General Philosophy of Science

Emergence is an omnipresent phenomenon that is present in almost all subjects, including physics, other branches of natural science, languages, and even social sciences and economics. Similarities and differences can be found in these domains. We discuss the classification of emergence, which can be organized according to different rules. We also explore universal properties among different levels of emergence, and where the differences among emergence patterns in different theories come from.

Following a line of discussion opened up by Patricia Kauark-Leite in her text Sobre a pluralidade de naturezas: Kant em diálogo com Forster, in this article we aim to delve into one of the points of the tense discussion between Kant (philosophy) and Forster (science) in the 18th century, namely: the right of an investigator of nature to use teleological principles when he lacks the resources via theory to advance knowledge. To this end, we seek to emphasize the terms used (...) by Kant in On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788), as we understand that his part of the discussion brings into the debate a question of right (present in the discussions of the first and third Critiques), which is fundamental to philosophers and scientists when engaged in an open dialogue about a form of knowledge. (shrink)

This manuscript introduces Conscious Anarchy, a philosophy designed to align human society with principles of sustainability, equity, and cooperation. It addresses the flaws of current systems – control, inequality, and unsustainable hierarchies – by proposing a transformative framework grounded in decentralized governance, ethical resource distribution, and the responsible use of technology. Conscious Anarchy fosters a gradual awakening to humanity’s interconnectedness. It emphasizes practical steps such as integrating empathy into education, testing decentralized governance models, and leveraging technology for transparent resource management. (...) While full transformation may take generations, immediate action is essential. By embracing balance and cooperation, humanity can avert systemic collapse and create a sustainable, equitable future. Conscious Anarchy invites individuals, communities, and institutions to contribute to this shared vision of lasting harmony and collective growth. (shrink)

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a conventionalist defense (...) of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

This article mainly investigates whether common Bayesian confirmation measures are affected by stopping rules. The results indicate that difference measure d, log-ratio measure r, and log-likelihood measure l are not affected by non-informative stopping rules, but affected by informative stopping rules. In contrast, Carnap measure $$\tau $$, normalized difference measure n, and Mortimer measure m are affected by (non-)informative stopping rules sometimes but sometimes aren’t. Besides, we use two examples to further illustrate that confirmation measures d, r, and l are (...) better than $$\tau,n$$, and m. (shrink)

This dissertation undertakes a philosophical analysis of “natural capital” and argues that this concept has prompted economists to view Nature in a radically novel manner. Formerly, economists referred to Nature and natural products as a collection of inert materials to be drawn upon in isolation and then rearranged by human agents to produce commodities. More recently, nature is depicted as a collection of active, modifiable, and economically valuable processes, often construed as ecosystems that produce marketable goods and services gratis. Nature (...) is depicted as consisting of various unproduced mechanisms or “natural machines” that are first discovered and then channeled so as to serve human ends. In short, nature as an ideal is a kind of garden that is characterized by natural objects purposefully arranged by intentional human agents. This dissertation first lays out working definitions of the key terms, such as capital and Nature, and then traces the historical roots of natural capital in the writings of eminent classical political economists, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. I then examine the question of substitutes for “critical natural capital”, and argue that the preservation paradox is warranted: no one can restore or preserve a part of Nature without turning it into an artifact. Following the recent work of Debra Satz and Michael Sandel, I finish my dissertation by situating the question of natural capital in the broader context of whether some goods should not be for sale, particularly those I define as Basic Ecological Goods. (shrink)

Physarum polycephalum, also known more colloquially as 'the blob', 'acellular slime mould', or just 'slime mould', is a unicellular multinucleate protist that has continued to attract the interest of biologists over the past century because of its complex life cycle, unique physiology, morphology, and behaviour. More recently, attention has shifted to Physarum as a model organism for investigating putative cognitive capacities such as decision making, learning, and memory in organisms without nervous systems. The aim of this Element is to illustrate (...) how Physarum can be used as a valuable tool for approaching various topics in the philosophy of biology. Physarum and its behaviour not only pose a challenge to some of the received views of biological processes but also, I shall argue, provide an opportunity to clarify and appropriately sharpen the concepts underlying such received views. (shrink)

This paper explores Thomas Kuhn’s mature conception of incommensurable theories as collective structured lexicons that are not mutually translatable. As will be argued, his view on this issue can profitably be approached in the light of the broad pragmatist attitude that one finds at the core of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy of language, which can also consistently be ascribed to Kuhn.

Big History expands the scope of historiography to study all the past, from the Big Bang to the present. Big History is decidedly non-anthropocentric, recognising that humans appeared only very recently from a much deeper past. The Bloomsbury Handbook of Big History brings together an international cast of leading and emerging scholars from a range of disciplines to provide the first comprehensive and balanced exploration of this new and increasingly significant field. -/- The handbook considers the ways in which Big (...) History broadens the scope of evidence historians use. It reveals how Big History allows for the use of information signals from the past, such as material remains, languages, ancient DNA, and fossils, using recently discovered techniques such as carbon-dating, the extraction of ancient DNA, and the analysis of background radiation from the origin of the universe. -/- Understanding Big History requires an examination of the ontology and epistemology of the past and its scientific inference and representation; chapters on the ontology of the past, historical information, historiographic experiments and predictions, the origin and the end of history, historical counterfactuals, contingency, necessity, and determination and under-determination of the past are included to facilitate this understanding. The handbook also provides a sustained analysis of the theoretical assumptions associated with synthetic historical science: the syntheses of genetics, linguistics, and archaeology to infer human prehistory, quantum physics and cosmology to infer the origin of the universe, and environmental science and biology to infer the history of life; as well as the distinct historical sciences and their methods: cosmology, evolutionary biology, geology, archaeology, historical linguistics, and human historiography. -/- This ground-breaking volume is vital reading for all historians, philosophers and historical scientists interested in becoming more scientifically self-conscious when adopting philosophical, theoretical, and methodological approaches to the past. (shrink)

The rapid rise of generative AI, including LLMs, has prompted a great deal of concern, both within and beyond academia. One of these concerns is that generative models embed, reproduce, and therein potentially perpetuate all manner of bias. The present study offers an alternative perspective: exploring the potential of LLMs to detect bias in human generated text. Our target is genetic essentialism in obesity discourse in Australian print media. We develop and deploy an LLM-based classification model to evaluate a large (...) sample of relevant articles (n=26,163). We show that our model detects genetic essentialist biases as reliably as human experts; and find that, while genes figure less prominently in popular discussions of obesity than previous work might suggest, when genetic information is invoked, it is often presented in a biased way. Implications for future work are discussed. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new Bayesian confirmation theory, according to which confirmational relations are causal relations between credences. The idea is that proposition E is evidentially relevant to proposition H relative to a credence distribution cr just in case cr(E) is a cause of cr(H), which is understood from an interventionist perspective as intervening on cr(E) would make a difference to the value of cr(H). E confirms H means that under an intervention on cr(E), cr(H) and cr(E) would covary in (...) the same direction; disconfirmation means that they would covary in the opposite direction. I argue that this causal theory explains how orthodox Bayesian theory succeeds in non-extreme credences and fails in extreme credences, the latter known as “the old evidence problem”. Furthermore, the causal theory provides a solution to the old evidence problem that avoids serious problems faced by some other solutions. Ultimately, the causal theory of confirmation subsumes orthodox Bayesian theory as a special-case application to non-extreme credences. (shrink)

An often-cited convention for discovery-oriented behavioral science research states that the general relative seriousness of the antecedently accepted false positive error rate of α = 0.05 be mirrored by a false negative error rate of β = 0.20. In 1965, Jacob Cohen proposed this convention to decrease a β-error rate typically in vast excess of 0.20. Thereby, we argue, Cohen (unintentionally) contributed to the wide acceptance of strongly uneven error rates in behavioral science. Although Cohen’s convention can appear epistemically reasonable (...) for an individual researcher, the comparatively low probability that published effect size estimates are replicable renders his convention unreasonable for an entire scientific field. Appreciating Cohen’s convention helps to understand why even error rates (α = β) are “non-conventional” in behavioral science today, and why Cohen’s explanatory reason for β = 0.20—that resource restrictions keep from collecting larger samples—can easily be mistaken for the justificatory reason it is not. (shrink)

In recent years, several scientific disciplines have been undergoing replication crises, and in response, preregistration has been offered as a solution to replicability problems. In this paper, I will draw connections between this new focus on preregistration and an older debate in the philosophy of science, namely predictivism—the thesis that predictions are epistemically superior to accommodations. Specifically, I shall argue that predictivism justifies preregistration. As it turns out, predictivists of all stripes have subtly different reasons to support preregistration. This unity (...) is significant because firstly, preregistration proponents often seem to be implicitly committed to stronger versions of predictivism, but strong predictivism has long been deemed untenable by philosophers of science. Furthermore, the efficacy of preregistration in dealing with Questionable Research Practices (QRPs) like p-hacking and HARKing is at best contentious, which blocks a straightforward empirical justification of preregistration. Although empirical validation of preregistration—which need not be based on preventing QRPs—will eventually be required, it would be nice to have a principled justification for preregistration while we await the empirical evidence. I will also argue that preregistration offers something in return to predictivism: the former bolsters the latter by serving as a counterargument to accommodationism—the antithesis of predictivism. (shrink)

हम सोच कर दुनिया नहीं बनाते। दुनिया को समझ कर हम सोचना सीखते हैं। कॉस्मोविज़न एक ऐसा शब्द है जिसका मतलब नींव का एक समूह होना चाहिए जिससे ब्रह्मांड, जीवन के रूप में इसके घटकों, जिस दुनिया में हम रहते हैं, प्रकृति, मानवीय घटनाओं और उनके संबंधों की एक व्यवस्थित समझ उभरती है। इसलिए, यह विज्ञान द्वारा पोषित विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन का एक क्षेत्र है, जिसका उद्देश्य हम जो हैं और जो हमारे चारों ओर है, और जो किसी भी तरह से (...) हमसे संबंधित है, उसके बारे में यह एकत्रित और ज्ञानमीमांसीय रूप से स्थायी ज्ञान है। यह मानव विचार जितना ही पुराना है, और वैज्ञानिक ब्रह्मांड विज्ञान के तत्वों का उपयोग करने के अलावा, यह दर्शन और विज्ञान में ब्रह्मांड और जीवन को संदर्भित करने वाली हर चीज को शामिल करता है। एक कॉस्मोविज़न विचारों, परिकल्पनाओं और मान्यताओं का एक समूह नहीं है, बल्कि अवलोकन, विश्लेषण, साक्ष्य और प्रदर्शन पर आधारित एक प्रणाली है। कोई भी कॉस्मोविज़न परिभाषित करने, स्थापित करने या प्रस्तावित करने का इरादा नहीं रखता है, बल्कि केवल समझने, विश्लेषण करने और व्याख्या करने का इरादा रखता है। हममें से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अपने सोच और व्यवहार के लिए पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में, रूपों को स्थापित किए बिना, जीवन भर अपने कॉस्मोविज़न का निर्माण और परिवहन करता है। भाषाई रूप से, "कॉस्मोविज़न" शब्द जर्मन से लिया गया है, जो कई दार्शनिकों द्वारा इस्तेमाल किए गए "वेल्टनशाउंग" की अवधारणा के बराबर है। हालाँकि, यह भाषाई संबंध लागू नहीं होता है क्योंकि यह हमारे द्वारा प्रस्तावित ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि के विपरीत है। यह जर्मन शब्द वास्तविकता के एक पूर्व-तार्किक या प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक दृष्टिकोण को संदर्भित करता है, जिसमें एक सहज संदर्भ होता है और आलोचनात्मक ज्ञान से बहुत दूर होता है जो इसके निर्माण के समय भी अस्तित्व में नहीं था। निस्संदेह, ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि, जिस अर्थ में हम उन्हें समझते हैं, इन प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक या पूर्व-तार्किक तत्वों को समाहित करता है और उनका उपयोग करता है जिसमें इतिहास, सामूहिक अचेतन और हमारे द्वारा धारण किए जाने वाले सभी मूलरूप शामिल हैं। हालाँकि, जिस अवधारणा को हम यहाँ लागू करते हैं, उसमें ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि इस सामग्री से बहुत आगे निकल जाती है, सबसे पहले इसे लगातार वर्तमान आलोचनात्मक सोच के अधीन करके, और अंत में विश्लेषणात्मक अनुभव (और न कि विचार या अंतर्ज्ञान) को अपना वास्तविक ब्रह्मांड बनाकर। एंटोनियो लोपेस इस विषय-वस्तु की व्यापकता को उजागर करते हैं: "ब्रह्मांडीय दर्शन विचार की उपज नहीं हैं। वे जानने की सरल इच्छा से उत्पन्न नहीं होते हैं। वास्तविकता की समझ इसकी संरचना में एक महत्वपूर्ण क्षण है, लेकिन फिर भी, यह केवल एक है। यह जीवन के मूल्यांकन के अनुभव से, और हमारी मानसिक समग्रता की संरचना से, जीवन को वास्तविकता के ज्ञान में, मूल्यांकन में, और इच्छाधारी वास्तविकता में चेतना तक ऊपर उठाना वह धीमा और कठिन कार्य है जो मानवता ने जीवन की अवधारणाओं के विकास में किया है।" -/- . (shrink)

This paper continues a reconstruction of the analytic turn in American philosophy between 1940 and 1970. The first part of this paper argued that philosophers at Princeton, Yale, and Columbia sought to stimulate ‘humanistic’ approaches to philosophy in their hiring policies and tenure decisions, thereby marginalizing the ‘scientific’ philosophies that were in vogue among their students. This second part unearths some of the mechanisms that contributed to the analytic turn once the movement’s fiercest opponents retired. I argue that a new (...) generation of deans and chairmen initially tried to craft ‘balanced’ departments but that various external variables— competition between elite universities, a shortage of graduates with training in modern logic, and the explosive growth of American higher education—eventually led to major policy shifts. Within a decade, I show, the distorted job market helped tip the balance into the other direction, strongly advantaging departments that had invested in analytic philosophy. By the late 1960s, the movement became so successful that the traditional division between humanistic and scientific approaches began to be replaced by a distinction between analytic and ‘continental’ philosophy, referring to the schools of philosophy that were popular across the Atlantic. American philosophy, by then, just was analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This two-part paper reconstructs the analytic turn in American philosophy through a comparative longitudinal study of three major philosophy departments: Princeton, Yale, and Columbia. I trace their hiring policies, tenure decisions, curriculum designs, and the external pressures that forced them to continuously adapt their strategies; and I use those analyses to distill some of the factors that contributed to the rapid growth of analytic philosophy between 1940 and 1970. In this first part, I show that philosophers at Princeton, Yale, and (...) Columbia actively tried to promote a ‘humanistic’ conception of philosophy until the early 1950s. I argue that logical positivism and related ‘scientific’ approaches were seen as a fundamental threat to the discipline and that this opposition influenced decision making at all three institutions. While many students and recent graduates saw philosophy as a scientific discipline, senior members of the community deplored the decline of the humanities and appointed mostly humanistic philosophers. I show that this generational conflict was reinforced by demographic, political, and economic developments and argue that these discriminatory practices helped forge a coalition between logical empiricists, scientific pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers, who all began to identify as ‘analytic’ philosophers after the war. (shrink)

Here, we aim at elucidating the epistemic grounds by which scientists traverse the path from ignorance to insight to scientific understanding- within the realm of empirical sciences, specifically focusing on cases marked by the existence of recalcitrant anomalies. We contend that scientific understanding is structuralist. Furthermore, we contend that the partial overcoming of anomalies between scientific theory and observation resides in the finding of some structures that allow for reconciliation and integration of the resulting inconsistencies and explanatory gaps by providing (...) novel inferential pathways and ways of making sense of dependency relations. Moreover, we claim that this type of understanding is gradual in that it begins with insight, understood in our view as a way of grasping what type of structure might be helpful in overcoming the above difficulties and leading eventually to a more full-blown understanding involving systematic integration and subsumption of theoretical posits and empirical observations within theoretical structures. (shrink)

Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce (...) empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical. (shrink)

How do scientists navigate between the need to capitalize on their prior knowledge through specialization, and the urge to adapt to evolving research opportunities? Drawing from diverse perspectives on adaptation, this paper proposes an unsupervised Bayesian approach motivated by Optimal Transport of the evolution of scientists' research portfolios in response to transformations in their field. The model relies on $186,162$ scientific abstracts and authorship data to evaluate the influence of intellectual, social, and institutional resources on scientists' trajectories within a cohort (...) of $2\,108$ high-energy physicists between 2000 and 2019. Using Inverse Optimal Transport, the reallocation of research efforts is shown to be shaped by learning costs, thus enhancing the utility of the scientific capital disseminated among scientists. Two dimensions of social capital, namely ``diversity'' and ``power'', have opposite associations with the magnitude of change in scientists' research interests: while ``diversity'' is associated with greater change and expansion of research portfolios, ``power'' is associated with more stable research agendas. Social capital plays a more crucial role in shifts between cognitively distant research areas. More generally, this work suggests new approaches for understanding, measuring and modeling collective adaptation using Optimal Transport. (shrink)

Many biologists, especially in ecology and evolution, analyze their data by estimating fits to a set of candidate models and selecting the best model according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). When the candidate models represent alternative hypotheses, biologists may want to limit the chance of a false positive to a specified level. Existing model selection methodology, however, allows for only indirect control over error rates by setting a threshold for the difference in AIC (...) scores. We present a novel theoretical framework for parametric Neyman-Pearson (NP) model selection using information criteria that does not require a pre-data null and applies to three or more non-nested models simultaneously. We apply the theoretical framework to the Error Control for Information Criteria (ECIC) procedure introduced by Cullan et al. (J Appl Stat 47: 2565–2581, 2019), and we show it shares many of the desirable properties of AIC-type methods, including false positive and negative rates that converge to zero asymptotically. We discuss implications for the compatibility of evidentialist and severity-based approach to evidence in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Alles entwickelt sich: der Kosmos mit seinen Strukturen, das Leben auf der Erde und die atemberaubend kreative Intelligenz (auch die künstliche) sowie unser Verständnis von alledem. Dieses Buch ist der menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Natur auf der Spur. Es handelt von Grundsatzfragen der Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie, von Präzisierungen der modernen Naturphilosophie und von vielen weiteren Facetten humanistischer Kultur. Leitidee ist die Einheit des Wissens im Lichte der Evolution. -/- Gerhard Vollmer zählt mit seinen Publikationen (die meisten im Hirzel-Verlag!) zur Erkenntnis- und (...) Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik und über ein evolutionäres, naturalistisches Weltbild zu den bedeutendsten Philosophen der letzten 50 Jahre im deutschsprachigen Raum. Viel beigetragen hat er auch zum interdisziplinären Diskurs und zur Wissenschaftskommunikation – von seinem akademischen Wirken ganz zu schweigen. -/- Autoren und Themen: -/- "Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie bei Schopenhauer - eine Spurensuche" - Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Düsseldorf. Vizepräsident der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Humanes Sterben sowie der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, Mitglied der Leopoldina. -/- "Das Realismusproblem in der Evolutionären Erkenntinstheorie" - Florian Chefai ist Direktoriumsmitglied und wissenschaftlicher Koordinator des Hans-Albert-Instituts. Studium der Philosophie und Soziologie in Trier. Seit 2020 Referent für Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bei der Giordano-Bruno-Stiftung. -/- "Evolution und Politik - oder: Wie man Türen öffnet" - Dr. Gerhard Engel ist Philosoph und Evolutionärer Humanist. 1988 Promotion im Fach Wissenschaftslehre bei Hans Albert, danach Lehrtätigkeit in Braunschweig, Mainz und Nordhausen. 2009 bis 2017 war er Präsident der Humanistischen Akademie Bayern. -/- "Auf der Suche nach der Objektivität" - Helmut Fink ist Theoretischer Physiker und Referent für Wissenschaft und Philosophie bei Kortizes – Institut für populärwissenschaftlichen Diskurs in Nürnberg. Seit 2013 Vorstandsmitglied der Heisenberg-Gesellschaft, seit 2017 Vorsitzender der Ludwig-Feuerbach-Gesellschaft. -/- "Materie und Emergenz - ein wirkungsvolles Duo" - Prof. Dr. Ernst Peter Fischer ist Wissenschaftshistoriker und -publizist. 1977 Promotion in Biologie bei Max Delbrück, 1987 Habilitation in Wissenschaftsgeschichte, danach Lehrtätigkeit in Konstanz und Heidelberg. -/- "Die Evolution als Ideengeber für eine Systematische Kreativität" - PD Dr. Dr. Ulrich Frey ist Philosoph und Ökologe. 2006 Promotion in Philosophie bei Gerhard Vollmer, 2016 Promotion zum Dr. rer. nat. bei Eckart Voland, 2017 Habilitation in Ökologie in Gießen. Forscher am Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt in Stuttgart. -/- "Die Dynamik der Ignoranz in den Wissenschaften" - Prof. Dr. Paul Hoyningen-Huene ist promovierter Theoretischer Physiker, pensionierter Professor für Theoretische Philosophie an der Leibniz Universität Hannover und Lehrbeauftragter für Wirtschaftsphilosophie an der Universität Zürich. Mitglied der Leopoldina. "KI: Neues Denkzeug oder Evolutionssprung?" - Prof. Dr. Hartmut Kliemt ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie und Ökonomik an der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management und Gastprofessor für Verhaltens- und Institutionenökonomik an der Universität Gießen. -/- "Warum manche Warum-Fragen immer wieder neu beantwortet werden" - Prof. Dr. Meinard Kuhlmann ist Wissenschaftsphilosoph im Philosophischen Seminar und im Studium Generale der Universität Mainz. 2012 bis 2021 Sprecher der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophie der Physik der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft. -/- "Sind die sogenannten 'Critical Studies' Kandidaten für Pseudowissenschaften?" - Dr. Martin Mahner ist Biologe und Wissenschaftstheoretiker. Von 1999 bis 2024 leitete er das Zentrum für Wissenschaft und kritisches Denken der Gesellschaft zur wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung von Parawissenschaften (GWUP) in Roßdorf bei Darmstadt. -/- "Das Realismusproblem in der Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie" - Dr. Jonas Pöld ist Direktoriumsmitglied des Hans-Albert-Instituts. Studium der Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Literaturwissenschaft in Berlin und Münster. 2024 Promotion in Philosophie in Münster. -/- "Im Lichte der Evolution: Kultur" - Dr. Dr. Hannes Rusch ist Verhaltensökonom. Promotionen 2014 in Biologie in Gießen und 2020 in Ökonomik in München. Seit 2023 Forschungsgruppenleiter am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Kriminalität, Sicherheit und Recht in Freiburg. -/- "Nietzsche und die Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts" - Prof. Dr. Claus-Artur Scheier ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie an der Technischen Universität Braunschweig. Arbeitsgebiete vor allem Metaphysik, Ästhetik und Deutscher Idealismus. Mitglied der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft. -/- "Auf Epikurus Schultern - eine kurze Geschichte des Naturalismus" - Dr. Dr. h.c. Michael Schmidt-Salomon ist Philosoph, Schriftsteller und Vorstandssprecher der Giordano-Bruno-Stiftung für Humanismus und Aufklärung. 1997 Promotion zum Dr. phil. in Trier, 2019 Dr. h.c. der TU Liberec (Reichenberg). -/- "»Spiegel«-Leser wissen mehr – Reflexionen über Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie" - Prof. Dr. Volker Sommer ist Primatologe und Anthropologe. Seit 1996 Professor für Evolutionäre Anthropologie am University College London. Er erforscht Ökologie und Verhalten wild lebender Primaten in Afrika und Asien. -/- "Warum manche Warum-Fragen immer wieder neu beantwortet werden" - Prof. Dr. Manfred Stöckler ist Theoretischer Physiker und Philosoph. 1981 Promotion zum Dr. phil. in Gießen. 1991 bis 2017 Professor für Theoretische Philosophie mit dem Schwerpunkt Naturphilosophie und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften an der Universität Bremen. -/- "Gerhard Vollmer als Philosophiedidaktiker – vom Lernen auf Vorrat, einer immer noch nötigen Fragekultur und dem Wert guter Beispiele" - Dr. Thomas Sukopp ist Akademischer Rat am Philosophischen Seminar, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophiedidaktik, der Universität Siegen. 2006 Promotion in Philosophie bei Gerhard Vollmer, danach Lehrtätigkeit unter anderem in Braunschweig, Bamberg und Augsburg, seit 2012 in Siegen. -/- "Die Evolution des Kosmos - Zufall und Notwendigkeit im Multiversum" - Rüdiger Vaas ist Philosoph, Publizist, Astronomie- und Physikredakteur des Monatsmagazins bild der wissenschaft. Mitherausgeber mehrerer Buchreihen. Arbeitsgebiete vorwiegend Naturphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie der Grundlagenphysik und Kosmologie. -/- "Im Lichte der Evolution: Kultur" - Prof. Dr. Eckart Voland ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie der Biowissenschaften an der Universität Gießen. Forschungen und Publikationen über Soziobiologie, zur historischen Demographie und evolutionären Anthropologie. -/- "Nikolaus Kopernikus - der missverstandene Astronom" - Prof. Dr. Franz Josef Wetz ist Philosoph und lehrte 1994 bis 2024 an der Pädagogischen Hochschule Schwäbisch Gmünd. 1981 bis 1993 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Zentrum für Philosophie und Grundlagen der Wissenschaft der Universität Gießen. (shrink)

There has long been an impression that reliabilism implies externalism and that frequentist statistics, due to its reliabilist nature, is inherently externalist. I argue, however, that frequentist statistics can plausibly be understood as a form of internalist reliabilism -- internalist in the conventional sense, yet reliabilist in certain unconventional and intriguing ways. Crucially, in developing the thesis that reliabilism does not imply externalism, my aim is not to stretch the meaning of ‘reliabilism’ merely to sever the implication. Instead, it is (...) to gain a deeper understanding of frequentist statistics, which stands as one of the most sustained attempts by scientists to develop an epistemology for their own use. (shrink)

En este artículo reflexionamos respecto de la técnica de observación en la metodología de las ciencias sociales. Nos proponemos construir una mirada amplia sobre la técnica de observación, que articule aspectos técnicos/operativos con reflexiones epistemológicas. Con este fin, discurrimos acerca de las cuestiones epistemológicas más relevantes a tomar en consideración, proponemos una clasificación de tipos de observación que sintetiza algunas de las definiciones existentes, y recuperamos algunos aprendizajes respecto del uso de la técnica en una experiencia de investigación empírica sobre (...) travestis/transmigrantes. Proponemos que la observación de campo comprende un conjunto de variantes que tienen en común la orientación teórica, la planificación flexible y la sistematización de registros, así como el hecho de diferenciarse tanto de la observación experimental como de la observación cotidiana. A su vez, postulamos cuatro ejes para ordenar las variantes de la observación de campo: participante-no participante, revelación-ocultamiento de la identidad del observador, estructurada-no estructurada, mediada tecnológicamente-no mediada tecnológicamente. En el plano operativo, destacamos la entrada a campo, la atribución de identidades y la negociación de roles como aspectos decisivos. (shrink)