Philosophy of Religion

Optimism (also sometimes called optimalism or axiarchism) says the best is productively responsible for the existence of all things. Despite its ancient Platonic pedigree, optimism has failed to flourish in recent analytic philosophy. Here I aim to support it by showing how it helps to solve problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, and cosmology. I use reasoning from analytic metaphysics to justify the existence of the One, which points to the Good. Following Neoplatonism, I outline five optimal emanations: the (...) One emanates the Best Logic, the Best Class Theory, the greatest model of that Best Class Theory, the Best World, and the greatest model of that Best World. I show how optimism helps to define the class of possible universes in a variant of Lewisian modal realism. While optimism is often thought to support monotheism, the optimism developed here is non-theistic. It is a kind of atheistic metaphysical Platonism. Nevertheless, it supports a polytheistic hierarchy of non-theistic deities. (shrink)

Throughout his oeuvre, Ricoeur is concerned with the problematic of time, namely, how to think through the interrelation between its irreducibly cosmological and experiential aspects The paper addresses this problematic by showing how time as past, present and future, entails the entanglement of time and memory. The irreducibility of the experiential time of memory, uncovers further complications. These include the continuities and discontinuities between the time of memory and ‘historical time’. The paper focuses on this theme, by explicating how, for (...) Ricoeur, the transition from the mnemonic to historical time becomes possible through the ‘historiographical operation’. The reflectivity inherent in the latter uncovers an enlarged conception of memory, encompassing collective memory and historicity. This sets up a hermeneutic circle between memory and history. In the first section, I discuss the historical framing of the problematic of time and memory, through Ricoeur’s analyses of the shifts in its articulation. This prepares the ground, in the second section, for a discussion of Ricoeur’s phenomenological typology of memory that lets the split between individual and ‘collective’ memory emerge. For Ricoeur, it is historiography that mediates this ‘split’. In the third section, I discuss the ‘connectors’ (reflective instruments) that mediate lived time and cosmological time, to contrast Ricoeur’s later, more processive approach, that allows for the transition from memory to historiography. The fourth section addresses this approach, via Ricoeur’s conception of ‘archived memory’, and uncovers the “dialectic between memory and history”. (shrink)

Is hopeful universalism a coherent belief for a Christian to hold? Recent criticism of the view has suggested it may not be. Most incisively, Michael Rea has highlighted how hopeful universalism seems to require a Christian to desire a state of affairs “that conflicts with what she believes to be the perfectly good will of God.” While there are versions of the view which are guilty of exactly what Rea alleges, it is not necessary for the hopeful universalist to hold (...) to them. Particularly, hopeful universalism can be understood to consist in a fittingness claim about one’s understanding of God’s will which requires no desires in conflict with said will. So, in this paper I argue for such a position, here termed “fittingness hopeful universalism” (FHU). I begin by sketching Rea’s critique to outline what we aim to avoid here. Next, I offer a brief survey of universalism’s place in theological history to highlight why Christians might prefer hopeful universalism to a more dogmatic version of the view. I then construct FHU to demonstrate one way Christians can avoid the problem Rea highlights while heeding historical theological norms. Finally, I anticipate and respond to two potential objections. Namely, that universalism and non-universalism cannot be co-equal goods, and that the co-equality of universalism and non-universalism would undermine divine goodness. (shrink)

In his magnum opus Temps et Récit, Paul Ricouer diagnoses three aporias of time in Husserl’s phenomenology. Of these, the first aporia is the most decisive, as it serves as the basis for the other two aporias. The first aporia identified by Ricœur refers to the retentional and protentional extension of “now” (jetzt), the present. The aporia of the present has its origin in the contrary conceptions of time by Aristotle and St. Augustine. The Aristotelian world time, as represented chiefly (...) in the harmonious movement of celestial bodies, seems to contradict the Augustinian conception of time, namely the time of soul – as distentio animi. In Husserl’s attempt to extend the punctiform “now” by a retentional and protentional time-consciousness, Ricœur sees the inevitable aporia of a fusion of two modally opposed representations of time, namely, movement and stasis. In my paper I try to show how the first aporia of time identified by Ricœur can be seen not merely as an aporia of the present (Gegenwart), but as the aporia of the presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) of secondary memory, as represented in Husserl's propaedeutic explanation of the retentional extension of a time-object (Zeitobjekt) in subjective time-consciousness. The time-object and its intentional in-existence in consciousness, which is primarily conceived by Brentano in a temporal ‘original association’ and later by Husserl in retentional and protentional extension, is thereby extended in a mnestic and furthermore historical framework. It is primarily an attempt to establish the existential autonomy of the in-existent time-object in consciousness. Memory as an in-existent temporal phenomenon seems to contradict the tacitly assumed primacy of noesis or noetic construction in phenomenology and thus illustrate its equally autonomous presentification in consciousness in the form of a temporal aporia. (shrink)

Aaron Rizzieri has argued that the problem of divine hiddenness is exacerbated in any theistic tradition which entails that people may experience negative afterlife consequences engendered by a failure to know God exists and relate to God properly. (2021) James Beilby has countered by suggesting an afterlife choice model according to which everyone will have a robust opportunity post-mortem to freely choose to be in relationship with the divine. (2023) I defend Rizzieri’s position against this counterargument on the grounds that (...) it is implausible that everyone will retain their libertarian freedom to be in relationship with the divine no matter what experiences they have had and attitudes they have cultivated in this life. (shrink)

This article examines the importance of the historical fall and doctrine of original sin in context of allegorical doctrines of the fall and sin. The article provides a moderate defense of a historic fall by critiquing what I shall dub Allegorical Accounts. Contemporary Allegorical Accounts of the fall and original sin deny that any historical fall of our human ancestors occurred. These accounts also affirm that all individuals require Christ’s atoning work for sin, freely fall into sin, and are not (...) created sinful or determined to fall into sin. I challenge the Allegorical Account. Given any Allegorical Account’s claims about the fall and original sin, I propose a set of jointly inconsistent propositions which I label as Atonement for All, Good Creation, and Time-Gap. If one assumes the Allegorical Account, any two propositions of the set will imply the falsity of the third. However, each of the three propositions is plausible. I examine possible modifications to avoid the inconsistency or conduct damage control—each of these is found wanting. Since these propositions are jointly inconsistent when one assumes an Allegorical Account, the article suggests that non-Allegorical Accounts of the fall and original sin may be theologically more important than recently regarded. (shrink)

This article examines the possibility of determining the ontological status of the embryo and the moral foundation of the framework on which this status is based. Discussions on the ontological status of the embryo are analyzed within the frameworks of substance and continuity theories. Substance theory posits that the embryo possesses an immutable essence in ontological terms. This theory, being metaphysical in nature, aligns with theistic perspectives, which hold that God grants humans a soul from His own spirit. Consequently, humans (...) are perceived as possessing an unchanging essence or nature. This perspective entails a metaphysical view consistent with substance ontology. Furthermore, in theistic thought, humans are regarded as beings deserving of dignity because they are created by God. Examples supporting this view are presented from Christian and Islamic thought, expressed as the concept of imago Dei and the notion of humanity being elevated above all other creations, respectively. The concept of human dignity found in theistic thought provides a metaphysical foundation supporting substance theory and endows humans with moral status. This notion leads to the conclusion that the thesis of human dignity, which attributes an ontological status to the embryo (viewing it as a potential human), also confers moral status upon the embryo. The idea that humans are ontologically dignified beings implies that every stage of human development, from the earliest biological moment of the embryonic phase to infancy and beyond, holds value in relation to the previous stage, further supporting this concept. The dignity thesis appears closely tied to the species, nature, and potentiality of the embryo. Initially, the relationship between dignity and the speciesist approach is emphasized. However, anti-speciesist perspectives argue for the equality of humans with other living beings, advancing secular critiques of the concept of human dignity. In response, this study seeks to establish a consistent position on the concept of dignity by addressing the points of contention between theistic and secular interpretations. The substance ontology adopted for the discussion of the embryo’s personal identity is further supported by the metaphysical thesis of essentialism. Essentialism asserts that every species has its own immutable essence. It is argued that the essential qualities of natural species emerge at specific stages of embryonic development. In contrast, advocates of continuity theory reject the idea that the embryo possesses an unchanging essence or that there exists a definitive threshold distinguishing one stage of human development from another. They claim that the moral status of the embryo can only be established on a conventional basis, which provides a precarious foundation rather than a robust one for its protection. Therefore, this study argues that providing an ontological foundation of a substantial nature for the embryo is more coherent. In addition, the article addresses criticisms of substance ontology and the thesis of human dignity, offering reasoned responses. While explaining the ontological status of the embryo within the framework of substance theory, it is demonstrated that this theory aligns with concepts such as human dignity, speciesism, and essentialism. The argument from potentiality concerning the embryo's ontology is highlighted as particularly significant. This argument resonates with the theistic notion that the soul or essence given to humans by God bestows dignity by virtue of its potential state. Through these approaches, the article concludes that the ontological status of the embryo determines its moral status. Analytical methods from the field of bioethics are employed to examine metaphysical issues. The significance of this study lies in addressing discussions about the ontological status of the embryo, a topic extensively explored in Western literature from a secular perspective but less frequently analyzed on a metaphysical basis. (shrink)

Nas Margens do Catolicismo: a travessia para além das fronteiras da ortodoxia é uma obra filosófica e teológica que desafia a ortodoxia e balança os alicerces do pensamento católico tradicional, explorando suas contradições internas e revisitando seus limites epistemológicos. Com rigor argumentativo e profundidade crítica, o livro analisa a circularidade da fé, a incoerência da doutrina punitivista do inferno, alguns aspectos contraditórios da moralidade católica, a doutrina do limbo dos infantes e a questão da Queda associada à origem do mal, (...) revelando como a ortodoxia muitas vezes se sustenta sobre bases autorreferentes e pouco lógicas. Em vez de uma simples atitude de negação ou contestação, a obra propõe uma "travessia intelectual" para o terreno da heterodoxia, questionando o que resta de alguns dos pilares da ortodoxia cristã após uma providencial crítica filosófica, lógica e conceitual. Para quem busca um pensamento livre, profundo e sem concessões, esta leitura é um convite à reflexão radical sobre a fé católica e seus limites ortodoxos, própria de quem quer pensar uma teologia adequada às exigências do tempo presente. (shrink)

This entry explores two features of John Locke’s (1632-1704) theological commitments: the existence and nature of God; and, the nature of punishment in the afterlife. Locke argues for a cogitative and immaterial God. Locke also denies eternal damnation, or eternal punishment and torment in the afterlife. The goal of this entry is to not only showcase Locke’s often overlooked discussion of eternal damnation, but also to show how this discussion, and Locke’s treatment of God, link up with his groundbreaking and (...) influential discussion of persons and their persistence conditions. (shrink)

En algunos escritos del "último Rahner" tenemos acceso a la propuesta de una Soteriología sistemática en la que se desarrollan de manera más articulada muchos de los presupuestos que habían venido gestándose a lo largo del quehacer teológico de nuestro autor. La reflexión soteriológica de Rahner pretende mostrar al hombre contemporáneo que Cristo continúa siendo el absoluto portador de la salvación (der absolute Heilbringer) y que lo acontecido en él y por él debe ser recibido como una oferta gratuita de (...) la libre autocomunicación de Dios para todos los hombres. En las siguientes páginas trataremos de presentar algunos de los grandes temas o núcleos fundamentales de la soteriología rahneriana: la única mediación de Jesucristo, la universalidad de la salvación, la comprensión cristiana de la redención y el significado de los términos "reconciliación" y "sustitución". Sin ocultar sus límites, la soteriología del "último" Karl Rahner se presenta. (shrink)

Senter makes a convincing case against Behemoth being a dinosaur in Job 40. He also deals with arguments for Leviathan and where elsewhere theologians have sought to categorise dinosaurs in scripture. I argue that, from the perspective of philosophy of science, we cannot conceive of dinosaurs in scripture seriously and it is time to lay the debate to rest for reasons other than translation.

Sir Arthur Eddington (1882-1944) was a prominent Quaker astrophysicist at Cambridge University who made an extraordinary impact on inter-war physics, helping to communicate relativity, cosmology and quantum physics to a popular audience. He was also a prolific science communicator whose philosophical reflections on the meaning of the new physics captivated global audiences. His quest for a theory of everything, though unsuccessful, came from his conviction that the nature of ultimate reality was spiritual, and is underappreciated for its historical impact. Much (...) can be learned from his legacy of trying to harmonize science and faith to a larger audience searching for meaning. Eddington’s ambitious attempt at a Christian theory of everything deserves further examination and can still teach us much about our approach to science and religion. (shrink)

Plato was a Greek philosopher and is considered one of the founders of the Western philosophical tradition. Through his dialogues he both preserved the teachings of his mentor, Socrates, and contributed his own novel insights into metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, and beyond. In this dialogue, Plato imagines a conversation between Socrates and the titular prophet Euthyphro. Socrates challenges Euthyphro's and our own confidence in knowing what the divine will is and poses a famous conundrum: Do the gods decide (...) what is and is not good, or does goodness determine what the gods do or do not like? In this piece, we will critically examine Plato's arguments about the divine will and explore his ideas about the nature of definition and explanation. Is it possible for anyone to have good evidence about what piety demands, or should we strive for no more than intellectual humility when it comes to questions about the divine? (shrink)

In a world of suffering, alienation, materialism and hedonism (pleasure as the aim of life), the struggle to avoid the pull toward egoism and worldly desires becomes challenging. It is also difficult to recognise the existence of eudaimonia ('ultimate happiness'): or can there possibly be a eudaimonic life? The debate regarding how to live a meaningful life and attain 'ultimate happiness' is ongoing since happiness is constantly being constructed and is hence, not established. Although some believe otherwise, the Islamic framework (...) argues that suffering and struggling against one’s ‘self’ can lead to serenity and a meaningful life. Interestingly, one would envisage that psychoanalysis draws away from 'ultimate happiness', as the self is always conflicted. However, Freud (1856-1939 CE.) seems to portray a similar but failed paradigm to the Islamic self and suffering; it can be questioned whether Freud attributes a ‘final stage’ of human fulfilment beyond the superego stage. Using conceptual, applied and comparative analysis through a psychosocial approach, this theoretical dissertation uses primary and secondary sources to critically compare and analyse Freud’s personality and drive theories with the Islamic philosophical conceptions of the self, illustrating whether both frameworks contribute isomorphic theoretical implications. Secondly, I rethink and reconstruct the idea of happiness and a meaningful eudaimonic life, and whether overcoming the self and suffering can guide towards it. Finally, after critically comparing the 'final stages' of the self, that is, jihād al-nafs (the struggle against oneself) and Freud’s superego stage, the dissertation is among the first to propose whether the serene self leads towards eudaimonia and whether Freud’s idea of unhappiness and pleasure principles lead towards hedonism and the possibility of eudaimonia. Throughout this analysis, the question of whether philosophy and psychoanalysis can account for the possibility of an 'ultimate happiness', or 'final human fulfilment' beyond the post-superego stage is promising; therefore, it would be significant to contribute and propose this theory to enhance the study’s academic originality for philosophy and psychosocial studies. -/- . (shrink)

When, if ever, is it reasonable to claim that an absurd event is a miracle? Hume famously says that claims like these are never reasonable. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, says that one is free to do so whenever one can feel an event’s divine origins, but confines himself to these subjective assessments and not claims about the actual causal processes leading to the event itself. In this paper, I argue that there are some cases where particular believers, using abductive (...) reasoning in traditionally induction-reliant objectivist accounts of miracle recognition, can reasonably accept claims about the miraculosity of particular events. I show that this account responds to the problems faced bothby the induction-reliant objectivists and the subjectivists, and that it also more closely corresponds to how we actually reason about claims to miraculosity. (shrink)

Rahner’s theology of the cross, as articulated in the last two decades of his life, has several weaknesses: it neglects Jesus’ Jewishness, makes supersessionist presumptions, is typically more abstruse than dramatic, and is insufficiently connected to his theology of sin. At the same time, many of his core soteriological insights remain valuable. This article seeks to expand on those insights, especially by integrating post-conciliar covenantal theologies. A soteriology which features Christ as the covenant-in-person, I argue, can serve as a corrective (...) to these shortcomings and capitalize on Rahner’s contributions. (shrink)

Noah McKay (2023) has proposed a novel argument against naturalism. He argues that while theism can explain our ability to arrive at a body of moral beliefs that are generally accurate and complete’, naturalism fails to do so. He argues that naturalism has only social and biological grounds to account for our moral beliefs, which means that naturalism can only claim pragmatic value for our moral beliefs. McKay dedicates his paper to arguing against naturalism. This paper will focus on theism (...) and examine whether theism can explain what naturalism cannot. Theism could rely on guided evolution or the miraculous intervention of God. In contrast to naturalism, theism has revelatory and supernatural grounds for our moral beliefs. This paper will demonstrate some of the challenges that these grounds would encounter. Finally, McKay’s argument implies a dichotomy between unguided evolution and theism, which rests on a problematic assumption about evolutionary theory; by abandoning the assumption, the dichotomy also dissolves. (shrink)

The present study examines the conceptual relationship between the Jewish neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen and the Ritschlian school, the dominant school of Protestant theology of his time. Its point of departure is that much can be illuminated in Cohen’s late work Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism [Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums] by reading it in the context of contemporary Protestantism. It argues that Cohen’s notions of “reconciliation” or “atonement” [Versöhnung] and forgiveness of sin (...) conduct a shadow dialogue with the Ritschlian school, and that they are formed, framed, and formulated with constant awareness of the prevalent Protestant stance, particularly as it is conceived by Albrecht Ritschl, the school’s so-called “father,” and Wilhelm Herrmann, Ritschl’s student and the school’s unofficial “founder.” It is suggested that the presence of the Ritschlian school in Religion of Reason is more extensive than what would be suggested by the sum total of explicit mentions of the relevant theologians’ names, and that this school serves both as a source from which Cohen draws and a foil against which he develops his own position. (shrink)

Within Christian theology, the second-person perspective primarily comes into play when it refers to God’s perspective on humanity. In contrast, this article focuses on the second-person perspective as a human perspective and explores its relevance for the development of an individual’s self-relationship. Drawing on insights from developmental psychology, it also argues for an intergenerational and social understanding of human sinfulness and advocates for more systematic-theological attention to childhood and adolescence. Overall, the article contributes to strengthening an intersubjective view of the (...) self and to deepening one of the many dimensions of human interdependence. (shrink)

The present paper is the third and final piece of an ongoing and as of yet unfinished dialog on normative issues about rationality and the self. After specifying the differences, yet also the actual – and to some extent: unexpected – agreements between myself and Menachem Fisch, I argue that the latter are more substantial and far-reaching. This is an assumption I seek to justify by unpacking the implications of Fisch’s core idea, according to which being rational in the fullest (...) human sense goes hand in hand with and in fact depends on being (able to be) a self. However, I also argue that some remaining shortcomings in Fisch’s account are mainly due to the latter’s all too liberal notion of rationality (“acting for a reason”) – shortcomings, which in my view can easily be remedied by a more restricted account, according to which acting for a reason only counts as rational, if and to the extent that the agent is “responsive to reasons,” i. e. willing to call his claim to being and acting rationally into question, whenever that claim is (expected to be) challenged by his peers. This notwithstanding, the entire conversation between Fisch and myself is arguably itself an instance of what it is about: a dialog concerning issues of rationality in the environment and spirit of a rationality conceived of as irreducibly dialogical. (shrink)

The paper charts the main points of my ongoing dispute with Heiko Schulz by teasing out the differences between my account of self and rationality, and Schulz’s Kierkegaardian alternative.

Lutheran theology is faced with the challenge of rearticulating the human relationship to God in justification in a way that is not only consistent with the biblical and theological tradition but also makes sense to modern human beings who inhabit a society of widespread biblical and theological illiteracy. In this article, I suggest rephrasing this relationship as a dialogue of mutual recognition between God and the human being. I ground this suggestion in a reinterpretation of Martin Luther’s understanding of justification (...) as a dialogical process of identity formation whereby God and humans are mutually recognised. In the justifying dialogue, the individual is recognised as a you in relation to God’s creative and saving I. Moreover, God is recognised as God when humans answer his initial address and call on him in prayer and in praise. Emphasising the role of the human response in the process of justification highlights the importance of the community of believers who express their answer to God’s word of law and gospel through prayer and songs of worship. (shrink)

The paper describes a form a non-Socratic dialogue which aims at exposing oneself to the normative critique of interlocutors with different commitments. It further argues that such exposure is the only way in which one can achieve critical distance from one's own commitments. It goes on to explore the epistemic and political virtues of this form of dialogue.

This essay offers a psychoanalytic perspective on ethics utilizing Jean Laplanche and Søren Kierkegaard. It proposes a homology between Kierkegaard’s ”God” and Laplanche’s “primal adult” as well as between Kierkegaard’s account of the indirection of love and the role of the analyst in the transference relationship. Both Kierkegaard and Laplanche center scenes of second-person relation in which a seductive asymmetry calls forth a rigorous ethics of unknowing.

This article explores the challenges of intercultural dialogue between European and non-European epistemologies through a study of Heidegger’s conversation with a Japanese thinker. It discusses the inherent challenges and potential failures in such dialogues, emphasizing the differences in language and thought systems, and concludes by considering the ethical implications of these dialogues and the necessity of an “ethics of not speaking”.

One of the most remarkable features of the current religious landscape in the West is the emergence of new Pagan religions. Here the author will use techniques from recent analytic philosophy of religion to try to clarify and understand the major themes in contemporary Paganisms. They will discuss Pagan concepts of nature, looking at nature as a network of animated agents. They will examine several Pagan theologies, and Pagan ways of relating to deities, such as theurgy. They will discuss Pagan (...) practices like divination, visualization, and magic. And they will talk about Pagan ethics. Their discussions are based on extensive references to contemporary Pagan writings, from many different traditions. New Pagan religions, and new Pagan philosophies, have much to contribute to the religious future of the West, and to contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

I reply here to Bishop and Persyzk’s “Varieties of Religious Naturalism.” I am sympathetic to their euteleology but I do not think their approach to religious naturalism serves their own position very well. Instead I propose a Pagan religious naturalism which fits better with both religious naturalism and their euteleology.