Aesthetics

The standard of pleasing art creates a notion that is axiological in the nature of the art itself. Given this claim Schopenhauer asserts that disturbing art does not provide relief for the spectator, therefore it may not be viewed as a temporary escape from life’s suffering. This opus claims otherwise using the very same principle of Arthur Schopenhauer on aesthetics and the Will to Life. The introduction provides the philosophical inquests of Arthur Schopenhauer that are associated with the metaphysical position (...) of the very banal action of appreciation. This opens the threshold for a review of written positions on the variables that would ascertain this principle of the Will to Life, the material of disturbing art, and the framework of the transcendence argument. These are crucial to establish the argument that this paper asserts in accordance to the research questions provided in the introduction, which focuses primarily on the transcendental analysis of the value of a qualified disturbing art. Following this review, the methodological means and the framework of transcendence is given premium. Deriving these contents from the hermeneutical processes, the opus provides a graphic representation on employing the transcendental method through hermeneutical procedures. Thus, creates a framework for the apparent philosophical investigation. Given these, the explications and discussions allow a better view on justifying and qualifying disturbing art according to its metaphysical and phenomenological connection with the Being as a natural spectator. Thus, leads to a possible novel argument utilized under the principles of Arthur Schopenhauer. (shrink)

Sentences containing predicates of personal taste (for example, ‘tasty’, ‘funny’) and aesthetic predicates (for example, ‘beautiful’) give rise to an acquaintance inference: They convey the information that speakers have first-hand experience with the object of predication, and that they can only be uttered appropriately if that is the case. This is surprisingly hard to explain. I will concentrate on aesthetic predicates, and firstly criticize previous attempts to explain the acquaintance phenomena. Second, I will suggest an explanation that rests on a (...) speech act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, according to which, in uttering ‘X is beautiful’ speakers perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously: an expressive and an assertive one. I will spell out this suggestion in detail and defend it against objections. Considering puzzles related to the acquaintance inference will lead to a new argument for a promising version of hybrid expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

Although Les Philosophes was an ordinary comedy, and Palissot was far from the caliber of Molière or Voltaire, it successfully consolidated conservative criticisms of the philosophes within a satirical framework, enjoying a successful three-month run in 1760. The reason behind its success was that it was at the center of a debate between the Enlightenment philosophers and the Counter-Enlightenment figures. In addition to being an example of 18th-century French comédie, the play serves as a valuable source for understanding the key (...) points of conservative discourse of the time. While Palissot seemed to focus on attacking individual philosophes’ personalities, he paired these attacks with conceptual critiques, and directed the most of his criticism primarily at Diderot and Rousseau. The play remains significant for two reasons: First, it captures almost all of the concerns and arguments of the conservative reaction to the Enlightenment. Second, it sheds light on Enlightenment thinkers' personal and intellectual struggles. This paper examines Palissot’s Les Philosophes not as a mere literary dispute but as a rich text that reveals the Counter-Enlightenment discourse that emerged in the second half of the 18th century. (shrink)

Despite its relative infancy, ecological science plays a pre-eminent role in current environmental decision-making globally and has, over recent decades, permeated a broad range of academic disciplines. Developments in two areas of philosophical thought in particular, environmental aesthetics and the aesthetics of science, beg an exploration of their intersection with respect to the role of aesthetics in ecological science. Here, we provide a contemporary synthesis of both environmental aesthetics and aesthetics of science to explore aesthetic dimensions of contemporary ecological science, (...) highlighting three main areas of convergence: 1.) the influence of aesthetic experiences and judgements of nature by ecologists on ecological science and our contemporary understanding of nature; 2.) the development and role of ecological ‘taste’ amongst ecologists; and 3.) moral, cultural and political implications of the ecological imagination as underpinned by current ecological science. We identify a risk for feedback mechanisms to perpetuate a relatively homogeneous ecological aesthetic as a result of reciprocal influences between ecological science and society which may further promote inadvertent policy advocacy and stifle scientific innovation. We suggest ecological science would benefit from increased aesthetic literacy and reflection by broadening the ecological imagination and intentionally facilitating more diverse and equitable science to inform policy outcomes. Our argument should be of interest to philosophers of science, ecologists and those that draw on their outputs. (shrink)

Despite its relative infancy, ecological science plays a pre-eminent role in current environmental decision-making globally and has, over recent decades, permeated a broad range of academic disciplines. Developments in two areas of philosophical thought in particular, environmental aesthetics and the aesthetics of science, beg an exploration of their intersection with respect to the role of aesthetics in ecological science. Here, we provide a contemporary synthesis of both environmental aesthetics and aesthetics of science to explore aesthetic dimensions of contemporary ecological science, (...) highlighting three main areas of convergence: 1.) the influence of aesthetic experiences and judgements of nature by ecologists on ecological science and our contemporary understanding of nature; 2.) the development and role of ecological ‘taste’ amongst ecologists; and 3.) moral, cultural and political implications of the ecological imagination as underpinned by current ecological science. We identify a risk for feedback mechanisms to perpetuate a relatively homogeneous ecological aesthetic as a result of reciprocal influences between ecological science and society which may further promote inadvertent policy advocacy and stifle scientific innovation. We suggest ecological science would benefit from increased aesthetic literacy and reflection by broadening the ecological imagination and intentionally facilitating more diverse and equitable science to inform policy outcomes. Our argument should be of interest to philosophers of science, ecologists and those that draw on their outputs. (shrink)

This article is a critical notice of Sherri Irvin’s Immaterial: Rules in Contemporary Art (2022). After introducing Irvin’s project, notably how she understands the role of “custom rules” for the display and conservation of, and participation in, works of contemporary art, I focus on two case studies that motivate her argument: Jan Dibbets’ work, All shadows that occurred to me (1969) and Sarah Sze’s Migrateurs (1997). According to Irvin, both works require the participation of museum conservators not merely for their (...) preservation, but also realization. Granting the latter, I consider its implications. Prior to the involvement of conservators the works in question appear indeterminate in crucial respects. The conservators’ role is to seek enough clarity about various rules governing the work to afford future installations of the work without consulting the artist. But both case studies reveal considerable artistic whimsy when it comes to abiding by the rules supposedly underwriting these works’ identity, raising worries for their persistence over time. Given their constitutive role, I consider whether there is room, on Irvin’s account, for the conservators to be right and the artist wrong about the nature of the works in question. (shrink)

Is finding someone funny a way of treating them as an object? And if so, does that make it immoral? In this paper, I argue that seeing someone as comic involves failing to take into account their subjectivity, which makes it a form of objectification. As for the morality of this ‘comic objectification’, I argue that regarding someone with a comically objectifying attitude is wrongful when such an attitude plays a role in legitimating the oppression of members of their social (...) group. (shrink)

This article provides a much-needed continuation of the discussion of mood in narrative cinema. Whereas the dominant accounts of mood and cinema are interested in how films and filmmakers artistically express ‘mood,’ and in whether these films can therefore give rise to an equivalent mood in viewers, this paper introduces the consideration of the moods spectators themselves bring to viewing experiences. I begin first with an overview of the influential accounts of mood and narrative cinema put forward by Carl Plantinga (...) and Robert Sinnerbrink, examining their strengths and weaknesses. In the second section, drawing on insights from phenomenological approaches to mood, namely a renewed concept of ‘attunement,’ I offer provisional sketches of three possible complex mood negotiations unexplored in the former accounts, with reference to sequences from specific films. In these cases, viewers can experience the aesthetically crafted moods of a film with affective, mooded investment without sharing an equivalent mood. (shrink)

Despite the extraordinary influence of Hegel’s aesthetics, the very term “aesthetics” features very seldom in his body of work. Considering both ongoing radical uncertainty as to the status of aesthetics as well as Hegel’s profound and persistent influence on aesthetics, it is worth reflecting on the reasons for, and potential alternatives to, Hegel’s use of the term “aesthetics.” This is the goal of this paper, which combines a reconstruction of Hegel’s variations on the topic with a broader perspective on what (...) they can still teach us today. I begin by discussing Hegel’s presentations of the topic of his lectures on aesthetics (Section II). In Section III, I argue that both Hegel’s ambivalence towards aesthetics and his eventual identification of the latter with a philosophy of art are rooted in his confrontation with Kant’s seminal, yet insufficient, attempt to surmount dualism through his theory of reflective judgment. The attempt to address Kant’s unresolved dualism ultimately leads to the equivalence, both conceptual and terminological, of aesthetics and philosophy of art, and to the autonomy of art as a form of the absolute spirit (Section IV). In the concluding section, I outline the fundamental tensions left open by this equivalence as open challenges in contemporary aesthetics (Section V). (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to identify the species of music that is most justifiably denominated sublime and to characterize it as fully as possible, in part through a suggested taxonomy of the species, illustrated by a wide range of musical examples. After a general discussion of sublimity in its original sphere of application—the natural world—I go on to consider the nature of sublime musical experience. I propose that categorizing music as some species of sublime is at base a (...) matter of what it is most like or most resembles among natural phenomena. This results in a scheme which recognizes five distinguishable kinds of sublime music: negatively transcendent, positively transcendent, mixedly transcendent, energizing, and transcendent-energizing. I distinguish sublime music from other valuable music kinds and finish by pointing to some rewards that come with the experience of sublime music. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to answer the problem of country music costuming. That is, how can we reconcile the practical identity associated with country music with the image of the male country singer as the “rhinestone cowboy.” This is the question of how to make sense of the rural, working-class, ruggedly, and traditionally masculine persona common to the genre and seemingly endorsed by it with the elaborately embroidered, brightly colored, and highly embellished fashion of the genre. The intractability of (...) this problem has led some to argue that the simplest solution is to just deny country music authenticity discourse altogether. I argue that by accounting for country music authenticity in terms of the genre’s being a dual character concept, we can fully address the skeptic’s worries. Beyond merely rendering the rhinestone encrusted “Nudie” suit compatible with country music aesthetic practice, this account also helps us make sense of the aesthetic value of country music costuming, and its potentially gender queer function. (shrink)