In dicephalus conjoined twinning, it appears that two heads share a body; in cephalopagus, it appears that two bodies share a head. How many human animals are present in these cases? One answer is that there are two in both cases—conjoined twins are precisely that, conjoined twins. Another is that the number of humans corresponds to the number of bodies—so there is one in dicephalus and two in cephalopagus. I show that both of these answers are incorrect. Prominent (...) accounts of biological individuation, which treat the organism as an integrated whole, reveal that in these and other cases of conjoined twinning the ‘twins’ share a single human animal. This has a number of consequences for the debate about what we are. First, if animalism is true, individuals of our kind can be—and are—profoundly psychologically divided. Second, cephalopagus twinning does not divide animalism from its rivals, as has been claimed. Finally, animalists can reply to a vicious species of the ‘too many thinkers’ problem to which they are allegedly uniquely vulnerable. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the ‘all or nothing problem’, Räsänen sets out to apply Horton’s ‘all or nothing’ problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy. Horton’s problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by allowing their arms (...) to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: it is morally permissible not to save either child and it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the ‘all or nothing’ problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area. (shrink)

Wollen (2022) is a critique of deontological libertarianism, the version of this philosophy predicated upon private property rights and the non-aggression principle. The launching pad for this article of his is the difficulty faced by conjoined twins, who diverge sharply in their view of their desirable future. The present rejoinder maintains that this author’s critique fails; further, that it really has little or nothing to do with conjoined twins per se, but, rather, aims at an entirely different challenge, (...) that of the tie or the dead heat. This latter is a critique that all political economic philosophies face, without exception, and libertarianism does no worse on this challenge than any other, the critique of Wollen to the contrary notwithstanding. (shrink)

Relativity allegedly contradicts presentism, the dynamic view of time and reality, according to which temporal passage is conceived of as an existentially distinguished ‘moving’ now. Against this common belief, the paper motivates a presentist interpretation of spacetime: It is argued that the fundamental concept of time—proper time—cannot be characterized by the earlier-later relation, i.e., not in the B-theoretical sense. Only the presentist can provide a temporal understanding of the twins’ paradox and of universes with closed timelike curves.

We understand metahistory as an approach that studies how histories within a particular discipline have been written and focus on insider scientists’ reconstructions of twin research. Using the concept of ethical-political affordances we suggest that such histories are based on a management of resources that prove to be beneficial for representing one’s own research traditions in a positive light. Instead of discussing information on the context and intellectual life of pioneers of the twin method, which include high-caliber eugenicists and Nazi (...) ideologues, and on how the twin method has been used and abused, insider scientists’ accounts present twin research as neutral, objective and void of any kind of political connotations. We show how important leaders of German twin research have been historically managed, and how their contributions have been distorted and omitted. Reasons for historical revisionism by omission and for selectively revised accounts of the past are discussed. Suggestions for writing accounts of the twin method are included and focus on the necessity of self-reflection, considerations regarding one’s own ethical-political inclinations, and review of the existing historical literature. In analyzing these connections, we attempt to understand how science, politics and history interact. (shrink)

This article explores the elective affinities between Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the sociology of critical capacities. It argues that these two research programmes can be understood as symmetrical twins. We show the extent to which the exchange between Bruno Latour and Luc Boltanski has influenced their respective theoretical developments. Three strong encounters between the twin research programmes may be distinguished. The first encounter concerns explanations for social change. The second encounter focuses on the status of objects and their relationship (...) to places. The third encounter is about the concept of critique. Drawing on their long-term mutual readings, we gain insight into how pleas for symmetrical analysis raised in response to Bourdieu’s theory of fields have evolved within both ANT and the sociology of critical capacity. We conclude by relating the development of the respective research programmes to the issue of disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

This paper explores the twin transition in family businesses, examining the parallel development of digital technologies and sustainable business practices, both of which are part of the current European agenda for a more sustainable future. While not widely recognised for their investments in disruptive innovation and digitalisation, family businesses (FBs) are more inclined to perform incremental changes, often driven by a longstanding commitment to sustainability and collaboration with internal and external stakeholders. This contrast makes them an ideal subject for a (...) more in-depth exploration of these transformative trends. The aim of this study is to adopt a broader perspective in twin-transition analysis, incorporating social and economic performance alongside environmental sustainability in relation to digital transformation. Therefore, we establish a connection between the triple-bottom-line (TBL) approach and digital innovation in the unique reality of FBs. Our research approach is based on interviews conducted across multiple studies that explore FB dynamics and digitalisation in different industries and countries, supplemented by insights from secondary data. We analyse data through a directed qualitative content analysis. By adopting a broader perspective on sustainability—shifting from an exclusive focus on the environmental dimension to a TBL approach—our findings position FBs as key players in the twin transition, excelling at both addressing sustainability challenges and fostering digital innovation. These companies should prioritise aligning their strategies with equitable, viable and bearable principles in line with the TBL approach by fostering socio-emotional wealth, engaging younger generations in digital innovation and implementing work–life balance initiatives that enhance employee satisfaction and sustainability. Most of these strategies can also be replicated by non-family businesses, establishing FBs as exemplary leaders in the twin-transition journey. (shrink)

(2002). Missing twins. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 13-17.

We study the foundation of space-time theory in the framework of first-order logic (FOL). Since the foundation of mathematics has been successfully carried through (via set theory) in FOL, it is not entirely impossible to do the same for space-time theory (or relativity). First we recall a simple and streamlined FOL-axiomatization Specrel of special relativity from the literature. Specrel is complete with respect to questions about inertial motion. Then we ask ourselves whether we can prove the usual relativistic properties of (...) accelerated motion (e.g., clocks in acceleration) in Specrel. As it turns out, this is practically equivalent to asking whether Specrel is strong enough to “handle” (or treat) accelerated observers. We show that there is a mathematical principle called induction (IND) coming from real analysis which needs to be added to Specrel in order to handle situations involving relativistic acceleration. We present an extended version AccRel of Specrel which is strong enough to handle accelerated motion, in particular, accelerated observers. Among others, we show that~the Twin Paradox becomes provable in AccRel, but it is not provable without IND. (shrink)

Fetal reduction is the practice of reducing the number of fetuses in a multiple pregnancy, such as quadruplets, to a twin or singleton pregnancy. Use of assisted reproductive technologies increases the likelihood of multiple pregnancies, and many fetal reductions are done after in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer, either because of social or health-related reasons. In this paper, I apply Joe Horton’s all or nothing problem to the ethics of fetal reduction in the case of a twin pregnancy. I argue (...) that in the case of a twin pregnancy, there are two intuitively plausible claims: abortion is morally permissible, and it is morally wrong to abort just one of the fetuses. But since we should choose morally permissible acts rather than impermissible ones, the two claims lead to another highly implausible claim: the woman ought to abort both fetuses rather than only one. Yet, this does not seem right. A plausible moral theory cannot advocate such a pro-death view. Or can it? I suggest ways to solve this problem and draw implications for each solution. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Twelve years ago the British media got wind of a London gynecologist who performed an elective reduction on a twin pregnancy reducing it to a singleton. Perhaps not surprisingly, opinion on the moral status of twin reductions was divided. But in the last few years new evidence regarding the medical risks of twin pregnancies has emerged, suggesting that twin reductions are relevantly similar to the reductions performed on high‐end multi‐fetal pregnancies. This evidence has appeared to resolve the moral debate.In this (...) paper I look at the role of clinical evidence in medical ethics. In particular I examine the role of clinical evidence in determining what counts as a significant harm or risk. First, I challenge the extent to which these empirical claims are descriptive, suggesting instead that the evidence is to some degree normative in character. Second, I question whether such empirical claims should count as evidence for what are essentially difficult ethical decisions – a role they appear to play in the case of elective reductions. I will argue that they should not, primarily because the value‐laden nature of this evidence conceals much of what is ethically at stake. It is important to recognize that empirical evidence cannot be a substitute for ethical deliberation. (shrink)

A brief account of Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment and its significance, written for a general audience. Sadly, I can't include Helen De Cruz's drawing of it - check out the beautiful book!

Horgan and Timmons, with their Moral Twin Earth arguments, argue that the new moral realism falls prey to either objectionable relativism or referential indeterminacy. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment on which the arguments are based relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. First, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth example and the conclusions drawn from that about the meaning of kind names. Further, it relies on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they (...) would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. I will argue that the similarities with Putnam’s thought experiment are questionable and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is questionable. I will then further argue that even if we accept the intuitions that Horgan and Timmons rely on, the anti-realist conclusion is not warranted due to there being more to the meaning of kind terms than the argument assumes. Once we develop the meaning of kind terms further we can acknowledge both that Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different properties with their moral terms, and that in spite of that they can have a substantive disagreement due to a shared meaning component. (shrink)

Charney argues that the presence of inherited epigenetic effects makes twin, family, and adoption studies obsolete. This argument relies on both a faulty characterization of these studies and indirect comparisons of DNA and factors. I argue that twin and family studies will in fact serve a necessary and vital role in the study of epigenetic and neogenetic processes.

The rapid adoption of digital technologies has revolutionized business operations and introduced emerging concepts such as Digital Twin (DT) technology, which has the potential to predict system responses before they occur, making it an attractive option for smart and sustainable tourism. However, implementing DT software systems poses significant challenges, including compliance with regulations and effective communication among stakeholders, and concerns surrounding security, privacy, and trust with the use of big data. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a documentation framework (...) for architectural decisions (DFAD) that applies the concept of big data governance to the digital system. The framework aims to ensure accountability, transparency, and trustworthiness while adhering to rules and regulations. To demonstrate its applicability, a case study and three case scenarios on the potential use of Mobile Positioning Data (MPD) in Indonesia for DT technology in smart and sustainable tourism were examined. The paper highlights the benefits of DFAD in shaping stakeholder communication and human–machine interactions while leveraging the potential of MPD to measure tourism statistics by Statistics Indonesia since 2016. Not only the documentation framework promotes compliance with regulations, but it also facilitates effective communication among stakeholders and enhances trust and transparency in the use of big data in DT technology for smart and sustainable tourism. This paper emphasizes the importance of effective big data governance and its potential to promote sustainable tourism practices. The multidisciplinarity approach on political science, software engineering, tourism, and official statistics provides an opportunity for academic contribution and decision-making processes. (shrink)

A case study of an ethical dilemma concerning twin nine-year-old sisters in a persistent vegetative state is presented. This is illustrated by the use of a systematic ethical framework to examine the case and the resolution, which was ultimately obtained with nurse—parent interrelations, using the human becoming nursing theory.

A presentation and analysis of the twin-earth thought experiments.

This volume will acquaint novice philosophers with one of the most important debates in twentieth-century philosophy, and will provide seasoned readers with a ...

The concept of a digital twin comes from engineering.1 It refers to a digital model of an artefact in the real world, which takes data about the artefact itself, data about other such artefacts, among other things, as inputs. The idea is that the maintenance of artefacts—such as jet engines—can be vastly improved if we work with digital twins that simulate actual objects. Similarly, personalised medicine might benefit from the digital modelling of body parts or even whole human bodies. (...) A medical digital twin could use data about the patient, more general population data, and other inputs to generate predictions about the patient. This could lead to highly personalised interventions and nuanced judgments about the patient’s health. Matthias Braun2 discusses this intriguing prospect, asking how we should think about the way(s) in which a digital twin could represent a patient. I will respond to Braun’s striking suggestion that we can regard a digital twin as an extension of the patient’s body. Notably, Braun does not compare his just-mentioned idea with the extended mind thesis popularised by Andy Clark and David Chalmers.3 But I am sure many readers will be reminded of the extended mind thesis. Accordingly, I will consider this comparison. I cannot discuss this comparison in detail, nor fully evaluate Braun’s suggestion. But I can say something about how we might approach this comparison, and provide some …. (shrink)

We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...) show that for the pure logic of one of these implicational connectives two – in general distinct – consequence relations (global and local) definable in the Kripke semantics for modal logic turn out to coincide, though this is not so for the pure logic of the other connective, and that there is an intimate relation between formulas constructed by means of the former connective and the local consequence relation. (Corollary 5.8. This, as we show in an Appendix, is connected to the fact that the ‘propositional operations’ associated with both of our implicational connectives are close to being what R. Quackenbush has called pattern functions.) Between these discussions Section 4 examines some of the replacement-of-equivalents properties of the two connectives, relative to these consequence relations, and Section 6 closes with some observations about the metaphor of identical twins as applied to such pairs of connectives. (shrink)

This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twin-earthed, (...) visual experience has a structure that means that it can only be the vehicle for representing entities with geometrical structures. (shrink)

Digital twinning in medicine refers to the idea of simulating a person’s organs, muscles or perhaps their entire body, in order to arrive more effectively at accurate diagnoses, to make treatment recommendations that reflect chances of success and possible side-effects, and to better understand the long-term trajectory of an individual’s overall condition. Digital twins, in these ways, build on the recent movement toward personalised medicine,1 and they undoubtedly present us with exciting opportunities to advance our health. Of course, the (...) opportunities are accompanied by newfound challenges—a common refrain in discussions surrounding emerging technologies. In a recent article, Matthias Braun surveys numerous problems, including the precision of simulations, ownership and consent to the use of digital models, and issues of justice in assuring equitable access to novel medical systems.2 In particular, he places special emphasis on the notion of representation. According to Braun, proper representation naturally calls for correspondence—namely a precise model offering dynamic, real-time feedback as well as transparency, both for the patient and the practitioner, in terms of the data being employed. While technical challenges remain, these goals are quite clear and relatively uncontroversial. Where a host of questions arise, however, is in the discussion on the interaction between the represented persons and their simulations. Alongside questions regarding ownership of one’s digital twin, Braun raises the concern that ‘giving …. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit an important response to the Moral Twin Earth (MTE) challenge: The Common Functional Role strategy (CFR). I argue that CFR is open to a revenge problem. MTE-cases allegedly show that two linguistic communities can be in genuine disagreement even when they are regulated by distinct families of properties. CFR provides a way to reconcile the intuition that the two communities are in genuine disagreement with the claim that the use of moral terms by both communities (...) is causally regulated by different families of properties. This is done by identifying a functional role that those families of properties both fulfill. Still, even if CFR is successful, its proponents need to face a serious revenge problem. Roughly, it could be that the families of properties that regulate each community are equally perfect realizers of the relevant higher-order functional state. I suggest that the proponent of CFR faces a dilemma: either CFR has controversial implications about first-order moral theory, or CFR needs to be coupled with substantive and parochial empirical/metaphysical assumptions to avoid those implications. (shrink)

Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons’ intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails (...) to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth. (shrink)

Alternate View Column AV-38 Keywords: special relativity, twin paradox, time dilation, starship, Einstein, Lorentz factor Published in the March-1990 issue of Analog Science Fiction & Fact Magazine; This column was written and submitted 8/20/89 and is copyrighted © 1989, John G. Cramer. All rights reserved. No part may be reproduced in any form without the explicit permission of the author.

Classical aesthetics cherishes the image of a self‐contained author who expresses himself by creating a work of art. This definition is markedly challenged by authors who create their work in co‐operation with a congenial partner. Twin authors are a rare phenomenon but they show that it is possible to split up a literary project and to write novels in tandem. In 1997 I approached some joint authors, questioning them on their common experience, on the distribution of their work load and (...) the harmonisation of the style and content of their novels, as well as the individual steps of production. The material I accumulated was complemented by investigations on late writers such as the brothers Goncourt and the double author Ellery Queen. The project made it evident that twin authors display a number of common features which are characteristic of their trade. All authors asked reported that writing in tandem required a pervasive internal harmony and mutual calculability. A close personal relationship appears to be vital, in the sense that the partners complement each other in their skills and views. When they assemble the material for their plots, most twin authors draw on journalistic research rather than on inspiration and empathy. Their novels normally appeal to a down‐to‐earth taste and avoid digressions into poetry or copious descriptions of feelings and moods. (shrink)

Urban Digital Twins (UDTs) have become the new buzzword for researchers, planners, policymakers, and industry experts when it comes to designing, planning, and managing sustainable and efficient cities. It encapsulates the last iteration of the technocratic and ultra-efficient, post-modernist vision of smart cities. However, while more applications branded as UDTs appear around the world, its conceptualization remains ambiguous. Beyond being technically prescriptive about what UDTs are, this article focuses on their aspects of interaction and operationalization in connection to people (...) in cities, and how enhanced by metaverse ideas they can deepen societal divides by offering divergent urban experiences based on different stakeholder preferences. Therefore, firstly this article repositions the term UDTs by comparing existing concrete and located applications that have a focus on interaction and participation, including some that may be closer to the concept of UDT than is commonly assumed. Based on the components found separately in the different studied cases, it is possible to hypothesize about possible future, more advanced realizations of UDTs. This enables us to contrast their positive and negative societal impacts. While the development of new immersive interactive digital worlds can improve planning using collective knowledge for more inclusive and diverse cities, they pose significant risks not only the common ones regarding privacy, transparency, or fairness, but also social fragmentation based on urban digital multiplicities. The potential benefits and challenges of integrating this multiplicity of UDTs into participatory urban governance emphasize the need for human-centric approaches to promote socio-technical frameworks able to mitigate risks as social division. (shrink)

In the article ‘Represent Me: Please! Towards an Ethics of Digital Twins in Medicine’, I analysed and tried to better understand the main ethical challenges associated with Digital Twins. For those who are just entering the debate with this article: DT is a metaphor for a bundle of artificial intelligence driven simulation technologies that constantly, in real time and ad personam simulate single or multiple parts of the body and make predictions about future health states based on these (...) simulations. My argument addresses the need to look at the breadth of challenges through a perspective of representation. From such a take, key consequences can be drawn for the further development of such technologies, the required means of control and not least the way to think about the interaction between humans and ‘their’ simulations. I am very grateful for the subsequent suggestions, criticisms and further arguments, which have helped me to elaborate my arguments more clearly and have led to a substantial advancement of the debate and the discussion about ethical questions in dealing with DT. Jenny Blumenthal-Barby,1 Deborah Lupton,2 Jenny Krutzinna,3 Janina Loh,4 Brent Mittelstadt,5 Sven Nyholm,6 Daniel Tigard7 and Max Tretter8 have made excellent points, which, in the following, I will not be able to reply to individually and in detail. In this response, I will try to bundle the open points and questions along the comments and considerations mentioned above and attempt to outline their significance for an ethics of DT. Four challenges seem to be central. A first point addresses anthropological issues. It is concerned …. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical and ethical issues associated with conjoined twins and their surgical separation. In cases in which there is an extensive sharing of organs, but nevertheless two distinguishable functioning brains, there are a number of philosophical and ethical challenges. This is because such conjoined twins: 1. give rise to puzzles concerning our identity, about whether we are identical to something psychological or biological;2. force us to decide whether what matters from an ethical point of view is (...) the biological life of our organisms or the existence of our consciousness or mind; 3. raise questions concerning when, if ever, it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one of us to save another;4. force us to reflect on the conditions for ownership of organs and the justification of removal of organs for transplantation which causes the death of the donor; 5. raise questions about who should take decisions about life-risking treatments when this cannot be decided by patients themselves.We examine and suggest answers to these questions. (shrink)

In "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth", David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist.

In publications in 1914 and 1918, Einstein claimed that his new theory of gravity somehow relativizes the rotation of a body with respect to the distant stars and the acceleration of the traveler with respect to the stay-at-home in the twin paradox. What he showed was that phenomena seen as inertial effects in a space-time coordinate system in which the non-accelerating body is at rest can be seen as a combination of inertial and gravitational effects in a space-time coordinate system (...) in which the accelerating body is at rest. Two different relativity principles play a role in these accounts: the relativity of non-uniform motion, in the weak sense that the laws of physics are the same in the two space-time coordinate systems involved; what Einstein in 1920 called the relativity of the gravitational field, the notion that there is a unified inertio-gravitational field that splits differently into inertial and gravitational components in different coordinate systems. I provide a detailed reconstruction of Einstein's rather sketchy accounts of the twins and the bucket and examine the role of these two relativity principles. I argue that we can hold on to but that is either false or trivial. (shrink)

In a 1911 research manuscript, Husserl puts forth an idea that resembles Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment presented in the 1970s. In this paper, I study Husserl’s “Twin Earth” passage and assess various readings of it to determine whether Husserl is better understood as an internalist or an externalist. I define internalism as the view that content depends solely on internal factors to the subject, whereas I distinguish between two versions of externalism: weak externalism, according to which content can also (...) depend on other subjects’ conceptions, and strong externalism, which maintains that content can also depend on the real world. Only strong externalism maintains what McGinn calls “the philosophical significance of externalism” because it entails realism about the world. I argue that Husserl is better understood as an externalist when it comes to the “Twin Earth” passage, but the more precise question regarding weak and strong externalism requires further evidence. This additional evidence concerns Husserl’s concepts of the identity of sense (Sinnesidentität) and worldly meaning (weltlicher Sinn). In evaluating externalist Husserl interpretations, I classify Smith’s externalist interpretation as weak, whereas I take Crowell’s externalist interpretation to be ambivalent. Crowell’s excellent but somewhat embryonic interpretation leaves the dependence relation between content and the real world ambiguous. I clarify this relation by assessing McGinn’s argument for the philosophical significance of externalism from the Husserlian viewpoint. Although this study is historical, it also serves a systematic purpose because the externalist interpretation of Husserl calls into question central issues in phenomenology and externalism. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I attempt to provide some new evidence in favour of the claim that meaning is normative—specifically, for the claim that semantic judgments or ascriptions of meaning are action-guiding. I attempt to achieve this by developing an analogue of the Moral Twin Earth argument advanced by Horgan and Timmons which I call the ‘Meaning Twin Earth’ argument. In the course of the dissertation, I outline Kripke’s 1982 sceptical argument for the thesis that there are no meaning facts in (...) virtue of which ascriptions of meaning are true or false and highlight how the claim that meaning is normative is necessary for that argument to succeed with the kind of generality that Kripke intends. I then explain how one of Kripke’s main arguments against dispositionalist accounts of meaning can be viewed as a kind of open question argument. This argument is ultimately a failure, but nonetheless, I argue that the argument can be revised in a way that does pose a genuine threat to dispositionalist accounts of meaning by using an analogue of Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth argument. I claim that a Meaning Twin Earth scenario yields linguistic intuitions that, in my view, are best explained by invoking the claim that meaning is normative. These intuitions constitute evidence against both reductive dispositionalism and anti-normativism about meaning. I forestall several potential objections to the Meaning Twin Earth argument drawn from Plunkett and Sundell, Copp, Merli, and Baker. In closing, I consider two broad options for a normativist account of semantic judgment: an expressivist form and a rationalist form. I argue that, provisionally, McDowell’s rationalist version of factualism about meaning faces a less serious challenge than Gibbard’s expressivist alternative. (shrink)

A key objection to naturalistic versions of moral realism is that the (meta)semantics to which they are committed yields incorrect semantic verdicts about so-called Moral Twin Earth cases. Recently, it has been proposed that the Moral Twin Earth challenge can be answered by adopting a neo-Aristotelian semantics for moral expressions. In this paper, I argue that this proposal fails. First, however attractive the central claims of neo-Aristotelianism are, they do not for us have the status of analytic constraints on the (...) use of ethical expressions, as they must if they are to block Moral Twin Earth counterexamples. Second, even when the neo-Aristotelian’s claims are taken as non-negotiable analytic constraints, the semantics faces a dilemma: if characteristic human functioning is understood in an ethically neutral way, the semantics yields an incorrect intension for ‘good human.’ If human functioning is understood in an ethically partisan way, the semantics fails to avoid problematic Moral Twin Earth counterexamples. (shrink)

During the first 16 days after fertilization, the developing embryo has the capacity to separate into two genetically identical embryos, or monozygotic twins (triplets, etc.). Because of this capacity, philosophers typically argue that the pre-16 day embryo is not a human being. On a Biological Account of Personal Identity (BAPI), which considers us human beings as essentially organisms, the development of the embryo into an organism at 16 (or 21) days marks our origins. The development of an embryo into (...) an organism is also said to mark the point at which the embryo loses its potential to give rise to monozygotic twins. This is considered a strength of the Biological account of our origins. I will argue here that it is the BAPI's own criteria that will have to allow cases of monozygotic twinning occurring even after 16 days, and that in virtue of this a Biological Account faces twinning puzzles usually reserved for earlier accounts of our origins. (shrink)

The first complete history of Minneapolis and St Paul published in two decades. The book spans their ramshackle beginnings as cross-river rivals to their thriving metropolitan partnership today.

Dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First. their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer’s interaction with the world. Second, Conceptual Role Semantics is not adequate for explaining a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative (...) compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content. (shrink)

In his contribution, ‘Represent me: please! Towards an ethics of digital twins in medicine’1, Braun shows that there is a fundamental ambivalence inherent in (the interaction with) digital twins: they can either open up new freedoms for the simulated persons, or, conversely, endanger and restrict their freedom. To prevent digital twins from restricting people’s freedom, Braun suggests a strong focus on control. Braun’s focus on control is insufficient, I will argue, because his idea of control works only (...) retroactively: it can only react to restrictions of freedom that have already occurred, but it cannot prevent them, nor can it restore any lost freedom. Control is therefore insufficient to defend people’s freedom. To prove my claim, I will first use an everyday example to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins. Second, I will show that digital twins endanger people’s freedom in a hermeneutic way. Finally, I will demonstrate why controllability cannot prevent this hermeneutic endangerment. I understand digital twins, like Braun, as simulation of a person, as their dynamic and precise effigy. Simulated twins use machine-learning and artificial intelligence capabilities to make predictive analyses about the simulated person and the future development of her health. Imagine: You are eating dinner. Meanwhile, your partner lectures you about the calorie density and nutrient composition of your food, warns you that your portion size exceeds your daily calorie requirement by x calories. It calculates how your dinner will negatively impact your body mass index (BMI) and physical fitness, and predicts what the consequences will be for your overall health. Based on these data and predictions, it creates an individualised diet plan for you—and at the same time shows you by how much you could improve your vital values by sticking to that plan. This example helps to illustrate the fundamental …. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment has come to have an enormous impact on contemporary philosophical thought. But while most of the discussion has taken place within the context of the philosophy of mind and language, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H8cT) have defended the intriguing suggestion that a variation on the original thought experiment has important consequences for ethics.' In a series of papers, they' ve developed the idea of a Moral Twin Earth and have argued that its significance (...) is that it has the resources to undermine naturalistic versions of moral realism.' H8t T don't hold back in their assessment. "Moral Twin.. (shrink)

In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while (...) the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism. (shrink)

David Garland?s The Culture of Control tells us more about the political culture of a post?11 September world than even he must have anticipated. The core of Garland?s cultural argument is his elaboration of a Durkheimian concept of moral individualism, to which he attributes a trend?setting influence lasting into the new millennium. He argues that, among youth, this new cultural influence has an egoistic, hedonistic quality, linked to a non?stop consumption ethos of the new capitalism. He emphasises that it is (...) the disadvantaged rather than the more privileged participants in this hedonistic youth culture who have been singled out for legal exposure and criminal sanctioning in a highly politicised binge of late modern penality. Garland?s prescient account exposes the first and most visible layers of social control that still hide vast inequalities in crime and punishment. There are important untold stories of the unpunished, more privileged participants in the hedonistic ?party? subculture of late modernity. The youthful patrons of this subculture, like their officially deviant counterparts, are disaffiliated and distrustful of conventional institutions, including contemporary work, family and politics. Garland awakens an awareness of our need to learn more about both the sanctioned and unsanctioned youth who are prominent and consequential players in our changing culture and politics. (shrink)

Edward Lee Thorndike (August 31, 1874 Williamsburg, Massachusetts 1] - August 9, 1949) was an American psychologist who spent nearly his entire career at Teachers College, Columbia University. His work on animal behavior and the learning process led to the theory of connectionism and helped lay the scientific foundation for modern educational psychology. He also worked on solving industrial problems, such as employee exams and testing. He was a member of the board of the Psychological Corporation, and served as president (...) of the American Psychological Association in 1912 This book, Measurements Of Twins (1905), by Edward L. Thorndike, is a replication of a book originally published before 1905. It has been restored by human beings, page by page, so that you may enjoy it in a form as close to the original as possible. This book was created using print-on-demand technology. Thank you for supporting classic literature. (shrink)

"Twin earth" examples have motivated a number of proposals for the lexicography of kind terms in natural languages. It is argued that these proposals create unacceptable difficulties for the analysis of de dicto propositional attitudes. A conservative solution of the twin earth problems is then proposed according to which they reflect pragmatic features of language use rather than semantic features of lexical content.

This paper presents an account of how human spontaneous embryonic chimeras are formed. On the prevalent view in the philosophical literature, it is said that chimeras are the product of two embryos that fuse to form a new third embryo. We call this version of fusion synthesis. In contrast to synthesis, we present an alternative mechanism for chimera formation called incorporation, wherein one embryo incorporates the cells of a second embryo into its body. We argue that the incorporation thesis explains (...) other types of chimera formation, which are better understood, and is more consistent than synthesis with what is known about embryological development. Incorporation also has different implications than synthesis and so avoids the philosophical puzzles that are often said to accompany embryonic chimera formation—puzzles which pose problems to the human embryo’s persistence from fertilization to the fetal stage of human development. (shrink)

Classical aesthetics cherishes the image of a self‐contained author who expresses himself by creating a work of art. This definition is markedly challenged by authors who create their work in co‐operation with a congenial partner. Twin authors are a rare phenomenon but they show that it is possible to split up a literary project and to write novels in tandem. In 1997 I approached some joint authors, questioning them on their common experience, on the distribution of their work load and (...) the harmonisation of the style and content of their novels, as well as the individual steps of production. The material I accumulated was complemented by investigations on late writers such as the brothers Goncourt and the double author Ellery Queen.The project made it evident that twin authors display a number of common features which are characteristic of their trade. All authors asked reported that writing in tandem required a pervasive internal harmony and mutual calculability. A close personal relationship appears to be vital, in the sense that the partners complement each other in their skills and views. When they assemble the material for their plots, most twin authors draw on journalistic research rather than on inspiration and empathy. Their novels normally appeal to a down‐to‐earth taste and avoid digressions into poetry or copious descriptions of feelings and moods. (shrink)