Augmented reality (AR) technologies function to ‘augment’ normal perception by superimposing virtual objects onto an agent’s visual field. The philosophy of augmented reality is a small but growing subfield within the philosophy of technology. Existing work in this subfield includes research on the phenomenology of augmented experiences, the metaphysics of virtual objects, and different ethical issues associated with AR systems, including (but not limited to) issues of privacy, property rights, ownership, trust, and informed consent. This paper addresses some epistemological issues (...) posed by AR systems. I focus on a near-future version of AR technology called the Real-World Web, which promises to radically transform the nature of our relationship to digital information by mixing the virtual with the physical. I argue that the Real-World Web (RWW) threatens to exacerbate three existing epistemic problems in the digital age: the problem of digital distraction, the problem of digital deception, and the problem of digital divergence. The RWW is poised to present new versions of these problems in the form of what I call the augmented attention economy, augmented skepticism, and the problem of other augmented minds. The paper draws on a range of empirical research on AR and offers a phenomenological analysis of virtual objects as perceptual affordances to help ground and guide the speculative nature of the discussion. It also considers a few policy-based and designed-based proposals to mitigate the epistemic threats posed by AR technology. (shrink)

The classical tragedies relate conflicts, choices and dilemmas that have meaningful parallels in our own experience. Many of the normative dimensions of tragedy, however, rely critically on the causal and motivational efficacy of divine forces. In particular, these narratives present supernatural interventions invading their characters’ practical deliberations and undermining their claims to autonomous agency. Does this dynamic find any analogy in a contemporary, secular conception of moral agency? It does, but it is an analogy that challenges certain standard philosophical accounts (...) of agentive self-governance. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 52-54.

In this essay, I introduce the reader to some major themes of the metaphysical thought of Juan de Fuica, a Chilean Franciscan Friar, who, in his activities as professor of philosophy, explained and developed, with many traces of originality, the philosophy of John Duns Scotus. In his cursus on metaphysics, Fuica presents the object of metaphysics, that is, the objective concept of the real being in common. Above all, he shows that being can receive a relative essential definition, in (...) which one can find the aspect of “non-repugnance” or “non-contradictoriness”, which is effectively common to the real being and the being of reason. Fuica, thus, makes an original contribution to the understanding of the scope of metaphysics and its connection to mental objects and the human mind broadly speaking. (shrink)

Without the support of imagination, one would not have the slightest idea of the cruel ‘real’ that has occurred in the Nazi extermination camps. Yet, in documentaries imaging the events of the Shoah, one runs the risk of missing their most basic property, namely their unimaginability. The mere idea that one is able to imagine the unimaginable comes down to a denial of the Shoah’s status as an event that defies our understanding. The unimaginable ‘real’ of the Shoah, (...) however, is not simply located in its object, in the cruelty of what happened in the camp. The Shoah makes us at the same time facing the unimaginable ‘real’ of the modern subject—the blind spot in our own identity. If we need imagination to deal with the Shoah, it is also because of an ungraspable ‘real’ in ourselves. This is why adequate Shoah representations, acknowledging their object as being beyond representation, include the same ‘beyond’ concerning the subject of the Holocaust memory. The essay makes this clear in an elaborated comparison of Claude Lanzmann’s 1985 film, Shoah, with some conceptual works of art from the late nineties—all of this ‘fine-tuned’ in a reflection upon Ingmar Bergman’s Persona. (shrink)

Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...) thatthis implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replacethe TG view that makes better sense of the value ofknowledge. (shrink)

In her recent book Gillian Brock argues that states’ legitimacy depends on their being part of a just state system that protects human rights. Here I discuss some practical limitations raised by Brock’s legitimacy framework: mainly, (1) the problematic real-world implications of such an account, and (2) the epistemic challenges that judgements inspired by this account would have to face, were we to proceed solely on the basis of it.

How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. My purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, I do not claim here to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, I offer a reconstruction making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the (...) argument is played by what I call the real thought move. I show that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. I finish by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and show how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Potochnik (Biol Philos 24(2):183–197, 2009) analyses some uses of optimality modelling in light of the anti-adaptationism criticism. She distinguishes two broad classes of such uses (weak and strong) on the basis of assumptions held by biologists about the role and the importance of natural selection. This is an interesting proposal that could help in the epistemological characterisation of some biological practices. However, Potochnik’s distinction also rests on the assumption that all optimality modelling represent the selection dynamic (...) involved in the system of phenomena being considered. Since this assumption does not hold for models belonging to optimal foraging theory (OFT)—one of behavioural ecology’s important modelling traditions—Potochnik’s proposal has to be critically reappraised. In this paper, we briefly discuss what is optimality modelling and what it means for a model to represent a dynamic of selection or of evolution. Then, we demonstrate that OFT modelling is unable to represent either past or contemporary selection dynamics. In order to make this point, we carefully delineate the theory’s rationale. This allows us to identify and analyse the assumptions on which the theory is built, and to circumscribe precisely the role that natural selection plays in it. Next, we show that the distinction of weak and strong uses of optimality modelling is seriously weakened when OFT modelling is taken into account. More precisely, the distinction is either irrelevant (if the assumption that selection dynamics are represented in all optimality modelling is held) or of a modest utility (if the assumption is dropped). However, we suggest that Potochnik’s original proposal could be saved, and that it even constitutes a tool to appraise the marks left in the literature by the evolution of optimality modelling practices in the last four decades, provided that it is made into a tripartite distinction. (shrink)

Reale's monumental work establishes the exact dimensions of Aristotle's concept of first philosophy and proves the profound unity of concept that exists in Aristotle's Metaphysics.

This article argues that the immediate critical responses to the blockbuster film Barbie (Greta Gerwig, 2023), which diverged along ideological lines, fail to account for the extent to which the film undercuts the very ideological divisions that sustain them. Rather than or in addition to presenting a left-wing or right-wing critique of contemporary gender roles, the film positions this contest within the vexed relationship between the ideal and the real. This metaphysical quandary is what propels the protagonists on a (...) Buddhist-inspired quest for authentic selfhood, a selfhood characterized by both the effacement of the discrete self (the Buddhist concept of anatman) and the eclipse of monumentalized cultural and commercial idols, like Barbie, that organize and disseminate ideology. (shrink)

Many women today prepare for a big meeting by reading a stack of folders and applying lipstick. They order their male colleagues around, then wait for those same men to help them on with their coats. They have higher-status jobs than some of the men they date, yet they never call men socially or ask them out. What's going on? Why such seemingly contradictory behaviors? Have women completely failed feminism--or has feminism failed them? In The Lipstick Proviso , Karen Lehrman--hailed (...) by the New York Times as the "sharpest" of the new feminist thinkers--shows that women today are failing neither feminism nor themselves. Rather, they've entered a new stage of feminism, one in which the personal is not political, differences between the sexes need to be respected, and courtship, chivalry, and the nuclear family don't have to be jettisoned just because they existed before the sixties. Thirty years after the women's movement liberated women from narrowly defined roles, Lehrman argues, we are finally beginning to see which traditionally feminine behaviors are more deeply rooted in biology and which are more heavily influenced by culture. Lehrman asserts that the result--whatever it is--will not undermine feminism as long as women still retain equal rights, opportunities, and responsibilities. Dispensing with the outdated notion of sisterhood, Lehrman offers women a "lipstick proviso": women don't have to sacrifice their complex individuality in order to be equal. As the first book to move beyond a critique of orthodox feminism, The Lipstick Proviso sets a radically new course for the future of the women's movement. While there's still much political work to be done, Lehrman argues that women should now focus on the personal sides of their lives. Women can't rightly be called autonomous if they stay with abusive or even emotionally challenged lovers; say "yes" to sex when they really mean "no"; overeat or undereat to hide their sexuality. With wit and grace, Karen Lehrman offers in The Lipstick Proviso a way to complete the feminist revolution, and clearly establishes herself as the definitive voice of the next generation of feminism. (shrink)

Recent new paradigms of computation, based on biological and physical models, address in a radically new way questions of efficiency and challenge assumptions ...

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii:From August 17 to 22, the Eighth International Congress on the Logic. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science will convene in Moscow. The theme of this congress is "Man, Science, Humanism."The work of the congress will be organized in the following sections: 1. Foundations of mathematical reasoning. 2. The theory of models. 3. Foundations of calculability and recursion theory. 4. The theory of sets. 5. General logic. 6. The general methodology of science. 7. Foundations of probability (...) and statistical inference. 8. Foundations of the physical sciences. 9. Foundations of the biological sciences. 10. Foundations of psychology and the cognitive sciences. 11. Foundations of the social sciences. 12. Foundations and philosophy of linguistics. 13. The history of logic, methodology, and the philosophy of science.Two symposia are planned for the congress: "Science and Ethics" and "The New Style of Scientific Thinking in Natural Science." In addition to the main sections, several round tables will be organized at the congress on the following topics: J. The methodology of solving global problems of the modern epoch: a systems approach. 2. Methodological and social problems of computerization. 3. Factors in the development of modern scientific knowledge. 4. Methodological problems in the all-around development of man.The journal Voprosy filosofii has published a number of articles related to these problems over the past year . Soviet scholars are taking an active part in the preparation and organization of this congress. The journal plans in subsequent issues to publish materials for the congress under the most varied rubrics. In this issue, with D. P. Gorskii's article "The Concept of Real and Ideal Types," we are opening a special section in which we shall publish basic materials devoted to the Eighth International Congress on the Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

Without the support of imagination, one would not have the slightest idea of the cruel ‘real’ that has occurred in the Nazi extermination camps. Yet, in documentaries imaging the events of the Shoah, one runs the risk of missing their most basic property, namely their unimaginability. The mere idea that one is able to imagine the unimaginable comes down to a denial of the Shoah’s status as an event that defies our understanding. The unimaginable ‘real’ of the Shoah, (...) however, is not simply located in its object, in the cruelty of what happened in the camp. The Shoah makes us at the same time facing the unimaginable ‘real’ of the modern subject—the blind spot in our own identity. If we need imagination to deal with the Shoah, it is also because of an ungraspable ‘real’ in ourselves. This is why adequate Shoah representations, acknowledging their object as being beyond representation, include the same ‘beyond’ concerning the subject of the Holocaust memory. The essay makes this clear in an elaborated comparison of Claude Lanzmann’s 1985 film, Shoah, with some conceptual works of art from the late nineties—all of this ‘fine-tuned’ in a reflection upon Ingmar Bergman’s Persona. (shrink)

This article reflects on how the issue of the Real allows us to rethink the human of today in a more complete and up-to-date way. And for this purpose, two apparently dissimilar perspectives of understanding the Real are discussed: that of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, which is rooted in Lacan’s psychoanalysis, and that of the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, which is born from a deep critical dialogue with Heidegger’s ontology. This paper will show the unity of two (...) visions of the Real that lie at the heart of what is human and that allow us to criticize certain very influential psychoanalytic thought, centred on Jacques-Alain Miller, which cannot account for what is happening to us radically in the current era, or, perhaps, in any era. (shrink)

Real Life in China at the Height of the Empire: Revealed by the Ghosts of Ji Xiaolan. Translated by DavId E. Pollard. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2014. Pp. xl + 334. $45.

This paper states that the concept of real is modified by the emergence of nomadic technology devices, which are responsible for creating a hybrid reality that merges physical and digital spaces. The concept of virtual space is analysed from the perspective of arts and science fiction. The first section shows how the concept of virtual space as a mindspace has been developed. The idea of cyberspace as a place for the mind emphasizes the traditional Cartesian doubt, that is, does (...) the mental image correspond to the real? In the second section, the paper argues that the concept of virtual changes, since it can no longer be considered a disjoint from physical space; rather, it belongs to it. Finally, the movies The Thirteenth Floor (Rusnak 1999) and The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski 1999) are case studies that illustrate how the idea of inhabiting a virtual space has changed from the traditional notion of virtual space as a place for the mind to a hybrid space that is part of our lives. As a result, it amplifies the notion of what the real can be. (shrink)