in Europe, leading to the birth of a philosophy of science as the study of the foundations, assumptions, methods, and limits of the study of natural realms. In fact, one can recognise several reasons for such foundation: on a general level, the need of providing philosophy with a secure foundation against the ‘sceptical crisis’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries highlighted by Richard Popkin. More specifically, however, the foundation of Cartesian and Newtonian philosophy and science served to defend the conceptual premises of new ways of thinking in an academic context, demonstrating the validity of such new ways and rejecting the commonsensical and non-explanatory assumptions of Scholastic philosophy, and, in the case of ’s Gravesande, the speculative character of Descartes’s physics itself. (shrink)

After the demise of logical empiricism in the late fifties of the past century, philosophy of science entered a sort of Kuhnian revolutionary phase. Both its central problems and the methods used to address them underwent a profound change; under the pressure of the “new” philosophy of science—and of the various historical, sociological, cultural, or feminist approaches—the way of doing philosophy championed by Carnap and Popper was progressively abandoned by many scholars interested in the study of science. (...) Today, it is unclear whether this revolutionary phase is coming to an end, and if a new paradigm is in sight. That this may be the case is suggested by the appearance of some advanced introductions to the philosophy of science, which aim at replacing classical work like those by Carnap and Hempel as manuals for the present generation of scholars. These new contributions provide the student, and the expert as well, with a firm grip of what, following Kuipers .. (shrink)

This book provides the first comprehensive discussion regarding the role that Kant ascribes to systematicity in the sciences. It considers not only what Kant has to say on systematicity in general, but also how the systematicity requirement for science is specified in different fields of knowledge. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 is devoted to historical context. The chapters explore precursors of Kant's account of the systematicity of the sciences. Part 2 (...) addresses the application of systematicity to the special sciences-cosmology, physics, chemistry, logic, mathematics, the life sciences and history. Finally, Part 3 explores the systematicity of philosophy. Kant and the Systematicity of the Sciences will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant and the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This is a review of Paul Hoyningen-Huene's book, Systematicity: The Nature of Science.

This is the first comprehensive view of the work of scholars in several different disciplines contributing to the development of the psychology of science. This new field of inquiry is a systematic elaboration and application of psychological concepts and methods to clarify the nature of the scientific enterprise. While the psychology of science overlaps the philosophy, history, and sociology of science in important ways, its predominant focus is on individuals and small groups, rather than broad social institutions (...) and concepts. The introduction surveys the field and traces its evolution in a historical context. Several contributors address epistemological issues raised by the psychology of science. Subsequent chapters discuss developments in the cognitive psychology of science, scientific theory, and the influence of social relationships on scientists' work. The conclusion proposes an agenda for further progress in this new approach to understanding science. (shrink)

The organic trope is a popular way of accepting the systematicity of Hegelian science. It allows for diversity and difference within the living whole, where each organ contributes to the life of the holistic "one", which, in turn, ensures the vitality of each organ. For example, in the Philosophy of Right, the organic state maintains itself in relation to the various institutions and corporations that constitute its organs. However, one element of the organic trope remains largely ignored: excretion. (...) Briefly, if we take Hegel's system as organic, then what does it excrete? What constitutes its excrement? This book chapter examines Hegel's philosophical, syllogistic interpretation of animal digestion and excretion in the Philosophy of Nature and then attempts to apply it to the organic system of science, as an individual, purposive life form whose subjectivity arises through the excretion of what is deemed superfluous. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora. These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science. In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...) propose a general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

A century ago historian of science George Sarton argued that “science is our greatest treasure, but it needs to be humanized or it will do more harm than good”. The systematic cultivation of an “historical spirit,” a philosophical appreciation of the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry, and a recognition that science is irreducibly a “collective enterprise” was, on Sarton’s account, crucial to the humanizing mission he advocated. These elements of Sarton’s program are more relevant than ever as (...) philosophers of science articulate research programs that take seriously the contextual factors, situated interests, and historical contingencies that shape the sciences we study. I trace the trajectory of a long-term philosophical engagement with archaeology that illustrates a succession of ways in which social, cultural, and political values configure inquiry, culminating in a program of collaborative research that raises the question of what role philosophers can usefully play when the challenges of humanizing scientific practice have centrally to do with navigating entrenched asymmetries of power. (shrink)

Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by addressing (...) Cartwright's views on the practice of model building in science and the question of how models represent the world before moving on to a detailed discussion of methodologically and metaphysically challenging problems. Finally, the book addresses Cartwright's original attempts to clarify profound questions concerning the metaphysics of science. With contributions from leading scholars, such as Ronald N. Giere and Paul Teller, this unique volume will be extremely useful to philosophers of science the world over. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was trained as a scientist and an engineer. He received a diploma in mechanical engineering from the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg, Berlin, in 1906, after which he did several years of research on aeronautics before turning to the full-time study of logic and philosophy. Hertz, Boltzmann, Mach, Weininger, and William James, all important influences on Wittgenstein, are authors whose work was both philosophical and scientific. The relationship between everyday life, science, and philosophy, is a central concern throughout (...) the course of his writing. He regarded philosophy, properly conducted, as an autonomous activity, a matter of clarifying our understanding of language, or investigating grammar. Wittgenstein thought philosophy should state the obvious as a way of disabusing us of the desire to formulate philosophical theories of meaning, knowledge, language, or science, and was deeply opposed to the naturalist view that philosophy is a form of science. In his later work, Wittgenstein rejected systematic approaches to understanding language and knowledge. Wittgenstein’s answer to the Socratic question about the nature of knowledge is that it has no nature, no essence, and so it is a mistake to think one can give a single systematic answer:If I was asked what knowledge is, I would list items of knowledge and add “and suchlike.” There is no common element to be found in all of them, because there isn’t one. (shrink)

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities (...) “facsimile sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense. (shrink)

What makes scientific knowledge possible? The philosopher Immanuel Kant in his magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, had a fascinating and puzzling answer to this question. Scientific knowledge, for Kant, is made possible by the faculty of reason and its demand for systematic unity. In other words, cognition about empirical objects can aspire to be scientific only if it is rationally embedded within or transformed into a system. But how can such system form once we take into account the (...) perspectival nature of knowledge, i.e., its being situated in individual human cognitive faculties? My PhD thesis has a two-pronged objective: to reconstruct the complexity of the notion of systematicity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; and to defend its plausibility in contemporary debates on the unity or plurality of scientific knowledge. As far as is concerned, Kant’s position is far from being clearly understood in the literature. Despite a renewed interest in Kant’s notion of systematicity in recent decades, existing contributions fail to offer a satisfactory account of it. The aim of my thesis is to provide a unified reading of reason’s systematicity as an essential feature of Kant’s analysis of the sources of cognition. In particular, I defend a novel account of theoretical reason the aims to support the following claims: systematicity is grounded in a legitimate use of reason’s ideas as prescriptive rules for empirical investigation; it is necessary to make empirical cognition possible and generate scientific hypotheses; and it gives us fundamental insights into Kant’s ‘empirical realism’ and his understanding of the role of metaphysics in science. With regard to, I show that Kant’s account of theoretical reason has much more to offer than generally acknowledged. In particular, I present it as providing a reconciling solution to the conflict between unity and pluralism in contemporary philosophy of science. Drawing inspiration from Kant’s ‘perspectivism,’ I argue that unity and pluralism are to be thought as mutually inclusive principles of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Theory of Science provides an accessible but systematic survey of perspectives on science and rationality through the arguments and ideas of leading thinkers of the 20th century, including Einstein, Carnap, Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hempel, Gadamer, Foucault, and Harding. The book also gives a critical introduction to scientific methodology, including the relationship between theory and observation, the problem of induction, hypothetic-deductive method, truth and progress, and explanation in natural and human science. The book covers the theory of (...) class='Hi'>science â?? part of the syllabus in Examen Philosophicum at The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) â?? for which there has hitherto been no unitary text book in English. Theory of Science is also suited to use in other courses at various levels, as well as being of interest to a wider audience concerned with the philosophical and social problems of science. (shrink)

Philosophy of science emerged as a distinctive part of philosophy in the twentieth century. It set its own agenda, the systematic study of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of science, and acquired its own professional structure, departments and journals. Its defining moment was the meeting (and the clash) of two courses of events: the breakdown of the Kantian philosophical tradition and the crisis in the sciences and mathematics in the beginning of the century. The emergence of the new (...) Frege-Russell logic, the arithmetisation of geometry and the collapse of classical mechanics called into question the neat Kantian scheme of synthetic a priori principles. But the thought that some a priori (framework) principles should be in place in order for science to be possible had still had a strong grip on the thinkers of the European continent. A heated intellectual debate started concerning the status of these a priori principles. The view that dominated the scene after the dust had settled was that the required framework principles were conventions. The seed of this thought was found in Poincaré’s writings, but in the hands of the Logical Positivists, it was fertilised with Frege’s conception of analyticity and Hilbert’s conception of implicit definitions. The consolidation of modern physics lent credence to the view that a priori principles can be revised; hence, a new conception of relativised a priori emerged. The linguistic turn in philosophy re-oriented the subject-matter of philosophical thinking about science to the language of science. Formal-logical methods and conceptual analysis were taken to be the privileged philosophical tools. Not only, it was thought, do they clarify and perhaps solve (or dissolve) traditional philosophical problems; they also make philosophy rigorous and set it apart from empirical science. In the 1930s, philosophy of science became the logic of science; it became synonymous to anti-psychologism, anti-historicism and anti-naturalism.. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is the organized expression of a growing intent among philosophers and scientists to clarify, perhaps unify, the programs, methods and results of the disciplines of philosophy and of science. The examination of fundamental concepts and presuppositions in the light of the positive results of science, systematic doubt of the positive results, and a thorough-going analysis and critique of logic and of language, are typical projects for this joint effort. It is not necessary to be (...) committed to a belief that science and philosophy are or should be one, or else that “never the twain shall meet.” If anything, there is to be expected a wholesome regard for the value of established science in furnishing a foil for philosophy and a check on its old extravagances. This does not mean that even the best-established science may not be subject to most devastating criticism by analysis of its foundations. In fact, despairing of the philosophy of the schools, science has done it largely for itself. The theories of gravitation, atomicity, electro-magnetism, evolution, relativity and quanta have all arisen through drastic revisions of complacent fundamental “truths.”. (shrink)

This volume collects previously unpublished contributions to the philosophy of science. What brings them together is a twofold goal: first and foremost, celebrating the name of Roberto Torretti, whose works in this and other areas have had –and continue to have– a significant impact on the international philosophy of science community; and second, the desire of advancing novel perspectives on various issues in the philosophy of science broadly construed. Roberto Torretti has made substantial contributions to current debates (...) in the history and philosophy of science, the general philosophy of science, and the philosophy of physics and geometry. Among his landmark contributions, we find his investigations in the history and philosophy of geometry, as well as his systematic studies of Einstein's relativity theory. This volume convenes leading philosophers and early-career scholars compiling a fine collection of chapters addressing recent debates on Kantian philosophy of science, the general philosophy of science, and the history and philosophy of physics and mathematics. (shrink)

Major figures of twentieth-century philosophy were enthralled by the revolution in formal logic, and many of their arguments are based on novel mathematical discoveries. Hilary Putnam claimed that the Löwenheim-Skølem theorem refutes the existence of an objective, observer-independent world; Bas van Fraassen claimed that arguments against empiricism in philosophy of science are ineffective against a semantic approach to scientific theories; W. V. O. Quine claimed that the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is trivialized by the fact that any (...) theory can be reduced to one in which all truths are analytic. This book dissects these and other arguments through in-depth investigation of the mathematical facts undergirding them. It presents a systematic, mathematically rigorous account of the key notions arising from such debates, including theory, equivalence, translation, reduction, and model. The result is a far-reaching reconceptualization of the role of formal methods in answering philosophical questions. (shrink)

How is Hegel's scientific (systematic) language meant to be objective? Through an examination of Hegel's theory of language, as outlined in the Encyclopedia, we understand how thought inhabits signs to form words, gaining in objectivity. The words of the positive sciences of the understanding are then taken up (reflected upon) syllogistically, where the discourse of Science is informed by the relative objectivity of its linguistic contents. The Philosophy of Nature, for example, does not reflect directly on nature but rather (...) gains its truth and objectivity through reflection on the discourses of the natural sciences. (shrink)

The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the nature of science (NOS). In this chapter we develop such an account by taking into consideration the consensus on NOS that emerged in the science education literature in the last decade or so. According to the family resemblance approach, the nature of science can be systematically and comprehensively characterised in terms of a number of science categories which exhibit strong (...) similarities and overlaps amongst diverse scientific disciplines. We then discuss the virtues of this approach and make some suggestions as to how one can go about teaching it in the classroom. (shrink)

This is the second volume of Proceedings of the Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science. At the time that this preface is being written, the fourth annual series of lectures within the framework of the Israel Colloquium is already behind us and the fifth is underway. The Israel Colloquium thus has now not only a future to look forward to but also a past which is a source, of pride and pleasure for those who take (...) part in this venture. The Israel Colloquium has, I believe, struck roots in the Israeli scientific and intellectual life, while drawing on the ever-increasing readiness of the international scientific and intellectual community for continuous support. As in the first volume, here too the papers presented, taken together, attempt a threefold representation of science and of the scientific activity: the historical, the social, and the systematic. A novel focal point in this volume is the treatment of some case studies illuminating historical, social, and philosophical aspects of medicine. Another center of gravity here is the Eddington Centennial Symposium which was a main event in the ColloƯ quium activity of the 1982-83 series. This is a fitting place for me to report with sorrow the untimely death in the summer of 1984 of Solly G. Cohen, one of Israel's leading scientists, who is among the contributors to this volume. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to the life and work of Ernest Nagel counted among the influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. Forgotten by the history of philosophy of science community in recent years, this volume introduces Nagel’s philosophy to a new generation of readers and highlights the merits and originality of his works. Best known in the history of philosophy as a major American representative of logical empiricism with some pragmatist and naturalist leanings, Nagel’s interests and activities went beyond (...) these limits. His career was marked with a strong and determined intention of harmonizing the European scientific worldview of logical empiricism and American naturalism/pragmatism. His most famous and systematic treatise on, The Structure of Science, appeared just one year before Thomas Kuhn’s even more renowned, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As a reflection of Nagel’s interdisciplinary work, the contributing authors’ articles are connected both historically and systematically. The volume will appeal to students mainly at the graduate level and academic scholars. Since the volume treats historical, philosophical, physical, social and general scientific questions, it will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, epistemologists, social scientists, and anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy and twentieth-century intellectual history. (shrink)

The two aims of the paper were to systematically review and critique social science and linguistic text analyses of nursing records in order to inform future research in this emerging area of research. Systematic searches in reference databases and in citation indexes identified 12 articles that included analyses of the social and linguistic features of records and recording. Two reviewers extracted data using established criteria for the evaluation of qualitative research papers. A common characteristic of nursing records was the (...) economical use of language with local meanings that conveyed little information to the uninitiated reader. Records were dominated by technocratic‐medical discourse focused on patients’ bodies, and they depicted only very limited aspects of nursing practice. Nurses made moral evaluations in their categorisation of patients, which reflected detailed surveillance of patients’ disturbing behaviour. The text analysis methods were rarely transparent in the articles, which could suggest research quality problems. For most articles, the significance of the findings was substantiated more by theoretical readings of the institutional settings than by the analysis of textual data. More probing empirical research of nurses’ records and a wider range of theoretical perspectives has the potential to expose the situated meanings of nursing work in healthcare organisations. (shrink)

Our purpose in the present work is to survey some of the formulations that the theme of networks has received in contemporary philosophy of science over a period spanning twelve decades, from the end of the 19th century up to the present time. The proposal advanced herein is to interpret the evolution of this theme in four stages: first, one that goes from a metaphor or expressive image to a notion aspiring at implementation, but still having a virtual character, (...) in the orthodox view of theories; second, a shift towards networks viewed as explicit, with the notion still having an enormous metaphorical power, as in Neurath and Quine; third, from this towards a concept amenable to implementation, as in Thagard, but still in search of an epistemological rationale, supposedly provided by BonJour and Dancy; and finally, as a notion fully endowed with a precise structuralist implementation, in the scope of the structuralist metatheory of Balzer-Moulines-Sneed. The interpretive framework adopted in this exercise in the history of philosophy of science is a modified version of Gerald Holton's thematic model, adapted to the history of philosophy instead of its original domain, the history of scientific ideas. In our version of the thematic model, we posit two main dimensions for the appraisal of any given philosophical concept, besides the thematic dimension: the metaphorical one and the dimension of its systematic implementation. (shrink)

The works of Paul K. Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson and Thomas S. Kuhn have come to occupy a central place in the annals of contemporary philosophy of science. Some of their contemporaries,, tend to regard them as the vanguard of a new “revolutionary” intellectual movement. Reacting against the views of their positivist predecessors, they embrace and propagate the idea that “pervasive presuppositions” are fundamental to scientific investigations. Thus, Feyerabend thinks that, “... scientific theories are ways of looking at the (...) world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our conception of reality”. This is in stark contrast to the positivist view that the aim of science is the systematization of experience that exists independently of any scientific theories. This new view of scientific theories also involves a “radical” conception of the nature of theoretical change. Rejecting the positivist notion of any constant element through such change, Kuhn regards a basic theoretical change as a conceptual revolution and “wants to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world”. Hanson uses the phrase ‘theory-loaded’ to give expression to a view of the semantic content of observation statements that follows from this general position. (shrink)

This chapter will be a brief survey of the concepts from general philosophy of science for those interested in cognitive science. It covers several major topics in the philosophy of science: scientific explanation and underdetermination, reductionism and levels of nature, and scientific realism. We will discuss the goals of science, the methods of science, and the most plausible interpretations of science. To demonstrate the importance of these topics, the chapter includes cases in which confusion (...) over these issues has led scientists astray. These cases include instances in which cognitive neuroscience has failed to discover adequate explanations for phenomena, when previously established research did not withstand further scrutiny, and the increasingly complex and bewildering interrelationship between the study of the mind and the study of the brain and its parts. These issues are common to many areas of science, but they can be particularly fraught in a field like cognitive neuroscience, as researchers from a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds and research foci come together to develop a systematic understanding of the mind. (shrink)

In this paper, the author analyzes and discusses the communicative approach used in the philosophy of science developed by N. Luhmann. He shows how Luhmann's communicative approach can be used to discuss a wide range "the classical problems" of knowledge: criteria for scientific knowledge, its autonomy and tools for achieving it, the problem of the foundation and structure of the scientific knowledge, the relationship between concepts and words, theories and methods.The author also analyzes the problem of the communication constraints (...) imposed on the process of systematic organization of science (i.e. the delimitation principle): the specificity and opportunity of the social theory, its differences and similarities with the settled classic examples of the theorizing; the peculiarities of the particular types of the scientific observation. (shrink)

Illustrations: 13 B/w & 1 Colour Illustrations Description: The frontiers of Traditional Knowledge and Science have long attracted the minds of scientists, theologians, intellectuals and students, who have been arguing both their similarities and dissimilarities, apparent contradictions, and the possibility of an ultimate harmony between the two. In ancient and medieval India - as in much of the Non-Western world - there was only one word for tradition and science, namely, vidya. Vidya encompassed what in the modern historically-sensitive (...) inquiries is called 'knowledge-systems.' However, in the modern West, placing Science and Tradition side-by-side has become something of an anathema, for many in the post-Enlightenment era regard Tradition to be a leftover from the Dark Ages. Science, in contrast, with its systematic approach to studying and understanding of all there is, has been considered to be unassailable. But even this impenetrable divide may be showing signs of rupture in the twenty-first century : there is now growing evidence of a line of continuity and creative engagement in a 'third space' between Science and Traditional Knowledge. Individuals and learned organizations are making enormous contributions in this interactive exploration. The Sir John Templeton Foundation, based in Philadelphia, USA, is one such international organization. Professor B.V. Subbarayappa is one such eminent scholar who has relentlessly pursued, and in his quiet way stimulated, the fusion of disparate minds in this area. He is hailed as a pioneer in the History and Philosophy of Science movement in India. His contributions in this field are without match and have earned him a name among scientists, science historians, philosophers and intellectuals all over the world. His monumental work and his sheer humanity have inspired the Editors of this volume to find a way to honour him. Scholars of various persuasions from around the world have contributed exploratory, specialist and dialogic essays toward this conversation of Science and Tradition. A biographical sketch with a comprehensive Bibliography (first-ever) of Prof Subbarayappa is also featured in the Introductory essay. Professor--D.P. Chattopadhyaya and J.N. Mohanty have offered prefatory comments of their own. Given the extensive range of topics discussed, both specialists and lay readers will doubtless gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between Science and Tradition in a cross-cultural context, and hopefully be inspired to develop respect for knowledge across these two frontiers. (shrink)

This handbook presents the state of the art of quantitative methods and models to understand and assess the science and technology system. Focusing on various aspects of the development and application of indicators derived from data on scholarly publications, patents and electronic communications, the individual chapters, written by leading experts, discuss theoretical and methodological issues, illustrate applications, highlight their policy context and relevance, and point to future research directions. A substantial portion of the book is dedicated to detailed descriptions (...) and analyses of data sources, presenting both traditional and advanced approaches. It addresses the main bibliographic metrics and indexes, such as the journal impact factor and the h-index, as well as altmetric and webometric indicators and science mapping techniques on different levels of aggregation and in the context of their value for the assessment of research performance as well as their impact on research policy and society. It also presents and critically discusses various national research evaluation systems. Complementing the sections reflecting on the science system, the technology section includes multiple chapters that explain different aspects of patent statistics, patent classification and database search methods to retrieve patent-related information. In addition, it examines the relevance of trademarks and standards as additional technological indicators. The Springer Handbook of Science and Technology Indicators is an invaluable resource for practitioners, scientists and policy makers wanting a systematic and thorough analysis of the potential and limitations of the various approaches to assess research and research performance. (shrink)

This article is mainly concerned with the methodology of public policy studies and how this methodology compares with that of standard scientific studies. The main systematic section of the article develops a concept of justified policy which is related to the concept of justified procedure that originates in ancient Greek mathematics. The last section sketches some ways in which philosophers can make a methodological contribution to policy analysis. Possible contributions are discussed under four headings: numerical models, statistical methodology, philosophy of (...) applications, and analysis of predictions. (shrink)