Results for 'weight of reasons'

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  1.  8
    Estimating weights of reasons using metaheuristics: A hybrid approach to machine ethics.Benoît Alcaraz, Aleks Knoks & David Streit - 2024 - In Sanmay Das, Brian Patrick Green, Kush Varshney, Marianna Ganapini & Andrea Renda (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES-24). ACM Press. pp. 27-38.
    We present a new approach to representation and acquisition of normative information for machine ethics. It combines an influential philosophical account of the fundamental structure of morality with argumentation theory and machine learning. According to the philosophical account, the deontic status of an action – whether it is required, forbidden, or permissible – is determined through the interaction of “normative reasons” of varying strengths or weights. We first provide a formal characterization of this account, by modeling it in(weighted) argumentation (...)
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  2.  45
    Comparative Value and the Weight of Reasons.Itai Sher - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (1):103-158.
    Abstract:One view of practical reasoning is that it involves the weighing of reasons. It is not clear, however, how the weights of reasons combine, especially given the logical and substantive relations among different reasons. Nor is it clear how the weighing of reasons relates to decision theoretic maximization of expected value. This paper constructs a formal model of reasons and their weight in order to shed light on these issues. The model informs philosophical debates (...)
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  3. The weight of reasons: a framework for ethics.Chris Tucker - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The book develops, defends, and applies a "Dual Scale" model of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. It addresses, among other things, what the general issue of weighing reasons is; what it is to weigh reasons correctly; whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and/or (...)
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  4. The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.
    This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively (...)
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  5. The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed characterisation of some ways in which our preferences reflect our reasons. I will argue that practical reasons can be characterised along two dimensions that influence our preferences: their balance and their weight. This is analogous to a similar characterisation of the way in which probabilities reflect the balance and weight of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I will illustrate the distinction between the balance and (...) of reasons, and show how this is crucial for an adequate account of preference and choice. The upshot is a more complete picture of a particular kind of decision, labelled by Isaac Levi and, more recently, Ruth Chang as ‘hard choices’. These are choices in which one option is better than another in some ways, the other is better than the first in some ways, but neither seems better overall. The distinction between the balance and weight of reasons presents a new way of understanding how hard choices vary by degree and what it is that makes them so hard. (shrink)
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  6. Bearing the Weight of Reasons.Stephen Kearns - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 173-190.
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  7. Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons.Chris Tucker - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):454-480.
    The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view (...)
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  8. An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons.Barry Maguire & Errol Lord - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
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  9. The End‐Relational Theory of ‘Ought’ and the Weight of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):405-417.
    Stephen Finlay analyses ‘ought’ in terms of probability. According to him, normative ‘ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between ‘ought’ and the balance of reasons. ‘A ought to Φ’ seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A Φ-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for ‘ought’, it also makes sense to think of reasons and (...)
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  10.  98
    The weight of facts: A puzzle about perception, reasons and deliberation.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):104-113.
    How should we understand the epistemic role of perception? According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), a subject’s perceptual knowledge that p is to be explained in terms of the subject believing that p for a factive and reflectively accessible reason. I argue that ED raises far-reaching questions for rationality and deliberation; I illustrate those questions by setting up a puzzle about belief-suspension, and I argue that ED does not have the resources to make sense of the rationality of belief-suspension in cases (...)
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  11. The Weight of Moral Reasons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3:35-58.
    This paper starts by giving an interpretation of the notorious question "Why be moral?" Then, to answer that question, it develops an account of why some moral reasons -- specifically, the moral reasons that ground moral requirements -- are sufficiently weighty that they outweigh all countervailing reasons for action.
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  12.  12
    The weight of truth.Xintong Wei - 2024 - Synthese 204 (2):1-24.
    Belief is said to be subject to a norm of truth. A norm, intuitively, tells us what we ought to or may do. What sort of claim can truth make on us? On one standard view, the truth norm of belief is obliging. One ought to believe the truth and truth only. On another view, the truth norm of belief is permissive. One may believe the truth and truth only. Recently, it has been argued that the truth norm plays no (...)
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  13. Weighting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.
    This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we assume (...)
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  14.  39
    The Weight of the Past.George Sher - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):152-164.
    ABSTRACT The question that this paper seeks to answer is that of whether the resistance to change that characterizes the conservative temperament has any rational basis. More precisely, my question is whether we have good grounds for accepting any version of the principle that if something exists then we need a reason to change it but don’t need a reason to keep it. The paper defends a version of this principle whose scope is restricted to familiar traditions and customs on (...)
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  15.  7
    Reason(s) have Weight with the Evidence of Practical Reason.Reena Kumari, Ravi Kumar & Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 18 (47):233-250.
    Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In (...)
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  16. The Weight of Tradition in the Formation of the Name Signs of the Deaf in China.Yau Shun-Chiu - 1996 - Diogenes 44 (175):55-65.
    The Chinese are probably the most particular people in the world when it comes to their names. As the Chinese proverb says, “worse than being born under a bad star is to receive a bad name.” For this reason it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the role of name signs in China without a certain knowledge of the Chinese tradition regarding the attribution of names. A legal Chinese name is made up of a family name, monosyllabic with some (...)
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  17. The composition of reasons.Campbell Brown - 2013 - Synthese 191 (5):779-800.
    How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons, the main two being (...)
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  18. Reasons Have no Weight.Dalia Drai - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):60-76.
    Practical reasoning is often described as weighing reasons. When one deliberates about what to do one puts all the reasons for the action on one side and all the reasons against the action on the other side. The balance between both sides determines the outcome of the deliberation. Assuming that this description is correct, the next question is how the different reasons for and against the action determine the outcome of the deliberation. This is the place (...)
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  19.  19
    Supporting the weight of the elephant in the room: Technical intelligence propped up by social cognition and language.Alex Thornton, Francesca Happé & Christine A. Caldwell - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    We consider the evolutionary plausibility of Osiurak and Reynaud's arguments. We argue that technical reasoning is not quite the magic bullet that O&R assume, and instead propose a co-evolutionary account of the interplay between technical reasoning and social learning, with language emerging as a vital issue neglected in O&R's account.
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  20.  53
    Conceptualizing uncertainty: the IPCC, model robustness and the weight of evidence.Margherita Harris - 2021 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    The aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of how to assess and communicate uncertainty in areas of research deeply afflicted by it, the assessment and communication of which are made more fraught still by the studies’ immediate policy implications. The IPCC is my case study throughout the thesis, which consists of three parts. In Part 1, I offer a thorough diagnosis of conceptual problems faced by the IPCC uncertainty framework. The main problem I discuss is the persistent (...)
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  21. In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for Democracy.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Why does reason matter, if in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's In Praise of Reason offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism--when, for example, people reject scientific evidence about such (...)
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  22. The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. It is argued that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. Its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of (...)
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  23. Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear (...)
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  24.  42
    The Collective Archives of Mind : An Exploration of Reasons from Metaethics to Social Ontology.Gloria Mähringer - unknown
    This monograph discusses the question of what it is to be a reason – mainly in practical ethics – and proposes an original contribution to metaethics.It critically examines theories of metaethical realism, constructivism and error theory and identifies several misunderstandings or unclarities in contemporary debates. Based on this examination, the book suggests a distinction between a conceptual question, that can be answered by pure first-personal thinking, and a material question, that targets responses to reasons as a natural phenomenon in (...)
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  25. Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being (...)
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  26.  32
    The Birth of Reason and Other Essays. [REVIEW]K. T. A. - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):578-578.
    The twenty-two essays collected for this book range widely in theme, style, and quality. The essays, a majority of which were previously unpublished, are arranged in three sections: 1) Early Essays, containing one particularly fine essay, "The Soul at Play," originally intended as part of Santayana's Soliloquies in England; 2) Later Essays, in which the title essay and "Friendship" are outstanding; and 3) Philosophical Essays, offering commentaries on Russell, Dewey, and James, on his own philosophy, and "On the False Steps (...)
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  27.  48
    Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason by Sofie Møller. [REVIEW]Jessica Tizzard - 2023 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 61 (2):332-334.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 208. Hardback, $105.00. -/- Even those with a passing knowledge of Kant's system will recognize his sustained use of legal metaphor and his appeal to lawfulness as a beacon of philosophical progress. He famously begins one of the most important (and impermeable) sections of the Critique of Pure (...)
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  28.  61
    Reasons, Weight, and Hybrid Approaches to the Metaphysics of Practical Normativity.Cory Davia - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):221-236.
    In virtue of what do some considerations count in favor or against actions? Some philosophers have recently been interested in hybrid answers to this question. For instance, it might be that some facts about reasons are brute, and some are explained in terms of agents’ acts of will. Such views face a challenge: they need a story about how reasons grounded in one way combine with reasons grounded in other ways to yield overall verdicts about what to (...)
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  29.  68
    From Kant to Schelling: Counter-Enlightenment in the Name of Reason.Damon Linker - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (2):337 - 377.
    MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY PRESENTS A PECULIAR PUZZLE to the historian of ideas. For most of the early modern period, philosophers throughout Europe had allied themselves with the Enlightenment in its self-proclaimed struggle against dogma, superstition, and ignorance. Yet beginning in late eighteenth century Germany, this situation began to change—so much so that by the early decades of the twentieth century, Germany had become the undisputed home of the philosophical Counter-Enlightenment. If today the most celebrated Counter-Enlightenment figures hail from France or (...)
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  30. A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
    This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the (...)
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  31. The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons.Marilie Coetsee - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford University Press. pp. 24-48.
    Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent (...)
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  32. Weight for Stephen Finlay.Daan Evers - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):737-749.
    According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I (...)
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  33.  91
    Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder.Olle Risberg - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (1):101-107.
    In this article I argue against Schroeder's account of the weight of normative reasons. It is shown that in certain cases an agent may have reasons she cannot know about without them ceasing to be reasons, and also reasons she cannot know about at all. Both possibilities are troubling for Schroeder's view.
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  34.  87
    Reasons in Weighted Argumentation Graphs.David Streit, Vincent de Wit & Aleks Knoks - 2023 - In Natasha Alechina, Andreas Herzig & Fei Liang (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction: 9th International Workshop, LORI 2023, Jinan, China, October 26–29, 2023, Proceedings. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 251-259.
    The philosophical literature that tackles foundational questions about normativity often appeals to normative reasons—or considerations that count in favor of or against actions—and their interaction. The interaction between normative reasons is usually made sense of by appealing to the metaphor of (normative) weight scales. This paper substitutes an argumentation-theoretic model for this metaphor. The upshot is a general and precise model that is faithful to the philosophical ideas.
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  35. Iqbal's Fractured Vision: History as a Science and the Moral Weight of the Past.Sara Aronowitz & Reza Hadisi - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (4):881-905.
    This paper aims to understand how we reason from historical premises to normative conclusions, tracing this question through the work of Muhammad Iqbal. On our reading, he wavers between two views of history, one a kind of natural science, and the other akin to religious interpretation. These tell different stories about the lessons we draw from history.
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  36. Epistemic agency and the self-knowledge of reason: on the contemporary relevance of Kant’s method of faculty analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.
    Each of Kant’s three Critiques offers an account of the nature of a mental faculty and arrives at this account by means of a procedure I call ‘faculty analysis’. Faculty analysis is often regarded as among the least defensible aspects of Kant’s position; as a consequence, philosophers seeking to inherit Kantian ideas tend to transpose them into a different methodological context. I argue that this is a mistake: in fact faculty analysis is a live option for philosophical inquiry today. My (...)
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  37. Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence.Boaz Miller - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:69-80.
    It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is (...)
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  38. Commitment: Worth the Weight.Alida Liberman & Mark Schroeder - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 104-120.
    This chapter takes an indirect approach to the question of how people weigh conflicting reasons to determine what they ought to do. It is argued that obligations are a distinct normative concept that also admits of weighing. A natural, simple way due to W. D. Ross—Simple Weighing—of construing the manner in which both reasons and obligations are weighed is introduced. Commitments are introduced as a third normative concept that admits of weighing, and it is argued that Simple Weighing (...)
     
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  39. In Defence of Proportionalism.Daan Evers - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):313-320.
    In his book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean theory of reasons. Humeanism is the view that you have a reason to X only if X‐ing promotes at least one of your desires. But Schroeder rejects a natural companion theory of the weight of reasons, which he calls proportionalism. According to it, the weight of a reason is proportionate to the strength of the desire that grounds it and the extent to which the (...)
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  40. The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.
    The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time. It is usually defended by normative antirealists, who tend to be attracted to Humean theories of reasons. But this is an awkward combination: 'A ought to X' entails that there are reasons for A to X, and 'A ought to X all things considered' entails that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. If the standards implicitly referred to are not those of (...)
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  41.  32
    Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will.John Lemos - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 25 (3):101-118.
    In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in (...)
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  42. Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons.Eric Sampson - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-6.
    We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.
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  43. Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reasons as premises of good reasoning. This account says, roughly, that to be a normative reason for a response (such as a belief or intention) is to be premise of good reasoning, from fitting responses, to that response. Second, building on the account of reasons, it develops and defends a fittingness-first account of the structure of the normative domain. This account says that (...)
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  44.  78
    J. M. Keynes' 'theory of evidential weight': Its relation to information processing theory and application in the general theory.Michael E. Brady - 1987 - Synthese 71 (1):37 - 59.
    The conclusions derived by Keynes in his Treatise on Probability (1921) concerning induction, analogical reasoning, expectations formation and decision making, mirror and foreshadow the main conclusions of cognitive science and psychology.The problem of weight is studied within an economic context by examining the role it played in Keynes' applied philosophy work, The General Theory (1936). Keynes' approach is then reformulated as an optimal control approach to dealing with changes in information evaluation over time. Based on this analysis the problem (...)
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  45. Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to (...)
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  46. The dual scale model of weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.
    The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward (...)
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  47. A Model and Indicator of Aggregate Need Satisfaction for Capped Objectives and Weighting Schemes for Situations of Scarcity.Anders Herlitz - 2017 - Social Indicators Research 133 (2):413-430.
    Abstract Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms of social welfare functions which are essentially and importantly non-satiable. However, there are good reasons to consider certain normative criteria and many policy objectives to be capped, i.e. bounded, and thus satiable provided sufficient resources are made available for their satisfaction. Inspired by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke class of indicators, this paper uses an interdisciplinary approach to develop a model for assessing outcomes in terms of capped (...)
     
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  48.  60
    Too old to vote? A democratic analysis of age-weighted voting.Andrei Poama & Alexandru Volacu - 2023 - European Journal of Political Theory 22 (4):565-586.
    Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence (...)
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  49.  33
    The specificity of terms affects conditional reasoning.Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda & Markus Knauff - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (1):72-93.
    Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with (...)
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  50. An Adam Smithian account of moral reasons.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1073-1087.
    The Humean Theory of Reasons, according to which all of our reasons for action are explained by our desires, has been criticized for not being able to account for “moral reasons,” namely, overriding reasons to act on moral demands regardless of one's desires. My aim in this paper is to utilize ideas from Adam Smith's moral philosophy in order to offer a novel and alternative account of moral reasons that is both desire-based and accommodating of (...)
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