Melissus

The passage “it must not have a body” of Melissus’ B9 is in contradiction, real or apparent, with the contents of B3 ̶ “it must be always unlimited in magnitude” ̶ and B7 ̶ “it is full.” After all, how can something without a body have magnitude and fullness? In this manuscript, I propose what I call the “immateriality thesis,” a view according to which what-is, as it has no body, no thickness, and no parts, is also immaterial. To defend (...) it, I first examine the relationship between the B9’s terms σῶμα (body) and πάχος (thickness) and the concepts of corporeality (“spatial limits”) and materiality (“physical constitution”) in the philosophical and medical literature of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Subsequently, I argue that, in B9, the denial of σῶμα and πάχος is equivalent to the denial of materiality to Melissus’ what-is. Furthermore, to support the “immateriality thesis,” I move away from the traditional strategies applied to resolve the incompatibility between B3, B7, and B9 and propose a new approach aiming to undo this Gordian knot of Melissus’ thought. I call it “modal analysis.” When applied to Melissan fragments, the “modal analysis” revealed the essential property of what-is, which is the indisputable assertion that it is τὸ ἓν (the one). Next, what-is’ accidental properties − μέγεθος (magnitude), πλέων (fullness), σῶμα (“lack of body”), and πάχος (“lack of thickness”) − were compared to the essential property. The upshot was that the “immateriality thesis,” although not without some difficulties, ended up being the best explanation we have left to interpret Melissus’ philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the prosaic deductive style developed by Melissus and Zeno. It first emphasizes the authors’ use of a systematic and reduced vocabulary solely dedicated to a priori deduction. In a second time, the paper delves into the systematic role of reductio ad absurdum in their reasoning and distinguishes several kinds of reductio employed by the authors. Through this analysis, the study shows how Melissus and Zeno not only developed and systematized certain aspects of Parmenides’ style but also introduced (...) original features that significantly influenced the philosophical writing style. (shrink)

La explicación tradicional del concepto de "vacío" (τò κενóν) en la filosofía antigua lo sitúa como una invención del atomismo de Demócrito y Leucipo o, incluso, del eleático Meliso de Samos. De esta manera se ocultan las profundas razones que pudieron llevar a la necesidad y surgimiento de un tal concepto, y aparece como si hubiera sido creado ex nihilo. En este artículo se pretende descubrir tanto el principio mitológico como el origen racional del concepto de "vacío" en la filosofía (...) presocrática, que lo sitúa como anterior a las historias contadas hasta ahora. Mediante dos columnas que intentan aprehender lo mismo desde puntos de vista distintos, se llegará a la conclusión de que el concepto de "vacío" fue definido en el inicio como diferencia y repetición. En contra de una determinada visión de la historia de la filosofía que ve a los "clásicos" y a los "modernos" como dos compartimentos separados e incluso enfrentados, en el curso de esta interpretación se establecerá un diálogo entre la doxografía presocrática y la filosofía contemporánea de Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Schmitt, Irigaray, Derrida o Deleuze. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the logical structure of Melissus philosophy, building on Laks Most’s translation and Barnes’ seminal work on the Samian. This will allow us to shed some light on the subtle argumentations of Melissus. On top of that, we frame Melissus’ metaphysics employing modern logical instruments. On one side, this reformulation makes clear a few assumptions hidden in the deductions made by the Samian; on the other side, our paper shows that contemporary analytic metaphysics (...) has forerunners dating back 2500 years. (shrink)

Parmenides and Melissus employ different deductive styles for their different kinds of argumentation. The former’s poem flows in an interesting sequence of passages: contents foreword, methodological premises, krisis, conclusions and corollaries. The latter, however, organizes an extensive process of deduction to show the characteristics of what is. In both cases, the strength of their argument rests on their deductive form, on the syntactical level of their texts: the formal structure of their reasonings help to identify the features and logical intersections (...) of their thoughts. On the one hand, Parmenides uses modal reasoning, enforcing the employment of the principle of the excluded middle. On the other hand, Melissus radicalizes the use of modal reasoning and employs counterfactual statements in order to develop his doctrine of what is. Despite their differences, both deserve a place in the Stone Age of logic and theory of argumentation due to their common ambition to demonstrate what is. (shrink)

A long historical tradition has set the survey of Melissus’ thought on the basis of the comparison with Parmenides. In fact, it seems impossible to talk about the first without reference to the second. Thus, it was rarely doubted that Melissus was an Eleatic, at least honoris causa. Classically, the comparison between the two philosophers has taken the form of an analysis of differences between the characters of the objects of their deductions. Recently, more sophisticated analyses focusing on further elements (...) of difference have been proposed. Nonetheless, additional points for comparison still remain, usually neglected, which allow us to hold that Melissus’ philosophy was neither the distorted and trivializing interpretation of Parmenides’ poem, nor an attempt to improve the eleatism. Based on the data presented here, it is reasonable to recognize in Melissus a thinker in conflict with Parmenides, albeit sharing some assumptions. Melissus’ procedure appears, in fact, as an attempt to replace the teaching of Parmenides with a new self-sufficient doctrine that partly takes on the same formal features but nonetheless possesses a different theoretical value and advances a quite different vision of reality. This strategy can be regarded as partially successful, at least with respect to its ancient reception. (shrink)

The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides and that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that (...) if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions and but not. (shrink)

With respect to Parmenides’ thought Melissus was regarded as a dissident thinker already in antiquity. His polemical introduction of the concept of void and the relative idea of infinite Being seemed particularly controversial. The aim of the present paper is to examine the origins of the Melissian understanding of void in order to trace its philosophical genesis to the criticism of the Atomist Leucippus. According to the philosopher from Abdera, the Eleatic fundamental principles had to conform to the obviousness of (...) bodies’ motion, which is why the Eleatic not-Being had to be understood as void. Melissus took issue with this view and criticized the idea of the void’s reality by means of a methodical argument. In the course of doing so, the philosopher from Samos distorted the original Parmenidean ontology, which is why his theories were often criticized severely as theoretically weak. (shrink)

No pensamento dos filósofos pré-socráticos da escola eleata, mais especificamente nos fragmentos da obra de Melisso de Samos, é possível constatar a importância da idéia do Uno, corolário da negação do devir nos argumentos que o referido pensador grego expõe. Em sua obra Migalhas filosóficas, e mais especificamente no Interlúdio, Søren Kierkegaard, sob o pseudônimo Johannes Climacus, questiona a idéia de necessidade do passado e expõe argumentos sobre o devir que podem ser lidos como antítese do pensamento do supracitado pensador (...) grego. Tais idéias conduzem a concepções distintas de tempo e eternidade.In the thought of the Pre-Socratic philosophers of the Eleatic School, particularly in the fragments of Melissus of Samos’ texts, it is possible to notice the importance of the idea of One, a consequence of the denial of the idea of becoming in the arguments of the aforesaid Greek philosopher. In his book Philosophical fragments, especially in its Interlude, Søren Kierkegaard, under his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, disputes on the idea of the necessity of the past and exposes arguments on the concept of becoming that can be read as an antithesis to Melissus of Samos doctrines. Such ideas lead to distinct notions of time and eternity. (shrink)