Modern contract law is characterized by a certain kind of unity and multiplicity. On the one hand, it establishes fundamental principles that apply to all contracts in general. But at the same time, it specifies further principles and rules for particular kinds of contracts or transaction-types that mark out their distinctive features, incidents and effects. Clearly, a viable theory of contract law should be able to provide a suitable account of both aspects. The central critical contention of The Choice (...) Theory of Contracts is that all prior approaches, in particular rights-based theories, have failed to do so. Indeed, Dagan and Heller argue that only a theory that explains the settled rules of contract law as teleologically oriented toward facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their different substantive goods, and thus as primarily power-conferring in this particularly robust sense, can provide the needed account. Such a theory, they believe, would be not only interpretatively accurate with respect to the actual law but also fully acceptable as a liberal view of contract. This Article challenges the core contentions of choice theory, suggesting why it may be unable to meet its own goal of explaining how contract law coherently specifies and integrates the general and specific dimensions of enforceable agreements. The Article looks into basic contract doctrines in order to specify a general conception of the contractual relation that can meet this desideratum and it sketches how, beginning with that conception, contract law unfolds a rich multiplicity of transaction-types. The resulting view is liberal but rights-based rather than teleological, and it proposes an alternative understanding of how the rules of contract law are power-conferring as well as duty-imposing. (shrink)

One of the paradoxes of the physical sciences is that as our knowledge has progressed, more and more diverse physical phenomena can be explained in terms of fewer underlying laws, or principles. In Hidden Unity, eminent physicist John Taylor puts many of these findings into historical perspective and documents how progress is made when unexpected, hidden unities are uncovered between apparently unrelated physical phenomena. Taylor cites examples from the ancient Greeks to the present day, such as the unity (...) of celestial and terrestrial dynamics (17th century), the unity of heat within the rest of dynamics (18th century), the unity of electricity, magnetism, and light (19th century), the unity of space and time and the unification of nuclear forces with electromagnetism (20th century). Without relying on mathematical detail, Taylor's emphasis is on fundamental physics, like particle physics and cosmology. Balancing what is understood with the unestablished theories and still unanswered questions, Taylor takes readers on a fascinating ongoing journey. John C. Taylor is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Physics at the University of Cambridge. A student of Nobel laureate Abdus Salam, Taylor's research career has spanned the era of developments in elementary particle physics since the 1950s. He taught theoretical physics at Imperial College, London, and at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and he has lectured worldwide. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society and a Fellow of the Institute of Physics. (shrink)

The main task of the paper is to explore Kant’s understanding of what unites the three kinds of judgment that he regards as the signature judgments of the three fundamental faculties of the mind--theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments--in a way that preserves their fundamental differences. I argue that these are differences in kind not only in degree; or, in the terms I motivate in the paper, differences in form. Thus, I aim to show that (1) the Romantic unity of (...) knowing, doing, and enjoying is not only inspired by Kant, but is in Kant’s own writings, and that (2) Kant understands this unity as a unity within a categorical variety: for him, theoretical judgment, practical judgment, and aesthetic judgment are the paradigmatic judgments of three formally different and irreducible rational capacities. I argue that a chief component in understanding the unity in this multiplicity is the imagination. This is because lawfulness turns out to be an essential mark of the “high” or “rational” aspects of the mind. But, for Kant, human beings can be lawful, and thus rational, in and of their world, only insofar as they are also imaginative. It is the imagination that allows us to be rational in our empirical world: to be rational animals. (shrink)

Here is a problem at the heart of the metaphysics of the natural world: How, if at all, can a unity undergo change? This problem incorporates two questions. First, in virtue of what is a thing a genuine unity? And second, the issue that’s more obvious in the formulation of the question: how, if at all, can such a unity undergo change? There are two basic approaches to this problem present in Newton’s physics. The more familiar grounds (...) unity and change in space and time, the second in the laws of nature. The latter approach is set out in this paper. I argue that a law-constitutive approach to the entities that are the subject-matter of Newton’s physics offers a principle of unity for things, be they simple or composite, and for the parts of composites, such that we also gain an account of what it is for a genuine unity to undergo change in its properties whilst retaining its numerical identity. I end by arguing that the law-constitutive approach favors endurantism over perdurantism. This paper is intended as an example of a particular approach to the relationship between metaphysics and philosophy of physics, according to which, as a philosopher, one engages with physics as a part of the history of philosophy, beginning with our deepest philosophical questions and using the development of physics read as a contribution to natural philosophy to explore how these questions are transformed, re-worked, addressed, and sometimes rendered non-questions. (shrink)

What is first philosophy today? In Unity and Aspect, the questioning begins with a new (old) approach to metaphysics: being is implied; it is implied in everything that is; it is an implication. BUt then, the history of philosophy must be rethought completely - for being implies unity, and time, and the other of time, namely, aspect. THe effect on the self and on self-understanding is radical: we can no longer be thought as human beings; rather, reaching back (...) to the ancient Greek name for us (phos), Haas seeks to rearticulate us as illuminating, as illuminating ourselves and others, and as implicated in our illuminations. UNity and Aspect then provokes us to problematize words and deeds, thoughts and things - and this means reconsidering our assumptions about history and survival, meaning and universality, sensibility and intimacy, knowledge and intentionality, action and improvisation, language and truth. ANd if Haas suspends the privilege enjoyed by our traditional philosophical concepts, this has implications for fields as diverse as ontology and phenomenology, ethics and aesthetics, education and linguistics, law and politics. (shrink)

Political theology has multiple provenances. One less cited is the seventeenth century irenic dictum: “and we would all embrace a mutual unity in things necessary; in things non necessary liberty; in all things charity.” While aimed at ecumenical peace, this call for mutual unity implied a deliberative context that went beyond sectarian Christian concerns. Liberty and charity were as conducive to a comprehensive church as more modest laws of toleration. My claim is that this dictum’s themes are extemporized (...) in recent pragmatist thought. (shrink)

Summary Within Husserl’s theory of perception, the role attributed to kinesthetic sensations determines a phase of the perceptive constitution that marks the boundary between pure receptivity and a first form of self-determination of consciousness. Kinesthetic experiences are, in fact, characterized not just as acts that are performed but rather that can be performed, albeit according to predetermined paths. This primitive form of ‘instinctive’ spontaneity of the Ego (linked to primal impulses) as realization of pre-established potentialities, characterizes what Husserl defines the (...) ‘ idiopsychic’ dimension of consciousness (Husserl, 1952, p. 135). However, although this level of consciousness unity presupposes a spontaneous activity, it can be investigated according to the ‘causal’ laws of motivation. The phenomenon of motivation was notoriously introduced by Husserl in §56 of Ideen II, as a specific law of spiritual life. However, there are two possible forms of motivation, one in which the Ego is actively involved, and a second one, called “associative motivation.” The latter basically indicates the passive tendency of creating associations between unities of the immanent sphere. In other terms, Husserl acknowledges the existence of “motivated relations” within the immanent sphere of mental acts which do not necessarily call for an active participation of the Ego. In this sense, the relation between motivating factors and motivated elements could be considered a kind of conditioning of the form “because-therefore,” in which the two elements arrange themselves in a succession of experiences. This work aims to show that this very kind of association is the same that pre-determines the unfolding possibility of kinesthetic chains. (shrink)

After a brief survey of arguments for a unitary particle theory of matter, offered by the writer in previous publications, the following new items are discussed. (1) The wave part of the dual aspect of matter, resting on the translation formula λ=h/p, is not covariant in the nonrelativistic domain. And relativistically, it is untenable not only on methodological grounds, but because it leads to obvious contradictions to elementary experience, e.g., in the equilibrium between a material oscillator and radiation. (2) The (...) photon story as usually presented is rectified historically and factually. (3) The previous derivation by the writer of quantum mechanical theory from a nonquantal background is supplemented, in order to be conclusive, by the postulate that the general probability relation is to become the ordinary addition law in the average. (4) Quotations from the writings of prominant dualists, intended by the latter to support their ideology, disclose a fantastic disarray of pseudophilosophical standpoints which can be cleared up only by repudiating the alleged dual nature of matter and of light and by ceasing to constantly mix up the contrast between particles and fields with that between particles and waves, and by returning to a strictly unitary aspect. (shrink)

In 1964, a great controversy over "one divides into two" and "two combine into one" broke out on the Chinese philosophical battlefront. Thanks to the chicanery of those "authorities on theory" and to the fact that some of our comrades were not able to comprehend or describe fully and accurately the dialectical materialist view of contradiction, this debate arrived at the erroneous conclusion that "one divides into two" is the dialectical method, is the law of the unity of opposites, (...) while "two combine into one" is metaphysical and represents placating or compromise between the opposites of a contradiction. Later, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" adopted and extended this conclusion in their strident call for the "philosophy of struggle" which formed the theoretical foundation of the ultraleftist line. In their distortions of the struggle of contradiction they denied the unity of contradiction. Under the direction of this philosophy of "struggle, struggle, struggle," which distorted the struggle aspect of contradiction and denied the unity of contradiction, which recognized only "dividing" and not "combining," the class struggle in China was expanded for many years, the battlelines of struggle were deepened, the enemy-versus-us-contradiction was intensified, wreaking destruction on the Party, the nation, and the people. Now it is time that we restore order from this chaos, distinguish clearly between which theories are true and which are false, and separate right practice from wrong. In order to really accomplish this, we must again present this case for a fair, public, and scientific trial. (shrink)

Resolving Dooyeweerd’s temporal/supratemporal dialectic opens the way to a deeper appreciation of naive experience and human identity as the image of God. This essay makes a case for that proposition, building on my critique of Dooyeweerd’s idea of cosmic time published previously in this journal. There I hypothesized that time—temporality—should be recognized as the first modal aspect rather than as a transaspectual common denominator of the other aspects. The religious root unity of the human community is not a supratemporal, (...) spiritual concentration point but rather humans themselves in their generations answering to God in all that they are and do. Humans are not temporal bodies directed by imperishable souls but whole persons-in-community, subject to all the modal laws and norms, living by faith in the true God or in false gods throughout this age, which opens to creation’s fulfillment in the age to come. (shrink)

This article examines the grappling of modern positivists with the question of legal unity. It presents and contrasts two antagonistic positivist strands—naturalist and normativist—epitomized in the works of Austin and Kelsen, respectively. The two strands correspond to two contrasting models of legal authority—criterial and coherence-based—and they accordingly diverge on the proper explanation of unity. Naturalist, criterial models purport to explain the unity of law based on extra-legal facts alone; normativist, coherence-based models resort strictly to the interrelation of (...) legal elements themselves. Against this backdrop, the article argues that Raz’s work on the subject is torn between Austin and Kelsen: While his naturalist ancestors accounted for legal unity externally, Raz’s prominent works are captivated by the Kelsenian realization that the unity of law must be accounted for internally. Two central upshots follow. First, the analysis provides a litmus test for the (in)ability of naturalist positivism to explain legal unity. Second, Raz’s strategic reliance on Kelsen distorts his work: Both the Grundnorm and validity chains are upended to fit Raz’s naturalist commitments. (shrink)

This paper argues with Kant that the only justifiable basis for a legal system is an innate right to freedom, which is defined as the right to be subject only to universal law and not to the arbitrary choices of others. Since rightful interaction is possible only within public institutional frameworks, we cannot respect one another’s innate right to freedom simply by interacting as virtuous individuals or as just states. In fact, only public authorities can have coercive authority, the rightfulness (...) of which is dependent upon the institutional framework constitutive of them. Of particular interest hesre is the requirement on states to provide public, institutional solutions to problems such as poverty and the failures of economic and financial systems. In addition, I pay special attention to why only the national public authority can establish a monopoly on coercion even though the establishment of a public authority is constitutive also of transnational rightful relations. (shrink)

I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise—the symmetry of the stress tensor—that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem would (...) not arise if he had kept his early theory of matter as made of mass points, or “physical monads.”. (shrink)

Max Weber famously diagnosed both an excess and a subordination of meaning in modernity when he coined the term disenchantment next to the fragmentation and irreconcilability of value spheres. Unlike Weber, however, who sought to keep the ideological and the rationalist sides of the modern divide together, his immediate followers capitalized either on his decisionism (i.e. Carl Schmitt) or on his universalism (i.e. Jürgen Habermas). In an attempt to develop a constructive perspective on the question of how we can conceive (...) of irreconcilable values within a larger normative horizon, this article introduces Karl Jaspers’s interpretation and refinement of Weber’s work. Most fundamentally, Jaspers’s existentialist philosophy of communication sought to turn Weber’s warring gods into a source of solidarity rather than divisiveness. I argue that Jaspers did so in rooting human freedom not in the decision or the law but in an experiential uncertainty and the knowledge not to know. The article closes with a discussion of some practical and theoretical implications of Jaspers’s thought for our understanding of diversity in unity in post-truth times. (shrink)

This lucid and compact book contains a forceful critique of the "wave-particle duality" interpretations of quantum theory, and a unitary particle theory which explains the quantum rules in terms of non-quantal axioms. To speak of a wave-particle duality, says Landé, is to speak of an abstraction and a real thing as if they were on a level of parity; and he takes Born's statistical interpretation of quantum phenomena as evidence that a unitary particle theory is needed. The problem then is (...) to explain why particles obey quantum laws of interference and h-dominated periodicity. Although much of the book assumes knowledge of mathematics and physics, many sections require no scientific background; and in the more technical sections there are frequent summaries which state the arguments and conclusions in a non-mathematical way. An incisive and provocative work which deserves to be widely read.--B. J. H. (shrink)

"This work springs from a conviction of the unity of nature, expressed here in a single principle. In its earliest form this conviction was merely the sense of a hidden unity of form in nature, which the intellect had not yet identified. At that stage it had little value, except in creating the need to find a rational justification for the a-rational feeling. Soon I realised that the discovery of a universal form of process was hindered by the (...) intellectual separation of the processes of subjective experience from those of the external world. It was necessary to bring into closer relation the scientific conception of the forms of external nature and the subjective sense of the forms of experience. This in turn led to the recognition that the methods of exact science had paid inadequate attention to the irreversible or one-way character of process, which is unmistakable in the subjective realm, but is also evident in many inorganic and organic processes, such as those do which form is developed. I expressed this view in a sketch of the outlook of the sciences, entitled Archimedes, or the Future of Physics (1927). The next step was the observation that one principle only could account for the development of regular spatial forms: the principle that asymmetry decreases in isolable processes. This concept of one-way process appeared to me to be the most general conception of spatial process conceivable at the present time, so that all other types of process should be capable of being represented as special cases. I called it the Unitary Principle and determined to use it as the basis of a comprehensive scientific method."--The preface. (shrink)

The idea of natural law, says the author, "is based on a belief that there exists a moral order which every normal person can discover by using his reason, and of which he must take account if he is to attune himself to his necessary ends as a human being." This notion has supported the philosophy and behaviour of men in all cultures since the beginning of society. It is implicit in the Mosaic code; is fundamental in the thought of (...) Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Newton and Mill; served as the "higher law" basis for English common law and the American Constitution; and is still relevant today. It is to natural law and to its relation to the condition of our society that the seven distinguished contributors to this volume address themselves. In keeping with their widely divergent backgrounds and different faiths, the writers reveal a refreshing range of opinion within a fundamental unity. (shrink)

Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. In that case, why (...) posit 'big-G' Grounding in addition to the 'small-g' grounding relations already in the metaphysician's toolkit? The best reasons for doing so stem from the Unity argument, according to which the further posit of Grounding is motivated as an apt unifier of the specific relations, and the Priority argument, according to which Grounding is needed in order to fix the direction of priority of the specific relations. I previously considered versions of these arguments, and argued that they did not succeed; in two papers, however, Jonathan Schaffer aims to develop a better version of the Unity argument, and offers certain objections to my reasons for rejecting the Priority argument. Here I consider these new arguments for Grounding. (shrink)

Everyday experience presents us with a world of ordinary objects, but philosophers struggle to devise a useful principle of composition that even comes close to generating just those composites we perceive the world to contain. This paper presents such a principle as a first step toward defending “object dispositionalism” as a theory of material objects. According to object dispositionalism, a plurality composes a whole just when it has the disposition to cause us to perceive a unity in the region (...) it occupies and because it possesses features that in combination realize that disposition. Sections “Object dispositionalism” and “Object dispositionalism’s color counterpart” introduce object dispositionalism and argue it satisfies plausible desiderata for a theory of material objects extant views do not. Relying on cognitive psychologists’ research on object perception, sections “The disposition to what?” through “The general mechanism” explicate the manifestation and basis of the causal power object dispositionalists propose is present wherever composition occurs. Sections “Why object perception researchers are realists” and “When we disagree” describe the perceivers with and conditions in which that causal power manifests and argues object-perception variation doesn’t undermine object dispositionalism’s status as a realist view. (shrink)

Xenophanes claimed that God is a ball, which means that he is a perfect body. This idea is well developed in Jagannatha worship, who is a central Deity in Orissa, India. It’s a round form of Krishna, who is usually depicted in a human like form. Jagannatha, his brother Baladeva and sister Subhadra are justified as round forms because of their specific manifestation of ecstasy, that, according to aesthetical theory (rasa tattva) happened to them. Yet there are many other explanations (...) of the Jagannatha’s roundness. Round form personifies unity and diversity principle in Jagannatha worship, whose image was dear in Orissa duringlong historical period to different religious groups: Vaishnavas, Shaivaites, Jains, Buddhists and even some Muslims. Orissa also has a blending of different cultures, sub-cultures and traditions. Even now, it has 62 distinct tribal groups, that makes a largest collection of diverse tribes in a single state. As the legend goes, Jagannatha made His first appearance in the tribe of Savaras thousands of years ago. Up until now, there are cooks in the Jagannatha kitchen that are called sauviras. In worship of Jagannatha we find the model of axiological globalism, when the difference in the vision of the reality does not obscure the interior mood of wholeness, unity. (shrink)

I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.

It is evident that disunity is a reality wherever we look in the world today. Even within the Body of Christ there is a lack of unity that is appalling. The universal church needs to develop a greater urgency about it and at the same time, do more about it than most are doing. If the universal church comes to a realization that genuine Christian unity is already ‘an established reality and can progressively be realized and brought into (...) the actualities of life’, perhaps then the universal church would strive harder to create and maintain a sustainable Christian unity making it a ‘lived reality’. As a Reformed family, we believe in the creative and redemptive activity of God, inaugurated in Jesus Christ but not yet completed. The Kingdom of God is a present reality, which will be expressed anew in all its fullness. This is our Christian hope, which is fundamental to our Christian faith and Christian faith is expectant faith. The universal Church therefore must offer the image of a people who are mature in faith and capable of finding a meeting-point beyond denominational barriers and not the image of a people divided and separated because of ecclesiastical differences. It is hoped that the Global Christian Forum will continue to reflect that image. (shrink)

The greater interconnectivity and interdependence unleashed by globalization are not creating a more harmonious, cosmopolitan humanity. On the contrary, the more global the world becomes, the more insistent particular differences, especially of the nationalist kind, are being articulated around the world, often leading to tension and conflict. This seeming paradox cannot be reconciled through simple mantras of ‘unity in diversity’. Rhetorical references to ‘a single humanity’ to overcome structurally entrenched divisions (as institutionalized in the world system of nation-states) are (...) not sufficient for the attainment of greater pan-human solidarity. In response to this predicament this paper argues for a cosmopolitan perspective, in which a humanistic universalism should not be seen as a static moral ideal, but as a social and political horizon that must be worked towards, but probably never achieved, through a painstaking and continuing process of cosmopolitanization against the grain of powerful modes of particularist closure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:102 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and removal of the social self, through the devaluation of values and de-culturation, to the objectivizatlonof the ego, the state of oneness and unity with all. The remaining sections of the book give an analysis of Rumi, the universal man of the Eas~, and an analysis of Goethe, the universal man of the West. The Rumi chapter contains impressive translations of RumPs poems and (...) the Goethe study offers a very pertinent critique of K. R. Eissler's psychoanalytic interpretation of the great man. Added is a case history of a young man who lived in two cultures, and after many errors and meanderings obtained full integration. The final section offers an application of the transcultural state to health, social change and leadership. A most rewarding and challenging work, marred only by an incredible number of typographical errors and a sometimes uneven English due to misunderstandings of the Dutch printers. Hg~RY WALTESBRANN Washington, D. C. Natural Law and Modern Society. Essays by John Cogley, Robert M. Hutchins, John Courtney Murray, SJ., Scott Buchanan, Philip Selznick, Harvey Wheeler, and Robert Gordis. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. 285. Meridian Books. $1.75.) This group of essays has been discussed from time to time at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. The essays provide an excellent survey of the various contexts in which the idea of natural law is functioning today: in jurisprudence, political theory, sciences, religions, and philosophies of culture. Though the emphasis is on "modem society," there is a large amount of history in this collection, going back to the ancients, and one of the most valuable features of the analysis is the evidence here offered that "natural law" has meant and still means many different things, and that this flexibility of meaning gives the idea an enduring vitality and relevance. This is the particular theme of Scott Buchanan's "Natural Law and Teleology", which chapter reviews almost the whole history of philosophy to show how the content of natural law has varied for teleological reasons. Since it is impossible to review this whole story, it seems simplest and least distorting to quote a series of passages from the essays so that the reader can estimate the range of subject-matter and the kind of observations in the volume : The natural lawyer who lacks a sense of history, a factual sense, is as seriously deficient as the one who has been victimmed by the historical setting of his own time. Social scientists are concerned with digging up and evaluating exactly the kind of factual material the conscientious natural lawyer needs (Cogley, pp. 24, 26). We are free, with the deference that is due previous laborers in the vineyard, to work out the ~pplication of the principles of natural law to the conditions of our own time. The ends of uman life are heldto be unchanging; the search for the best way of achieving them is continuous and adapted to changing conditions and new knowledge. The search for a revival of natural law--not necessarily, or even principally pitched in Thomistic terms but projected more generally on a ~us gent~um, pluralistic basis--may well be the dominant theme of American legal philosophy over the second half of the century (Hutchins, pp. 34, 37, 46). Plato saw an epitome of the legal and political crisis of the city-state in the trial and death of Socrates.... The sophists are operators in opinion and power.... Plato sets out to find the truth in science and the good of the state.... There is no doctrinal answer to the quest.... The Dialogues practice what they preach, a relentless dialectical exposure of ideas masquerading in dogmas and opinions.... The endless mutual persuasions in any community could result in good laws if the formal processes of government provided insights for the citizens and magistrates alike.... Neither Plato nor Aristotle commonly uses the phrase 'natural law'.... For the Stoics what Plato had described as the "community of ideas," which was only the notion of the interpenetration of BOOK REVIEWS 103 mutual implication of ideas, became the Logos, the perhaps infinite total of... (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to raise a few questions about Bayne s mereological account of the unity of consciousness. In Section 1, I raise a few clarificatory questions about the account and the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. In Sections 2 and 3, I offer an alternative view of unity of consciousness and contrast it with Bayne's view. I call this view the connectivity account. These sections prepare the ground for the main question of this (...) article: why should we prefer Bayne's mereological view to the connectivity view? (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the central problem of Aristotle’s Metaphysics H (VIII) 6 is the unity of forms and that he solves this problem in just the way he solves the problem of the unity of composites – by hylomorphism. I also discuss the matter– form relationship in H 6, arguing that they have a correlative nature as the matter of the form and the form of the matter.

Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the.

Synonyms Cognitive universals; Human nature; Human universals Definition The “psychic unity” idea denotes the existence of a set of psychological and cognitive capacities universally shared by human beings and grounded in biological equality.